A portion of the roof of a single story building collapsed during a thunder storm. A failure analysis was conducted to determine whether this structural failure was due to improper design, substandard construction materials, faulty erection, or extreme weather conditions. The failure analysis consisted of an onsite inspection, macrofractographic examination of the fractures where the girders were welded to the columns, macrofractographic examination of the fractured trusses, metallographic examination of the girder and truss materials, chemical analysis of the low-carbon steel girder and truss materials, and mechanical testing of the truss material. It was concluded that substandard structural components in combination with faulty construction was responsible for this service failure.

A type 17-4PH stainless steel tube exhibited brown discoloration after a pickling operation. EDS analysis of the extracted substance revealed relatively high levels of iron and chromium, along with lower amounts of aluminum, silicon, sulfur, chlorine, calcium, manganese, and nickel. The iron, chromium, and nickel are likely in the form of dissolution products from the pickling solution. FTIR analysis revealed the presence of polypropylene and poly(ethylene:propylene). The EDS results showed that the discoloration of the tube was associated with oxidation products of the tube material, as well as adherent organic residue. Analysis by FTIR of the residue revealed detectable levels of two polymeric substances, which were later determined to be construction materials of the pickling tank. It was recommended that more frequent cleaning and/or replacement of the pickling solution be put into place and another type of tank material be considered.

Although field corrosion tests had indicated that type 316L stainless steel would be a suitable material for neutralization tanks, the vessels suffered severe corrosion when placed in service. Welded coupons of type 316L had been tested along with similar Alloy 20Cb® (UNS NO8020) specimens in a lead-lined tank equipped with copper coils that had served in this function prior to construction of the new tanks. Both materials exhibited virtually no corrosion and no preferential weld attack. Type 316L was selected for the project. The subsequent corrosion was the result of the borderline passivity of type 316L in hot dilute sulfuric acid (about 0.1%). Inaccuracy of the testing was attributed to the presence of cupric ions in the lead-lined vessel fluids, which had been released by corrosion of the copper coils. Careful control of both temperature and pH was recommended to reduce the corrosion to an acceptable limit.

Cold cracking of structural steel weldments is a well-documented failure mechanism, and extensive work has been done to recognize welding and materials selection parameters associated with it. These efforts, however, have not fully eliminated the occurrence of such failures. This article examines a case of cold cracking failure in the construction industry. Fortunately, the failure was identified prior to final erection of the structural members and the weld was successfully reworked. The article explains how various welding parameters, such as electrode/wire selection, joint design, and pre/postheating, played a role in the failure. Human factors and fabrication practices that contributed to the problem are covered as well.

A failed laser mirror and another complete mirror of the same construction were analyzed. The laser mirror consisted of three layers of material brazed together to form channels through which the cooling water flows. Samples were analyzed with light optical and scanning electron microscopy. The corrosion product contained molybdenum and copper with a trace of gold. The base material was analyzed as molybdenum with negligible alloying additions. The primary mode of corrosion attack on the base material appeared to be intergranular, although uniform corrosion was evident also. It was concluded that corrosion attack sufficiently weakened the base material and the brazed joints, allowing catastrophic failure of the mirror due to the pressure of the cooling water. It was recommended that the mirrors be cleaned of all corrosion products present as a result of past service conditions and proof tested. It was recommended that the water system consisting of deionized water and formaldehyde be replaced with water having a low oxygen content and a cathodic inhibitor (oxygen scavenger).

The interior of a cylindrical tank used for the road transport of concentrated sulfuric acid revealed severe blistering of the plates, mainly over the crown and more particularly on the first ring. The tank, made in 1958, was of welded construction, the material being mild steel plate. Some of the blisters were pierced by drilling a hole in the center and at the same time applying a small flame. In several cases combustion of the escaping gas caused minor explosions, a result characteristic of hydrogen. Etching showed the material to be a low-carbon steel in the partly spheroidized condition. There was no evidence of cracking of the material in the region of the blisters and bend tests demonstrated it possessed satisfactory ductility. The primary cause of the blistering was ascribed to the presence of discontinuities within the plate. This provided cavities in which the hydrogen was able to accumulate and build up pressure. Had the material been free from discontinuities of appreciable size, the blistering would not have occurred.

This article focuses on failure analyses of aircraft components from a metallurgical and materials engineering standpoint, which considers the interdependence of processing, structure, properties, and performance of materials. It discusses methodologies for conducting aircraft investigations and inspections and emphasizes cases where metallurgical or materials contributions were causal to an accident event. The article highlights how the failure of a component or system can affect the associated systems and the overall aircraft. The case studies in this article provide examples of aircraft component and system-level failures that resulted from various factors, including operational stresses, environmental effects, improper maintenance/inspection/repair, construction and installation issues, manufacturing issues, and inadequate design.

Two bolts from the stressed structure of a church building that had broken during stressing were examined to establish the cause of fracture. The fracture of one of the first bolt occurred in a double-vee groove weld whose root was not completely welded. The second bolt had cracked outside of the weld seam closely under the head. Neither one had been particularly deformed before fracture. The composition of the head pieces corresponded approximately to manganese steel (Material No. 1 0845), a weldable construction steel with increased yield point and strength, while the shafts were made from Cr-Mo steel (Material No. 1.7225) according to DIN 17200. It was found that the bolts were not made from a suitable alloy steel, but were welded together from two unsuitable steels, one of which lacked sufficient strength. The austenitic weld seams showed hot tears and were not welded through to the root. Also, the pieces were not preheated before welding, so that stress cracks occurred in the transition zones. The second bolt was overstressed during the impact caused by the breaking of the first bolt.

Corrosion in a closed-loop cooling water system constructed of austenitic stainless steel occurred during an extended lay up of the system with biologically contaminated water. The characteristics of the failure were those of microbiologically influenced corrosion (MIC). The corrosion occurred at welds and consisted of large subsurface void formations with pinhole penetrations of the surfaces. Corrosive attack initiated in the heat affected zones of the welds, usually immediately adjacent to fusion lines. Stepwise grinding, polishing, and etching through the affected areas revealed that voids generally grew in the wrought material by uniform general corrosion. Tunneling or worm-holing was also observed, whereby void extension occurred by initiating daughter voids probably at flaws or other inhomogeneities. Selective attack occurred within the fusion zone, i.e., within the cast two-phase structure of the weld filler itself. The result was a void wall which consisted of a rough and porous ferritic material, a consequence of preferential attack of the austenitic phase and slightly lower rate of corrosive attack of the ferrite phase. The three-dimensional spongy surface was studied optically and with the scanning electron microscope.

A longeron assembly constructed of Alclad 2024, some parts being in the T3 condition, others in the T42 condition, failed at a rivet hole. Plastic deformation at the crack site was found, but no plastic deformation was found in similar failed components. It was concluded that the numerous hairline cracks in the Alclad layer adjacent to the main fracture were fatigue cracks. In another case, bonded samples of 2024-T3 sheet were fatigue tested at various stress levels. Failures could be separated into three groups: those that failed in the adhesive bond, those that failed in the base material, and those that exhibited a dual failure. The last category failed in the adhesive bond and also showed a type of pitting on one face of the base material. In a third case, a 2024-T4 extrusion section was found to exhibit blistering after chemical milling. The presence of interconnecting microcracks between adjacent discontinuities supported a hydrogen blistering diagnosis.

Two Z-shape impeller vanes failed. The vane material was 14-hard type 301 stainless steel. The vanes were of two-piece construction, with a longitudinal weld. Analyses indicated that the vanes had not been solution annealed after welding, leaving the heat-affected zone above the welds in a highly sensitized state. The sensitized material lost corrosion resistance, became embrittled along the grain boundaries, and finally failed by intergranular cracking. Use of type 410 martensitic stainless steel was recommended.

The front wall of a cast iron crankcase cracked at the transition from the comparatively minor wall thickness to the thick bosses for the drilling of the bolt holes. Metallographic examination showed the case was aggravated by the fact that the casting had a ferritic basic structure and the graphite in part showed a granular formation, so that strength of the material was low. In a second crankcase with the same crack formation the structure in the thick-wailed part was better. But it also showed granular graphite in the ferritic matrix in the thin-walled part between the dendrites of the primary solid solution precipitated in the residual melt. A third crankcase had fractures in two places, first at the frontal end wall and second at the thinnest point between two bore holes. In all three cases casting stresses caused by unfavorable construction and rapid cooling were responsible for the crack formation. A fourth crankcase had cracked in the bore-hole of the frontal face. In this case the cause of the fracture was the low strength of a region that was caused by a bad microstructure further weakened by the bore hole.

Five cylinders out of a group of nine in a drying machine developed leaks after a few months service in a textile mill. Leakage was reported from locations between the hoop and body and from the circumferential welds. The materials in the affected area were 18/8 Ti and 18/10/3/Mo austenitic stainless steels. Examination of the cracks at high magnification revealed them to be of the stress-corrosion type. The welds were of satisfactory quality. Cracking was also visible at these locations, this again being of the stress corrosion type. The method of cylinder construction introduced a crevice between the outer hoop and the cylinder at the inboard edge so that during washing of the rolls, water could penetrate the crevice and subsequent heating would lead to the concentration of chlorides within the crevice. Redesign of the cylinder to eliminate the crevice was recommended.

Metallographic studies found that steel used to fabricate the U.S.S. Arizona battleship during original construction, 1913-1915 and reconstruction, 1929-1931 were consistent with the best materials available during each time period. Due to the force of the forward magazine detonation, the best steel available today would not have had any impact on the outcome. Heavy banding in steels from both periods could adversely affect the corrosion resistance under anaerobic conditions that prevail during a corrosion cycle that has developed under hard biofouling layers for over 58 years. Banding would have no effect on corrosion rate under aerobic conditions that may occur in local areas on the hull. In the part of the ship from which samples for this report were obtained, high temperatures above 1340 deg F did not occur. Hull plate samples from the submerged wreckage are not yet available. These samples will be important to confirm findings to this time and determine the remaining thickness of the hull plate and, indirectly, the integrity of the fuel oil tanks.

During periodic inspection of the tubes of a reformer furnace, a soapy water leak test with the tubes pressurized with nitrogen was being carried out by site personnel in a manner contrary to the policy of the organization when one of the tubes suddenly disintegrated with explosive violence. The tube approximately 30 ft. long by 6 in. diam, was constructed of three spun cast sections butt welded together. The material specified for tubes for this service was basically a 25% chromium, 20% nickel, cast stainless steel containing 0.4% carbon to optimize creep resistance. Failure initiated in the region of the tube where the dark fracture surface and columnar grain structure were evident. These features indicated the presence of a defective zone or progressive cracking which had occurred during service. Microscopic examination of sections through the zone revealed extensive creep cracking. The cracking was intergranular and followed the interdendritic columnar structure adjacent to the outer surface.

A special eyebolt was used to lift prefabricated concrete panels weighing approximately 16 cwt. Two eyebolts were used with a spreader bar to give a vertical lift on each eyebolt. Following failure of one eyebolt, which resulted in dropping of the load and subsequent failure of the other one, a complete eyebolt was submitted for assessment. Microscopic examination indicated a medium carbon-manganese steel had been used for the lower screwed portion of the eyebolt. Failure may have been due to brittle fracture or to fatigue, both of which could have been initiated at cracks in the hardened material in the region of the weld securing the screwed portion to the intermediate collar and which may have formed at the time of manufacture. Out-of-squareness of the thread with the collar, as was seen in the example submitted, gave rise to bending stresses when the bolt was tightened down, and this could have been a further factor which promoted failure. It was suggested that the design and construction could be improved by either making the component in one piece or, if it was desired, to adapt a standard eyebolt.

Two cases of failure of centrifuge baskets were investigated. The first involved a centrifuge running at approximately 1000 rpm. The basket was constructed from a perforated sheet of stainless steel rolled into a cylinder and joined by a single vee longitudinal weld. Detailed examination showed the weld had not completely penetrated the full depth of the section. The fracture faces showed a gradually progressing fatigue crack developing from a notch, formed by the lack of penetration, at the root of the weld. Microscopic examination of the parent plate showed it was a typical titanium stabilized austenitic steel. It is probable that had the basket been subjected to a periodic inspection by a competent person, this failure would not have occurred. The second case concerned a continuous duty centrifuge operating at 2200 rpm. Fracture had occurred at the circumferential weld attaching the stainless steel skirt to the basket rim and also in the region of the vertical weld which was made when the skirt was formed into a cone. Stress-corrosion cracking of the skirt material, which contained residual stresses due to cold-rolling, had been caused by the presence of sodium chloride.

A steam jacketed autoclave of orthodox design was fabricated from mild steel for a working pressure of 320 psi. The only unusual feature in its construction was a protective layer of weld metal, which was deposited on the internal surface of the upper half of the 1 in. thick shell. The first indication of latent trouble was provided by the bolts which attached the stirring paddles to the shaft and the stationary scraper blades to the shell, either failing in service or breaking off when an attempt was made to remove them. It was the practice to renew them all annually. Microscopic examination of a failed bolt showed the path of the fracture and the secondary cracking associated with it were intergranular, suggesting that failure resulted from stress corrosion. A steel of the rimming type had been used to make the bar from which the bolt was forged. Cracks which originate at the root of threads generally result from fatigue but, in this instance, their intergranular mode of progression indicated that they were due to stress-corrosion. Examination of shell material showed that the cracks in the vessel were wholly intergranular. It was apparent from this evidence that this cracking was also due to stress-corrosion.

The maximum life of base-loaded headers and piping is not possible to be predicted until they develop microcracking. The typical elements of a periodic inspection program after the occurrence of the crack was described extensively. Cracks caused by creep swelling in the stub-to-header welds in the secondary superheater outlet headers (constructed of SA335-P11 material) of a major boiler were described as an example. The OD of the header was measured to detect the amount of swelling and found to have increased 1.6% since its installation. Ligament cracks extending from tube seat to tube seat were revealed by surface inspection. Cracks were found to originate from inside the header, extend axially in the tube penetrations and radially from those holes into the ligaments. Cracks in 94 locations, ranging from small radial cracks to full 360Ý cracks were revealed by dye-penetrant inspection. The unit was operated under reduced-temperature conditions and with less load cycling than previously until a redesigned SA335-P22 header was installed.

A superheater in a generator produced 80 t/h of steam at 400 deg C and 41 kPa. Failure took place at the connection from the collector to the vent line used during start up. The material of construction was carbon steel, and the unit had 240,000 h of operation at the time of failure, with 99 shutdowns. Widespread cracking on the inside was apparent, the most severe cracking being some distance from the nozzle connection in a downstream direction. Widespread cracking and pitting were observed also at the connections to the safety valve and soot blower. Pitting was most apparent on the downstream sides of the openings in the shell. In all the damaged areas the mechanism of failure involved surface pitting and subsequent SCC. This failure showed the problems that can develop where there are long lines in which condensation may occur and return periodically to a superheater or other hot component. In this particular case, control of dissolved solids in the boiler feedwater may have been inadequate.