AISI type 321 stainless steel heat exchanger tubes failed after only three months of service. Macroscopic examination revealed that the leaks were the result of localized pitting attack originating at the water side surfaces of the tubes. Metallographic sections were prepared from both sets of tubes. Microscopic examination revealed that the pits had a small mouth with a large subsurface cavity which is typical of chloride pitting of austenitic stainless steel. However, no pitting was found in other areas of the system, where the chloride content of the process water was higher. This was attributed to the fact that they were downstream from a deaeration unit. It was concluded that the pitting was caused by a synergistic effect of chlorine and oxygen in the make-up water. Because it was not possible to install a deaeration unit upstream of the heat exchangers, it was recommended that a molybdenum-bearing stainless steel such as 316L or 317L be used instead of 321.

A type 321 stainless steel (AMS 5570) pressure-tube assembly that contained a brazed reinforcing liner leaked during a pressure test. Fluorescent liquid-penetrant inspection revealed a circumferential crack extended approximately 180 deg around the tube parallel to the fillet of the brazed joint. The presence of multiple origin cracks was indicated on the inside surface of a fractured portion of the crack surface. The cracks had originated adjacent to the braze joining the tube and the reinforcing liner and propagated through the wall to the outer surface. The residues on the inner surface of the tube were identified as fluorides from the brazing flux by chemical analysis. The nature of the crack, potential for corrosion due to residual fluorides and residual swaging stress in the tube prior to brazing, confirmed that failure of the tube end was due to stress-corrosion cracking. Stress relief treatment of tube before brazing and immediate cleaning of brazing residual fluorides was recommended to avoid failure.

An aircraft fuel-nozzle-support assembly exhibited cracks along the periphery of a fusion weld that attached a support arm to a fairing in a joint that approximated a T-shape in cross section. The base metal was type 321 stainless steel. Examination showed a good-quality weld penetrating to the support arm beneath, but revealed notch configurations at the inner mating surfaces at each edge of the fairing, the result of welding a poor fit-up of the support arm to the fairing. Fractures that originated at the cracks were examined by stereomicroscope and were found to contain fatigue marks that indicated crack propagation from multiple origins at the inner surface of the weld edge. Fatigue cracking was initiated at stress concentrations created by the notches at the inner surfaces between the support arm and the fairing, enhanced by poor fit-up in preparation for welding.

A fuel-nozzle-support assembly showed transverse indications after fluorescent liquid-penetrant inspection of a repair-welded area at a fillet on the front side of the support neck adjacent to the mounting flange. Visual examination disclosed an irregular crack. The crack through the neck was sectioned; examination showed that the crack had extended through the repair weld. The crack had followed an intergranular path. The crack was opened, and binocular-microscope examination of the fracture surface showed that the surface contained dendrites with discolored oxide films that were typical of exposure to air when very hot. Several additional subsurface cracks, typical of hot tears, were observed in and near the weld. There had been too much local heat input in making the repair weld. The result was localized thermal contraction and hot tearing. The cracking of the repair weld was attributed to unfavorable welding practice that accentuated thermal contraction stresses and caused hot tearing. Recommendations involved use of a small-diameter welding electrode, a lower heat input, and deposition in shallow layers that could be effectively peened between passes to minimize internal stress.

A welded elbow assembly (AISI type 321 stainless steel, with components joined with ER347 stainless steel filler metal by gas tungsten arc welding) was part of a hydraulic-pump pressure line for a jet aircraft. The other end of the tube was attached to a flexible metal hose, which provided no support and offered no resistance to vibration. The line was leaking hydraulic fluid at the nut end of the elbow. Investigation supported the conclusion that failure was by fatigue cracking initiated from a notch at the root of the weld and was propagated by cyclic loading of the tubing as the result of vibration and inadequate support of the hose assembly. Recommendations included changing the joint design from a cylindrical lap joint to a square-groove butt joint. Also, an additional support was recommended for the hose assembly to minimize vibration at the elbow.

The hot gas casing of a gas turbine used for peak load power production had developed extensive cracking during operation. The operating time was 18,000 h, and it had been subjected to 1,600 operating cycles. The gas temperature on the hot side was 985 deg C, on the cold side 204 deg C, the material being AISI 321 stainless steel. The purpose of the present study was to determine optimum repair welding procedures on the premise that the material was basically sound and undamaged by creep. The cracking was the result of thermal fatigue, and such cracks can propagate at elevated temperature, with damage ahead of the crack tip occurring by means of very local processes of creep. Metallographic examination disclosed heavy surface layers of carbides, such that the material was extremely brittle when subjected to bending. Accordingly, although it was demonstrated that the casing could be welded successfully, it was suggested that the remaining useful life was effectively exhausted and that it should be replaced. Thermal stresses produced during operation would rapidly result in additional cracks.

A 321 stainless steel radar coolant-system assembly fabricated by torch brazing with AWS type 3A flux, failed at the brazed joint when subjected to mild handling before installation, after being stored for about two years. It was revealed by visual examination of the failed braze that the filler metal had not covered all mating surfaces. Lack of a metallurgical bond between the brazing alloy and stainless steel and instead mechanical bonding of the filler metal to an oxide layer on the stainless steel surface was revealed by examination of the broken joint at the cup. It was indicated by the thickness of the oxide layer that the steel surface was not protected from oxidation by the flux during torch heating. It was concluded that the failure was caused by lack of a metallurgical bond between the brazing alloy and the stainless steel. Components made of 347 stainless steel (better brazeability) brazed with a larger torch tip (wider heat distribution) and AWS type 3B flux (better filler-metal flow) were recommended for radar coolant-system assembly.

A failure analysis was conducted to determine the cause of recurring failure of flexible bellows in an exhaust hose assembly. The bellows were made of type 321 stainless steel. Visual examination showed that cracks followed a path along the seam weld in the bellows. Most of the cracks followed a multidirectional/circular pattern, occasionally chipping off the convolutions, an indication of high-resonance fatigue-type cracking. Scanning electron fractography showed fatigue striations throughout the fracture surface. The microstructure consisted of relatively large grains and an abnormal degree of titanium-base stringers. Wall thickness was about 0.15 mm (0.006 in.) underside. It was concluded that the high vane pass frequency excited the natural vibration of the bellows to a higher resonance and cracked the bellows after a relatively short service period. The assembly was redesigned, and no further cracking occurred.

Stainless steel liners (AISI type 321) used in bellows-type expansion joints in a duct assembly installed in a low-pressure nitrogen gas system failed in service. The duct assembly consisted of two expansion joints connected by a 32 cm (12 in.) OD pipe of ASTM A106 grade B steel. Elbows made of ASTM A234 grade B steel were attached to each end of the assembly, 180 deg apart. A 1.3 mm (0.050 in.) thick liner with an OD of 29 cm (11 in.) was welded inside each joint. The upstream ends were stable, but the downstream ends of the liners remained free, allowing the components to move with the expansion and contraction of the bellows. Investigation (visual inspection, hardness testing, and 30x fractographs) supported the conclusion that the liners failed in fatigue initiated at the intersection of the longitudinal weld forming the liner and the circumferential weld by which it attached to the bellows assembly. Recommendations included increasing the thickness of the liners from 1.3 to 1.9 mm (0.050 to 0.075 in.) in order to damp some of the stress-producing vibrations.

Two freshwater tanks (0.81 mm (0.032 in) thick, type 321 stainless steel) were removed from aircraft service because of leakage due to pitting and rusting on the bottoms of the tanks. One tank had been in service for 321 h, the other for 10 h. There had been departures from the specified procedure for chemical cleaning of the tanks in preparation for potable water storage. The sodium hypochlorite sterilizing solution used was three times the prescribed strength, and the process exposed the bottom of the tanks to hypochlorite solution that had collected near the outlet. Investigation (visual inspection, 95x unetched images, chemical testing with a 5% salt spray, chemical testing with sodium hypochlorite at three strength levels, samples were also pickled in an aqueous solution containing 15 vol% concentrated nitric acid (HNO3) and 3 vol% concentrated hydrofluoric acid (HF) and were then immersed in the three sodium hypochlorite solutions for several days) supported the conclusion that failure of the stainless steel tanks by chloride-induced pitting resulted from using an overly strong hypochlorite solution for sterilization and neglecting to rinse the tanks promptly afterward. Recommendations included revising directions for sterilization and rinsing.

A type 321 stainless steel downcomer expansion joint that handled process gases was found to be leaking approximately 2 to 3 weeks after installation. The expansion joint was the second such coupling placed in the plant after failure of the original bellows. The failed joint was disassembled and examined to determine the cause of failure. Energy-dispersive x-ray analysis revealed significant peaks for chlorine and phosphorus, indicating failure by chloride stress-corrosion cracking (SCC). Cracks in the liner and bellows exhibited a branched pattern also typical of SCC. Cracks through the inner liner initiated on the outer surface of the liner and propagated inward, whereas cracks in the bellows originated on the inner surface and propagated outward. Stress-corrosion cracking of the assembly was caused by chloride contaminants trapped inside the bellows following hydrostatic testing. Checking the test fluid for chloride and removing all fluids after hydrostatic testing were recommended to prevent further failure.

The top tube of a horizontal superheater bank in the reheat furnace of a steam generator ruptured after seven years in service. The rupture was found to have occurred in the ferritic steel tubing (2.25Cr-1Mo steel (ASME SA-213, grade T-22)) near the joint where it was welded to austenitic stainless steel tubing (type 321 stainless steel (ASME SA-213, grade TP321H)). The surface temperature of the tube was found to be higher than operating temperature in use earlier. The ferritic steel portion of the tube was found to be longitudinally split and heavily corroded in the region of the rupture. A red and white deposit was found on the sides and bottom of the tube in the rupture area. The deposit was produced by attack of the steel by the alkali acid sulfate and had thinned the tube wall. It was concluded that rupture of the tube had occurred due to thinning of the wall by coal-ash corrosion. The thinned tubes were reinforced by pad welding. Type 304 stainless steel shields were welded to the stainless steel portions of the top reheater tubes and were held in place about the chromium-molybdenum steel portions of the tubes by steel bands.

A 44.5 mm (1.75 in.) diam type 321 stainless steel seamless tube in a power-generating turbine failed after 19,000 h in service. The tube was used to carry a mixture of approximately 25% steam and 75% hot air. Three fractured pieces and part of the tube containing the mating fracture surface were examined. Both fractographic and metallographic features revealed that the failure was by thermal fatigue caused by the presence of biaxial thermal stresses on the inner surface of the tube. It was recommended that the steam and air be thoroughly mixed prior to entering the tube to decrease the temperature fluctuations of the inner surface.

New type 321 corrosion-resistant steel heat shields were cracking during welding operations. A failure analysis was performed. The cause was found to be chloride induced stress-corrosion cracking. Packaging was suspected and confirmed to be the cause of the chloride contamination. A contributing factor was the length of time spent in the packaging, 21 years.

The working fluid of a hypersonic wind tunnel is freon 14 heated in molten-metal-bath heat exchangers. The coils of the heaters have failed several times from various causes. They have been replaced each time with a stainless steel deemed more appropriate, but they continue to fail. In this case study, the history of failures is traced, the causes are analyzed, and recommendations are made for future design and maintenance. Coils fabricated from AISI 316 should provide satisfactory service life if reasonable precautionary measures are observed during maintenance and testing.

Failure of AISI type 321 stainless steel internal springs from newly manufactured lip seals on a shaft between a turbine power unit and a pump in a commercial aircraft secondary unit was investigated. Examination of the coils from two failed springs showed that both had failed by fatigue. The springs contained drawing defects that served as the fatigue crack initiation sites. It was recommended that the wire drawing process be investigated for various levels of steel cleanliness to predict the incidence of drawing defects at the wire surface. Stress analysis to determine the minimum tolerable defect size was also recommended.

A type 321 stainless steel bellows expansion joint on a 17-cm (6 in.) OD inlet line (347 stainless) in a gas-turbine test facility cracked during operation. The line carried high-purity nitrogen gas at 1034 kPa (150 psi) with a flow rate of 5.4 to 8.2 kg/s (12 to 18 lb/s). Cracking occurred in welded joints and in unwelded portions of the bellows. The bellows were made by forming the convolution halves from stainless steel sheet, then welding the convolutions together. Evidence from visual examination, liquid penetrant inspection chemical analysis, hardness tests, and metallographic examination of sections etched with Vilella's reagent supports the conclusions that failure of the bellows occurred by intergranular fatigue cracking. Secondary degrading effects on the piping existed as well. Recommendations included the acceptability of Type 321 stainless steel (provided open-cycle testing does not result in surface oxidation and crevices) Although type 347 stainless steel would be better, and Inconel 600 would be an even better choice. Welds would also need modified processing for reheating and annealing. Prevention of oil leakage into the system would minimize carburization of the piping and bellows.

A ring-type joint in a reactor pipeline for a hydrocracker unit had failed. Cracks were observed on the flange and the associated ring gasket during an inspection following a periodic shutdown of the unit. The components were manufactured from stabilized grades of austenitic stainless steel; the flange from type 321, and the ring gasket from 347. Examination revealed that the failure occurred by transgranular stress-corrosion cracking, initiated by the presence of polythionic acid. Detailed metallurgical investigation was subsequently conducted to identify what may have caused the formation of polythionic acid in the process gas.

Several AISI type 321 stainless steel welded oil tank assemblies used on helicopter engine systems began to leak in service. One failure, a fracture on the aft side of a spot weld, was submitted for analysis. SEM fractography examination revealed fatigue failure. The failure initiated at an overload fracture near the root of the weld and was followed by mode III fatigue crack propagation (tearing) around the periphery of the weld. The initial overload fracture was caused by a high external load, which produced a concentrated stress and fracture at the weld root. The subsequent fatigue fracture was caused by engine vibrations during operation of the aircraft. Fracture characteristics indicated that the fatigue would not have occurred if the initial damage had not taken place.

This article addresses the forms of corrosion that contribute directly to the failure of metal parts or that render them susceptible to failure by some other mechanism. It describes the mechanisms of corrosive attack for specific forms of corrosion such as galvanic corrosion, uniform corrosion, pitting and crevice corrosion, intergranular corrosion, and velocity-affected corrosion. The article contains a table that lists combinations of alloys and environments subjected to selective leaching and the elements removed by leaching.