On 21 April 1995, the contents of a large blender (6 cu m) reacted and caused an explosion that killed and injured a number of workers at a plant in Lodi, NJ. A mixture of sodium hydrosulfite and aluminum powder was being mixed at the time of the accident. This report focuses on evaluations of the blender to determine if material or mechanical failures were the cause of the accident. The results indicate that the mixing vessel was metallurgically sound and did not contribute to the initiation of the failure. However, the vessel was not designed for mixing chemicals that must be isolated from water and excessive heat. Water leaking into the vessel through a graphite seal may have initiated the reactions that caused the accident.

An octagonal steel ingot weighing 13 tons made of manganese-molybdenum steel developed gaping cross-cracks on all eight sides in the forging press during initial pressure application. It was reported that the steel had been melted in a basic 12-ton arc furnace, oxygenated, furnished with 42 kg of 75% ferrosilicon and 12 kg aluminum additions, alloyed with 160 kg of 80% ferromanganese, and finally deoxidized in the ladle with 42 kg calcium silicon. For metallographic examination a plate approximately 100 mm thick was cut parallel to one of the eight planes. Platelet-like particles could be discerned on the conchoidal fracture planes with the SEM. The precipitates proved to be thin and partially transparent platelets of a hexagonal crystal lattice whose parameters resemble those of AIN. The precipitates were at least in part still undissolved in spite of the long holding period at high initial forging temperature. Another block melted under the same conditions and immediately after the defective one, was forged into a gear ring without any trouble. This ring was free of grain boundary precipitates, but it contained only 0.012 % AI and 0.0102 % N.

In 1975, a manufacturer was awarded a contract to produce modular air-traffic control towers for the U.S. Navy. The specifications called for painted steel siding, but the manufacturer convinced the Navy to substitute aluminum-bonded-to-plywood panels that were provided by a supplier. In less than one year, the panels began to delaminate and the aluminum began to crack. It was found that the failure was the result of chloride-induced intergranular corrosion caused by chemicals in the adhesive and excessive moisture in the wood introduced during manufacturing.

This article discusses technologies focused on processing plastic materials or producing direct tools used in plastics processing. The article focuses on extrusion and injection molding, covering applications, materials and their properties, equipment, processing details, part design guidelines, and special processes. It also covers the functions of the extruder, webline handling, mixing and compounding operations, and process troubleshooting. Thermoforming and mold design are covered. Various other technologies for polymer processing covered in this article are blow molding, rotational molding, compression molding, transfer molding, hand lay-up process, casting, and additive manufacturing.

Nickel anodes failed in several electrolysis cells in a heavy-water upgrading plant. Dismantling of a cell revealed gouging and the presence of loosely attached black porous masses on the anode. The carbon steel top, plate was severely corroded. An appreciable quantity of black powder was also present on the bottom or the cell. SEM/EDX studies of the outer and inner surfaces of the gouged anode showed the presence of iron globules at the interface between the gouged and the unattacked anode. The chemical composition of the black powder was determined to be primarily iron. Cell malfunction was attributed to the accelerated dissolution of the carbon steel anode top, dislodgment of grains from the material, and subsequent closing of the small annular space between the anode and the cathode by debris from the anode top. Cladding of the carbon steel top with a corrosion-resistant material, such as nickel, nickel-base alloy, or stainless steel, was recommended.

In a steel foundry, tensile and bend specimens of castings made in a 2-ton basic arc furnace showed, at irregular intervals, regions with coarse-grained fractures where the specimens broke prematurely, so that the specified strength and toughness values could not be reached. Several cast tensile specimens and some forcibly-broken pieces of the flanges of armature yokes made of cast steel GS C 25 according to DIN 17 245 were investigated. Microscopic examination showed that the cause of damage was the superabundant use of aluminum as deoxidizer. According to recommendations, the aluminum addition was reduced by one-half. Since then, there have been no additional rejects due to insufficient tensile and bend values.

An investigation of the impeller and deposit samples from a centrifugal compressor revealed that an aluminum IR-12 refrigerant reaction had occurred, causing extensive damage to the second-stage impeller and contaminating the internal compressor components. The spherical surface morphology of the impeller fragments suggested that the aluminum had melted and resolidified. The deposits were similar in composition and were identified by XRD as consisting primarily of aluminum trifluoride. In addition, EDS analysis detected major amounts of chlorine and iron. Results of a combustion test indicated that the compressor deposit was comprised of a 9. 8 wt% carbon and that the condenser deposit contained 8.7 wt% carbon. It was concluded that the primary cause of failure was the rubbing of the impeller against the casting and that a self-sustaining Freon fire had occurred in the failed compressor

This article provides an overview of metal additive manufacturing (AM) processes and describes sources of failures in metal AM parts. It focuses on metal AM product failures and potential solutions related to design considerations, metallurgical characteristics, production considerations, and quality assurance. The emphasis is on the design and metallurgical aspects for the two main types of metal AM processes: powder-bed fusion (PBF) and directed-energy deposition (DED). The article also describes the processes involved in binder jet sintering, provides information on the design and fabrication sources of failure, addresses the key factors in production and quality control, and explains failure analysis of AM parts.

A failure analysis investigation was conducted on a fractured aluminum tailwheel fork which failed moments after the landing of a privately owned, 1955 twin-engine airplane. Nondestructive evaluation via dye-penetrant inspection revealed no discernible surface cracks. The chemical composition of the sand-cast component was identified via optical emission spectroscopy and is comparable to an aluminum sand-cast alloy, AA 712.0. Metallographic evaluation via optical microscopy and scanning electron microscopy revealed a high degree of porosity in the microstructure as well as the presence of deleterious intermetallic compounds within interdendritic regions. Macrohardness testing produced hardness values which are noticeably higher than standard hardness values for 712.0. The primary fracture surfaces indicate evidence of mixed-mode fracture, via intergranular cracking, cleaved intermetallic particles, and dimpled cellular regions in the matrix. The secondary fracture surface demonstrates similar features of intergranular fracture.

This article reviews the general characteristics of fretting wear in mechanical components with an emphasis on steel. It focuses on the effects of physical variables and the environment on fretting wear. The variables include the amplitude of slip, normal load, frequency of vibration, type of contact and vibration, impact fretting, surface finish, and residual stresses. The form, composition, and role of the debris are briefly discussed. The article also describes the measurement, mechanism, and prevention of fretting wear. It concludes with several examples of failures related to fretting wear.

Accelerated aging tests on detonator assemblies, to verify the compatibility of gold bridgewire and Pd-In-Sn solder with the intended explosives, revealed an unusual form of corrosion. The tests, conducted at 74 deg C (165 deg F) and 54 deg C (130 deg F), indicated a preferential attack of the gold. To investigate the problem, a matrix of test units was produced and analyzed. Scanning electron microscopy, EDX analysis, and x-ray diffraction techniques were used to determine the extent of the corrosion and identify the corrosion products. The results indicated that the preferential attack of the gold was due to HCN formed by decomposition of the explosive powder at high temperatures. Other associated reactions were also observed including the subsequent attack of the solder by the gold corrosion product and degradation of the plastic header.

Fretting is a wear phenomenon that occurs between two mating surfaces; initially, it is adhesive in nature, and vibration or small-amplitude oscillation is an essential causative factor. Fretting generates wear debris, which oxidizes, leading to a corrosion-like morphology. This article focuses on fretting wear related to debris formation and ejection. It reviews the general characteristics of fretting wear, with an emphasis on steel. The review covers fretting wear in mechanical components, various parameters that affect fretting; quantification of wear induced by fretting; and the experimental results, map approach, measurement, mechanism, and prevention of fretting wear. This review is followed by several examples of failures related to fretting wear.

The first part of this article focuses on two major forms of machining-related failures, namely machining workpiece (in-process) failures and machined part (in-service) failures. Discussion centers on machining conditions and metallurgical factors contributing to (in-process) workpiece failures, and undesired surface layers and metallurgical factors contributing to (in-service) machined part failures. The second part of the article discusses the effects of microstructure on machining failures and their preventive measures.

This article discusses the generic features of impact wear on metals, ceramics, and polymers. It describes normal impact wear and compound impact wear, as well as the features of impact wear testing apparatus such as ballistic impact wear apparatus and pivotal hammer impact wear apparatus. Most mechanical components continue to be functional beyond the zero wear limit, and their usefulness is normally connected with the loss of a specific depth of material. The article reviews the zero impact wear model and some measurable impact wear models. It presents a case study illustrating the impact of wear failure on automotive engine inlet valves and seat inserts.

Metallography is an important component of failure analysis. In the case of a liquid metal embrittlement (LME) failure it is usually conclusive if a third phase constituent can be formed inside of the cracks after failure. In the case where it is necessary to characterize the third phase material, one can use various x-ray spectrographic techniques in conjunction with a scanning electron microscope (SEM). This study describes those metallographic and SEM analysis techniques for determining the mode of failure for a locomotive traction motor by LME.

Impact or percussive wear is defined as the wear of a solid surface that is due to percussion, which is a repetitive exposure to dynamic contact by another body. Impact wear, however, has many analogies to the field of erosive wear. The main difference is that, in impact wear situations, the bodies tend to be large and contact in a well-defined location in a controlled way, unlike erosion where the eroding particles are small and interact randomly with the target surface. This article describes some generic features and modes of impact wear of metals, ceramics, and polymers. It discusses the processes involved in testing and modeling of impact wear, and includes two case studies.

Following a freight train derailment, part of a fractured side frame was retained for study because a portion of its fracture surface exhibited a rock candy appearance and black scale. It was suspected of having failed, thereby precipitating the derailment. Metallography, scanning electron microscopy, EDXA, and x-ray mapping were used to study the steel in the vicinity of this part of the fracture surface. It was found to be contaminated with copper. Debye-Scherrer x-ray diffraction patterns obtained from the scale showed that it consisted of magnetite and hematite. It was concluded that some copper was accidentally left in the mold when the casting was poured. Liquid copper, carrying with it oxygen in solution, penetrated the austenite grain boundaries as the steel cooled. The oxygen reacted with the steel producing a network of scale outlining the austenite grain structure. When the casting fractured as a result of the derailment, the fracture followed the scale in the contaminated region thus creating the “rock candy” fracture.

An arsenical admiralty brass (UNS C44300) finned tube in a generator air cooler unit at a hydroelectric power station failed. The unit had been in operation for approximately 49,000 h. The cooling medium for the tubes was water from a river. Air flowed over the finned exterior of the tubes, while water circulated through the tubes. Investigation (visual inspection, leak testing, history review, 100X micrographs etched in potassium dichromate, chemical analysis, and EDS and XRD analysis of internal tube deposits) supported the conclusion that the cause of the tube leaks was ammonia-induced SCC. Because the cracks initiated on the inside surfaces of the tubes and because the river water was not treated before it entered the coolers, the ammonia was likely present in the river water and probably concentrated under the internal deposits. Recommendations included either eliminating the ammonia (prohibitively expensive in cost and time) or using an alternate material (such as a 70Cu-30Ni alloy or a more expensive titanium alloy) that is resistant to ammonia corrosion as well as to chlorides and sulfur species.

Original carbon steel and subsequent replacement austenitic stainless steel superheater tube U-bend failures occurred in a waste heat boiler. The carbon steel tubes had experienced metal wastage in the form of caustic corrosion gouging, while the stainless steel tubes failed by caustic-induced stress-corrosion cracking. Sodium was detected by EDS in the internal deposits and the base of a gouge in a carbon steel tube and in the internal deposits of the stainless steel tube. The sodium probably formed sodium hydroxide with carryover moisture and caused the gouging, which was further aggravated by the presence of silicon and sulfur (silicates and sulfates). It was recommended that the tubes be replaced with Inconel 600 or 601, as a practical option until the carryover problem could be solved.