An arsenical admiralty brass (UNS C44300) finned tube in a generator air cooler unit at a hydroelectric power station failed. The unit had been in operation for approximately 49,000 h. The cooling medium for the tubes was water from a river. Air flowed over the finned exterior of the tubes, while water circulated through the tubes. Investigation (visual inspection, leak testing, history review, 100X micrographs etched in potassium dichromate, chemical analysis, and EDS and XRD analysis of internal tube deposits) supported the conclusion that the cause of the tube leaks was ammonia-induced SCC. Because the cracks initiated on the inside surfaces of the tubes and because the river water was not treated before it entered the coolers, the ammonia was likely present in the river water and probably concentrated under the internal deposits. Recommendations included either eliminating the ammonia (prohibitively expensive in cost and time) or using an alternate material (such as a 70Cu-30Ni alloy or a more expensive titanium alloy) that is resistant to ammonia corrosion as well as to chlorides and sulfur species.

AM350 stainless steel bellows used in the control rod drive mechanism of a fast breeder reactor failed after 1000 h of service in sodium at 550 deg C (1020 deg F). Helium leak testing indicated that leaks had occurred at various regions of the welded joints between the convolutes in the bellows. The weld failure was attributed to poor quality assurance during fabrication, which resulted in cracklike openings at the fusion zone. The openings extended during tensile loading. Use of proper welding procedures and quality control measures were recommended to prevent future failures.

During periodic inspection of the tubes of a reformer furnace, a soapy water leak test with the tubes pressurized with nitrogen was being carried out by site personnel in a manner contrary to the policy of the organization when one of the tubes suddenly disintegrated with explosive violence. The tube approximately 30 ft. long by 6 in. diam, was constructed of three spun cast sections butt welded together. The material specified for tubes for this service was basically a 25% chromium, 20% nickel, cast stainless steel containing 0.4% carbon to optimize creep resistance. Failure initiated in the region of the tube where the dark fracture surface and columnar grain structure were evident. These features indicated the presence of a defective zone or progressive cracking which had occurred during service. Microscopic examination of sections through the zone revealed extensive creep cracking. The cracking was intergranular and followed the interdendritic columnar structure adjacent to the outer surface.

A number of AISI 347 stainless steel bellows intended for use in the control rod drive mechanism of a fast breeder reactor were found to be leaking before being placed in service. The bellows, which had been in storage for one year in a seacoast environment, exhibited a leak rate on the order of 1 x 10−7 cu cm/s (6 x 10−8 cu in./s). Optical metallography revealed numerous pits and cracks on the surfaces of the bellow convolutes, which had been welded to one another using an autogenous gas tungsten arc welding process. Microhardness measurements indicated that the bellows had not been adequately stress relieved. It was recommended that a complete stress-relieving treatment be applied to the formed bellows. Improvement of storage conditions to avoid direct and prolonged contact of the bellows with the humid, chloride-containing environment was also recommended.

An arsenical admiralty brass (UNS C44300) finned tube in a generator air cooler unit at a hydroelectric power station failed. The unit had been in operation for approximately 49,000 h. Stereomicroscopic examination revealed two small transverse cracks that were within a few millimeters of the tube end, with one being a through-wall crack. Metallographic examination of sections containing the cracks showed branching secondary cracks and a transgranular cracking mode. The cracks appeared to initiate in pits. EDS analysis of a friable deposit found on the inside diameter of the tube and XRD analysis of crystalline compounds in the deposit indicated the possible presence of ammonia. Failure was attributed to stress-corrosion cracking resulting from ammonia in the cooling water. It was recommended that an alternate tube material, such as a 70Cu-30Ni alloy or a titanium alloy, be used.

Various aluminum bronze valves and fittings on the essential cooling water system at a nuclear plant were found to be leaking. The leakage was limited to small-bore socket-welded components. Four specimens were examined: three castings (an ASME SB-148 CA 952 elbow from a small-bore fitting and two ASME SB-148 CA 954 valve bodies) and an entire valve assembly. The leaks were found to be in the socket-weld crevice area and had resulted from dealloying. It was recommended that the weld joint geometry be modified.

When a large LPG low-carbon steel storage tank was put into service for the first time and filled beyond the proof testing level, a brittle fracture crack initiated at a fillet weld between a stiffener ring and the wall. The crack propagated to a length of 5.5 m and arrested. Analysis showed that the plates satisfied the criteria of BS 4741. It was concluded that the cause of crack initiation was the lack of a mouse hole at the junction between the stiffening ring and the wall of the tank. The tank was repaired and put back in service. When it was filled beyond the proof test level, again a brittle crack was initiated at a horizontal weld defect and propagated vertically, destroying the tank and the liquefaction plant. The initiation site was a thumbnail elliptical crack in a horizontal weld, having a depth of 1.5 mm, and a length of 4.5 mm. This showed that as late the mid-1970s, misunderstanding of brittle fracture led to the wrong design and construction of an LPG storage tank. The best design specification is to use a correlation between LAST, the Lowest Anticipated Service Temperature, and the DBTT measured by either Charpy tests or DTT.

A spiral heat exchanger made from 316L stainless steel developed a leak after eight years of service as a condenser on a distillation tower. Examination identified the leak as being located on the cooling water side in the heat affected zone (HAZ) of a weld joining two plates. Cooling water deposits were observed in a V-shaped corner formed by the weld. A metallurgical examination identified the presence of transgranular cracks in the HAZ on the cooling water side. Analysis of the cooling water revealed the presence of chlorides. Based on the metallurgical analysis and other findings, it was determined that the cracks and associated leak were the result of chloride stress-corrosion cracking.

A steam heated exchanger was designed for concentrating sulfuric acid. Tantalum was selected for the tubing and the tube sheet liner because of its outstanding corrosion resistance. However, although the exchanger passed a searching shop inspection, it leaked during site testing. Considerable argument ensued about whether the cracking observed was due to poor welding during fabrication, or through abuse during handling on site. An SEM examination of the fractures revealed high cycle, low amplitude fatigue, and the problem was traced to vibration during road transport. Further failures were avoided by improved design and packing. This paper illustrated the value of SEM fractography when a rapid investigation is needed under the pressures of a fast moving project.

The dished ends of a heavy water/helium storage tank manufactured from 8 mm (0.3 in.) thick type 304 stainless plate leaked during hydrotesting. Repeated attempts at repair welding did not alleviate the problem. Examination of samples from one dished end revealed that the cracking was confined to the heat affected zone (HAZ) surrounding circumferential welds and, to a lesser extent, radial welds that were part of the original construction. Most of the cracks initiated and propagated from the inside surface of the dished ends. Microstructures of the base metal, HAZ, and weld metal indicated severe sensitization in the HAZ due to high heat input during welding. An intergranular corrosion test confirmed the observations. The severe sensitization was coupled with residual stresses and exposure of the assembly to a coastal atmosphere during storage prior to installation. This combination of factors resulted in failure by stress-corrosion cracking. Implementation of a new repair procedure was recommended. Repairs were successfully made using the new procedure, and all cracks in the weld repair zones were eliminated.

Welded connections are a common location for failures for many reasons, as explained in this article. This article looks at such failures from a holistic perspective. It discusses the interaction of manufacturing-related cracking and service failures and primarily deals with failures that occur in service due to stresses caused by externally applied loads. The purpose of this article is to enable a failure analyst to identify the causative factors that lead to welded connection failure and to identify the corrective actions needed to overcome such failures in the future. Additionally, the reader will learn from the mistakes of others and use principles that will avoid the occurrence of similar failures in the future. The topics covered include failure analysis fundamentals, welded connections failure analysis, welded connections and discontinuities, and fatigue. In addition, several case studies that demonstrate how a holistic approach to failure analysis is necessary are presented.

Copper tubes from the cooler assemblies of a large air-conditioning unit exhibited leakage upon installation of the unit. Sections from two leaking tubes and one nonleaking tube were subjected to pressure testing and microscopic examination. The cause of leaking was determined to be pitting corrosion. Extensive pitting was found on the insides of all sections examined, with deep and numerous pits in leaking areas. Circumstantial evidence indicated that antifreeze solution left in the tubes from the manufacturing operation was the most likely cause of the pitting.

Two leaks were discovered at a sulfur recovery unit in a refinery. The leaks were at pipe-to-elbow welds in a 152 mm (6 in.) (NPS 6) diam line, operating in lean amine service at 50 deg C (120 deg F) and 2.9 MPa (425 psig). Thickness measurements indicated negligible loss of metal, and the leaks were clamped. A year later, 15 additional leaks were discovered, again at pipe-to-elbow welds in lean amine lines. Further nondestructive testing located other cracks, giving a total of 35. These lines had been in service for approximately eight years. Investigation (visual inspection, hardness testing, and micrographic cross-sections) supported the conclusion that the failure was caused by lean amine SCC. It was considered unlikely that these pipe welds had received such a postweld heat treatment, although it is industry practice to postweld stress relieve piping and pressure vessels in lean amine service if the temperature is expected to be above 95 deg C (200 deg F). Recommendations included inspecting all welds using shear wave ultrasonic testing and postweld heat treating all welds in lean amine service.

A system of carbon steel headers, handling superheated water of 188 deg C (370 deg F) at 2 MPa (300 psi) for automobile-tire curing presses, developed a number of leaks within about four months after two to three years of leak-free service. All the leaks were in shielded metal arc butt welds joining 200 mm (8 in.) diam 90 deg elbows and pipe to 200 mm (8 in.) diam welding-neck flanges. A flange-elbow-flange assembly and a flange-pipe assembly that had leaked were removed for examination. Investigation (visual inspection, hardness testing, chemical analysis, magnetic-particle testing, radiographic inspection, and 2% nital etched 1.7x views) showed varying IDs on the assemblies and supported the conclusions that the failures of the butt welds were the result of fatigue cracks caused by cyclic thermal stresses that initiated at stress-concentrating notches at the toes of the interior fillet welds on the surfaces of the flanges. Recommendations included using ultrasonic testing to identify the appropriate joints and then replacing them. Special attention to accuracy of fit-up in the replacement joints was also recommended to achieve smooth, notch-free contours on the interior surfaces.

Type 316L (UNS S31603) austenitic stainless steel piping was installed as part of a storm-sewer treatment collection system in a manufacturing facility. Within six months of start-up, leaks were discovered. Investigation (on-site current flow testing, visual inspection, water tests, and 5x/10x images etched in ASTM 89 reagent) supported the conclusion that the pitting in the austenitic stainless steel pipe was believed to be caused by damage to the passive layer brought about by a combination of MIC, high chloride levels, and high total dissolved solids. The low-flow and stagnant conditions present in the piping were primary contributors to the pit progression. Recommendations included replacing the pipe. Several alloys, nonmetallic materials, and lining materials were proposed for coupon testing to determine which would operate best in an environment with high levels of aerobic bacteria.

A section of type 304 stainless steel pipe from a stand by system used for emergency injection of cooling water to a nuclear reactor failed during precommissioning. Leaking occurred in only one spot. Liquid penetrant testing revealed a narrow circumferential crack. Metallographic examination of the cracked area indicated stress-corrosion cracking, which had originated at rusted areas that had formed on longitudinal scratch marks on the outer surface of the pipe. The material was free from sensitization, and there was no significant amount of cold work. It was recommended that the stainless steel be kept rust free.

This article discusses the failure analysis of several steel transmission pipeline failures, describes the causes and characteristics of specific pipeline failure modes, and introduces pipeline failure prevention and integrity management practices and methodologies. In addition, it covers the use of transmission pipeline in North America, discusses the procedures in pipeline failure analysis investigation, and provides a brief background on the most commonly observed pipeline flaws and degradation mechanisms. A case study related to hydrogen cracking and a hard spot is also presented.

This investigation involved two AISI 304L acid storage tanks and one AISI 304L spent solvent tank from a sewage treatment facility. After installation, these tanks were hydrostatically tested using sewage effluent. No leaks were found and after a year or two, the tanks were drained and filled with nitric acid in preparation for service. Three weeks later the two acid tanks were found to be leaking from the bottom. Samples from the spent solvent tank revealed that pitting was located in a depressed area near a suction hole, beneath a black residue. It was concluded that the acid tanks failed by chloride-induced pitting initiated by microbial activity. Further, the spent solvent tank failed by a similar, but anaerobic mechanism. The use of the effluent for the hydrostatic test and the failure to remove it and clean and dry the tanks was the primary cause of failure. Localized carbide segregation in the original plate served as preferential corrosion sites. Had the tanks been hydrostatically tested in a proper manner, the pitting may not have occurred.

A nuclear steam-generator vessel constructed of 100-mm thick SA302, grade B, steel was found to have a small leak. The leak originated in the circumferential closure weld joining the transition cone to the upper shell. The welds had been fabricated from the outside by the submerged arc process with a backing strip. The backing was back gouged off, and the weld was completed from the inside with E8018-C3 electrodes by the shielded metal arc process. Striations of the type normally associated with progressive or fatigue-type failures including beach marks that allowed tracing the origin of the fracture to the pits on the inner surface of the vessel were revealed. Copper deposits with zinc were revealed by EDS examination of discolorations. Pitting was revealed to have been caused by poor oxygen control in the steam generators and release of chloride into the steam generators. It was concluded by series of controlled crack-propagation-rate stress-corrosion tests that A302, grade B, steel was susceptible to transgranular stress-corrosion attack in constant extension rate testing with as low as 1 ppm chloride present. It was recommended to maintain the coolant environment low in oxygen and chloride. Copper ions in solution should be eliminated or minimized.