Search Results for fractographic evaluation

While there are many fracture mechanisms that can lead to the failure of a plastic component, environmental stress cracking (ESC) is recognized as one of the leading causes of plastic failure. This article focuses on unpacking the basic concepts of ESC to provide the engineer with a better understanding of how to evaluate and prevent it. It then presents factors that affect and contribute to the susceptibility of plastic to ESC: material factors, chemical factors, stress, and environmental factors. The article includes the collection of background information to understand the circumstances surrounding the failure, a fractographic evaluation to assess the cracking, and analytical testing to evaluate the material, design, manufacturing, and environmental factors.

Nuclear power plants typically experience two or three high-cycle fatigue failures of stainless steel socket-welded connections in small bore piping during each plant-year of operation. This paper discusses fatigue-induced failure in socket-welded joints and the strategy Texas Utilities Electric Company (TU Electric) has implemented in response to these failures. High-cycle fatigue is invisible to proven commercial nondestructive evaluation (NDE) methods during crack initiation and the initial phases of crack growth. Under a constant applied stress, cracks grow at accelerating rates, which means cracks extend from a detectable size to a through-wall crack in a relatively short time. When fatigue cracks grow large enough to be visible to NDE, it is likely that the component is near the end of its useful life. TU Electric has determined that an inspection program designed to detect a crack prior to the component leaking would involve frequent inspections at a given location and that the cost of the inspection program would far exceed the benefits of avoiding a leak. Instead, TU Electric locates these cracks by visually monitoring for leaks. Field experience with fatigue-induced cracks in socket-welded joints has confirmed that visual monitoring does detect cracks in a timely manner, that these cracks do not result in catastrophic failures, and that the plant can be safely shut down in spite of a leaking socket-welded joint in a small bore pipe. Historical data from TU Electric and Southwest Research Institute are presented regarding the frequency of failures, failure locations, and the potential causes. The topics addressed include 1) metallurgical and fractographic features of fatigue cracks at the weld toe and weld root; 2) factors that are associated with fatigue, such as mechanical vibration, internal pulsation, joint design, and welding workmanship; and 3) implications of a leaking crack on plant safety. TU Electric has implemented the use of modified welding techniques for the fabrication of socket-welded joints that are expected to improve their ability to tolerate fatigue.

This article provides an overview of the structural design process and discusses the life-limiting factors, including material defects, fabrication practices, and stress. It details the role of a failure investigator in performing nondestructive inspection. The article provides information on fatigue life assessment, elevated-temperature life assessment, and fitness-for-service life assessment.

A helicopter was hovering approximately 10 ft above a ship when one spar section failed explosively. Visual inspection revealed a crack had progressed through one member of a dual spar plate assembly at a fold pin lug hole. The remaining spar plate carried the blade load until the aircraft was landed. The helicopter main rotor blade spar fracture was analyzed by conventional and advanced computerized fractographic techniques. Digital fractographic Imaging Analysis of theoretical and actual fracture surfaces was applied for automatic detection of fatigue striation spacing. The approach offered a means of quantification of fracture features, providing for objective fractography.

Life assessment of structural components is used to avoid catastrophic failures and to maintain safe and reliable functioning of equipment. The failure investigator's input is essential for the meaningful life assessment of structural components. This article provides an overview of the structural design process, the failure analysis process, the failure investigator's role, and how failure analysis of structural components integrates into the determination of remaining life, fitness-for-service, and other life assessment concerns. The topics discussed include industry perspectives on failure and life assessment of components, structural design philosophies, the role of the failure analyst in life assessment, and the role of nondestructive inspection. They also cover fatigue life assessment, elevated-temperature life assessment, fitness-for-service life assessment, brittle fracture assessments, corrosion assessments, and blast, fire, and heat damage assessments.

Post-service destructive evaluation was performed on two commercially pure zirconium pump impellers. One impeller failed after short service in an aqueous hydrochloric acid environment. Its exposed surfaces are bright and shiny, covered with pockmarks, and peppered with pitting. Uniform corrosion is evident and two deep linear defects are present on impeller blade tips. In contrast, the undamaged impeller surfaces are covered with a dark oxide film. This and many other impellers in seemingly identical service conditions survive long lives with little or no apparent damage. No material or manufacturing defects were found to explain the different service performance of the two impellers. Microstructure, microhardness and material chemistry are consistent with the specified material. Examination reveals the damage mechanism to be corrosion-enhanced cavitation erosion, the most severe form of erosion corrosion. Cavitation damage to the protective oxide film caused the zirconium to lose its normally outstanding corrosion resistance. The root cause of the impeller failure is most likely the introduction of excessive air into the pump due to low liquid level, a bad seal or inadequate head. Corrosion pitting, crevice corrosion, and solidification cracks (casting defect) also contributed to the failure.

A 17-4 PH steering actuator rod end body broke during normal take-off. Results of failure analysis revealed that the wall thickness of the race was much below the design limits, thus causing the race to rest on the body's swaged edges rather than on the load carrying centerline of the body. This assembly condition generated abnormal high loads on the swaged edges, ultimately resulting in fatigue failure. To prevent a recurrence of similar failure in the future, the dimensions of the race in the spherical bearing were changed, no further failure occurred.

The paper describes the findings from a damaged propeller blade made from Mn-Ni-Al-bronze, commercially known as Superston 70 (ABS Type 5). The blade had broken at the 0.65 pitch radius location, and the fracture occurred in a brittle mode. The findings reported here point to two potential contributors to the propeller blade failure, viz., the presence of casting flaws at the low pressure side of the propeller blade and service stresses at this surface that reached approximately 400 MPa. This stress value exceeded the yield strength at the corresponding location of the unbroken blade by approximately 40%.

After completing a fatigue test of an aluminum alloy component machined from a 7079-T6 forging, technicians noted a 5 in. crack which ran longitudinally above and through the flange. When the fracture face was examined by light microscopy, observers could not ascertain the exact mode of fracture. Electron fractography revealed that five different modes of crack growth were operative as the part failed. Region 1 was a shallow zone (about 0.002 in. at its deepest) of dimpled structure typical of an overload failure. Region 2 was a zone that grew by a stress corrosion mechanism. Through a fatigue mechanism was operative in Region 3, it was not the cause of the large crack. Region 4, which covered 50% of the fracture area, developed mainly by stress corrosion. This zone gradually changed into the combination of intergranular and transgranular overload in Region 5, which covered approximately the remaining 50% of the fracture. Apparently, after stress corrosion moved halfway through, the part failed by overload. This failure analysis proved that a crack, originally thought to be a fatigue failure, was actually a stress corrosion crack.

A failure analysis investigation was conducted on a fractured aluminum tailwheel fork which failed moments after the landing of a privately owned, 1955 twin-engine airplane. Nondestructive evaluation via dye-penetrant inspection revealed no discernible surface cracks. The chemical composition of the sand-cast component was identified via optical emission spectroscopy and is comparable to an aluminum sand-cast alloy, AA 712.0. Metallographic evaluation via optical microscopy and scanning electron microscopy revealed a high degree of porosity in the microstructure as well as the presence of deleterious intermetallic compounds within interdendritic regions. Macrohardness testing produced hardness values which are noticeably higher than standard hardness values for 712.0. The primary fracture surfaces indicate evidence of mixed-mode fracture, via intergranular cracking, cleaved intermetallic particles, and dimpled cellular regions in the matrix. The secondary fracture surface demonstrates similar features of intergranular fracture.

Stainless steel liners (AISI type 321) used in bellows-type expansion joints in a duct assembly installed in a low-pressure nitrogen gas system failed in service. The duct assembly consisted of two expansion joints connected by a 32 cm (12 in.) OD pipe of ASTM A106 grade B steel. Elbows made of ASTM A234 grade B steel were attached to each end of the assembly, 180 deg apart. A 1.3 mm (0.050 in.) thick liner with an OD of 29 cm (11 in.) was welded inside each joint. The upstream ends were stable, but the downstream ends of the liners remained free, allowing the components to move with the expansion and contraction of the bellows. Investigation (visual inspection, hardness testing, and 30x fractographs) supported the conclusion that the liners failed in fatigue initiated at the intersection of the longitudinal weld forming the liner and the circumferential weld by which it attached to the bellows assembly. Recommendations included increasing the thickness of the liners from 1.3 to 1.9 mm (0.050 to 0.075 in.) in order to damp some of the stress-producing vibrations.