The specified elongation of 10% could not be achieved in several hollow pinion gear shafts made of cast Cr-Mo steel GS 35 Cr-Mo 5 3 that were heat treated to a strength of 90 kp/sq mm. The steel was melted in a basic 3 ton arc furnace and deoxidized in the furnace and in the pan with a total of 7 kg aluminum. Fracture of a tensile specimen occurred with low elongation and, apparently, also with low reduction of area. In some places it was coarse grained conchoidal. It was found that the exceptionally low elongation of the cast specimens was due to excessive deoxidation by aluminum.

The cause of fracture of two piston rods of hammers of a drop forge was determined. The first rod of 180 mm diam consisted of an unalloyed steel with 0.37% C and 0.67% Mn and had a strength of 56 kp/sq mm at 26% elongation. Fatigue fractures propagated from several points which could be recognized as flaky cracks already in the fracture, and which later were united. No material defects could be detected in the cross section parallel to the fracture plane except for these very short cracks. These comparatively insignificant defects were sufficient to cause the fracture during high impact fatigue stresses in the drop forge. The second piston rod of 120 mm diam consisted of a steel with 0.25% C and 1.00% Mn. It allegedly had 57 kp/sq mm tensile strength and 26% elongation. The basic structure of the 120 mm piston rod was ferritic-pearlitic and hardness of 155 Brinell was accordingly low, corresponding to approximately 53 kp/sq mm tensile strength. The incipient fractures had no connection with the material defects in this shaft and therefore the fracture could not have been caused by them. Probably the low strength of the piston rod was insufficient for the high stresses.

Extra high strength zinc-coated 1080 steel welded wire was wound into seven-wire cable strands for use in aerial cables and guy wires. The wires and cable strands failed tensile, elongation, and wrap tests, with wires fracturing near welds at 2.5 to 3.5% elongation and through the welded joints in wrap tests. The welded wire was annealed by resistance heating. The wire ends had a chisel shape, produced by the use of sidecutters. Tests of the heat treatment temperatures showed that the wire near the weld area exceeded 775 deg C (1425 deg F). Metallographic examination revealed martensite present in the weld area after the heat treatment. The test failures of the AISI 1080 steel wire butt-welded joints were due to martensite produced in cooling from the welding operation that was not tempered adequately in postweld heat treatment, and to poor wire-end preparation for welding that produced poorly formed weld burrs. The postweld heat treatment was standardized on the 760 deg C (1400 deg F) transformation treatment. The chisel shape of the wire ends was abandoned in favor of flat filed ends. The wrap test was improved by adopting a hand-cranked device. Under these conditions, the welded joints withstood the tensile and wrap tests.

During a routine inspection, cracks were discovered in several aluminum alloy (similar to either 2014 or 2017) coupling nuts on the fuel lines of a missile. The fuel lines had been exposed to a marine atmosphere for six months while the missile stood on an outdoor test stand near the seacoast. A complete check was then made, both visually and with the aid of a low-power magnifying glass, of all coupling nuts of this type on the missile. Investigation (visual inspection, spectrographic and chemical analysis, and metallographic examination) supported the conclusion that the cracking of the aluminum alloy coupling nuts was caused by stress corrosion. Contributing factors included use of a material that is susceptible to this type of failure, sustained tensile stressing in the presence of a marine (chloride-bearing) atmosphere, and an elongated grain structure transverse to the direction of stress. The elongated grain structure transverse to the direction of stress was a consequence of following the generally used procedure of machining this type of nut from bar stock. Recommendations included changing the materials specification for new coupling nuts for this application to permit use of only aluminum alloys 6061-T6 and T651 and 2024-T6, T62, and T851.

A water tube boiler with two headers and 15.5 atm working pressure became leaky in the lower part due to the formation of cracks in the rivet-hole edges. The boiler plate of 20 mm thickness was a rimming steel with 0.05% C, traces of Si, 0.38% Mn, 0.027% P, 0.035% S, and 0.08% Cu. The mean value of the yield point was 24 (24) kg/sq mm, the tensile strength 39 (38) kg/sq mm, the elongation at fracture, d10, 26 (24)%, the necking at fracture 71 (66)% and notch impact value 11.5 (9.4) kgm/sq cm (the values in brackets are for the transverse direction). The specimen from inside surface of the boiler was polished and etched with Fry-solution, which revealed parallel striations formed due to the cold bending of the plate. The zones of slip were concentrated around the rivet holes. The cracks were formed here. The structure examination proved that the cracks had taken an exactly intercrystalline path, which is characteristic for caustic corrosion cracks. It was recommended that the internal stresses be removed through annealing or alternatively lye-resistant steel should be used.

The upper frame from a large cone crusher failed in severe service after an unspecified service duration. The ductile iron casting was identified as grade 80-55-06, signifying minimum properties of 552 MPa (80 ksi) tensile strength, 379 MPa (55 ksi) yield strength, and 6% elongation. Investigation (visual inspection, chemical analysis, unetched 30x images, and 2% nital etched 30x images) was difficult because the fracture surface of the frame section was obliterated by postfracture corrosion. Repeated attempts at cleaning using progressively stronger chemicals revealed that no telltale fracture morphology remained. However, the investigation supported the conclusion that the crusher frame failed via brittle overload fracture, likely due to excessive service stresses and substandard mechanical properties. Recommendations included additional quality-control measures to provide better spheroidal graphite morphology at the frame surface.

In the EMD-2 Joint Directed Attack Munition (JDAM), the A357 aluminum alloy housing had been redesigned and cast via permanent mold casting, but did not meet the design strength requirements of the previous design. Mechanical tests on thick and thin sections of the forward housing assembly revealed tensile properties well below the allowable design values. Radiology and CT evaluations revealed no casting defects. Optical microscopy revealed porosity uniformly distributed throughout the casting on the order of 0.1 mm pore diam. Scanning electron microscopy revealed elongated pores, which indicated turbulent filling of the mold. Spherical pores would have indicated the melt had been improperly degassed. Based on these findings, it was recommended that the manufacturer analyze and redesign the gating system to eliminate the turbulent flow problem during the permanent mold casting process.

To ensure no malfunctions and although there were no apparent problems, a main fuel control was returned to the factory for examination after service on a test aircraft engine that had experienced high vibrations. When the fuel control was disassembled, a lever, cast from AMS 5350 (AISI type 410) stainless steel that was through-hardened to 26 to 32 HRC and passivated, was shown to be cracked. The crack initiated at the sharp corner of the elongated milled slot and propagated across to the outer wall. The sections around the crack were spread about 30 deg apart, showing the fracture surface under investigation had beach marks initiating at the sharp corner along the milled slot. Changes in frequency or amplitude of vibration caused different rates of propagation, resulting in a change in pattern. This evidence supported the conclusion that the lever failed in fatigue as a result of excessive vibration of the fuel control on the test engine. Recommendations included redesign of the lever with a large radius in the corner where cracking originated. This would reduce the stress-concentration factor significantly, thus minimizing the susceptibility of the lever to fatigue.

Pitostatic system connectors were being found cracked on several aircraft. Two of the cracked connectors made of 2024-T351 aluminum alloy were submitted for failure analysis. The connectors had cut pipelike threads that were sealed with Teflon-type tape when installed. Longitudinal cracks were located near the opening of the female ends of each connector. A cross section showed intergranular cracking with multiple branching in one connector. Scanning electron microscopy (SEM) showed intergranular cracking and separation of elongated grains. A cross section of connector threads showed an incomplete thread form resulting from improper tapping. It was concluded that the pitostatic system connectors failed by SCC. The stress was caused by forcing the improperly threaded female nut over its fully threaded male counterpart to effect a seal. The one connector tested for chemical composition was not made of 2024 aluminum alloy as reported but of 2017 aluminum. It was recommended that the pitostatic system connector manufacturing process be revised to produce full-depth threads rather than pseudo pipe threads. Wall thickness should be increased to increase the hoop stress bearing area if pipe threads were to be used. A determination of proper torque values for tightening the connectors was suggested also.

The cause of the fatigue failure in the retaining ring of the compressor region of an aero-engine turbine was found to be the presence of a high concentration of nonmetallic inclusions. The results of chemical analysis were used to estimate the phases present. The most frequently observed inclusions were spinel solid solutions of the type MO middot; N2O3, where M = Fe, Mn, or Mg and N = Cr or Al. The detrimental inclusions were corundum, calcium aluminates, cristobalite, and silicates. The most detrimental phases were traced on the surfaces of the specimens fractured using impact loading; the comparison is being made with the polished surfaces and the tensile specimen fracture surfaces. The inclusions in the failed retaining ring were compared with the ones in a similar component obtained from a used engine. In the case of the latter, a large number of fine and elongated (Mn, Cr, Fe)S inclusions were present along with spinels. The nondeformable, rigid oxide particles are considered more undesirable than the sulfides as far as fatigue life of the component is concerned. It has been reported that the presence of sulfides may eliminate the stresses due to oxides.

The engine on a jet aircraft was shut down immediately as it produced excessive vibration. Complete failure of the cage in one of the two main-shaft ball bearings (placed side by side in the engine) was revealed in the dismantled engine. The ball bearings (made of vacuum-melted 52100 steel) were both of the single-row deep-groove type with split inner rings and were designed to operate at a maximum temperature of 175 deg C. Overtempering of the rings was indicated by the reduced hardness in comparison to unfailed rings. Severe damage to approximately 20% of the load-bearing surface, with more damage on one of the shoulders of the groove, was revealed during examination of the outer raceway of the bearing which indicated misalignment of the bearing. No damage other than spalling cavities in the inner-ring raceway, caused by the elongated subsurface inclusion revealed by metallographic examination of circumferential section of the largest cavity, was exhibited by the second bearing. It was concluded that the fracture of the cage was caused by overheating and misalignment caused excessive stressing of the bearing on the main shaft.

Proper stress analysis during component design is imperative for accurate life and performance prediction. The total stress on a part is comprised of the applied design stress and any residual stress that may exist due to forming or machining operations. Stress-corrosion cracking may be defined as the spontaneous failure of a metal resulting from the combined effects of a corrosive environment and the effective component of tensile stress acting on the structure. However, because of the orientation dependence in aluminum, it is the residual stress occurring in the most susceptible direction that must be considered of primary importance in material selection for design configuration. A Navy UH-1N helicopter main rotor blade grip manufactured from a 2014-T6 aluminum alloy forging failed because of a design flaw that left a high residual tensile stress along the short transverse plane; this in turn provided the necessary condition for stress corrosion to initiate. A complete failure investigation to ascertain the exact cause of the failure was conducted utilizing stereomicroscopic examination, scanning electron microscopy, metallographic inspection and interpretation, energy-dispersive chemical analysis, physical and mechanical evaluation. Stereomicroscopic examination of the opened crack fracture surface revealed one large fan-shaped region that had propagated radially through the thickness of the material from two distinct origin areas on the internal diam of the grip. Higher magnification inspection near the origin area revealed a flat, wood-like appearance. Scanning electron microscopy divulged the presence of substantial mud cracking and intergranular separation on the fracture surface. Metallographic examination revealed intergranular cracking and substantial leaf separation along the elongated grains parallel to the fracture surface. Chemical composition and hardness requirements were found to be as specified. The blade grip failed due to a stress corrosion crack which initiated on the inner diam and propagated in the short transverse direction through the thickness of the component. The high residual tensile stress in the part resulting from the forging and exposed after machining of the inner diam, combined with the presence of moisture, provided the necessary conditions to facilitate crack initiation and propagation.

Several newly developed liquid propane gas (LPG) cylinders made from Fe-0.13C-0.42Mn steel failed, each fracturing in the longitudinal direction. One of the cylinders was thoroughly analyzed to determine the cause. Deep-drawing flaws were observed on the inner wall of the cylinder, oriented in the direction of the fracture and roughly equal in length. Flaws about 1.3 mm deep, steps, and a chevron pattern were observed on the fractured surface as were cleavage facets, revealed by SEM. Hardness was relatively high and the microstructure near the fracture surface appeared elongated. In addition, the stress intensity factor KI calculated from the value of the internal pressure was lower than that estimated by the fracture toughness test. All of this suggests that the tanks were not sufficiently annealed and prone to brittle fracture. The analysis thus proves that cracks initiated by deep-drawing flaws were the primary cause of failure.

A steel galvanizing vat measuring 3 x 1.2 x 1.2 m (10 x 4 x 4 ft) and made of 19 mm thick carbon steel plate (ASTM A285, grade B)) at a shipbuilding and ship-repair facility failed after only three months of service. To verify suspected failure cause, two T joints were made in 12.5 mm thick ASTM A285, grade B, steel plate. One joint was welded using the semiautomatic submerged arc process with one pass on each side. A second joint was welded manually by the shielded metal arc process using E6010 welding rod and four passes on each side. The silicon content of the shielded metal arc weld was 0.54%, whereas that of the submerged arc weld was 0.86%. After being weighed, the specimens were submerged in molten zinc for 850 h. Analysis (visual inspection, chemical analysis, 100x 2% nital-etched micrographs) supported the conclusions that the vat failed due to molten-zinc corrosion along elongated ferrite bands, possibly because silicon was dissolved in the ferrite and thus made it more susceptible to attack by the molten zinc. Recommendations included rewelding the vat using the manual shielded metal arc process with at least four passes on each side.

A 75 cm OD x 33 mm thick pipe in a horizontal section of a hot steam reheat line ruptured after 15 years in service. The failed section was manufactured from rolled plate of material specification SA387, grade C. The longitudinal seam weld was a double butt-weld that was V-welded from both sides and failure was found to propagate along the longitudinal seam and its HAZ. The fracture surface near the inner wall of the pipe was found to have a bluish gray appearance, while the fracture surface near the outer wall was rust colored (oxides). The transverse-to-the-weld specimen from the longitudinal seam weld was revealed to have lower elongation and a shear type failure rather than the cup-cone failures. It was concluded that the welded longitudinal seam exhibited embrittlement. A low-ductility intergranular fracture that progressed through the weld metal was revealed by scanning electron microscopy. The cracks were revealed to be in existence for some time before the final failure which was indicated by the extent and amount of corrosion products. It was concluded that low ductility was responsible for the original initiation of cracks in the pipe.

A spindle made of hardenable 13% chromium steel X40 Cr13 (Material No. 1.4034) that was fastened to a superheated steam push rod made of high temperature structural steel 13Cr-Mo44 (Material No. 1.7335) by means of a convex fillet weld, fractured at the first operation of the rod directly next to the weld bead. Investigation showed that the fracture of the superheated steam push rod spindle was caused by hardening and hardening crack formation in the weld seams and adjoining areas. It would have been preferable to avoid welding near the cross sectional transitions altogether in consideration of the crack sensitivity of high hardenability steels. If for some reason this was not possible, then all precautions should have been taken that are applicable to the particular steel, such as preheating, slow cooling and stress relief tempering after welding. The selection of an austenitic additive material should have been considered because it could have equalized stresses due to its high elongation. Most probably, however, a material of lower hardenability should have been selected for the spindle if high operating properties were of paramount importance.