Nickel anodes failed in several electrolysis cells in a heavy-water upgrading plant. Dismantling of a cell revealed gouging and the presence of loosely attached black porous masses on the anode. The carbon steel top, plate was severely corroded. An appreciable quantity of black powder was also present on the bottom or the cell. SEM/EDX studies of the outer and inner surfaces of the gouged anode showed the presence of iron globules at the interface between the gouged and the unattacked anode. The chemical composition of the black powder was determined to be primarily iron. Cell malfunction was attributed to the accelerated dissolution of the carbon steel anode top, dislodgment of grains from the material, and subsequent closing of the small annular space between the anode and the cathode by debris from the anode top. Cladding of the carbon steel top with a corrosion-resistant material, such as nickel, nickel-base alloy, or stainless steel, was recommended.

New aircraft wing panels extruded from 7075-T6 aluminum exhibited an unusual pattern of circular black interrupted lines, which could not be removed by scouring or light sanding. The panels, subsequent to profiling and machining, were required to be penetrated inspected, shot peened, H2SO4 anodized, and coated with MIL-C-27725 integral fuel tank coating on the rib side. Scanning electron microscopy and microprobe analysis (both conventional energy-dispersive and Auger analyzers) showed that the anodic coating was applied over an improperly cleaned and contaminated surface. The expanding corrosion product had cracked and, in some places, had flaked away the anodized coating. The corrodent had penetrated the base aluminum in the form of subsurface intergranular attack to a depth of 0.035 mm (0.0014 in.). It was recommended that a vapor degreaser be used during cleaning prior to anodizing. A hot inhibited alkaline cleaner was also recommended during cleaning prior to anodizing. The panels should be dichromate sealed after anodizing. The use of deionized water was also recommended during the dichromate sealing operation. In addition, the use of an epoxy primer prior to shipment of the panels was endorsed. Most importantly, surveillance of the anodizing process itself was emphasized.

A forged aluminum alloy 2014-T6 catapult-hook attachment fitting (anodized by the chromic acid process to protect it from corrosion) from a naval aircraft broke in service. Spectrographic analysis, visual examination, microscopic examination, and tensile analysis showed minute cracks on the inside surface of a bearing hole, and small areas of pitting corrosion were visible on the exterior surface of the fitting. The analysis also revealed a small number of rosettes, suggestive of eutectic melting, in an otherwise normal structure. These examinations and analyses support the conclusion that the presence of chromic acid stain on the fracture surface proved that the forging had cracked before anodizing. This suggest that the crack initiated during straightening, either after machining or after heat treatment. The structure and composition of the alloy appear to have been acceptable. Ductility was acceptable so rosettes found in the microstructure are believed to have been nondamaging. Had they contributed to the failure, the ductility would have been very low. The recommendations included inspection for cracks and revising the manufacturing process to include a fluorescent liquid-penetrant inspection before anodizing, because chromic acid destroys the penetrant. This inspection would reduce the possibility of cracked parts being used in service.

Rough operation of the roller bearing mounted in an electric motor/gearbox assembly was observed. The bearing components made of low-alloy steel (4620 or 8620) and the cup, cone and rollers were carburized, hardened and tempered. The contact surfaces of these components (cup, cone and roller) were revealed to be uniformly electrolytically etched by visual examination. The action similar to anodic etching was believed to have occurred as a result of stray currents in the electric motor (not properly grounded) and the presence of an electrolyte (moisture) between the cup and roller surfaces of the bearing. As a remedial action, the bearing was insulated for protection from stray currents by grounding of the motor and the moisture was kept out by sealing both bearings in the assembly.

Several case-hardened and zinc-plated carbon-manganese steel wheel studs fractured in a brittle manner after very limited service life. The fracture surfaces of both front and rear studs showed no sign of fatigue beach marks or deformation in the form of shear lips that would indicate either a fatigue mechanism or ductile overload failure. SEM analysis revealed that the mode of fracture was intergranular decohesion, which indicates an environmental influence in the fracture mechanism. The primary fracture initiated at a thread root and propagated by environmentally-assisted slow crack growth until final fracture. The natural stress concentration at the thread root, when tightened to the required clamp load concomitant with the presence of cracks in the carburized case, was sufficient to exceed the critical stress intensity for hydrogen-assisted stress cracking (HASC). The zinc plating exacerbated the situation by providing a strong local corrosion cell in the form of a sacrificial anode region adjacent to the cracked thread. The enhanced generation of hydrogen in a corrosive environment subsequently lead to HASC of the wheel studs.

After about two years in service, a 303 stainless steel valve in contact with a carbonated soft drink in a vending machine occasionally dispensed a discolored drink with a sulfide odor. According to the laboratory at the bottling plant, the soft drink in question was strongly acidic, containing citric and phosphoric acids and having a pH of 2.4 to 2.5. Investigation (visual inspection, chemical analysis, immersion testing in the soft drink, and 100x unetched micrographs) supported the conclusion that the failure was caused by the size and distribution of sulfide stringers in the alloy used in the valve. Manganese sulfide stringers in the valve were exposed at end-grain surfaces in contact with the beverage. The stringers, which were anodic to the surrounding metal, were subject to corrosion, producing a hydrogen sulfide concentration in the immediately adjacent liquid. Recommendations included changing the valve material to type 304 stainless steel.

The failure of a 90-10 cupronickel heat exchanger tube resulted in flooding of the vessel and subsequently sinking it. The corrosion of the cupronickel alloy was facilitated by the high sulfur content of the seawater in which it operated. The failure modes were anodic dissolution and copper reprecipitation.

Type 316L stainless steel pipes carrying brine at 120 deg C (250 deg F) and at a pH of about 7, failed by perforation at or near circumferential butt-weld seams. The failure was examined optically and radiographically in the field. Specimens were removed and examined metallographically and with a SEM in the laboratory. The examinations revealed a combination of failure mechanisms. The pitting failure of the welds was attributed to localized attack of an activated surface, in which anodic pits corroded rapidly. Additionally, SCC driven by residual welding stresses occurred in the base metal adjacent to the welds. Use of highly stressed austenitic stainless steels in high-chloride environments having a temperature above 65 deg C (150 deg F) should be discouraged. Solution annealing or shot peening to reduce residual stresses may be advisable. If heat treatment is not feasible after welding, the substitution of a more corrosion-resistant alloy, such as Incoloy 800 or 825, may be necessary.

An outer fan-duct assembly of titanium alloy Ti-5Al-2.5Sn (AMS 4910) for a gas-turbine fan section cracked 75 mm (3 in.) circumferentially through a repair weld in an arc weld in the front flange-duct segment. Examination of the crack with a binocular microscope revealed no evidence of fatigue. A blue etch-anodize inspection showed the presence of an alpha case along the edges of the repair weld. The alpha case, a brittle oxide-enriched layer, forms when welds are inadequately shielded from the atmosphere during deposition. The brittleness of this layer caused transgranular cracks to form and propagate in tension under the thermal stresses created by the repair-weld heat input. The crack resulted from contamination and embrittlement of a repair weld that had received inadequate gas shielding. Thermal stresses cracked the oxide-rich layer that formed. The gas-shielding accessories of the welding torch were overhauled to ensure that leak-in or entrainment of air was eliminated. Also, the purity of the shielding-gas supplies was rechecked to make certain that these had not become contaminated.

Forged aluminum alloy 2014-T6 hinge brackets in naval aircraft rudder and aileron linkages were found cracked in service. The cracks were in the hinge lugs, adjacent to a bushing made of cadmium-plated 4130 steel. Investigation (visual inspection and 250X micrographs) supported the conclusion that the failure of the hinge brackets occurred by SCC. The corrosion was caused by exposure to a marine environment in the absence of paint in stressed areas due to chipping. The stress resulted from the interference fit of the bushing in the lug hole. Recommendations included inspecting all hinge brackets in service for cracks and for proper maintenance of paint. Also suggested was replacing the aluminum alloy 2015-T6 with alloy 7075-T6, and surface treatment for the 7075-T6 brackets was recommended using sulfuric acid anodizing and dichromate sealing. Finally, it was also recommended that the interference fit of the bushing in the lug hole be discontinued.

During a routine shear-pin check, the end lug on the barrel of the forward canopy actuator on a naval aircraft was found to have fractured. The lug was forged from aluminum alloy 2014-T6. Investigation (visual inspection, 2x views, and 140X micrographs etched with Keller's reagent) supported the conclusion that the cause of failure was SCC resulting from exposure to a marine environment. The fracture occurred in normal operation at a point where damage from pitting and intergranular corrosion acted as a stress raiser, not because of overload. The pitting and intergranular attack on the lug were evidence that the surface protection of the part had been inadequate as manufactured or had been damaged in service and not properly repaired in routine maintenance. Recommendations included anodizing the lug and barrel in sulfuric acid and giving them a dichromate sealing treatment, followed by application of a coat of paint primer. During routine maintenance checks, a careful examination was suggested to look for damage to the protective coating, and any necessary repairs should be made by cleaning, priming, and painting. Severely corroded parts should be removed from service.

Two outboard main-wheel halves (aluminum alloy 2014-T6 forged) from a commercial aircraft were removed from service because of failure. One wheel half was in service for 54 days and had made 130 landings (about 1046 roll km, or 650 roll mi) when crack indications were discovered during eddy-current testing. The flange on the second wheel half failed after only 31 landings, when about 46 cm (18 in.) of the flange broke off as the aircraft was taxiing. Stains on the fracture surfaces were used to determine when cracking was initiated. The analysis (visual inspection, liquid penetrant inspection, and micrographs with deep etching in aqueous 20% sodium hydroxide) supported the conclusion that failure on both wheel halves was by fatigue caused by a forging defect resulting from abnormal transverse grain flow. The crack in the first wheel half occurred during service, and the surfaces became oxidized. Because the fracture surface of the second wheel half had chromic acid stains, it was obvious that the forging defect was open to the surface during anodizing. No recommendations were made except to notify the manufacturer.

The flange on an outboard main-wheel half (aluminum alloy 2014-T6 forging) on a commercial aircraft fractured during takeoff. The failure was discovered later during a routine enroute check. The flange section that broke away was recovered at the airfield from which the plane took off and was thus available for examination. Failure occurred after 37 landings (about 298 roll km, or 185 roll miles). Examination of the fracture surfaces revealed that a forging defect was present in the wall of the wheel half. The anodized coating showed distinct twin-parallel and end-grain patterns between which the fracture occurred. The periphery of the defect was the site of several small fatigue cracks that eventually progressed through the remaining wall. Rapid fatigue then progressed circumferentially. Metallographic examination using Keller's reagent showed that the microstructure was normal for aluminum alloy 2014-T6 and the hardness surpassed the minimum hardness required for aluminum alloy 2014-T6. An abrupt change in the direction of grain flow across the fracture plane indicated that the wall had buckled during forging. This evidence supported the conclusion that the wheel half failed in the flange by fatigue as the result of a rather large subsurface forging defect. No recommendations were made.

An external tank pressure/vent valve regulates the external tank fuel feed system, which transfers fuel under pressure to the internal tanks of the aircraft. A dual-position valve was found to be sticking at the intermediate positions. Also, service air check valves located on the incoming lines contained poppets that were being stuck in a closed or partially closed position because of suspected corrosion product. Residue taken from the check valve poppet and from the dual-position valve was chemically analyzed. Chloride was present in both samples. It was suspected that moisture entering the service air lines left a chloride-containing compound upon evaporation within the air check valves and pressure/vent assembly. This compound subsequently reacted with the anodized, dichromate sealed check valve housing to lock the check valve poppets in a closed or partially closed position, decreasing the actual pressure being supplied to the pressure/vent valve. It was recommended that an inspection be conducted to ensure that the service air check valves are operating properly prior to removal and servicing of the pressure/vent valve assembly. It was also recommended that dry-film lubricant be checked to ensure that it meets specifications for the pressure/vent valve assembly.

One of five underground drain lines intended to carry a highly acidic effluent from a chemical-processing plant to distant holding tanks failed in just a few months. Each line was made of 304L stainless steel pipe 73 mm (2 in.) in diam with a 5 mm (0.203 in.) wall thickness. Lengths of pipe were joined by shielded metal arc welding. Soundness of the welded joints was determined by water back-pressure testing after several lengths of pipe had been installed and joined. Before completion of the pipeline, a pressure drop was observed during back-pressure testing. An extreme depression in the backfill revealed the site of failure. Analysis (visual inspection, electrical conductivity, and soil analysis) supported the conclusions that the failure had resulted from galvanic corrosion at a point where the corrosivity of the soil was substantially greater than the average, resulting in a voltage decrease near the point of failure of about 1.3 to 1.7 V. Recommendations included that the pipelines be asphalt coated and enclosed in a concrete trough with a concrete cover. Also, magnesium anodes, connected electrically to each line, should be installed at periodic intervals along their entire length to provide cathodic protection.