Coiled tubing used in drilling operations failed at the halfway point of its estimated fatigue life. The failure was found to be transverse to the tubing axis. Visual examination revealed a flat fracture surface extending 13 mm with the rest of the fracture showing shear lips indicative of tensile overload. The flat portion of the fracture surface was typical of fatigue cracking. Fatigue striations were revealed by SEM. Corrosion pitting on the tubing ID from which the fatigue crack had propagated were observed on closer examination. The corrosion pitting was speculated to have occurred when the tubing was idle and fluids accumulated at the bottom of the tubing wraps. The coiled tubing was concluded to have failed prematurely due to low-cycle fatigue initiated at corrosion pitting sites. Corrosive attack on the coiled tubing was recommended to be reduced by completely removing fluids or modifying the fluids in the tubing or purging by flowing dry nitrogen to dry it out.

During natural gas drilling in the EMS region in 1956, considerable numbers of longitudinal cracks and transverse fractures occurred in the connecting pieces of the bore rods. The connectors were screwed onto the rods by means of a fine thread and tightly joined with it by shrinkage at 530 deg C. The connectors were made of SAE 4140 Cr-Mo steel. The material for the rod pipes was Fe-0.4C-1Mn steel. Structural stresses played a role in the cracking. Iron sulfide formed on the fracture planes and flake-like stress cracks occurred in the steel. The hydrogen sulfide content of the gas was the cause of damage. Hydrogen liberated by reaction with the iron caused the formation of iron sulfide after penetration of the steel, which had an explosive effect during molecular separation under high pressure. This in turn caused the crack formation in conjunction with the external and residual stresses.

A masonry type drill bit, designed for impact drilling in rock, fractured after a short time in service. Samples of the failed bit were analyzed using optical and scanning electron microscopy, quantitative metallography, and chemical analysis. The composition was found to be that of 18CrNi3Mo steel. Investigators also found evidence of inclusions and prior austenite grain size, although it was determined that neither played a role in the failure. Rather, according to test data, the failure occurred because of stress concentration (due to geometric discontinuities along the tooth profiles) and the cumulative effect of torque and force loading (the byproduct of continuous twisting and axial impact). Cracks readily initiate under these conditions then propagate quickly through what was found to be networks of tempered martensite, thus resulting in premature failure.

A wire hoisting rope on a drilling rig failed during a lift, after a few cycles of operation, causing extensive damage to support structures. The failure investigation that followed included mechanical property testing and chemical, metallurgical, and finite element analysis. The rope was made from multiple strands of 1095 steel wire. Its chemical composition, ferrite-pearlite structure, and high hardness indicate that the wire is a type of extra improved plow steel (EEIPS grade). The morphologies of the fracture surfaces suggest that the wires were subjected to tensile overloading. This was confirmed by finite element analysis, which also revealed compressive contact stresses between the wires and between the rope and sheave surface. Based on the results, it was concluded that a tensile overload, due to the combined effect of a sudden load and undersized sheave, is what ultimately caused the rope to fail.

Cadmium-coated type 410 martensitic stainless steel 1 4 -14 self-drilling tapping screws fractured during retorquing tests within a few weeks after installation. The screws were used to assemble structural steel frames for granite panels that formed the outer skin of a high-rise building. Fractographic and metallographic examination showed that the fractures occurred in a brittle manner from intergranular crack propagation. Laboratory and simulated environmental tests showed that an aqueous environment was necessary for the brittle fracture/cracking phenomenon. The cracks were singular and intergranular with little branching. Secondary subsurface cracks suggested possible hydrogen embrittlement. The 410 screws had been introduced to replace conventional case-hardened carbon steel screws that conform to SAE specification J78. Carbon steel screws had a proven record of acceptable performance for the intended application. It was recommended that use of the 410 screws be discontinued in preference to the case-hardened carbon steel screws.

A stainless tool steel bone drill broke during an operation on a patient and was examined. It showed two fatigue fractures, one of which had started from a sharp-edged, coarsely milled slot (fracture A1), and the other from a point on the outer sheath surface which was not subjected to particularly high stresses (fracture A2). Fatigue fracture A1 resulted from the stress concentration built up at this point as a result of the sharp edges and the coarse machining grooves. The remains of a number, which had been inscribed with an electrical engraving tool for identification purposes, were found at the point of origin of fracture A2. The material had been heated to the melting point during the engraving of the number, and multiple cracking occurred during cooling. One of these cracks led to the development of fatigue fracture A2.

A fireball engulfed half of a drill rig while in the process of drilling a shot hole. Subsequent investigation revealed the cause of the fire was the failure of the oil return hose to the separator/receiver in the air compressor. The failed hose was a 50.8 mm 100R1 type hose, as specified in AS 3791-1991 Hydraulic Hoses. This type of hose consisted of an inner tube of oil-resistant synthetic rubber, a single medium-carbon steel wire braid reinforcement, and an oil-and-weather resistant synthetic rubber cover. The wire braiding was found to be severely corroded in the area of the failure zone. The physical cause of the hose failure was by severe localized corrosion of the layer of reinforcing braid wire at the transition between the coupling and the hose at the end of the ferrule. This caused a reduction of the wire cross-sectional area to the extent that the wires broke. Once the majority of the braid wires were broken there was not enough intrinsic strength in the rubber inner hose to resist the normal operating pressures.

Several crankshaft failures occurred in equipment that was being used in logging operations in subzero temperatures. Failure usually initiated at a cracked pin oil hole, and the failure origin was approximately 7.6 mm (0.3 in.) from the shaft surface. The holes were produced by gun drilling, giving rise to surface defects. The fracture surface was characteristic of fatigue in that it was flat, relatively shiny, and exhibited beach marks. The crack surface was at a 45 deg angle to the axis of the shaft, indicating dominant tensile stresses. The material was the French designation AFNOR 38CD4 (similar to AISI type 4140H) and was in the quenched-and-tempered condition, with a yield strength of about 760 MPa (110 ksi). It was treated to have compressive surface stresses, and the prior-austenite grain size was ASTM 8. Analysis (visual inspection, stress analyses, and macrographs) supported the conclusion that failure was caused by fatigue stress caused by surface defects in the oil holes. Recommendation includes drilling the oil holes by a technique that essentially eliminates surface defects.