Large quantities of aluminum-clad spent nuclear materials have been in interim storage in the fuel storage basins at The Savannah River Site while awaiting processing since 1989. This extended storage as a result of a moratorium on processing resulted in corrosion of the aluminum clad. Examinations of this fuel and other data from a corrosion surveillance program in the water basins have provided basic insight into the corrosion process and have resulted in improvements in the storage facilities and basin operations. Since these improvements were implemented, there has been no new initiation of pitting observed since 1993. This paper describes the corrosion of spent fuel and the metallographic examination of Mark 31A target slugs removed from the K-basin storage pool after 5 years of storage. It discusses the SRS Corrosion Surveillance Program and the improvements made to the storage facilities which have mitigated new corrosion in the basins.

The wires used in a wet precipitator for cleaning the gases coming off a basic oxygen furnace failed. The system consisted of six precipitators, three separate dual units, each composed of four zones. Each zone contained rows of wires (cold drawn AISI 1008 carbon steel) suspended between parallel collector plates. It was determined that the 1008 wires failed because of corrosion fatigue. It was decided to replace all of the wires in the two zones with the highest rates of failure with cold-drawn type 304 austenitic stainless steel wire. These expensive wires, however, failed after a week by transgranular SCC. Annealed type 430 ferritic stainless steel was subsequently suggested to prevent further failures.

A kiln, 7.6 m (25 ft) long with a 1 m (3 ft) internal diameter and a 6.3 mm (0.25 in.) wall thickness, is used to regenerate spent charcoal returned by water utilities. This charcoal contains up to 0.57% S and 2.04% Cl. The kiln is made of Inconel 601 (N06601) welded using Inconel 617 (N06617) as a filler alloy. Wet charcoal is fed in at one end of the kiln and travels while being tumbled within the inclined rotating vessel. Temperatures range from 480 deg C (900 deg F) (Zone 1) to 900 deg C (1650 deg F) (Zones 2 and 3). Steam is introduced at the discharge end at 95 g/s (750 lb/h), 34 to 69 kPa (5 to 10 psi), and 125 deg C (260 deg F). The kiln developed perforations within eight months of operation. Investigation (visual inspection, metallurgical analysis, energy-dispersive spectroscopy, and 44X micrographs) supported the conclusion that the sulfur and chlorine in the charcoal attacked the Inconel 601, forming various sulfides and chlorides. Recommendations included on-site testing, and installation of test coupons of various alloys before fabricating another kiln. The suggested alloys were RA85H, 800HT, HR-120, Haynes 556, and HR-160.

Decarburization of steel may occur as skin decarburization by gases either wet or containing oxygen, and as a deep ongoing destruction of the material by hydrogen under high pressure. Guidelines are given for recognizing decarburization and determining at what point cracks occurred. How decarburization changes workpiece properties and the case of hydrogen decarburization are addressed through examples.

Wet natural gas was dried by being passed through a carbon steel vessel that contained a molecular-sieve drying agent. The drying agent became saturated after several hours in service and was regenerated by a gas that was heated to 290 to 345 deg C in a salt-bath heat exchanger. The tee joint in the piping between the heat exchanger and the sieve bed failed after 12 months. A hole in the tee fitting and a corrosion product on the inner surface of the pitting was revealed by visual examination. Iron sulfide was revealed by chemical analysis of the scale which indicated hydrogen sulfide attack on the carbon steel. The presence of oxygen was indicated by the carbon and sulfur found in the scale on the piping and in the sieves indicated that oxygen combined with moisture produced conditions for attack of hydrogen sulfide on carbon steel. Turbulence with some effect from the coarse grain size was interpreted to have contributed. The piping material was changed from carbon steel to AISI type 316 stainless steel as it is readily weldable and resistant to corrosion by hydrogen sulfide.

A failure occurred in buried brass (92% Cu, 8% Zn) piping used to carry drinking water in wet clay soil after less than two years in service. Investigation (visual inspection, chemical analysis of both the pipe surface and water, and a comparison of the corrosion failure of power station condenser tubing cooled by seawater for two copper alloys, an aluminum brass alloyed with arsenic (UNS C68700, ASTM B111, or Cu-Zn-20Al DIN17660), and a cupronickel 70-30 alloy with iron added (C71500, ASTM B111, or Cu-Ni-30Fe DIN17665)) supported the conclusion that the failure was caused by microbial induced corrosion by sulfate-reducing bacteria. No recommendations were made.

A CF-8M (cast type 316) neck liner or manway was removed from the top of a digester vessel. Repeated attempts to repair the part in the field during its life cycle of many years had failed to keep the unit from leaking. The casting was a CF-8M modified with the molybdenum level at the top end of the range. The plate was standard 317L material. The filler metal was type 316, although marginal in molybdenum content. Investigation (visual inspection, chemical analysis, micrographs, and metallographic examination) supported the conclusion that the damage to the neck liner was due to Cl-SCC in an area of debris buildup. It appeared the original casting suffered SCC in a low-oxygen area high in chlorides from repeated wet/dry cycles where there was a buildup of debris. Recommendations included redesigning the neck liner to eliminate the abrupt change where there was debris buildup. If redesign was impossible, an alloy more resistant to Cl-SCC, such as a duplex stainless steel or a high-molybdenum (4 to 6%) austenitic stainless steel, should be used.

One inch diam Type 304 stainless steel piping was designed to carry containment atmosphere samples to an analyzer to monitor hydrogen and oxygen levels during operational and the design basis accident conditions that are postulated to occur in a boiling water reactor. Only one of six lines in the system had thru-wall cracks. Shallow incipient cracks were detected at the lowest elevations of one other line. The balance of the system had no signs of SCC attack. Chlorides and corrosion deposits in varying amounts were found throughout the system. The failure mechanism was transgranular, chloride, stress-corrosion cracking. Replacement decisions were based on the presence of SCC attack or heavy corrosion deposits indicative of extended exposure time to chloride-contaminated water. The existing uncracked pipe, about 75 percent of the piping in the system, was retained despite the presence of low level surface chlorides. Controls were implemented to insure that temperatures are kept below 150 deg F, or, walls of the pipe are moisture-free or the cumulative wetted period will never exceed 30 h.

The self-powered flux detectors used in some nuclear reactors are Pt or V-cored co-axial cables with MgO as an insulator and Inconel 600 as the outer sheath material. The detectors are designed to operate in a He atmosphere; to maximize the conduction of heat (generated from the interaction with gamma radiation) and to prevent corrosion. A number of failures have occurred over the years because of a loss of the He cover gas in the assembly. This has resulted in either acid attack on the Inconel 600 sheath in a wet environment or gaseous corrosion in a dry environment. In the latter case, nitriding and embrittlement occurred at temperatures as low as 300 to 400 deg C (determined from an examination of the oxidation of the Zircaloy-2 carrier rod on which the detectors were mounted). Recent results are described and discussed in terms of the oxidation and nitriding kinetics of Zircaloy-2 and Inconel 600, respectively.

During a routine inspection on an aircraft assembly line, an airframe attachment bolt was found to be broken. The bolt was one of 12 that attach the lower outboard longeron to the wing carry-through structure. Failure occurred on the right-hand forward bolt in this longeron splice attachment. The bolt was fabricated from PH13-8Mo stainless steel heat treated to have an ultimate tensile strength of 1517 to 1655 MPa (220 to 240 ksi). A water-soluble coolant was used in drilling the bolt hole where this fastener was inserted. Investigation (visual inspection, 265 SEM images, hardness testing, auger emission spectroscopy and secondary imaging spectroscopy, tensile testing, and chemical analysis) supported the conclusion that failure of the attachment bolt was caused by stress corrosion. The source of the corrosive media was the water-soluble coolant used in boring the bolt holes. Recommendations included inspecting for corrosion all the bolts that were installed using the water-soluble coolant at the spliced joint areas, rinsing all machined bolt holes with a noncorrosive agent, and installing new PH13-8Mo stainless steel bolts with a polysulfide wet sealant.

During a routine inspection on an aircraft assembly line, an airframe attachment bolt was found to be broken. The bolt was one of 12 that attach the lower outboard longeron to the wing carry-through structure. Failure occurred on the right-hand forward bolt in this longeron splice attachment. The bolt was fabricated from PH13-8Mo stainless steel heat treated to have an ultimate tensile strength of 1517 to 1655 MPa (220 to 240 ksi). A water-soluble coolant was used in drilling the bolt hole where this fastener was inserted. Investigation (visual inspection, 265 SEM images, hardness testing, auger emission spectroscopy and secondary imaging spectroscopy, tensile testing, and chemical analysis) supported the conclusion that failure of the attachment bolt was caused by stress corrosion. The source of the corrosive media was the water-soluble coolant used in boring the bolt holes. Recommendations included inspecting for corrosion all the bolts that were installed using the water-soluble coolant at the spliced joint areas, rinsing all machined bolt holes with a noncorrosive agent, and installing new PH13-8Mo stainless steel bolts with a polysulfide wet sealant.

Soft-soldered copper pipe joints used in refrigerating plants failed. The solder had not adhered uniformly to the pipe surface. In addition, there were some longitudinal grooves on the pipe surfaces, parts of which were not filled with solder. The unsoldered areas formed cavities within the joints, some of which had been in direct communication with the outsides via the grooves or interconnected cavities. On cooling, moisture condensed on the external surfaces. Some of this was drawn by capillary action into the cavities in open communication with the external surface. On continued cooling to below freezing-point, water that entered the cavities solidified. This was accompanied by a slight increase in volume, which collapsed the pipe walls. In the examples, the pipe ends had not been properly tinned. The solder used was found to be of the tin-antimony type, containing about 5% antimony, which is more difficult to use than the usual tin-lead alloys. The use of this particular type of solder was a contributory factor in the production of unsound joints in the samples examined.

Investigation of alleged corrosion damage to hot-rolled steel during transit requires metallurgical, chemical, and corrosion knowledge. Familiarity with non-destructive techniques and sampling procedures is necessary. A complete record of shipment history is also required, including the purchasing specifications and observations and photographs taken during surveys enroute. A frequent conclusion of such investigations is that the alleged corrosion is of no significance or did not occur during the voyage.

Due to the recent requirement of higher integration density, solder joints are getting smaller in electronic product assemblies, which makes the joints more vulnerable to failure. Thus, the root-cause failure analysis for the solder joints becomes important to prevent failure at the assembly level. This article covers the properties of solder alloys and the corresponding intermetallic compounds. It includes the dominant failure modes introduced during the solder joint manufacturing process and in field-use applications. The corresponding failure mechanism and root-cause analysis are also presented. The article introduces several frequently used methods for solder joint failure detection, prevention, and isolation (identification for the failed location).