In a HyL III heat exchanger's radiant pipes, metal dusting reduced the pipe thickness from 8.5 to 3 mm in just nine months, leaving craters on the inner surface. The pipes are fabricated from HK 40 alloy. The heated gas (400 to 800 deg C) consisted of CO, CO2, and H2, with a 4:1 CO/CO2 ratio. Metallographic investigations revealed that the surface of the attacked pipes consisted of (Cr, Fe) carbide. The metal dusting was the result of a decomposition process (CO to CO2 + C) that deposited C on the pipe surface. Because of the high temperature, the C subsequently diffused through the surface oxide layer (Cr2O3), triggering a succession of reactions that led to pitting and the formation of craters.

The jackscrew drive pins on a landing-gear bogie failed when the other bogie on the same side of the airplane was kneeled for tire change. The pins, made of 300M steel, were shot peened and chromium plated on the outside surface and were cadmium plated and painted with polyurethane on the inside surface. The top of the jackscrew was 6150 steel. Both ends of the pins were revealed to be dented where the jackscrew had pressed into them and were observed to have been resulted due to overdriving the jackscrew at the end of an unkneeling cycle. These dented areas were found to be heavily corroded with chromium plating missing. A heavily corroded intergranular fracture mode was revealed by chromium-carbon replicas of the areas of fracture origin. Deep corrosion pits adjacent to the fracture origins and directly beneath cracks in the chromium plate were revealed by metallographic examination. It was concluded that stress-corrosion cracks grew out from the rust pits. The pin material was changed from 300M steel to PH 13-8 Mo stainless steel, which is highly resistant to rusting and SCC and the jacking control system was modified to prevent overdriving.

Four tanks made from type 304L stainless steel were removed from storage. Atmospheric corrosion on the outside of the tanks and pitting and crevice corrosion on the inside were visible. Metallographic examination revealed that the internal corrosion had been caused by crevices related to weld spatter and uneven weld deposit and by service water that had not been drained after hydrostatic testing. External corrosion was attributed to improper passivation. It was recommended that the surfaces be properly passivated and that, before storage, the interiors be rinsed with demineralized water and dried.

Coiled tubing used in drilling operations failed at the halfway point of its estimated fatigue life. The failure was found to be transverse to the tubing axis. Visual examination revealed a flat fracture surface extending 13 mm with the rest of the fracture showing shear lips indicative of tensile overload. The flat portion of the fracture surface was typical of fatigue cracking. Fatigue striations were revealed by SEM. Corrosion pitting on the tubing ID from which the fatigue crack had propagated were observed on closer examination. The corrosion pitting was speculated to have occurred when the tubing was idle and fluids accumulated at the bottom of the tubing wraps. The coiled tubing was concluded to have failed prematurely due to low-cycle fatigue initiated at corrosion pitting sites. Corrosive attack on the coiled tubing was recommended to be reduced by completely removing fluids or modifying the fluids in the tubing or purging by flowing dry nitrogen to dry it out.

A cracked, martensitic stainless steel, low-pressure turbine blade from a 623 MW turbine generator was found to exhibit fatigue cracks during a routine turbine inspection. The blade was cracked at the first notch of the fir tree and the cracks initiated at pits induced by chloride attack. Examination of the blade microstructure at the fracture origins revealed oxide-filled pits and transgranular cracks. The oxide filled cracks appeared to have originated at small surface pits and probably propagated in a fatigue or corrosion-fatigue fracture mode. It was recommended that the sources of the chlorides be eliminated and that the remaining blades be inspected at regular maintenance intervals for evidence of cracking.

The pawl spring which was part of a selector switch used in telephone equipment failed. The springs were blanked from 0.4 mm (0.014 in.) thick tempered 1095 steel and then nickel plated. Numerous pits around the rivet holes were revealed by microscopic examination of longitudinal specimens. Delaminations that were formed at inclusion sites during punching of the rivet holes and that were filled with nickel during the plating operation were revealed by microscopic examination of the rivet hole. These delaminations were interpreted to have acted as stress raisers and initiated the fracture. Long, narrow sulfide stringers which were the probably the cause of delamination in this spring material were revealed in the raw material used to make the springs. It was concluded that fracture of the springs was caused by fatigue that had originated at delaminations around the rivet holes.

The floors (fabricated from aluminum alloy 7178-T6 sheet, with portions of the sheet chemically milled to reduce thickness) of the fuel tanks in two aircraft failed almost identically after 1076 and 1323 h of service, respectively. Failure in both tanks occurred in the rear chemically milled section of the floor. An alkaline etch-type cleaner was used on the panels before chemical milling and before painting. Various tests and measurements indicated that the aluminum alloy used for the fuel-tank floors conformed to the specifications for 7178-T6. Low power magnification, fractographs taken with a scanning electron, and optical microscopic examination of the milled sections revealed extensive pitting on both sides of the floors. Evidence found supports the conclusions that the floors failed by fatigue cracking that initiated near the center of the fuel-tank floor and ultimately propagated as rapid ductile-overload fractures. The fatigue cracks originated in pits on the fuel-cell side of the tank floors. The pits were attributed to attack caused by the alkaline-etch cleaning process. Recommendations included monitoring of the alkaline-etch cleaning to avoid the formation of pits and careful inspection following alkaline-etch cleaning, to be scheduled before release of the floor panels for painting.

A hollow, splined alloy steel aircraft shaft (machined from an AMS 6415 steel forging – approximately the same composition as 4340 steel – then quenched and tempered to a hardness of 44.5 to 49 HRC) cracked in service after more than 10,000 h of flight time. The inner surface of the hollow shaft was exposed to hydraulic oil at temperatures of 0 to 80 deg C (30 to 180 deg F). Analysis (visual inspection, 15-30x low magnification examination, 4x light fractograph, chemical analysis, hardness testing) supported the conclusions that the shaft cracked in a region subjected to severe static radial, cyclic torsional, and cyclic bending loads. Cracking originated at corrosion pits on the smoothly finished surface and propagated as multiple small corrosion-fatigue cracks from separate nuclei. The originally noncorrosive environment (hydraulic oil) became corrosive in service because of the introduction of water into the oil. Recommendations included taking additional precautions in operation and maintenance to prevent the use of oil containing any water through filling spouts or air vents. Also, polishing to remove pitting corrosion (but staying within specified dimensional tolerances) was recommended as a standard maintenance procedure for shafts with long service lives.

Two shafts that transmit power from the engine to the propeller of a container ship failed after a short time in service. The shafts usually have a 25 year lifetime, but the two in question failed after only a few years. One of the shafts, which carries power from a gearbox to the propeller, is made of low alloy steel. The other shaft, part of a clutch mechanism that regulates the transmission of power from the engine to the gears, is made of carbon steel. Fracture surface examination of the gear shaft revealed circumferential ratchet marks with the presence of inward progressive beach marks, suggesting rotary-bending fatigue. The fracture surfaces on the clutch shaft exhibited a star-shaped pattern, suggesting that the failure was due to torsional overload which may have initiated at corrosion pits discovered during the examination. Based on the observations, it was concluded that rotational bending stresses caused the gear shaft to fail due to insufficient fatigue strength. This led to the torsional failure of the corroded clutch shaft, which was subjected to a sudden, high level load when the shaft connecting the gearbox to the propeller failed.

After less than 30 days in service, several cadmium-plated retaining rings, made of 4140 steel tubing and heat treated to 36 to 40 HRC, broke during operation that included holding components of a segmented fitting in place under a constant load. Photographic and 100x nital-etched micrographic examination showed a microstructure of tempered martensite with low inclusion content as well as a pit or burned spot on the outer area of the ring. The defect was approximately 0.18 mm (0.007 in.) deep and 0.5 mm (0.020 in.) in diam and had a hardness of 58 to 60 HRC. The base metal adjacent to the defect had a hardness of 36 to 40 HRC. Small cracks or fissures were also evident within the defect. Thus, the rings failed in brittle fracture as the result of an arc strike (or burn) on the surface of the ring. At the site of the arc strike, a small region of hard, brittle untempered martensite was formed as the result of an arc strike during the cadmium-plating operation. Fracture occurred readily when the ring was stressed. No recommendations were made.

The support bearing of a hydrofoil vessel failed after only 220 h of operation. The bearing consisted of an outer ring made of chromium-plated AISI type 416 stainless steel and an inner ring with a spherical outer surface made of AISI type 440C stainless steel, with a plastic material, bonded to the outer ring, between the two. The inner ring was found to have failed in four places. The two metallic rings were allowed to come in contact with each other by the disappearance of the plastic material. It was revealed by examination of the fracture surfaces of the inner ring that the failure was caused by fatigue initiated in corrosion pits (caused by seawater). The fracture was found to be transgranular. It was recommended that the inner and outer rings should both be made from the more corrosion resistant 17-4 PH (AISI type 630) stainless steel.