Cold cracking of structural steel weldments is a well-documented failure mechanism, and extensive work has been done to recognize welding and materials selection parameters associated with it. These efforts, however, have not fully eliminated the occurrence of such failures. This article examines a case of cold cracking failure in the construction industry. Fortunately, the failure was identified prior to final erection of the structural members and the weld was successfully reworked. The article explains how various welding parameters, such as electrode/wire selection, joint design, and pre/postheating, played a role in the failure. Human factors and fabrication practices that contributed to the problem are covered as well.

A structure had been undergoing fatigue testing for several months when a post-like member heat treated to a tensile strength of 1517 to 1655 MPa (220 to 240 ksi) ruptured. The fracture occurred in the fillet of the post that contacted the edge of a carry-through box bolted to the member. At failure, the part was receiving a second set of loads up to 103.6% of design load. Visual investigations showed rubbing and galling of the fillet. Microscopic and metallographic examination revealed beach marks on the fracture surface and evidence of cold work and secondary cracking in the rubbed and galled area. Electron fractography confirmed that cracking had initiated at a region of tearing and that the cracks had propagated by fatigue. Mechanical properties of all specimens exceeded the minimum values specified for the post. This evidence supports the conclusion that fatigue was the primary cause of failure. Rubbing of the faying surfaces worked the interference area on the post until small tears developed. These small tears became stress-concentration points that nucleated fatigue cracks. Recommendations included rounding the edge of the box in the area of contact with the post to ensure a tangency fit.

A portion of a 19 mm (0.75 in.) diam structural steel bolt was found on the floor of a manufacturing shop. This shop contained an overhead crane system that ran on rails supported by girders and columns. Inspection of the crane system revealed that the bolt had come from a joint in the supporting girders and could be considered one of the principal fasteners in the track system. Analysis (visual inspection, metallographic exam, and hardness testing) supported the conclusions that fatigue induced by the overhead movement of the crane produced failure of the bolt. The bolt was deficient in strength for the cyclic applied loads in this case and probably was not tightened sufficiently. Recommendations included removing the remaining bolts in the crane support assembly and replacing them with a higher-strength, more fatigue-resistant bolt, for example, SAE grade F, 104 to 108 HRB. The bolts should be tightened according to the specifications of the manufacturer, and the system should be periodically inspected for correct tightness.

The structural collapse of an iron-ore bucket-wheel stacker reclaimer at the beginning of operation was investigated by means of mechanical tests, microstructural characterization, and computational structural analysis. The mechanical failure was a consequence of a brittle fracture by cleavage. The crack followed the heat-affected zone of a welded joint connecting a rectangular hollow section member and a plate flange. The main factors contributing to failure were related with a combination of design-in and manufacturing-in factors like high load-strength ratio at the point of failure, local stress concentration as a result of geometry restrictions, and weld defects. This particular section was responsible for the load transfer between the front tie member and the boom extremity, and its failure was the main cause of the catastrophic failure of the equipment.

A spindle made of hardenable 13% chromium steel X40 Cr13 (Material No. 1.4034) that was fastened to a superheated steam push rod made of high temperature structural steel 13Cr-Mo44 (Material No. 1.7335) by means of a convex fillet weld, fractured at the first operation of the rod directly next to the weld bead. Investigation showed that the fracture of the superheated steam push rod spindle was caused by hardening and hardening crack formation in the weld seams and adjoining areas. It would have been preferable to avoid welding near the cross sectional transitions altogether in consideration of the crack sensitivity of high hardenability steels. If for some reason this was not possible, then all precautions should have been taken that are applicable to the particular steel, such as preheating, slow cooling and stress relief tempering after welding. The selection of an austenitic additive material should have been considered because it could have equalized stresses due to its high elongation. Most probably, however, a material of lower hardenability should have been selected for the spindle if high operating properties were of paramount importance.

Cadmium-coated type 410 martensitic stainless steel 1 4 -14 self-drilling tapping screws fractured during retorquing tests within a few weeks after installation. The screws were used to assemble structural steel frames for granite panels that formed the outer skin of a high-rise building. Fractographic and metallographic examination showed that the fractures occurred in a brittle manner from intergranular crack propagation. Laboratory and simulated environmental tests showed that an aqueous environment was necessary for the brittle fracture/cracking phenomenon. The cracks were singular and intergranular with little branching. Secondary subsurface cracks suggested possible hydrogen embrittlement. The 410 screws had been introduced to replace conventional case-hardened carbon steel screws that conform to SAE specification J78. Carbon steel screws had a proven record of acceptable performance for the intended application. It was recommended that use of the 410 screws be discontinued in preference to the case-hardened carbon steel screws.

In a shipyard one of the two posts of a loading gear fractured under a comparatively small load at the point where it was welded into the ship’s deck. The post consisted of several pipe lengths that were produced by longitudinal seam welding of 27 mm thick sheets. The sheet metal was a construction steel of 60 to 75 kp/sq mm strength. Thick-walled parts of steels of such high strength must be preheated to approximately 200 deg C along the edges prior to welding to minimize the strong heat losses by the cold mass of the part. In the case under investigation this either was not done at all or the preheating was not high enough or sufficiently uniform. This damage was therefore caused by a welding defect.

On 23 Dec 1997, a portion of the main ore conveyor at a large mine collapsed onto a highway and shut down mine operations. The conveyor structure that collapsed was supported by a steel truss spanning 185 ft. Truss failure occurred just as the conveyor transport rate was increased to 8,260 tph. Under this total loading, which was only slightly above the regular operating condition, a poorly designed and fabricated transition joint in the west lower chord failed, thereby overloading other key structural members and causing the entire truss to collapse. Another contributing cause of the collapse was the transition joint welds, where the fracture originated. They were made with undersized fillet welds, 20% smaller than specified on the original fabrication drawing. Because of the poorly designed joint detail and the deficient welds, both of which concentrated stress and strain in the low ductility direction of the transition joint plate, lamellar tearing of plate material occurred at the boxed I-beam fillet weld attachment. Brittle fracture of this joint precipitated global collapse of the truss structure.