An aero engine failed due to the misalignment of the ball bearing fitted on the main shaft of the engine. The aero engine incorporates two independent compressors: a six-stage axial flow LP compressor and a nine-stage axial flow HP compressor. The bearing under consideration is a HP location bearing and is fitted at the rear of the nine-stage compressor. It was supposed to operate for at least 5000 h, but failed catastrophically after 1300 h, rendering the engine unserviceable. Unusually high stresses caused by misalignment and uneven axial loading resulted in the generation of fatigue crack(s) in the inner race. When the crack reached the critical size, the collar of the race fractured, causing subsequent damage. The cage also failed due to excessive stresses in the axial direction, and its material was smeared on the steel balls and the outer race.

An aircraft was grounded when illumination of the transmission oil-pressure light and an accompanying drop in pressure on the oil-pressure gage was reported by the pilot. No discrepancy in the bearing assemblies and related components was revealed by teardown analysis of the transmission. The center bearing of the transmission input-shaft ball-bearing stack had a broken cage and one ball was found to have been split into several pieces. Several scored balls and flaking damage in the raceways of the inner and outer rings was observed. The origin (area in rectangle) was oriented axially in the raceway and was flanked by areas of markedly different-textured flaking damage. Stringers of nonmetallic inclusions were revealed at the origin during metallographic examination of a section parallel to the axially oriented origin. Thus it was concluded that the failure was caused by contact fatigue mechanism (flaking) activated by the subsurface nonmetallic inclusions.

The case study presented in this article details the failure investigation of an M50 alloy steel bearing used in a jet engine gearbox drive assembly. It discusses the investigative steps and analytic tools used to determine the root cause, highlighting the importance of continuous, thorough questioning by the investigating activity. The combined analyses demonstrated that the bearing failed by a single event overload as evidenced by bulk deformation and traces of foreign material on the rolling elements. The anomalous transferred metal found on the rolling elements subsequently led to the discovery of overlooked debris in an engine chip detector, and thus resulted in a review of several maintenance practices.

The engine on a jet aircraft was shut down immediately as it produced excessive vibration. Complete failure of the cage in one of the two main-shaft ball bearings (placed side by side in the engine) was revealed in the dismantled engine. The ball bearings (made of vacuum-melted 52100 steel) were both of the single-row deep-groove type with split inner rings and were designed to operate at a maximum temperature of 175 deg C. Overtempering of the rings was indicated by the reduced hardness in comparison to unfailed rings. Severe damage to approximately 20% of the load-bearing surface, with more damage on one of the shoulders of the groove, was revealed during examination of the outer raceway of the bearing which indicated misalignment of the bearing. No damage other than spalling cavities in the inner-ring raceway, caused by the elongated subsurface inclusion revealed by metallographic examination of circumferential section of the largest cavity, was exhibited by the second bearing. It was concluded that the fracture of the cage was caused by overheating and misalignment caused excessive stressing of the bearing on the main shaft.

A broken aircraft crankshaft and a severely damaged main brass bearing were examined to determine whether engine failure was initiated in the bearing or in the crankshaft. The steel crankshaft failure was a classical fatigue fracture. The bearing had been subjected to extremely high temperatures, as indicated by melting in the brass components and the extreme distortion in the rollers. Microscopic examination on the crankshaft material showed it to be a good quality steel. On the other hand, the chromium plate was thick, porous, and cracked in many places, including the point of the main fatigue crack. It was concluded that the over-all failure was initiated in the crankshaft, and the failure of the bearing resulted from that failure.

When a roller-bearing assembly was removed from an aircraft for inspection after a short time in service, several areas of apparent galling were noticed around the inside surface of the inner cone of the bearing. These areas were roughly circular spots of built-up metal. The bearing had not seized, and there was no evidence of heat discoloration in the galled areas. The inner cone, made of modified 4720 steel and carburized for wear resistance, rode on an AISI type 630 (17-4 PH) stainless steel spacer. Consequently, it was desirable to determine whether the galled spots contained any stainless steel from the spacer. Other items for investigation were the nature of the bond between the galled spot and the inner cone and any evidence of overtempering or rehardening resulting from localized overheating. Analysis (visual inspection, electron probe x-ray microanalysis, microscopic examination, and hardness testing) supported the conclusions that galling had been caused by a combination of local overload and abnormal vibration of mating parts of the roller-bearing assembly. No recommendations were made.

A tri-lobe cylindrical roller bearing was submitted for investigation to determine the cause of uniformly spaced axial fluting damages on its rollers and outer raceway surfaces. The rollers and raceways were made from premium-melted M50 and M50NiL, aircraft quality steels often used in bearings to minimize the effects of orbital slippage and rolling-contact fatigue. The damaged areas were examined under a scanning electron microscope, which revealed a high density of microcraters, characteristic of local melting and material removal associated with bearing currents. Investigators also examined the effect of electrical discharge on crater dimensions and density and the role that thermoelectric voltage potentials may have played.

Three wing flap hinge bearings were received by the laboratory for analysis. The bearings were fabricated from chromium-plated type 440C martensitic stainless steel. The intergranular fracture pattern seen in the electron fractographs, coupled with the corrosion pits observed on the inner diam of the bearings, strongly suggested that failure initiated by pitting and progressed by SCC or hydrogen embrittlement from the plating operation. It was recommended that the extent of the flap hinge bearing cracking problem be determined by using nondestructive inspection because it is possible to crack hardened type 440C during the chromium plating process. An inspection for pitting on the bearing inner diam was also recommended. It was suggested that electroless nickel be used as a coating for the entire bearing. A review of the chromium plating and baking sequence was recommended also to ensure that a source of hydrogen is not introduced during the plating operation.

The governor on an aircraft engine failed and upon disassembly of the unit, it was discovered that the retainer for the flyweight pivot pins was broken. The channel-shaped retainer was made of 0.8 mm (0.030 in.) thick 1018 or 1020 steel. The part was plated with copper, which acted as a stop-off during carburizing of the offset, circular thrust-bearing surface surrounding the 16-mm (0.637-in.) diam hole. The bearing surface was case hardened to a depth of 0.05 to 0.1 mm (0.002 to 0.005 in.), then austempered to obtain a minimum hardness of 600 Knoop (1-kg, or 2.2-lb, load). Considerable vibration was created in the installation because of the design of the mechanical device used to transmit power to the governor. The pins were permitted to slide axially a small distance. Analysis (visual inspection, microscopic examination, and ductility measurements) supported the conclusion that failure of the retainer was the result of fatigue caused by vibration in the flyweight assembly. Impact of the pivot pins on the retainer also contributed to failure. Recommendations included redesign of the flyweight assembly, and replacement of the channel-shaped retainer with a spring-clip type of pin retainer.

The master connecting rod of a reciprocating aircraft engine revealed cracks during routine inspection. The rods were forged from 4337 (AMS 6412) steel and heat treated to a specified hardness of 36 to 40 HRC. H-shaped cracks in the wall between the knuckle-pin flanges were revealed by visual examination. The cracks were originated as circumferential cracks and then propagated transversely into the bearing-bore wall. No inclusions in the master rod were detected by magnetic-particle and x-ray inspection. Three large inclusions lying approximately parallel to the grain direction and fatigue beach marks around two of the inclusions were revealed by macroscopic examination of the fracture surface. Large nonmetallic inclusions that consisted of heavy concentrations of aluminum oxide (Al2O3) were revealed by microscopic examination of a section through the fracture origin. The forging vendors were notified about the excess size of the nonmetallic inclusions in the master connecting rods and a nondestructive-testing procedure for detection of large nonmetallic inclusions was established.

Pitostatic system connectors were being found cracked on several aircraft. Two of the cracked connectors made of 2024-T351 aluminum alloy were submitted for failure analysis. The connectors had cut pipelike threads that were sealed with Teflon-type tape when installed. Longitudinal cracks were located near the opening of the female ends of each connector. A cross section showed intergranular cracking with multiple branching in one connector. Scanning electron microscopy (SEM) showed intergranular cracking and separation of elongated grains. A cross section of connector threads showed an incomplete thread form resulting from improper tapping. It was concluded that the pitostatic system connectors failed by SCC. The stress was caused by forcing the improperly threaded female nut over its fully threaded male counterpart to effect a seal. The one connector tested for chemical composition was not made of 2024 aluminum alloy as reported but of 2017 aluminum. It was recommended that the pitostatic system connector manufacturing process be revised to produce full-depth threads rather than pseudo pipe threads. Wall thickness should be increased to increase the hoop stress bearing area if pipe threads were to be used. A determination of proper torque values for tightening the connectors was suggested also.

Cartridge-pneumatic starter systems are used on military aircraft. In the cartridge mode used for alert starts, the starter turbine is driven by hot gases produced through the controlled burning of a solid propellant cartridge within a closed chamber (the breech chamber/cartridge chamber assembly). Premature failures of steel breech chambers have been prevalent enough to cause serious concern. The breech chamber is fabricated from a 4340 Ni-Cr-Mo steel forging heat treated to a hardness in the range HRC 40 to 45. The failures have taken several forms, including fracture and unzipping of the chamber dome, burn-through of the dome, and shearing of bayonet locking lugs. Factors identified as significant in the failures are the pressure developed in the chamber and internal corrosion of the chamber in an environment that can produce stress-corrosion cracking. The interior configuration of the chamber and the stress distribution also have a bearing upon the failure modes. Several failures are reviewed to illustrate the problems.

A forged aluminum alloy 2014-T6 catapult-hook attachment fitting (anodized by the chromic acid process to protect it from corrosion) from a naval aircraft broke in service. Spectrographic analysis, visual examination, microscopic examination, and tensile analysis showed minute cracks on the inside surface of a bearing hole, and small areas of pitting corrosion were visible on the exterior surface of the fitting. The analysis also revealed a small number of rosettes, suggestive of eutectic melting, in an otherwise normal structure. These examinations and analyses support the conclusion that the presence of chromic acid stain on the fracture surface proved that the forging had cracked before anodizing. This suggest that the crack initiated during straightening, either after machining or after heat treatment. The structure and composition of the alloy appear to have been acceptable. Ductility was acceptable so rosettes found in the microstructure are believed to have been nondamaging. Had they contributed to the failure, the ductility would have been very low. The recommendations included inspection for cracks and revising the manufacturing process to include a fluorescent liquid-penetrant inspection before anodizing, because chromic acid destroys the penetrant. This inspection would reduce the possibility of cracked parts being used in service.

A 52000 bearing steel valve guide component operating in the fuel supply system of a transport aircraft broke into two pieces after 26 h of flight. The valve guide fractured through a set of elongated holes that had been electrodischarge machined into the component. Analysis indicated that the part failed by low cycle fatigue. The fracture was brittle in nature and had originated at a severely eroded zone of craters in a hard, deep white layer that was the result of remelting during electrodischarge machining. It was recommended that the remaining parts be inspected using a stereoscopic microscope and/or a borescope.

Several cases of embrittlement failure are analyzed, including liquid-metal embrittlement (LME) of an aluminum alloy pipe in a natural gas plant, solid metal-induced embrittlement (SMIE) of a brass valve in an aircraft engine oil cooler, LME of a cadmium-plated steel screw from a crashed helicopter, and LME of a steel gear by a copper alloy from an overheated bearing. The case histories illustrate how LME and SMIE failures can be diagnosed and distinguished from other failure modes, and shed light on the underlying causes of failure and how they might be prevented. The application of LME as a failure analysis tool is also discussed.

The outer tube, or stem, on a bicycle frame fractured after two years of use. Detailed investigation revealed that the lower stem bearing had been loose for some time and the bottom bearing cup contained many cracks. Metallographic examination of the chromium-plated cup confirmed the brittle nature of the cracks, located along prior austenite boundaries. The failure was attributed to hydrogen embrittlement due to improper manufacturing procedures following chromium plating. The cracking led to looseness in the bearing and consequent scoring, cracking, and overloading of the stem.