Argonne National Laboratory has conducted analyses of failed components from nuclear power-generating stations since 1974. The considerations involved in working with and analyzing radioactive components are reviewed here, and the decontamination of these components is discussed. Analyses of four failed components from nuclear plants are then described to illustrate the kinds of failures seen in service. The failures discussed are (1) intergranular stress-corrosion cracking of core spray injection piping in a boiling water reactor, (2) failure of canopy seal welds in adapter tube assemblies in the control rod drive head of a pressurized water reactor, (3) thermal fatigue of a recirculation pump shaft in a boiling water reactor, and (4) failure of pump seal wear rings by nickel leaching in a boiling water reactor.

The steam tug Hercules was an ocean-going and bay tug for 55 years before being retired. It is now being restored by the National Park Service. A broken steam valve was obtained for microstructural examination. The body was gray cast iron, and the stem and seat were brass. The examination centered on corrosion of the brass components. The seat and shaft were alpha brass, with a hardness of 64 and 79 DPH, respectively. A nut held the shaft onto the seat, and was alpha-beta brass with a hardness of 197 DPH. Welded on the end of the shaft was a ring of hard (DPH 294) alpha-beta brass, which seated against the nut. The brass seat and stem show little corrosion. However, the alpha-beta brass nut and welded tip showed extensive dezincification. This process of removal of Zn and the retention of Cu began in the high Zn beta phase, but eventually both phases were attacked. The depth of penetration was consistent with dezincification rates reported in the literature for such brasses in salt water if the valve had been in service about 55 years.

On 15 March 2000, a National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) train traveling from Chicago to Los Angeles derailed in Carbondale, KS. After the initial on-scene investigation, 12 pieces of rail were sent to the materials laboratory for examination. Ten of them were from the point of derailment (POD). A vertical crack was observed in the head of the rail (vertical split head). The crack was at least 233 in. (591 cm) long, continuing through the entire lengths of most pieces recovered from the POD. The vertical fracture surface had features consistent with overstress fracture with short-term exposure to an oxygen-rich environment. Fracture features emanated from longitudinally-aligned inclusions rich in aluminum.

The circumstances surrounding the in-service failure of a cast Ni-base superalloy (Alloy 713LC) second stage turbine blade and a cast and coated Co-base superalloy (MAR-M302) first stage air-cooled vane in two turbine engines used for marine application are described. An overview of a systematic approach, analyzing the nature of degeneration and failure of the failed components, utilizing conventional metallurgical techniques, is presented. The topographical features of the turbine blade fracture surface revealed a fatigue-induced crack growth pattern, where crack initiation had taken place in the blade trailing edge. An estimate of the crack-growth rate for the stage II fatigue fracture region coupled with the metallographic results helped to identify the final mode of the turbine blade failure. A detailed metallographic and fractographic examination of the air-cooled vane revealed that coating erosion in conjunction with severe hot-corrosion was responsible for crack initiation in the leading edge area.

Several newly developed liquid propane gas (LPG) cylinders made from Fe-0.13C-0.42Mn steel failed, each fracturing in the longitudinal direction. One of the cylinders was thoroughly analyzed to determine the cause. Deep-drawing flaws were observed on the inner wall of the cylinder, oriented in the direction of the fracture and roughly equal in length. Flaws about 1.3 mm deep, steps, and a chevron pattern were observed on the fractured surface as were cleavage facets, revealed by SEM. Hardness was relatively high and the microstructure near the fracture surface appeared elongated. In addition, the stress intensity factor KI calculated from the value of the internal pressure was lower than that estimated by the fracture toughness test. All of this suggests that the tanks were not sufficiently annealed and prone to brittle fracture. The analysis thus proves that cracks initiated by deep-drawing flaws were the primary cause of failure.

The Advanced Photon Source (APS) is a state-of-the-art synchrotron light source. The storage ring vacuum chamber is fabricated from 6061 extruded aluminum. Water connections to the vacuum chambers that were fabricated from 3003 aluminum had developed water leaks, which were subsequently remedied after considerable investigations.

A double-walled, hemispherical metal beam exit window made of alloy 718 developed a crack during service, leading to coolant leakage. The window had been exposed to radiation damage from 800 MeV protons and a cyclic stress from 600 MPa tensile to near zero induced by numerous temperature cycles calculated to be from 400 to 30 deg C (752 to 86 deg F). The window was activated to >200 Sv/h. It was determined through analysis using remote handling techniques and hot cells that the crack initiated near a spot weld used to affix thermocouples to the window surface. In addition to analysis of the crack, some of the irradiated material from the window was used to measure mechanical properties. Hot cell techniques for preparation of samples and testing were developed to determine true operating conditions of radiation, strain, and temperature.

A forged alloy steel arm of a lifting fork with an approximate cross section of 150 x 240 mm (5.92 x 9.45 in.) fractured after only a short service life on a lift truck. The fracture surface had the appearance of a fracture originating from a surface crack. Analysis (visual inspection, 200x micrographs, chemical analysis, and metallographic examination) supported the conclusion that the primary cause of the failure was the brittleness (lack of impact toughness) of the steel. The coarse bainitic microstructure was inadequate for the service application. The microstructure resulted from either improper heat treatment or no heat treatment after the forging operation. The surface cracks in the lifting-fork arm acted as starter notches (stress raisers), assisting in the initiation of fracture. No recommendations were made.

An intergranular stress-corrosion cracking failure of 304 stainless steel pipe in 2000 ppm B as H3BO3 + H2O at 100 deg C was investigated. Constant extension rate testing produced an intergranular type failure in material in air. Chemical analysis was performed on both the base metal and weld material, in addition to fractography, EPR testing and optical microscopy in discerning the mode of failure. Various effects of Cl-, O2 and MnS are discussed. Results indicated that the cause of failure was the severe sensitization coupled with probable contamination by S and possibly by Cl ions.

A metallurgical failure analysis was performed on pieces of the cracked vent header pipe from the Edwin I. Hatch Unit 2 Nuclear power plant. The analysis consisted of optical microscopy, chemical analysis, mechanical Charpy impact testing, and fractography. It was found that the material of the vent header met the mechanical and chemical properties of ASTM A516 Grade 70 carbon-manganese steel material and microstructures were consistent with this material. Fracture faces of the cracked pipe were predominantly brittle in appearance with no evidence of fatigue contribution. The NDTT (Nil ductility Transition Temperature) for this material was approximately -51 deg C (-60 deg F). The fact that the material's NDTT was significantly out of the normal operating range of the pipe suggested an impingement of low temperature nitrogen (caused by a faulty torus inerting system) induced a thermal shock in the pipe which, when cooled below its NDTT, cracked in a brittle manner.

An evaluation of indications in the main turbine building column horizontal plate welds was conducted by the joint efforts of field metallography and nondestructive examinations. The turbine building main column horizontal plate welds were selected at random and were inspected to find discontinuities, metallurgical evaluation of the discontinuities, analysis of any failure modes, and determination of the best repair techniques. The welds were made with prequalified joints in accordance with AWS D1.1-77 and required only visual inspection. More sensitive inspection methods were applied to the welds in order to better define the indications found with the visual inspections. Cracks were found in 17 field welds and in two test plate welds. The causes of the cracking are related to the weld design and installation procedure. Three field welds were rejected because of the depth of the cracks. The NDT inspections, evaluations, method of field metallography, analysis and conclusions are discussed with recommendations for corrective actions in the following report.

Personnel responsible for laboratory protection at some plants are required to participate in exercises simulating a breach of security at the site. This document reports a metallurgical investigation of blank firing adapters (BFA), one of which exploded during such a training exercise. Determination of the cause of the explosion was the primary objective of the examination. Metallographic studies included the examination of BFAs fabricated from two different types of alloys that were tested for shock reaction. Optical microscopy supported by electron microscopy and analytical methods were used. Our investigation supports the supposition that a live round of ammunition was inadvertently fired.

Despite extensive aircraft landing gear design analyses and tests performed by designers and manufacturers, and the large number of trouble-free landings, aircraft users have experienced problems with and failures of landing gear components. Different data banks and over 200 failure analysis reports were surveyed to provide an overview of structural landing gear component failures as experienced by the Canadian Forces over the last 20 years on more than 20 aircraft types, and to assess trends in failure mechanisms and causes. Case histories were selected to illustrate typical problems, troublesome failure mechanisms, the role of high strength aluminum alloys and steels, and situations where fracture mechanics analyses provided insight into the failures. The two main failure mechanisms were: fatigue occurring mainly in steel components, and corrosion related problems with aluminum alloys. Very few overload failures were noted. A number of causes were identified: design deficiencies and manufacturing defects leading mainly to fatigue failures, and poor materials selection and improper maintenance as the principal causes of corrosion-related failures. The survey showed that a proper understanding of the failure mechanisms and causes, by thorough failure analysis, provides valuable feedback information to designers, operators and maintenance personnel for appropriate corrective actions to be taken.

The truck beam of the left main landing gear (MGL) of a Boeing 707 airplane collapsed on the ground just after the aircraft was unloaded and refueled. The investigation revealed that failure was caused by the propagation of an intergranular crack originating from the bottom of the pit. The crack reached the critical size and caused failure by stress-corrosion cracking (SCC) under static loading conditions in service. The failed beam was protected by a well adhering paint system. However, the presence of adequate amounts of corrosion preventive compound films (CPC) on the surfaces of the failed beam could not be conclusively established because of the long term service exposure and presence of lubricants.

The failures of two aircraft components, one from a landing gear and the other from an ejector rack mechanism, were investigated. Both were made from PH 13-8 Mo (UNS S13800) precipitation-hardening stainless steel which had been heat treated to the H1000 and H950 tempers respectively and then chromium plated. The parts were characterized metallographically and mechanically and were found to be compliant. Detailed fractographic examination revealed that the first stage of both failures was similar: subsurface initiation of numerous cracks with a wide range of orientations and cleavage like features. The cracking was followed by fatigue in one case and catastrophic failure in the other. Hydrogen embrittlement was identified as the most likely mechanism of failure.

Three ASME SA106 grade B carbon steel feed water piping reducers from a pressurized water reactor showed indications of flaws near welds during ultrasonic testing. Further examination and testing indicated that the cracks resulted from a low-cycle corrosion fatigue phenomenon.

Various aluminum bronze valves and fittings on the essential cooling water system at a nuclear plant were found to be leaking. The leakage was limited to small-bore socket-welded components. Four specimens were examined: three castings (an ASME SB-148 CA 952 elbow from a small-bore fitting and two ASME SB-148 CA 954 valve bodies) and an entire valve assembly. The leaks were found to be in the socket-weld crevice area and had resulted from dealloying. It was recommended that the weld joint geometry be modified.

A pair of steam generators operating at a pressurized water reactor site were found to be leaking near a closure weld. The generators were the vertical U-tube type, constructed from ASTM A302 grade B steel. The shell material exhibited high hardness values prior to confirmatory heat treatment, indicating high residual stresses in the area of the weld. All cracks were transgranular and were associated with pits on the inside surfaces of the vessels. It was concluded that the cracking was caused by a low-cycle corrosion fatigue phenomenon, with cracks initiating at areas of localized corrosion and propagating by fatigue. The cause of the pitting/cracking was related to the unit's copper species in solution.

A 460 mm (18 in.) diam suction line to the main feed water pump for a nuclear power plant failed in a violent, catastrophic manner. Samples of pipe, elbow, and weld materials (ASTM A106 grade B carbon steel, ASTM A234 grade WPB carbon steel, and E7018 carbon steel electrode, respectively) from the suction line were analyzed. Evidence of overall thinning of the elbow and pipe material and ductile tearing of fractures indicated that the feed water pipe failed as a result of an erosion corrosion mechanism, which thinned the wall sufficiently to cause rapid, ductile tearing of the material after its design stress had been exceeded. It was recommended that steel with a higher chromium content be used to mitigate the erosion corrosion potential in the lines and that more rigorous nondestructive (ultrasonic) examinations be performed.

The failure of a spiral bevel gear from the transmission of a helicopter was discovered when the transmission was removed after an in-flight incident. Two adjacent teeth from the carburized AISI 9310 steel gear were found to have undergone fatigue failure. Internal initiation occurred in a region depleted of chromium and nickel. This condition coincides with a microstructural inhomogeneity consisting of large, soft ferrite grains. Its origin was probably contamination of the solidifying ingot during the consumable vacuum arc remelting operation.