The increasing demand for semiconductor chips and the outsourcing of chip fabrication have heightened vulnerability to hardware security threats. While optical probing has been used extensively for semi-invasive/non-invasive attacks, its resolution limits and obsolescence in advanced technologies have necessitated exploring other techniques. Electron-beam probing (EBP) has emerged as a powerful method, offering 20x better spatial resolution than optical probing, and applies to sub- 7nm flip-chips and advanced 3D architecture systems. However, the increased resolution of EBP also poses a threat to sensitive information on these advanced chips, calling for developing countermeasures to secure assets. By understanding the capability of EBP, the potential of using EBP to extract sensitive data such as encryption keys, soft IP, neural network parameters, and proprietary algorithms will be discussed. This paper delves into the principles behind EBP, its capabilities, challenges for this technique, and potential applications in failure analysis and potential attacks. It highlights the need for developing effective countermeasures to protect sensitive information on advanced node technologies.

This paper discusses the basic physics of scanning acoustic microscopy, the counterfeit features it can detect, and how it compares with other screening methods. Unlike traditional optical inspection and IR and X-ray techniques, SAM can identify recycled and remarked chips by exposing ghost markings, fill material differences, delaminations from excessive handling, and popcorn fractures caused by trapped moisture. The paper presents several examples along with detailed images of these telltale signs of semiconductor counterfeiting. It also discusses the potential of developing an automated solution for detecting counterfeits on a large scale.

Semiconductor manufacturing, including the multistep fabrication of ICs and tedious assembly of PCBs, has been outsourced to untrusted regions due to globalization. This invites many problems particularly for PCBs, which are vulnerable to nondestructive methods of attack such as X-ray data collection and surface trace probing. In the case of ICs, high-z materials have proven to be an effective countermeasure to block or scatter X-rays, but PCBs, because of their larger dimensions, are more difficult to fully secure. In this paper, a framework for passively obfuscating the critical connections between components on PCBs is demonstrated. A proof of concept is presented whereby an EDA tool combining the small features of micro electromechanical systems with X-ray simulation and 3D manufacturing processes is used to iteratively optimize a PCB design to thwart reverse engineering and probing attacks.