One of five underground drain lines intended to carry a highly acidic effluent from a chemical-processing plant to distant holding tanks failed in just a few months. Each line was made of 304L stainless steel pipe 73 mm (2 in.) in diam with a 5 mm (0.203 in.) wall thickness. Lengths of pipe were joined by shielded metal arc welding. Soundness of the welded joints was determined by water back-pressure testing after several lengths of pipe had been installed and joined. Before completion of the pipeline, a pressure drop was observed during back-pressure testing. An extreme depression in the backfill revealed the site of failure. Analysis (visual inspection, electrical conductivity, and soil analysis) supported the conclusions that the failure had resulted from galvanic corrosion at a point where the corrosivity of the soil was substantially greater than the average, resulting in a voltage decrease near the point of failure of about 1.3 to 1.7 V. Recommendations included that the pipelines be asphalt coated and enclosed in a concrete trough with a concrete cover. Also, magnesium anodes, connected electrically to each line, should be installed at periodic intervals along their entire length to provide cathodic protection.

Six cases of failure attributed to microbiologically influenced corrosion (MIC) were analyzed to determine if any of the failures could have been avoided or at least predicted. The failures represent a diversity of applications involving typical materials, primarily stainless steel and copper alloys, in contact with a variety of liquids, chemistries, and substances. Analytical techniques employed include stereoscopic examination, energy dispersive x-ray spectroscopy (EDS), temperature and pH testing, and metallographic analysis. The findings indicate that MIC is frequently the result of poor operations or improper materials selection, and thus often preventable.

A white cast iron water-line plug in a fire sprinkler systems split during leak repair. Examination revealed no material flaws, fatigue, or excessive corrosion. The plug head exhibited signs of excessive loads used in attempts to force the plug farther into the pipe. The evidence obtained indicated that the failure resulted from human error.

A resistance-welded carbon steel superheater tube made to ASME SA-276 specifications failed by pitting corrosion and subsequent perforation, which caused the tube to leak. The perforation was found to have occurred at a low point in a bend near the superheater outlet header. It was found that the low points of the superheater tubes could not be completely drained during idle periods. Water-level marks were noticed on the inside surface above the area of pitting. It was revealed by microscopic examination that localized pitting had resulted from oxidation. It was concluded that water contained in the tube during shutdowns had accumulated and cumulative damage due to oxygen pitting resulted in perforation of one of the tubes. Filling the system with condensate or with treated boiler water was suggested as a corrective action. Alkalinity was suggested to be maintained at a pH of 9.0 and 200 ppm of sodium sulfite should be added to the water.

One inch diam Type 304 stainless steel piping was designed to carry containment atmosphere samples to an analyzer to monitor hydrogen and oxygen levels during operational and the design basis accident conditions that are postulated to occur in a boiling water reactor. Only one of six lines in the system had thru-wall cracks. Shallow incipient cracks were detected at the lowest elevations of one other line. The balance of the system had no signs of SCC attack. Chlorides and corrosion deposits in varying amounts were found throughout the system. The failure mechanism was transgranular, chloride, stress-corrosion cracking. Replacement decisions were based on the presence of SCC attack or heavy corrosion deposits indicative of extended exposure time to chloride-contaminated water. The existing uncracked pipe, about 75 percent of the piping in the system, was retained despite the presence of low level surface chlorides. Controls were implemented to insure that temperatures are kept below 150 deg F, or, walls of the pipe are moisture-free or the cumulative wetted period will never exceed 30 h.

Failure of a pilot scale test melter resulted from severe overheating of an Inconel 690 (690) jacketed molybdenum electrode. Extreme temperatures were required to melt the glass during this campaign because the feed material contained a very high waste loading. Metallurgical evaluation revealed the presence of an alloy containing nickel and molybdenum in several ingots found on the bottom of the melter and on a drip which had solidified on the electrode sheath. This indicates that a major portion of the electrode assembly was exposed to a temperature of at least 1317 deg C, the nickel/molybdenum eutectic temperature. Small regions on the end of the 690 sheath showed evidence of melting, indicating that this localized region exceeded 1345 deg C, the melting point of 690. In addition to nickel, antimony was found on the grain boundaries of the molybdenum electrode. This also contributed to the failure of the electrode. The source of the antimony was not identified but is believed to have originated from the feed material. Metallurgical evaluation also revealed that nickel had attacked the grain boundaries of the molybdenum/tungsten drain valve. This component did not fail in service; however, intergranular attack led to degradation of the mechanical properties, resulting in the fracture of the drain valve tip during disassembly. Antimony was not observed on this component.

Within the first few months of operation of an 8 km (5 mile) long 455 mm (18 in.) diam high-pressure steam line between a coal-fired electricity-generating plant and a paper mill, several of the Inconel 600 bellows failed. The steam line operated at 6030 kPa (875 psi) and 420 deg C (790 deg F). Metallographic sections, energy-dispersive x-ray spectra, chemical analyses, tensile tests, and Auger microscope analyses showed the failed bellows met the specifications for the material. However, investigation also showed entire oxide thickness was contaminated with relatively large amounts of sodium, calcium, potassium, aluminum, and sulfur, alkali, alkali earth, and other contaminants that completely permeated even the thin oxides on the fracture surfaces. Additional investigation of the purity of the steam itself as reported by the power plant showed that corrosion and cracks were ultimately caused by the steam. While under normal operation, the steam's purity posed no problem to the material, during boiler cleaning operations, the generating plant had allowed contamination to get into the steam line.

A combination of adverse factors was present in the disruption of a turbo-alternator gearbox. The major cause was the imposition of a gross overload far in excess of that for which the gearbox was designed. The contributory factors were a rim material (EN9 steel) that was inherently notch-sensitive and liable to rupture in a brittle manner. Discontinuities were present in the rims formed by the drain holes drilled in their abutting faces, and possibly enhanced by the stress-raising effect of microcracks in the smeared metal at their surfaces It is probable that the load reached a value in excess of the yield point within the delay time of the material so when the fracture was initiated, it was preceded by several microcracks giving rise to the propagation of a brittle fracture.

The bottom flange of a vertical pipe coupled to an isolating valve in a steam supply line to a turbine failed. Steam pressure was 1,500 psi and the temperature 416 deg C (780 deg F). Multiple cracking occurred in the bore of the flange. A quarter-segment was cut out and examined. The cracks were located in the part of the flange that formed a continuation of the pipe bore. The majority of them originated at the end of the flange bore and extended axially along the pipe and radially across the flange face. Magnetic crack detection revealed a further number of cracks in the weld deposit. While the fracture in the weld metal was of the ductile type exhibiting a fine fibrous appearance, that in the flange material was of the cleavage type. Microscopic examination revealed that the cracks were blunt-ended fissures of the type characteristic of corrosion-fatigue. It was concluded that cracking was due to corrosion-fatigue, which arose from the combined effect of a fluctuating tensile stress in the presence of a mildly corrosive environment.

An oil scavenge pump was found to have failed when a protective shear neck fractured during the start of a jet engine. Visual inspection revealed that the driven gear in one of the bearing compartments was frozen as was the corresponding drive gear. Spacer wear and thermal discoloration (particularly on the driven gear) were also observed. The gears were made from 32Cr-Mo-V13 steel, hardened and nitrided to 750 to 950 HV. Micrographic inspection of the gear teeth revealed microstructural changes that, in context, appear to be the result of friction heating. The spacers consist of Cu alloy (AMS4845) bushings force fit into AA2024-T3 Al alloy spacing elements. It was found that uncontrolled fit interference between the two components had led to Cu alloy overstress. Thermal cycling under operating conditions yielded the material. The dilation was directed inward to the shaft, however, because the bushing had only a few microns of clearance. The effect caused the oil to squeeze out, resulting in metal-to-metal contact, and ultimately failure.

Several hundred leaks were reported in the type 304 stainless steel pipelines, vessels, and tanks of a chemical plant at a tropical location within a few weeks after startup. Investigation of the failure involved a site visit, metallographic examination and analysis of the material, analysis of hydrotest waters, and microbiological examination of slime that had formed in certain pipework sections. It was determined that the failure resulted from microbially induced corrosion promoted by the use of poor-quality hydrotest water and uncontrolled hydrotesting practice. Use of appropriate hydrotesting procedures was recommended to prevent similar failures.

Nuclear power plants typically experience two or three high-cycle fatigue failures of stainless steel socket-welded connections in small bore piping during each plant-year of operation. This paper discusses fatigue-induced failure in socket-welded joints and the strategy Texas Utilities Electric Company (TU Electric) has implemented in response to these failures. High-cycle fatigue is invisible to proven commercial nondestructive evaluation (NDE) methods during crack initiation and the initial phases of crack growth. Under a constant applied stress, cracks grow at accelerating rates, which means cracks extend from a detectable size to a through-wall crack in a relatively short time. When fatigue cracks grow large enough to be visible to NDE, it is likely that the component is near the end of its useful life. TU Electric has determined that an inspection program designed to detect a crack prior to the component leaking would involve frequent inspections at a given location and that the cost of the inspection program would far exceed the benefits of avoiding a leak. Instead, TU Electric locates these cracks by visually monitoring for leaks. Field experience with fatigue-induced cracks in socket-welded joints has confirmed that visual monitoring does detect cracks in a timely manner, that these cracks do not result in catastrophic failures, and that the plant can be safely shut down in spite of a leaking socket-welded joint in a small bore pipe. Historical data from TU Electric and Southwest Research Institute are presented regarding the frequency of failures, failure locations, and the potential causes. The topics addressed include 1) metallurgical and fractographic features of fatigue cracks at the weld toe and weld root; 2) factors that are associated with fatigue, such as mechanical vibration, internal pulsation, joint design, and welding workmanship; and 3) implications of a leaking crack on plant safety. TU Electric has implemented the use of modified welding techniques for the fabrication of socket-welded joints that are expected to improve their ability to tolerate fatigue.

This article discusses the effect of using unsuitable alloys, metallurgical discontinuities, fabrication practices, and stress raisers on the failure of a pressure vessel. It provides information on pressure vessels made of composite materials and their welding practices. The article explains the failure of pressure vessels with emphasis on stress-corrosion cracking, hydrogen embrittlement, brittle and ductile fractures, creep and stress rupture, and fatigue with examples.

On 21 April 1995, the contents of a large blender (6 cu m) reacted and caused an explosion that killed and injured a number of workers at a plant in Lodi, NJ. A mixture of sodium hydrosulfite and aluminum powder was being mixed at the time of the accident. This report focuses on evaluations of the blender to determine if material or mechanical failures were the cause of the accident. The results indicate that the mixing vessel was metallurgically sound and did not contribute to the initiation of the failure. However, the vessel was not designed for mixing chemicals that must be isolated from water and excessive heat. Water leaking into the vessel through a graphite seal may have initiated the reactions that caused the accident.

The assignment of financial liability for turbine blade failures in steam turbines rests on the ability to determine the damage mechanism or mechanisms responsible for the failure. A discussion is presented outlining various items to look for in a post-turbine blade failure investigation. The discussion centers around the question of how to determine whether the failure was a fatigue induced failure, occurring in accordance with normal life cycle estimates, or whether outside influences could have initiated or hastened the failure.

Corrosion in a closed-loop cooling water system constructed of austenitic stainless steel occurred during an extended lay up of the system with biologically contaminated water. The characteristics of the failure were those of microbiologically influenced corrosion (MIC). The corrosion occurred at welds and consisted of large subsurface void formations with pinhole penetrations of the surfaces. Corrosive attack initiated in the heat affected zones of the welds, usually immediately adjacent to fusion lines. Stepwise grinding, polishing, and etching through the affected areas revealed that voids generally grew in the wrought material by uniform general corrosion. Tunneling or worm-holing was also observed, whereby void extension occurred by initiating daughter voids probably at flaws or other inhomogeneities. Selective attack occurred within the fusion zone, i.e., within the cast two-phase structure of the weld filler itself. The result was a void wall which consisted of a rough and porous ferritic material, a consequence of preferential attack of the austenitic phase and slightly lower rate of corrosive attack of the ferrite phase. The three-dimensional spongy surface was studied optically and with the scanning electron microscope.

As the result of a leak detected in a plate-formed header at PENELEC'S Shawville Unit No. 3, an extensive failure investigation was initiated to determine the origin of cracking visible along the longitudinal weld seam. Fabricated from SA387-D material and designed for a superheater outlet temperature of 566 deg C, the 11.4 cm thick header had operated for approximately 187,000 h at the time of the failure. Discussion focuses on the results of a metallographic examination of boat samples removed from the longitudinal seam weldment in the vicinity of the failure and at other areas of the header where peak temperatures were believed to have been reached. The long-term mechanical properties of the service-exposed base metal and creep-damaged weld metal were determined by creep testing. Based on the utility's decision to replace the header within one to three years, an isostress overtemperature lead specimen approach was taken, whereby failure of a test specimen in the laboratory would precede failures in the plant. These tests revealed approximately a 2:1 difference in life for the base metal as compared to weld metal.

This article provides the framework for the investigation of bridge failures. It explains the types of bridge loading and presents the regulatory provisions for bridges. Some bridge failures in the U.S. that resulted in significant changes in bridge manufacturing, design, regulation, and/or maintenance are also discussed. In addition, the article provides information on traffic damage and fatigue cracking that result in bridge failures. The need for steels with better fracture toughness in bridge design is also discussed.

This article provides an overview of the electrochemical nature of corrosion and analyzes corrosion-related failures. It describes corrosion failure analysis and discusses corrective and preventive approaches to mitigate corrosion-related failures of metals. These include: change in the environment; change in the alloy or heat treatment; change in design; use of galvanic protection; use of inhibitors; use of nonmetallic coatings and liners; application of metallic coatings; use of surface treatments, thermal spray, or other surface modifications; corrosion monitoring; and preventive maintenance.

This article aims to identify and illustrate the types of overload failures, which are categorized as failures due to insufficient material strength and underdesign, failures due to stress concentration and material defects, and failures due to material alteration. It describes the general aspects of fracture modes and mechanisms. The article briefly reviews some mechanistic aspects of ductile and brittle crack propagation, including discussion on mixed-mode cracking. Factors associated with overload failures are discussed, and, where appropriate, preventive steps for reducing the likelihood of overload fractures are included. The article focuses primarily on the contribution of embrittlement to overload failure. The embrittling phenomena are described and differentiated by their causes, effects, and remedial methods, so that failure characteristics can be directly compared during practical failure investigation. The article describes the effects of mechanical loading on a part in service and provides information on laboratory fracture examination.