This article describes three design-life methods or philosophies of fatigue, namely, infinite-life, finite-life, and damage tolerant. It outlines the three stages in the process of fatigue fracture: the initial fatigue damage leading to crack initiation, progressive cyclic growth of crack, and the sudden fracture of the remaining cross section. The article discusses the effects of loading and stress distribution on fatigue cracks, and reviews the fatigue behavior of materials when subjected to different loading conditions such as bending and loading. The article examines the effects of load frequency and temperature, material condition, and manufacturing practices on fatigue strength. It provides information on subsurface discontinuities, including gas porosity, inclusions, and internal bursts as well as on corrosion fatigue testing to measure rates of fatigue-crack propagation in different environments. The article concludes with a discussion on rolling-contact fatigue, macropitting, micropitting, and subcase fatigue.

Carbon steel axle forgings were rejected due to internal cracks observed during final machining. To determine the cause of the cracks, the preforms of the forging were analyzed in detail at each stage of the forging. The analysis revealed a large central burst in the intermediate stage of the forging preform, which subsequently increased in the final stage. A high upset strain during forging, especially in the final stage, accentuated the center burst by high lateral flow of the metal. It was concluded that the center burst of the axle forging resulted from a high concentration of nonmetallic inclusions in the central portion of the raw bar stock rather than the usual problem of improper forging temperature. Strict control over the inclusion content in the raw material by changing the vendor eliminated the problem.

A forged pressure vessel made from high temperature austenitic steel X8Cr-Ni-MoVNb 16 13 K (DIN 1.4988) failed. The widest part of the burst had fine cracks on the internal wall running longitudinally. When the internal wall was cleaned, numerous even finer cracks were exposed. On the fracture surfaces in this region an irregularly formed zone was visible in the direction of the internal wall and a fibrous oriented fracture zone towards the external wall. The fracture was typical of stress-corrosion cracking in austenitic steels. Vanadium trichloride was present and tensile stresses were of necessity set up by the internal pressure. Stress-corrosion cracking does not occur if one of the basic requirements is lacking. Because the chloride agent and tensile stresses were inevitably present, the only possible way to prevent future reoccurrence is to forge the entire pressure vessel from a material immune to stress-corrosion cracking or to use interchangeable linings of such a material. A nickel alloy could be considered.

A jack cylinder split open during simulated service testing. The intended internal test pressurization was reportedly analogous to typical service. The material and mechanical properties of the cylinder pipe were unknown, although subsequent testing showed that the pipe satisfied the requirements for a grade 1045 medium-carbon, plain carbon steel. Investigation (visual inspection, chemical analysis, 2% nital etched 119x images, and tension testing) supported the conclusion that the cylinder pipe burst in a mixed brittle-ductile manner due to overpressurization. It is likely that the bearing strength of the pipe was slightly compromised by a low-strength layer of decarburization. Recommendations included evaluating the testing procedure for the possibility of inadvertent overpressurization and analyzing successfully tested cylinders to identify changes in material, and perhaps heat treatment, that may have contributed to this failure.

The primary purpose of this article is to describe general root causes of failure that are associated with wrought metals and metalworking. This includes a brief review of the discontinuities or imperfections that may be common sources of failure-inducing defects in the bulk working of wrought products. The article addresses the types of flaws or defects that can be introduced during the steel forging process itself, including defects originating in the ingot-casting process. Defects found in nonferrous forgings—titanium, aluminum, and copper and copper alloys—also are covered.

This article describes the general root causes of failure associated with wrought metals and metalworking. This includes a brief review of the discontinuities or imperfections that may be the common sources of failure-inducing defects in bulk working of wrought products. The article discusses the types of imperfections that can be traced to the original ingot product. These include chemical segregation; ingot pipe, porosity, and centerline shrinkage; high hydrogen content; nonmetallic inclusions; unmelted electrodes and shelf; and cracks, laminations, seams, pits, blisters, and scabs. The article provides a discussion on the imperfections found in steel forgings. The problems encountered in sheet metal forming are also discussed. The article concludes with information on the causes of failure in cold formed parts.

An eddy current survey of the copper evaporator (chiller) tubes in an absorption air-conditioning unit revealed two tubes in the evaporator bundle with indications typical of longitudinal cracks. Significant necking down and grain distortion at the fracture surfaces was revealed by metallographic examination. The fracture features were found to be characteristic of an overload failure in a ductile material. The ruptured tubes were concluded as a result of examination to have failed as a result of excessive internal pressure. The source of the excessive internal pressure was assumed to be a freeze-up of the tube side water that occurred during interruption of the tube side flow or misoperation of the unit.

Severe pitting corrosion of a carbon steel tube was observed in the air preheater of a power plant, which runs on rice straw firing. Approximately 1450 tubes were removed from Stage 3 of the preheater (air inlet and flue gas outlet) due to corrosion and local bursting. Samples from Stage 2 (where corrosion was low) and Stage 3 (severe corrosion) were taken and subjected to visual inspection, SEM, x-ray diffraction, microhardness measurement, and chemical and microstructural analysis. It was determined that extended non-operation of the plant resulted in the settlement of corrosive species on the tubes in Stage 3. The complete failure of the tube occurred due to diffusion of these elements into the base metal and precipitation of potassium and chlorine compounds along the grain boundaries, with subsequent dislodging of grains. The nonmetallic inclusions acted as nucleating sites for local pitting bursting. Nonuniform heat transfer in Stage 3 operation accelerated the selective corrosion of front-end tubes. The relatively high heat transfer in this stage resulted in condensation of some corrosive gases and consequent corrosion. Continuous operation of the plant with some precautions during assembly of the tubes reduced the corrosion problem.

A welded natural gas line of 400 mm OD and 9 mm wall thickness made of unalloyed steel with 0.22C had to be removed from service after four months because of a pipe burst. Metallographic examination showed the pipe section located next to the gas entrance was permeated by cracks or blisters almost over its entire perimeter in agreement with the ultrasonic test results. Only the weld seam and a strip on each side of it were crack-free. Based on this investigation, the pipeline was taken out of service and reconstructed. To avoid such failures in the future, two preventative measures may be considered. One is to desulfurize the gas. Based on tests, however, the desulfurization would have to be carried very far to be successful. The second possibility is to dry the gas to such an extent as to prevent condensate, and this corrosion, from forming no matter how low winter temperatures may drop. This measure was ultimately recommended, deemed more effective and cheaper.

During the preproduction stages of forging, an initial batch of 50 mm (2 in.) diam Al-4Cu alloy (L77) extruded bar stock material was found to be cracking randomly. Failure analysis was conducted to determine the metallurgical factors underlying the phenomenon. Microexamination of sections across the defects revealed intergranular cracks tracing a path of round, segregated particles and oxide film discontinuities. The segregated particles were rich in copper It was concluded that the cracking was the result of segregations occurring in poor-quality raw material. The source of segregation was suspected to be the use of improperly made master alloys. Use of improved melting techniques and proper master alloys was recommended.

Piping and structural components used in space launch facilities such as NASA's Kennedy Space Center and the Air Force's Cape Canaveral Air Station face extreme operating conditions. Launch effluent and residue from solid rocket boosters react with moisture to form hydrochloric acid that settles on exposed surfaces as they are being subjected to severe mechanical loads imparted during lift-off. Failure analyses were performed on 304 stainless steel tubing that ruptured under such conditions, while carrying various gases, including nitrogen, oxygen, and breathing air. Hydrostatic testing indicated a burst strength of 13,500 psi for the intact sections of tubing. Scanning electron microscopy and metallographic examination revealed that the tubing failed due to corrosion pitting exacerbated by stress-corrosion cracking (SCC). The pitting originated on the outer surface of the tube and ranged from superficial to severe, with some pits extending through 75% of the tube's wall thickness. The SCC emanated from the pits and further reduced the service strength of the component until it could no longer sustain the operating pressure and final catastrophic fracture occurred. Corrosion-resistant coatings added after the investigation have proven effective in preventing subsequent such failures.

A 127 cu m (4,480 cu ft) pressurized railroad tank car burst catastrophically. The railroad tank was approximately 18 m (59 ft) long (from 2:1 elliptical heads), 3 m (10 ft) in OD, and 16 mm (0.63 in.) thick. The chemical and material properties of the tank were to comply with AAR M-128 Grade B. As a result of the explosive failure of the tank car, fragments were ejected from the central region of the car between the support trucks from ground zero to a maximum of approximately 195 m (640 ft). The mode of failure was a brittle fracture originating at a preexisting lamination and crack in the tank wall adjacent to the tank nozzle. The mechanism of failure was overpressurization of the railroad tank car caused by a chemical reaction of the butadiene contents. The interrelationship of the mode, mechanism, and consequences of failure is reviewed to reconstruct the sequence of events that led up to the breach of the railroad tank car. Means to prevent similar reoccurrences are discussed.

Numerous flaws were detected in a steam turbine rotor during a scheduled inspection and maintenance outage. A fracture-mechanics-based analysis of the flaws showed that the rotor could not be safely returned to service. Material, samples from the bore were analyzed to evaluate the actual mechanical properties and to determine the metallurgical cause of the observed indications. Samples were examined in a scanning electron microscope and subjected to chemical analysis and several mechanical property tests, including tensile, Charpy V-notch impact, and fracture toughness. The material was found to be a typical Cr-Mo-V steel, and it met the property requirements. No evidence of temper embrittlement was found. The analyses showed that the observed flaws were present in the original forging and attributed them to lack of ingot consolidation. A series of actions, including overboring of the rotor to remove indications close to the surface and revision of starting procedures, were implemented to extend the remaining life of the rotor and ensure its fitness for continued service.

Flow forming technology has emerged as a promising, economical metal forming technology due to its ability to provide high strength, high precision, thin walled tubes with excellent surface finish. This paper presents experimental observations of defects developed during flow forming of high strength SAE 4130 steel tubes. The major defects observed are fish scaling, premature burst, diametral growth, microcracks, and macrocracks. This paper analyzes the defects and arrives at the causative factors contributing to the various failure modes.

Forged austenitic steel rings used on rotor shafts in two 100,000 kW generators burst from overstressing in a region of ventilation holes. A variety of causes contributed to the brittle fractures in the ductile austenitic alloy, including stress concentration by holes, work hardened metal in the bores, and a variable pattern of residual stress.

Decarburization of steel may occur as skin decarburization by gases either wet or containing oxygen, and as a deep ongoing destruction of the material by hydrogen under high pressure. Guidelines are given for recognizing decarburization and determining at what point cracks occurred. How decarburization changes workpiece properties and the case of hydrogen decarburization are addressed through examples.

Failure occurred in two TOW flight missile cases in unrelated launchings. After an extensive investigation, it was concluded that stress corrosion was the most likely cause of failure. Subsequent to this conclusion, inner wall softening was observed in an unfired TOW flight missile case. Questions arose as to how the softening occurred and whether or not it had contributed to the failures. This report contains the results of a study which resolved that inner wall softening could not have been present in the failed missile cases.

A power plant using two steam generators (vertical U-tube and shell heat exchangers, approximately 21 m (68 ft) high with a steam drum diameter of 6 m (20 ft)) experienced a steam generator tube rupture. Each steam generator contained 11,012 Inconel alloy 600 (nickel-base alloy) tubes measuring 19 mm OD, nominal wall thickness of 1.0 mm (0.042 in.), and average length of 18 m (57.75 ft). The original operating temperature of the reactor coolant was 328 deg C (621 deg F). A tube removal effort was conducted following the tube rupture event. Investigation (visual inspection, SEM fractographs, and micrographs) showed evidence of IGSCC initiating at the OD and IGA under ridgelike deposits that were analyzed and found to be slightly alkaline to very alkaline (caustic) in nature. Crack oxide analysis indicated sulfate levels in excess of expected values. The analysis supported the conclusion that that the deposits formed at locations that experienced steam blanketing or dryout at the higher levels of the steam generators. Recommendations included steam generator water-chemistry controls, chemical cleaning, and reduction of the primary reactor coolant system temperature.