This article illustrates the use of the American Petroleum Institute (API) 579-1/ASME FFS-1 fitness-for-service (FFS) code (2020) to assess the serviceability and remaining life of a corroded flare knockout drum from an oil refinery, two fractionator columns affected by corrosion under insulation in an organic sulfur environment, and an equalization tank with localized corrosion in the shell courses in a chemicals facility. In the first two cases, remaining life is assessed by determining the minimum thickness required to operate the corroded equipment. The first is based on a Level 2 FFS assessment, while the second involves a Level 3 assessment. The last case involves several FFS assessments to evaluate localized corrosion in which remaining life was assessed by determining the minimum required thickness using the concept of remaining strength factor for groove-like damage and evaluating crack-like flaws using the failure assessment diagram. Need for caution in predicting remaining life due to corrosion is also covered.

Life assessment of structural components is used to avoid catastrophic failures and to maintain safe and reliable functioning of equipment. The failure investigator's input is essential for the meaningful life assessment of structural components. This article provides an overview of the structural design process, the failure analysis process, the failure investigator's role, and how failure analysis of structural components integrates into the determination of remaining life, fitness-for-service, and other life assessment concerns. The topics discussed include industry perspectives on failure and life assessment of components, structural design philosophies, the role of the failure analyst in life assessment, and the role of nondestructive inspection. They also cover fatigue life assessment, elevated-temperature life assessment, fitness-for-service life assessment, brittle fracture assessments, corrosion assessments, and blast, fire, and heat damage assessments.

This article provides an overview of the structural design process and discusses the life-limiting factors, including material defects, fabrication practices, and stress. It details the role of a failure investigator in performing nondestructive inspection. The article provides information on fatigue life assessment, elevated-temperature life assessment, and fitness-for-service life assessment.

This article describes some of the welding discontinuities and flaws characterized by nondestructive examinations. It focuses on nondestructive inspection methods used in the welding industry. The sources of weld discontinuities and defects as they relate to service failures or rejection in new construction inspection are also discussed. The article discusses the types of base metal cracks and metallurgical weld cracking. The article discusses the processes involved in the analysis of in-service weld failures. It briefly reviews the general types of process-related discontinuities of arc welds. Mechanical and environmental failure origins related to other types of welding processes are also described. The article explains the cause and effects of process-related discontinuities including weld porosity, inclusions, incomplete fusion, and incomplete penetration. Different fitness-for-service assessment methodologies for calculating allowable or critical flaw sizes are also discussed.

Accelerated life testing and aging methodologies are increasingly being used to generate engineering data for determining material property degradation and service life (or fitness for purpose) of plastic materials for hostile service conditions. This article presents an overview of accelerated life testing and aging of unreinforced and fiber-reinforced plastic materials for assessing long-term material properties and life expectancy in hostile service environments. It considers various environmental factors, such as temperature, humidity, pressure, weathering, liquid chemicals (i.e., alkalis and acids), ionizing radiation, and biological degradation, along with the combined effects of mechanical stress, temperature, and moisture (including environmental stress corrosion). The article also includes information on the use of accelerated testing for predicting material property degradation and long-term performance.

This article addresses the effects of damage to equipment and structures due to explosions (blast), fire, and heat as well as the methodologies that are used by investigating teams to assess the damage and remaining life of the equipment. It discusses the steps involved in preliminary data collection and preparation. Before discussing the identification, evaluation, and use of explosion damage indicators, the article describes some of the more common events that are considered in incident investigations. The range of scenarios that can occur during explosions and the characteristics of each are also covered. In addition, the article primarily discusses level 1 and level 2 of fire and heat damage assessment and provides information on level 3 assessment.

The lifetime assessment of polymeric products is complicated, and if the methodology utilized leads to inaccurate predictions, the mistakes could lead to financial loss as well as potential loss of life, depending on the service application of the product. This article provides information on the common aging mechanisms of polymeric materials and the common accelerated testing methods used to obtain relevant data that are used with the prediction models that enable service life assessment. Beginning with a discussion of what constitutes a product failure, this article then reviews four of the eight major aging mechanisms, namely environmental stress cracking, chemical degradation, creep, and fatigue, as well as the methods used in product service lifetime assessment for them. Later, several methods of service lifetime prediction that have gained industry-wide acceptance, namely the hydrostatic design basis approach, Miner's rule, the Arrhenius model, and the Paris Law for fatigue crack propagation, are discussed.

A fireball engulfed half of a drill rig while in the process of drilling a shot hole. Subsequent investigation revealed the cause of the fire was the failure of the oil return hose to the separator/receiver in the air compressor. The failed hose was a 50.8 mm 100R1 type hose, as specified in AS 3791-1991 Hydraulic Hoses. This type of hose consisted of an inner tube of oil-resistant synthetic rubber, a single medium-carbon steel wire braid reinforcement, and an oil-and-weather resistant synthetic rubber cover. The wire braiding was found to be severely corroded in the area of the failure zone. The physical cause of the hose failure was by severe localized corrosion of the layer of reinforcing braid wire at the transition between the coupling and the hose at the end of the ferrule. This caused a reduction of the wire cross-sectional area to the extent that the wires broke. Once the majority of the braid wires were broken there was not enough intrinsic strength in the rubber inner hose to resist the normal operating pressures.

The boom lift equalizer hose on an excavator failed and the resultant release of high-pressure hydraulic fluid damaged the operator cabin. The hose was a heavy duty, high-impulse, multiple-spiral wire-reinforced, rubber covered hydraulic hose equivalent to 100R13 specifications as set in AS3791-1991. It had a maximum operating pressure of 34.5 MPa (5000 psi). The failure occurred adjacent to one of the couplings, although some of the wire strands had not broken. The two outer layers of reinforcement wire on the failed end had experienced extensive corrosion, corroding away completely in most areas. This corrosion was fairly uniform around the circumference of the hose. The loss of two spirals/layers of wire reinforcement effectively reduced the pressure carrying capacity of the hose to below that of the maximum operational pressure experienced. Either the hose (or assembly) was already corroded prior to being fitted, or, the hose experienced aggressive conditions causing rapid corrosion of the exposed wire strands.

A detailed fracture mechanics evaluation is the most accurate and reliable prediction of process equipment susceptibility to brittle fracture. This article provides an overview and discussion on brittle fracture. The discussion covers the reasons to evaluate brittle fracture, provides a brief summary of historical failures that were found to be a result of brittle fracture, and describes key components that drive susceptibility to a brittle fracture failure, namely stress, material toughness, and cracklike defect. It also presents industry codes and standards that assess susceptibility to brittle fracture. Additionally, a series of case study examples are presented that demonstrate assessment procedures used to mitigate the risk of brittle fracture in process equipment.

The sudden collapse of a tower crane on a building site resulted in severe injuries to the driver. Failure took place at the upper portion of the foundation or lowermost section. The mast sections were constructed from four main corner angles welded to end frames also made from angle sections which were gusseted and fitted with additional doubling plates in the corners where the jointing bolts were fitted. It was evident that the collapse was due to failure of the welds attaching the corner angles to an end frame. Many of the welds at the locations where failure occurred were of poor quality. The corner angles appeared to have been cut slightly shorter than the required dimensions. This was compensated in one case by the use of a weld build-up and in the other three by make-up pieces attached by welds of insignificant dimensions.

This article briefly reviews the general causes of weldment failures, which may arise from rejection after inspection or failure to pass mechanical testing as well as loss of function in service. It focuses on the general discontinuities observed in welds, and shows how some imperfections may be tolerable and how the other may be root-cause defects in service failures. The article explains the effects of joint design on weldment integrity. It outlines the origins of failure associated with the inherent discontinuity of welds and the imperfections that might be introduced from arc welding processes. The article also describes failure origins in other welding processes, such as electroslag welds, electrogas welds, flash welds, upset butt welds, flash welds, electron and laser beam weld, and high-frequency induction welds.

Following a fracture mechanics “fitness-for-purpose” analysis of petroleum industry cold service pressure vessels, using the British Standard PD 6493, it was realized that an analogous approach could be used for the failure analysis of a similar pressure vessel dome which had failed in service some years previously. The failed pressure vessel, with a diam of 2.5 m and several meters tall, had been made of 12 mm thick IZETT steel plate of the same type and heat treatment as used in the earlier fitness-for-purpose already measured. Examination of the fracture surfaces suggested, from fatigue striations manifested by SEM, that the vessel was subject to significant fatigue cracking, which was probably corrosion assisted. From COD measurements at the operating temperature of -130 deg C (-202 deg F), and a finite stress analysis, a fracture mechanics evaluation using BS PD6493 yielded realistic critical flaw sizes (in the range 51 to 150 mm). These sizes were consistent with the limited fracture surface observations and such flaws could well have been present in the vessel dome prior to catastrophic failure. For similar pressure vessels, an inspection program based on a leak-before-break philosophy was consequently regarded as acceptable.

This article provides some new developments in elevated-temperature and life assessments. It is aimed at providing an overview of the damage mechanisms of concern, with a focus on creep, and the methodologies for design and in-service assessment of components operating at elevated temperatures. The article describes the stages of the creep curve, discusses processes involved in the extrapolation of creep data, and summarizes notable creep constitutive models and continuum damage mechanics models. It demonstrates the effects of stress relaxation and redistribution on the remaining life and discusses the Monkman-Grant relationship and multiaxiality. The article further provides information on high-temperature metallurgical changes and high-temperature hydrogen attack and the steps involved in the remaining-life prediction of high-temperature components. It presents case studies on heater tube creep testing and remaining-life assessment, and pressure vessel time-dependent stress analysis showing the effect of stress relaxation at hot spots.

This article offers an overview of fatigue fundamentals, common fatigue terminology, and examples of damage morphology. It presents a summary of relevant engineering mechanics, cyclic plasticity principles, and perspective on the modern design by analysis (DBA) techniques. The article reviews fatigue assessment methods incorporated in international design and post construction codes and standards, with special emphasis on evaluating welds. Specifically, the stress-life approach, the strain-life approach, and the fracture mechanics (crack growth) approach are described. An overview of high-cycle welded fatigue methods, cycle-counting techniques, and a discussion on ratcheting are also offered. A historical synopsis of fatigue technology advancements and commentary on component design and fabrication strategies to mitigate fatigue damage and improve damage tolerance are provided. Finally, the article presents practical fatigue assessment case studies of in-service equipment (pressure vessels) that employ DBA methods.

The crankshaft of a six cylinder, 225-hp diesel engine driving a small locomotive was examined. About nine months after installation a fall in oil pressure was traced to damage to No. 5 crank pin bearing. A small lip present on one side of the discontinuity apparently served to scrape the bearing material. The defect was stoned smooth, a new bearing fitted, and the engine returned to service. The engine performed satisfactorily for a further twelve months until fracture of the crankshaft through the No. 5 crank pin supervened. The fracture revealed a complex torsional fatigue failure. Microscopic examination revealed that the pin had been hard chromium plated and that the plating followed the curved edge of the outer extremity of the defect. This crank pin contained an inherent defect in the form of a slag inclusion or crack situated at the surface. That the crack only showed itself after a period of service suggests that initially it may have been slightly below the surface of the machined pin and some slight extension outwards took place in service.

A hoist lift hose on a loader failed catastrophically. The hoses were a 100R13 type (as classified in AS3791-1991) with 50.8 mm nominal internal diameter. They consisted of six alternating spirals of heavy wire around a synthetic rubber inner tube with a synthetic rubber outer sheath. Failure of the lift hose was approximately 50 to 100 mm away from the "upper" end of the hose, with the straight coupling that attaches to the hydraulic system. The return hose was in much better condition, with no apparent deformation and only small areas of mechanical damage to the outer sheath. There were two modes of failure of the wire: tensile and corrosion related. The predominant corrosion mechanism appeared to be crevice corrosion related, with the corrosion being driven by the retention of water by the cover material around the wire strands. In this case study (and in most wire-reinforced hydraulic hoses), the wire reinforcing strands were a medium-carbon steel in the cold drawn condition. Radiographic nondestructive testing (NDT) was recommended to determine when a hydraulic hose should be replaced.

A special eyebolt was used to lift prefabricated concrete panels weighing approximately 16 cwt. Two eyebolts were used with a spreader bar to give a vertical lift on each eyebolt. Following failure of one eyebolt, which resulted in dropping of the load and subsequent failure of the other one, a complete eyebolt was submitted for assessment. Microscopic examination indicated a medium carbon-manganese steel had been used for the lower screwed portion of the eyebolt. Failure may have been due to brittle fracture or to fatigue, both of which could have been initiated at cracks in the hardened material in the region of the weld securing the screwed portion to the intermediate collar and which may have formed at the time of manufacture. Out-of-squareness of the thread with the collar, as was seen in the example submitted, gave rise to bending stresses when the bolt was tightened down, and this could have been a further factor which promoted failure. It was suggested that the design and construction could be improved by either making the component in one piece or, if it was desired, to adapt a standard eyebolt.

Following the crash of a Mirage III-0 aircraft (apparently caused by engine failure), a small crack was detected in a bolt hole in the wing main spar (AU4SG aluminum alloy). Because this area was considered to be critical to aircraft safety and similar cracking was found in other spars in service, the Royal Australian Air Force requested that the crack growth rate during service be determined. The loading history of the aircraft was made available in the form of flight by-flight records of the counts from the vertical accelerometer sensors fitted to the airframe and a series of “overstress” events recorded during the life of the aircraft. The bolt hole was examined by eddy current testing, visual examination, high-powered light microscope, and scanning electron microscope. Simulation tests were also conducted. The use of simulation specimens permitted actual crack growth rate data to be determined for the configuration of interest.