A large crack developed at a girder-truss joint area of the Fremont bridge in Portland, OR, on 28 Oct 1971. It occurred during a positioning procedure involving a junction piece welded to a girder, starting as a brittle fracture and terminating in plastic hinges in the girder web welds. The arch rib top plate, as it met the main girder, formed a composite beam of A588/A36 composition. Investigation showed the original design of the failed component called for an angle of high geometric stress concentration (90 deg with no radius) in a region of substantial transverse weld joints. While the material met chemical and mechanical property requirements, tests showed it had low fracture toughness and critical-sized flaws oriented normal to the principal stress in the failed junction piece. Fabrication procedures resulted in high residual stresses and a metallurgical notch at the radius in the junction piece. Stresses induced during jacking (the procedure used to raise bridge components into position) applied the stresses in the critical radius that triggered the cracking.

A vessel made of ASTM A204, grade C, molybdenum alloy steel and used as a hydrogen reformer was found to have cracked in the weld between the shell and the lower head. Six samples from different sections were investigated. The crack was found to be initiated at the edge of the weld in the coarsegrain portion of the HAZ. The microstructure was found to be severely embrittled and severely gassed in an area around the crack. The microstructure of the metal in the head was revealed to be banded and contained spheroidal carbides. The lower head was established by hardness values and microscopic examination to have been overheated for a sufficiently long time to reduce the tensile strength below the minimum required for the steel. It was interpreted that the wide difference in tensile strength between head and weld metal (including HAZ) formed a metallurgical notch that enhanced the diffusion of hydrogen into the metal in the cracked region. The resultant embrittlement and associated fissuring was established to have caused the failure. The hydrogen was diffused out by wrapping the vessel in asbestos and heating followed by cooling as prescribed by ASME code.

An articulated rod (made from 4337 steel (AMS 6412) forging, quenched and tempered to 36 to 40 HRC) used in an overhauled aircraft engine was fractured after being in operation for 138 h. Visual examination revealed that the rod was broken into two pieces 6.4 cm from the center of the piston-pin-bushing bore. The fracture was nucleated at an electroetched numeral 5 on one of the flange surfaces. A notch, caused by arc erosion during electroetching, was revealed by metallographic examination of a polished-and-etched section through the fracture origin. A remelted zone and a layer of untempered martensite constituted the microstructure of the metal at the origin. Small cracks, caused by the high temperatures developed during electro-etching, were observed in the remelted area. It was concluded that fatigue fracture of the rod was caused by the notch resulting from electroetching and thus electroetched marking of the articulated rods was discontinued as a corrective measure.

A section from a stop-block guide fell to the floor on a crane runway after it failed. A brittle crystalline-type break was disclosed by examination of the fracture surface. The point of initiation was in a hardened heat-affected layer that had developed during flame cutting and welding. The metal was identified to be 1020 steel. It was indicated by the coarse as-rolled structure (grain size of ASTM 00 to 4) of the base metal that the weldment (stop block and guide) had not been normalized. The brittle failure was evaluated to have been initiated at a metallurgical and mechanical notch produced by flame cutting and welding. As corrective measures, fully silicon-killed 1020 steel with a maximum grain size of ASTM 5 were used to make new stop-block weldments. The weldments were normalized at 900 deg C after flame cutting and welding to improve microstructure and impact strength. All flame-cut surfaces were ground to remove notches.

A bolt manufacturer observed that products made from certain shipments of steel 41 Cr4 wire were prone to the formation of quench cracks in their rolled threads. The affected wire was tested and found to be highly sensitive to overheating because of the metallurgical method by which it was produced. A stronger decarburization of the case was a contributing factor that could not be prevented by working because the thread was rolled. Hardening tests conducted by the bolt manufacturer showed that quench cracks did not occur in specimens that were turned down before hardening and when notches were machined instead of beaten with a chisel.

On 14 April 1912, at 11:40 p.m., Greenland Time, the Royal Mail Ship Titanic on its maiden voyage was proceeding westward at 21.5 knots (40 km/h) when the lookouts on the foremast sighted a massive iceberg estimated to have weighed between 150,000 to 300,000 tons at a distance of 500 m ahead. Immediately, the ship’s engines were reversed and the ship was turned to port (left) in an attempt to avoid the iceberg. In about 40 sec, the ship struck the iceberg below the waterline on its starboard (right) side near the bow. The iceberg raked the hull of the ship for 100 m, destroying the integrity of the six forward watertight compartments. Within 2 h 40 min the RMS Titanic sank. Metallurgical examination and chemical analysis of the steel taken from the Titanic revealed important clues that allow an understanding of the severity of the damage inflicted on the hull. Although the steel was probably as good as was available at the time the ship was constructed, it was very inferior when compared with modern steel. The notch toughness showed a very low value (4 J) for the steel at the water temperature (-2 deg C) in the North Atlantic at the time of the accident.

Numerous flaws were detected in a steam turbine rotor during a scheduled inspection and maintenance outage. A fracture-mechanics-based analysis of the flaws showed that the rotor could not be safely returned to service. Material, samples from the bore were analyzed to evaluate the actual mechanical properties and to determine the metallurgical cause of the observed indications. Samples were examined in a scanning electron microscope and subjected to chemical analysis and several mechanical property tests, including tensile, Charpy V-notch impact, and fracture toughness. The material was found to be a typical Cr-Mo-V steel, and it met the property requirements. No evidence of temper embrittlement was found. The analyses showed that the observed flaws were present in the original forging and attributed them to lack of ingot consolidation. A series of actions, including overboring of the rotor to remove indications close to the surface and revision of starting procedures, were implemented to extend the remaining life of the rotor and ensure its fitness for continued service.

Both rods in a Harrington rod cervical stent failed after a short time in service. Metallurgical analysis revealed a significant number of notches as well as enlarged grain size in one of the two rods, rough shallow-cracked surfaces along the bend profiles, possible signs of corrosion, and fractures (on both rods) near indentations imparted by retaining clamps. The observations suggest that surface roughness and bending defects initiated cracking that led to the fatigue failure of the compromised rod, followed some time later by the overload fracture of the second rod.

Stainless steel liners (AISI type 321) used in bellows-type expansion joints in a duct assembly installed in a low-pressure nitrogen gas system failed in service. The duct assembly consisted of two expansion joints connected by a 32 cm (12 in.) OD pipe of ASTM A106 grade B steel. Elbows made of ASTM A234 grade B steel were attached to each end of the assembly, 180 deg apart. A 1.3 mm (0.050 in.) thick liner with an OD of 29 cm (11 in.) was welded inside each joint. The upstream ends were stable, but the downstream ends of the liners remained free, allowing the components to move with the expansion and contraction of the bellows. Investigation (visual inspection, hardness testing, and 30x fractographs) supported the conclusion that the liners failed in fatigue initiated at the intersection of the longitudinal weld forming the liner and the circumferential weld by which it attached to the bellows assembly. Recommendations included increasing the thickness of the liners from 1.3 to 1.9 mm (0.050 to 0.075 in.) in order to damp some of the stress-producing vibrations.

A felt guide roll fractured in-service on a paper manufacturing machine, damaging the belt as well as multiple dryer rolls, nearby felt guide rolls, and the frame of the machine. The investigation included visual and stereoscopic examination, chemical and microstructural analysis, microhardness and tensile testing, stress calculations, and vibration measurements. Based on the results, the roll fracture was attributed to high-cycle fatigue associated with a plug weld over one of the five threaded fasteners added to secure a balance weight inside the roll. The balance weight was installed to compensate for variations in wall thickness (i.e., weight distribution) of the pipe product used to make the roll. According to the investigation, resonance and vibration, which were initially considered, did not cause the failure.

Within about one month, several knuckle pins (AMS 6470 steel failed, and required to have a minimum case hardness of 92 h15N, a case depth of 0.4 to 0.5 mm (0.017 to 0.022 in.), and a core hardness of 285 to 341 HRB) used in engines failed over a range of 218 to 463 h in operation. Visual examination revealed beach marks typical of fatigue cracks that had nucleated at the base of the longitudinal oil hole. Micrographs of sections revealed a remelt zone and an area of untempered martensite within the region of the cracks. However, review of inspection procedures disclosed the pins had been magnetic-particle inspected by inserting a probe into the longitudinal hole. Evidence found supports the conclusions that the knuckle pins failed by fatigue fracture. The circular cracks at the longitudinal holes were the result of improper technique in magnetic-particle inspection. Thermal transformation of the metal also causes a stress concentration that may lead to fatigue failure. Recommendations included insulating the conductor to prevent arc burning at the base of the longitudinal oil hole. Also, a borescope or metal monitor could be used to inspect the hole for evidence of arc burning from magnetic-particle inspection.

Failure occurred by fatigue cracking of links from chains which were used to replace the ropes on grabs of the multirope type. In the first example, the links were made from high tensile steel rod. The fracture in the side of the link was duplex in appearance one half of the surface being discolored, indicative of a preexisting crack of the fatigue type, whilst the remaining portion was brightly crystalline, resulting from brittle fracture at the time of the mishap. In the second example, the fracture took place at a similar location adjacent to one of the butt welds situated at the mid-length of the sides. Brinell hardness values confirmed that the link was made from the higher tensile grade of material. The cracks were due to fatigue, there being no indications that the weld was initially defective.

An anchorage plate which fractured was one of a pair used as intermediate members through which the boom suspension ropes were attached to the jury-mast of an excavator. Failure of the plate released the ropes on one side of the boom, resulting in extensive damage to the latter and also bending of the other anchorage plate. The anchorage plates were 23 x 9 in. and had been flame-cut from mild steel plate. Collars were fillet-welded on each side at both ends to provide extra bearing area for the pins. Holes had then been flame-cut slightly under size and bored to final dimensions. The plates were given a slight set after flame-cutting to provide a more direct line of pull for the ropes. The fracture surface was bounded by narrow lips, indicative of shear failure. Failure of the anchorage plate was attributed to cracks present at the junctions of the fillet welds, and deficient notch-ductility of the material from which the plates were made.

Three sprinkler system dry pipe valve castings (class 30 gray iron), two that had failed in service and one that had been rejected during machining because of porosity, were submitted for examination. The two failures consisted of cracks in a seating face. All three were from the same heat. Visual examination showed that the casting had cracked through a thin area in the casting sidewall. Evidence of a sharply machined corner at the fracture site was also discovered. Tensile testing and metallographic analysis revealed no metallurgical cause for the failure. It was recommended that the manufacturer work with the foundry to evaluate the criticality of core placement and to eliminate the undesired thin section.

Two type 316L stainless steel orthopedic screws broke approximately 6 weeks after surgical implant. The screws had been used to fasten a seven-hole narrow dynamic compression plate to a patient's spine. The broken screws and screws of the same vintage and source were examined using macrofractography, SEM fractography, and hardness testing. Fractography established that fracture was by fatigue and that the fatigue cracking originated at corrosion pits. Hardness while below specification, still indicated that the screws were in the cold-worked condition and notch sensitive during fatigue loading. Use of a steel with a higher molybdenum content (317L) in the annealed condition was recommended.

A steel splice plate in a power transmission line tower cracked while in service. Metallographic analysis indicated the presence of a white hard martensite layer near the crack, which occurred in the heel of the plate. Mechanical property tests revealed localized hardening in the area of the crack, supporting the metallurgical findings. A substantial deterioration of the Charpy impact toughness of the material in the heel region was also observed which is believed to have caused the initiation and propagation of the cracks leading to the failure.

The U-0.8wt%Ti alloy is often used in weapon applications where high strength and fairly good ductility are necessary. Components are immersion quenched in water from the gamma phase to produce a martensitic structure that is amenable to aging. Undesirable conditions occur when a component occasionally cracks during the quenching process, and when tensile specimens fail prematurely during mechanical testing. These two failures prompted an investigative analysis and a series of studies to determine the causes of the cracking and erratic behavior observed in this alloy. Quench-related failures whereby components that cracked either during or immediately after the heat treatment/quenching operation were sectioned for metallographic examination of the microstructure to examine the degree of phase transformation. Examination of premature tensile specimen failures by scanning electron microscopy and X-ray imaging of fracture surfaces revealed pockets of inclusions at the crack origins. In addition, tests were conducted to evaluate the detrimental effects of internal hydrogen on ductility and crack initiation in this alloy.

A stuffing box (sand cast from ASTM A 536, grade 60-45-10, ductile iron) began leaking water after two weeks of service. The machine was operating at 326 rpm with a discharge water pressure of 21.4 MPa (3100 psi). Investigation (visual inspection, mechanical analysis, and nital etched 100x magnification) supported the conclusion that the crack initiated at the inner edge of a lubrication hole and had propagated toward both the threaded and flange ends of the casting. An appreciable residual-stress concentration must have been present and caused propagation of the crack. The residual stress might have been caused when a fitting was tightly screwed into the lubrication hole, and it might have been concentrated by notches at the inner end of the hole created when the drill broke through the sidewall to the stuffing box.

Postflight inspection of a gas-turbine aircraft engine that had experienced compressor stall revealed that the engine air-intake bullet assembly had dislodged and was seated against the engine-inlet guide vanes at the 3 o'clock position. The bullet assembly consisted of an outer aerodynamic shell and an inner stiffener shell, both of 1.3 mm (0.050 in.) thick aluminum alloy 6061-T6, and four attachment clips of 1 mm (0.040 in.) thick alclad aluminum alloy 2024-T42. Each clip was joined to the outer shell by 12 spot welds and was also joined to the stiffener. Analysis (visual inspection, dye-penetrant inspection, and 10x/150x micrographs of sections etched with Keller's reagent) supports the conclusion that the outer shell of the bullet assembly separated from the stiffener because the four attachment clips fractured through the shell-to-clip spot welds. Fracture occurred by fatigue that initiated at the notch created by the intersection of the faying surfaces of the clip and shell with the spot weld nuggets. The 6061 aluminum alloy shell and stiffener were in the annealed (O) temper rather than T6, as specified. Recommendations included heat treating the shell and stiffener to the T6 temper after forming.

During the routine hydraulic pressure test of a boiler following modification, failure by leakage from the drum took place and was traced to a region where extensive multiple cracking had occurred. Catastrophic rupture or fragmentation of the vessel fortunately did not take place. Prior to the test, cracking was present already, extending up to 90% of the wall thickness. Analyses of brownish deposit material did not reveal the presence of any substances likely to cause stress-corrosion cracking of a Ni-Cu-Mo low-alloy steel.