In some cases, the failure analysis team finds that all components meet their requirements, the system was properly assembled, and it was not operated or tested in an out-of-specification manner, yet it still failed. When this occurs, the only conclusion the failure analysis team can reach is that it missed something in its analysis or that the design is defective. This chapter focuses on the latter possibility by discussing the various factors that a failure analysis team should consider to identify the causes of defects in system design. These include requirements identification and verification, circuit performance, mechanical failures, materials compatibility, and environmental factors. Examples that illustrate the value of design analysis are also presented.

A product pedigree describes its design and how it was built and shows that it was built in accordance with the drawings and other documentation defining the product configuration. Evaluating the pedigree of a failed product can help to rule in or rule out hypothesized failure causes. This chapter describes various areas that can be examined by the failure analysis team to assess the pedigree of the failed system. If the failure analysis team suspects product pedigree anomalies it should confirm conformance through independent means.

After the fault-tree, a failure-cause identification method has identified potential failure causes and the failure analysis team has prepared a failure mode assessment and assignment (FMA&A). The team knows specifically what to search for when examining components and subassemblies from the failed system. There are numerous techniques and technologies available for examining and analyzing components and subassemblies, which are categorized as follows: optical approaches, dimensional inspection and related approaches, nondestructive test approaches, mechanical and environmental approaches, and chemical and composition analysis for assessing material characteristics. This chapter is a detailed account of the working principle and the steps involved in these techniques and technologies.

At the conclusion of a systems failure analysis, the people involved should have a much more in-depth understanding of how the system is supposed to work. The analysis should help understand shortfalls in the design, production, testing, and use of the system. The failure analysis team will have identified other potential failure causes and actions required to preclude future failures. This is valuable knowledge, and it should not be set aside or ignored when the failure analysis team concludes its activities. This chapter is a brief account of the creation of failure analysis libraries, of process guidelines based on previous failure analyses, and of troubleshooting and repair guidelines. Also provided is a listing of the various steps that should be included in a failure analysis procedure.

Failure mode assessment and assignment (FMA&A) is a tool designed to help organize the evaluation of hypothesized failure modes. This chapter begins by describing the process of preparing an FMA&A. It then describes the follow-on activities to evaluate the hypothesized failure cause. The chapter also provides information on evaluating the hypothesized potential causes.

Statistics, data analysis, root cause analysis, and problem-solving processes play a key role in failure investigations. This chapter explains how to collect failure investigation data, how to build and maintain a database for company-related failures, and how to use corresponding statistics including type of failure, material, and root cause. It describes the purpose and benefits of conducting a root cause analysis and the factors, namely relative failure importance and company value, that determine when an investigation should be performed. The chapter also discusses the four-step problem-solving process as it applies to failure investigation, how to assemble an investigation team, and the details of organization and planning. It concludes with a case history of the Firestone 500 steel-belted tire failure, stressing the importance of a systematic approach to failure investigations.

The design process is the first and most important step in corrosion control. Major savings in operating costs are possible by anticipating corrosion problems so as to provide proper design for equipment before assembly or construction begins. This chapter describes the role of the design team in producing a successful final design, general considerations in corrosion-control design, and design details that accelerate corrosion. The details that must be considered when attempting to control corrosion by design include plant/site location, plant environment, component/assembly shape, fluid movement, surface preparation and coating procedures, and compatibility, insulation, and stress considerations. Design solutions for specific forms of corrosion, namely crevice corrosion, galvanic corrosion, erosion-corrosion, and stress-corrosion cracking, are then considered. A brief section is devoted to the discussion on corrosion allowance used for steel parts subject to uniform corrosion. Finally, the chapter describes the design considerations for using weathering steels.

This chapter discusses the important role of metallography and the metallographer in predicting and understanding the properties of metals and alloys. Examples are presented of a metallographer working as part of a team in a research laboratory of a large steel company and a metallographer working alone at a small iron foundry. The three basic areas in all metallography laboratories are discussed: the specimen preparation area, the polishing/etching area, and the observation/micrography area. Important safety issues in a metallographic laboratory are also considered.

This chapter focuses on what can cause a system to fail and addresses the challenge in approaching a system failure. It then examines the steps involved in the four-step problem-solving process: defining the problem, identifying all potential failure causes and evaluating the likelihood of each, identifying the potential solutions, and identifying the best solution. The chapter concludes by describing the responsibilities of a failure analysis team.

In the second step of the four-step problem-solving process, the failure analysis team should identify all potential failure causes. This chapter discusses the steps involved in five such techniques for identifying potential causes of failure, namely brainstorming, mind mapping, Ishikawa diagrams, the “five whys” technique, and flow charting.

This chapter targets areas that determine if a change occurred and if the change induced the failure: change or what's different analysis. It describes the different sources of changes that induce process deficiencies: design, process, test and inspection, environmental, supplier lot, aging, and supplier changes. The chapter presents an example of a cluster bomb failure to explain how the failure analysis team found and corrected the failure cause.

Contaminants can be a cause of numerous types of system failures. There are numerous techniques for confirming contaminant presence. When the presence of a contaminant is suspected, the failure analysis team must find and eliminate the contaminant source, which can be obvious or quite subtle. This chapter summarizes a few commonly encountered contaminant sources to stimulate the reader's thinking about potential contaminant sources. A case study of titanium component washing at Litton Lasers is presented to illustrate how the presence of contaminants leads to a system failure.

After the failure analysis team hypothesizes failure causes, prepares a failure mode assessment and assignment, and evaluates all potential failure causes, it may find in some cases that several causes are still suspect but cannot be confirmed. In this situation, an experiment is necessary to confirm or rule out suspected causes. This chapter discusses two predominant methods for doing this, namely analysis of variance (ANOVA) and Taguchi methods (a more powerful technique based on ANOVA).

Over the revolutionary era of semiconductor technology, Computer-Aided Design Navigation (CADNav) tools have played an increasingly critical role in silicon debug and failure analysis (FA) in efforts to improve manufacturing yield while reducing time-to-market for integrated circuit (IC) products. This article encompasses the key principles of CADNav for various aspects of semiconductor FA and its importance for improved yield and profitability. An overview of the required input data and formats are described for both IC and package devices, along with key considerations and best practices recommended for fast fault localization, accurate root cause analysis, FA equipment utilization, efficient cross-team collaboration, and database management. Challenges with an FA lab ecosystem are addressed by providing an integrated database and software platform that enable design layout and schematic analysis in the FA lab for quick and accurate navigation and cross-tool collaboration.

This chapter focuses on common failure characteristics exhibited by mechanical and electrical components. The topic is considered from two perspectives: one possibility is that the system failed because parts were nonconforming to drawing requirements and another possibility is that the system failed even though all parts in the system met their drawing requirements. The common failures discussed in this chapter include those associated with metallic components, composite materials, plastic components, ceramic components, and electrical and electronic components.

Quantifying a fault-tree analysis is a useful tool for assessing the most likely causes of a system failure. This chapter addresses fault-tree analysis event probabilities and ranking of failure causes based on these probabilities. Failure rates, failure-rate sources, probability determinations, mean times between failure, and related topics are also discussed. The discussion covers the practices observed in fault-tree analysis quantification and processes involved in calculating the probability of the top undesired event.

Corrective action means the implementation or modification of things designed to eliminate or reduce failure causes. This chapter addresses developing potential solutions and selecting the best solution. It discusses the special operations that should be used only as temporary or interim corrective actions to overcome design, process, and other failure causes. The chapter concludes by describing the process of corrective action implementation.

This chapter covers special fault-tree analysis topics, including the use of transfer symbols, INHIBIT gates, sequential AND gates, state-of-the-part versus state-of-the-system considerations, and the fault tree to identify redundancy-defeating failures.