Examination of a connecting-rod shell bearing from a six-cylinder gasoline engine was done after it was returned to the factory. Copper-lead alloy SAE 485 bonded to a low-carbon steel backing was used to make the bearing and the oil used in the engine was the recommended one. Measurable material loss was visible over most of the bearing halves particularly in a wide region at the centerline. A brittle waxlike substance identified to be a mixture of copper and lead sulfides covered the visible shallow pits and the darkened region. Change of oil with greater frequency to prevent the buildup of sulfur compounds or bearing halves that have corrosion-resistant overlay materials were recommended as best solutions.

Two leaks were discovered at a sulfur recovery unit in a refinery. The leaks were at pipe-to-elbow welds in a 152 mm (6 in.) (NPS 6) diam line, operating in lean amine service at 50 deg C (120 deg F) and 2.9 MPa (425 psig). Thickness measurements indicated negligible loss of metal, and the leaks were clamped. A year later, 15 additional leaks were discovered, again at pipe-to-elbow welds in lean amine lines. Further nondestructive testing located other cracks, giving a total of 35. These lines had been in service for approximately eight years. Investigation (visual inspection, hardness testing, and micrographic cross-sections) supported the conclusion that the failure was caused by lean amine SCC. It was considered unlikely that these pipe welds had received such a postweld heat treatment, although it is industry practice to postweld stress relieve piping and pressure vessels in lean amine service if the temperature is expected to be above 95 deg C (200 deg F). Recommendations included inspecting all welds using shear wave ultrasonic testing and postweld heat treating all welds in lean amine service.

A gray cast iron (ASTM 247 type A) gate valve in an oleum and sulfuric acid piping loop at a chemical process plant fractured catastrophically after approximately 10 years of service. The valve was a 150 mm (6 in.) bolted flange type rated to conform to ANSI B16.1 for service at 1034 kPa (150 psi) and 120 deg C (250 deg F) maximum in 93 to 99% sulfuric acid. The fracture originated at stress-corrosion cracks that occurred in a high-stress transition region at the valve body-to-flange juncture. The mechanical properties of the failed valve were below those of the manufacturer's cited specification, and the wall thickness through which the fracture occurred exceeded the minimum 9.5 mm (38 in.) thickness cited by the manufacturer The valve flange had been unbolted and rebolted to a maintenanced piping coil immediately prior to failure. It was recommended that the flange-to-valve body juncture be redesigned to reduce stress levels. A method of maintenance and inspection in concert with a criterion for life prediction for this and other valves and components in the system was also recommended.

A flanged 100 mm (4 in.) diam low-carbon steel spool piece lined with Teflon was removed from a sulfuric acid denitrification system after cracks were observed in the painted coating. Visual and microstructural examination along with SEM fractography revealed scaled iron oxides on all opened crack surfaces. The surfaces had a faceted morphology, indicating intergranular fracture. Cracks originated at the interface between the tube and the Teflon liner Corrosion products were found caked into the intergranular region between the liner and the spool. The portion of the liner that had been exposed to the process stream was discolored. Failure of the spool was attributed to stress-corrosion cracking promoted by the presence of nitrates. Nitric acid contaminant in the sulfuric acid stream had diffused through the liner and accumulated in the annular space. Use of a liner that is more impermeable to the diffusion of ionic species was recommended.

Results of failure analyses of two aircraft crankshafts are described. These crankshafts were forged from AMS 6414 (similar composition to AISI 4340) vacuum arc remelted steels with sulfur contents of 0.003% (low sulfur) and 0.0005% (ultra-low sulfur). A grain boundary sulfide precipitate was caused by overheat of the low sulfur steel, and an incipient melting of grain boundary junctions was caused by overheat of the ultra-low sulfur steel. The precipitates and incipient melting in these two failed crankshafts were observed during the examination. As expected, impact fractures from the low sulfur steel crankshaft contained planar dimpled facets along separated grain boundaries with a small spherical manganese sulfide precipitates within each dimple. In contrast, planar dimpled facets along separated grain boundaries of impact fractures from the ultra-low sulfur crankshaft steel contained a majority of small spherical particles consisting of nitrogen, boron, iron, carbon, and a small amount of oxygen. Some other dimples contained manganese sulfide precipitates. Fatigue samples machined from the ultra-low sulfur steel crankshaft failed internally at planar grain boundary facets. Some of the facets were covered with nitrogen, boron, iron, and carbon film, while other facets were relatively free of such coverage. Results of experimental forging studies defined the times and temperatures required to produce incipient melting overheat and facets at grain boundary junctions of ultra-low sulfur AMS 6414 steels.

A cold-formed Grade TP 304 stainless steel swaged region of a reheater tube in service for about 8000 hours cracked because of sulfur-induced stress-corrosion cracking (SCC). Cracking initiated from the external surface and a high sulfur content was detected in the outer diameter and crack deposits. Comparison of the microstructure and hardness of the swaged region and unswaged Grade TP 304 stainless steel tube metal indicated that the swaged section was not annealed to reduce the effects of cold working. The high hardness created during swaging increased the stainless steel's susceptibility to sulfur-induced SCC. Because SCC requires water to be present, cracking most likely occurred during downtime or startups. To prevent future failures, the boiler should be kept dry during downtime to avoid formation of sulfur acids, and the swaged sections of the tubes should be heat treated after swaging to reduce or eliminate strain hardening of the metal.

High-chromium steel pipes 42.25 x 3.25 mm from a blast furnace gas fired recuperator for the preheating of air were heavily oxidized and perforated in places. It was found that the blast furnace gas had a high sulfur content. Both the carburization and the formation of sulfide proved that in addition, from time to time at least, combustion was incomplete and the operation was carried out in a reducing atmosphere, with the result that oxygen deficiency prevented the formation or maintenance of a protective surface layer on the external surface of the pipes. The sulfur would probably not have damaged the nickel-free steel used here at the given temperatures if it had been present as sulfur dioxide in an oxidizing atmosphere. The damage was therefore caused primarily by an incorrectly conducted combustion process.

A tie rod, nut, and bellows from a failed 610 mm (24 in.) diam tied universal expansion joint that carried tail gases consisting of N 2 + O 2 with slight traces of nitrogen oxides and water were examined. The materials were SA 193-B7 (AISI 4140), SA 194–214, and Incoloy 800H, respectively. Visual examination of the bellows revealed cracks in heavily cold-worked areas (both inside and outside) and considerable corrosion. SEM analysis showed a classical intergranular failure pattern with microcracking. The threaded tie rod microstructure contained spheroidized carbide that was more pronounced at the tie rod end of the failure. Energy-dispersive X-ray analysis of fracture surfaces from the bellows showed the presence of chlorine and sulfur. Failure of the bellows was attributed to stress-corrosion cracking, with chlorine and sulfur being the corroding agents. The rod damage was the result of failure of the bellows, which allowed escaping hot gases to impinge on the tie rods and heat them to approximately 595 deg C (1100 deg F). It was recommended that the insulation be analyzed to determine the origin of the chlorine and sulfur and that it be replaced if necessary.

A Nicrofer 3718 sinter belt used in a sinter furnace operated at 965 deg C (1770 deg F) for the curing of nickel briquettes stretched and fractured after only 6 months in service. Macrofractographic, metallographic, and chemical analyses of several broken links of the woven belt and an unused section of new wire showed that the fracture resulted from sulfur attack and overheating during service. It was recommended that the sinter belt material be changed to Nicrofer 3220-H (alloy 800H).

Hydraulic cylinder housings were being fabricated from 4140 grade seamless steel tubing. During production, magnetic-particle inspection indicated the presence of circumferential and longitudinal cracks in a large number of cylinders. Analysis (visual inspection, dye penetrant inspection, 50x/90x/400x SEM micrographs, and metallographic analysis) supports the conclusion that the cracking problem in these components was identified as quench cracks due to their brittle, intergranular nature and the characteristic temper oxide on the fracture surfaces. Although the steel met the compositional requirements of SAE 4140, the sulfur level was 0.022% and would account for the formation of the sulfide stringers observed. Apparently, the combination of the clustered, stringer-type inclusions and the quenching conditions were too severe for this component geometry. The result was a high incidence of quench cracks that rendered the parts useless. Recommendations included changing the specification, requiring the steel to have lower sulfur concentrations. Magnetic-particle cleanliness standards should be imposed that will exclude material with harmful clusters of sulfide stringers, for example, modified AMS 2301.

One of 14 vertical radiant tubes (RA 333 alloy) in a heat-treating furnace failed when a hole about 5 x 12.5 cm (2 x 5 in.) corroded completely through the tube wall. The tube measured 183 cm (72 in.) in length and 8.9 cm (3 in.) in OD and had a wall thickness of about 3 mm (0.120 in.). Failure occurred where the tube passed through the refractory hearth (floor) of the furnace. Although the furnace atmosphere was neutral with respect to the work, it had a carburizing potential relative to the radiant tubes. Analysis (visual inspection, 250x spectroscopic examination of specimens etched with mixed acids, metallographic examination, and chemical analysis) supported the conclusions that the premature failure of the tube by perforation at the hearth level resulted from (1) corrosion caused by sulfur contamination from the refractory cement in contact with the tube and (2) severe local overheating at the same location. Recommendations included replacing all tubes using a low sulfur refractory cement in installation and controlling burner positioning and regulation more closely to avoid excessive heat input at the hearth level.

The welds joining the liner and shell of a fluid catalytic cracking unit failed. The shell was made of ASTM A515 carbon steel welded with E7018 filler metal. The liner was made of type 405 stainless steel and was plug welded to the shell using ER309 and ER310 stainless steel filler metal. Fine cracks starting inside the weld zone and spreading outward through the weld and toward the surface were observed during examination. Decarburization and graphitization of the carbon steel at the interface was noted. The high carbon level was found to allow martensite to form eventually. The structure was found to be austenitic in the area where the grain-boundary precipitates appeared heaviest. The composition of the precipitates was analyzed using an electron microprobe to reveal presence of sulfur. Microstructural changes in the weld alloy at the interface were interpreted to be caused by dilution of the alloy and the presence of sulfur caused hot shortness. The necessary internal stress to produce extensive cracking was produced by the differential thermal expansion of the carbon and stainless steels. Periodic careful gouging of the affected areas followed by repair welding was recommended.

An Incoloy 800H (UNS N08810) transfer line on the outlet of an ethane-cracking furnace failed during decoking of the furnace tubes after nine years in service. A metallographic examination using optical and scanning electron microscopy as well as energy-dispersive x-ray spectroscopy revealed that the failure was due to sulfidation. The source of the sulfur in the furnace effluent was either dimethyl disulfide, injected into the furnace feed to prevent coke formation and carburization of the furnace tubes, or contamination of the feed with sulfur bearing oil.