Search Results for nace

Coiled tubing with 80 ksi yield strength manufactured to a maximum hardness of 22 HRC to meet NACE Standard MR0175 requirement for sour gas service failed after being on 38 jobs (70% of its estimated fatigue life). A transverse crack where a leak occurred was identified as the primary failure point. Numerous OD surface fissures were revealed by a low-power microscope. A brittle zone near the OD, identified as a sulfide stress crack with additional fatigue cracking was revealed by SEM. Sulfide stress cracking defined as brittle failure by cracking under the combined action of tensile stress and corrosion in the presence of water and hydrogen sulfide was concluded to have initiated the failure which was propagated by fatigue. It was recommended that in the presence of known corrosive environments the tubing should not be used above 50% of its theoretical fatigue life.

Sucker-rod pumps are operating in very aggressive environments in oil well production. The combined effect of a corrosive environment and significant mechanical loads contribute to frequent cases of failure of the rod string during operation. Standards and recommendations have been developed to control and avoid those failures. This study presents various failure cases of sucker rods in different applications. The heat treatment of the steel material and the resulting microstructure are an important factor in the behavior of the sucker rod. A spheroidized microstructure presents a weaker resistance to corrosion affecting the rod life. Non-metallic inclusions are a pitting preferential site leading to fatigue crack initiation. Heterogeneous microstructure as banded martensite and ferrite/pearlite decreases the ductility of the material affecting the fatigue propagation resistance.

A group of control valves that regulate production in a field of sour gas wellheads performed satisfactorily for three years before pits and cracks were detected during an inspection. One of the valves was examined using chemical and microstructural analysis to determine the cause of failure and provide preventive measures. The valve body was made of A216-WCC cast carbon steel. Its inner surface was covered with cracks stemming from surface pits. Investigators concluded that the failure was caused by a combination of hydrogen-induced corrosion cracking and sulfide stress-corrosion cracking. Based on test data and cost, A217-WC9 cast Cr–Mo steel would be a better alloy for the application.

This article focuses on the mechanisms of microbiologically influenced corrosion as a basis for discussion on the diagnosis, management, and prevention of biological corrosion failures in piping, tanks, heat exchangers, and cooling towers. It begins with an overview of the scope of microbial activity and the corrosion process. Then, various mechanisms that influence corrosion in microorganisms are discussed. The focus is on the incremental activities needed to assess the role played by microorganisms, if any, in the overall scenario. The article presents a case study that illustrates opportunities to improve operating processes and procedures related to the management of system integrity. Industry experience with corrosion-resistant alloys of steel, copper, and aluminum is reviewed. The article ends with a discussion on monitoring and preventing microbiologically influenced corrosion failures.

The shafts on two centrifugal pumps failed during use in a petroleum refinery. Light optical microscopy and scanning electron microscopy were used to analyze the damaged materials to determine the cause of failure. The results showed that one shaft, made of duplex stainless steel, failed by fatigue fracture, and the other, made of 316 austenitic stainless steel, experienced a similar fracture, which was promoted by the presence of nonmetallic inclusion particles.

Six cases of failure attributed to microbiologically influenced corrosion (MIC) were analyzed to determine if any of the failures could have been avoided or at least predicted. The failures represent a diversity of applications involving typical materials, primarily stainless steel and copper alloys, in contact with a variety of liquids, chemistries, and substances. Analytical techniques employed include stereoscopic examination, energy dispersive x-ray spectroscopy (EDS), temperature and pH testing, and metallographic analysis. The findings indicate that MIC is frequently the result of poor operations or improper materials selection, and thus often preventable.

Corrosion in a closed-loop cooling water system constructed of austenitic stainless steel occurred during an extended lay up of the system with biologically contaminated water. The characteristics of the failure were those of microbiologically influenced corrosion (MIC). The corrosion occurred at welds and consisted of large subsurface void formations with pinhole penetrations of the surfaces. Corrosive attack initiated in the heat affected zones of the welds, usually immediately adjacent to fusion lines. Stepwise grinding, polishing, and etching through the affected areas revealed that voids generally grew in the wrought material by uniform general corrosion. Tunneling or worm-holing was also observed, whereby void extension occurred by initiating daughter voids probably at flaws or other inhomogeneities. Selective attack occurred within the fusion zone, i.e., within the cast two-phase structure of the weld filler itself. The result was a void wall which consisted of a rough and porous ferritic material, a consequence of preferential attack of the austenitic phase and slightly lower rate of corrosive attack of the ferrite phase. The three-dimensional spongy surface was studied optically and with the scanning electron microscope.

A brackish water pump impeller was replaced after four years of service, while its predecessor lasted over 40 years. The subsequent failure investigation determined that the nickel-aluminum bronze impeller was not properly heat treated, which made the impeller susceptible to aluminum dealloying. The dealloying corrosion was exacerbated by erosion because the pump was slightly oversized. The investigation recommended better heat treating procedures and closer evaluation to ensure that new pumps are properly sized.

This article illustrates the use of the American Petroleum Institute (API) 579-1/ASME FFS-1 fitness-for-service (FFS) code (2020) to assess the serviceability and remaining life of a corroded flare knockout drum from an oil refinery, two fractionator columns affected by corrosion under insulation in an organic sulfur environment, and an equalization tank with localized corrosion in the shell courses in a chemicals facility. In the first two cases, remaining life is assessed by determining the minimum thickness required to operate the corroded equipment. The first is based on a Level 2 FFS assessment, while the second involves a Level 3 assessment. The last case involves several FFS assessments to evaluate localized corrosion in which remaining life was assessed by determining the minimum required thickness using the concept of remaining strength factor for groove-like damage and evaluating crack-like flaws using the failure assessment diagram. Need for caution in predicting remaining life due to corrosion is also covered.

Two failures of AP15A grade J-55 electric resistance welded (ERW) tubing in as our gas environment were investigated. The first failure occurred after 112 days of service. Replacement pipe failed 2 days later. Surface examination of the failed tubing indicated that fracture initiated at the outside surface. Metallographic analysis showed that the fracture originated in the upturned fibers adjacent to the ERW bond line. Cross sections of the weld were removed from three random locations in the test sample. At each location, the up turned fibers of the weld zone contained bands of hard-appearing microstructure. Hardness measurements confirmed these observations. The cracks followed these bands. It was concluded that the tubing failed from sulfide stress cracking, which resulted from bands of susceptible microstructure in the ERW zone. The banded microstructure in the pipe suggested that chemical segregation contributed to the hard areas. Postweld normalized heat treatment apparently did not sufficiently reduce the hardness of these areas.

This article discusses the failure analysis of several steel transmission pipeline failures, describes the causes and characteristics of specific pipeline failure modes, and introduces pipeline failure prevention and integrity management practices and methodologies. In addition, it covers the use of transmission pipeline in North America, discusses the procedures in pipeline failure analysis investigation, and provides a brief background on the most commonly observed pipeline flaws and degradation mechanisms. A case study related to hydrogen cracking and a hard spot is also presented.

Various aluminum bronze valves and fittings on the essential cooling water system at a nuclear plant were found to be leaking. The leakage was limited to small-bore socket-welded components. Four specimens were examined: three castings (an ASME SB-148 CA 952 elbow from a small-bore fitting and two ASME SB-148 CA 954 valve bodies) and an entire valve assembly. The leaks were found to be in the socket-weld crevice area and had resulted from dealloying. It was recommended that the weld joint geometry be modified.

Large quantities of aluminum-clad spent nuclear materials have been in interim storage in the fuel storage basins at The Savannah River Site while awaiting processing since 1989. This extended storage as a result of a moratorium on processing resulted in corrosion of the aluminum clad. Examinations of this fuel and other data from a corrosion surveillance program in the water basins have provided basic insight into the corrosion process and have resulted in improvements in the storage facilities and basin operations. Since these improvements were implemented, there has been no new initiation of pitting observed since 1993. This paper describes the corrosion of spent fuel and the metallographic examination of Mark 31A target slugs removed from the K-basin storage pool after 5 years of storage. It discusses the SRS Corrosion Surveillance Program and the improvements made to the storage facilities which have mitigated new corrosion in the basins.