Repeated failures of high-pressure ball valves were reported in a chemical plant. The ball valves were made of AFNOR Z30C13 martensitic stainless steel. Initial examination of the valves showed that failure occurred in a weld at the ball/stem junction end of austenitic stainless steel sleeves that had been welded to the valve stem at both ends. Metallographic examination showed that a crack had been introduced into the weld by improper weld heat treatment. Stress concentration at the weld location resulting from an abrupt change in cross section facilitated easy propagation of the crack during operation. Proper weld heat treatment was recommended, along with avoidance of abrupt change in cross section near the weld. Due penetrant testing at the ball stem junction before and after heat treatment was also suggested.

After about two years in service, a 303 stainless steel valve in contact with a carbonated soft drink in a vending machine occasionally dispensed a discolored drink with a sulfide odor. According to the laboratory at the bottling plant, the soft drink in question was strongly acidic, containing citric and phosphoric acids and having a pH of 2.4 to 2.5. Investigation (visual inspection, chemical analysis, immersion testing in the soft drink, and 100x unetched micrographs) supported the conclusion that the failure was caused by the size and distribution of sulfide stringers in the alloy used in the valve. Manganese sulfide stringers in the valve were exposed at end-grain surfaces in contact with the beverage. The stringers, which were anodic to the surrounding metal, were subject to corrosion, producing a hydrogen sulfide concentration in the immediately adjacent liquid. Recommendations included changing the valve material to type 304 stainless steel.

The safety valve on a steam turbogenerator was set to open when the steam pressure reaches 2400 kPa (348 psi). The pressure had not exceeded 1790 kPa (260 psi) when the safety-valve spring shattered into 12 pieces. The steam temperature in the line varied from about 330 to 400 deg C (625 to 750 deg F). Because the spring was enclosed and mounted above the valve, its temperature was probably slightly lower. The 195 mm (7 in.) OD x 305 mm (12 in.) long spring was made from a 35 mm (1 in.) diam rod of H21 hot-work tool steel. It had been in service for about four years and had been subjected to mildly fluctuating stresses. Analysis (visual inspection, 0.3x photographs, 0.7x light fractographs, and metallographic examination) supported the conclusions that the spring failed by corrosion fatigue that resulted from application of a fluctuating load in the presence of a moisture-laden atmosphere. Recommendations included replacing all safety valves in the system with new open-top valves that had shot-peened and galvanized steel springs. Alternatively, the valve springs could be made from a corrosion-resistant metal-for example, a 300 series austenitic stainless steel or a nickel-base alloy, such as Hastelloy B or C.

Two outer valve springs made from air-melted 6150 pretempered steel wire broke during production engine testing. The springs were 50 mm in OD and 64 mm in free length, had five coils and squared-and-ground ends, and were made of 5.5 mm diam wire. It was revealed that fracture was nucleated by an apparent longitudinal subsurface defect. The defect was revealed by microscopic examination to be a large pocket of nonmetallic inclusions (alumina and silicate particles) at the origin of the fracture. Partial decarburization of the steel was observed at the periphery of the pocket of inclusions. Torsional fracture was indicated by the presence of beach marks at a 45 deg angle to the wire axis. It was established that the spring fractured by fatigue nucleated at the subsurface defect.

A pilot-valve bushing fractured after only a few hours of service. In operation, the bushing was subjected to torsional stresses with possible slight bending stresses. A slight misalignment occurred in the assembly before fracture. The bushing was made of 8617 steel and was case hardened to a depth of 0.13 to 0.4 mm (0.005 to 0.015 in.) by carbonitriding. Specifications required that the part be carbonitrided, cooled, rehardened by quenching from 790 deg C (1450 deg F), then tempered at about 175 deg C (350 deg F). Visual examination, hardness testing, and metallographic and microstructural investigation supported the conclusion that the bushing fractured in fatigue because of a highly stressed case-hardened surface of unsatisfactory microstructure and subsurface nonmetallic inclusions. Cracks initiated at the highly stressed surface and propagated across the section as a result of cyclic loading. The precise cause of the unsatisfactory microstructure of the carbonitrided case could not be determined, but it was apparent that heat-treating specifications had not been closely followed. Recommendations included that inspection procedures be modified to avoid the use of steel containing nonmetallic stringer inclusions and that specifications for carbonitriding, hardening, and tempering be rigorously observed.

After two weeks of operation, a poppet used in a check valve to control fluid flow and with a maximum operating pressure of 24 MPa (3.5 ksi) failed during operation. Specifications required that the part be made of 1213 or 1215 rephosphorized and resulfurized steel. The poppet was specified to be case hardened to 55 to 60 HRC, with a case depth of 0.6 to 0.9 mm (0.025 to 0.035 in.); the hardness of the mating valve seat was 40 HRC. Analysis showed that the fracture occurred through two 8 mm (0.313 in.) diam holes at the narrowest section of the poppet. The valve continued to operate after it broke, which resulted in extensive loss of metal between the holes. 80x micrograph and 4x macrograph of a 5% nital etched longitudinal section, and chemical analyses showed the poppet did fit 1213 or 1215 specs. However, hardness measurements showed surface hardness was excessive-61 to 65 HRC instead of the specified 55 to 60 HRC. Thus, the poppet failed by brittle fracture, and cracking occurred across nonmetallic inclusions. Recommendation was to redesign the valve with the poppet material changed to 4140 steel, hardened, and tempered to 50 to 55 HRC.