A steel galvanizing vat measuring 3 x 1.2 x 1.2 m (10 x 4 x 4 ft) and made of 19 mm thick carbon steel plate (ASTM A285, grade B)) at a shipbuilding and ship-repair facility failed after only three months of service. To verify suspected failure cause, two T joints were made in 12.5 mm thick ASTM A285, grade B, steel plate. One joint was welded using the semiautomatic submerged arc process with one pass on each side. A second joint was welded manually by the shielded metal arc process using E6010 welding rod and four passes on each side. The silicon content of the shielded metal arc weld was 0.54%, whereas that of the submerged arc weld was 0.86%. After being weighed, the specimens were submerged in molten zinc for 850 h. Analysis (visual inspection, chemical analysis, 100x 2% nital-etched micrographs) supported the conclusions that the vat failed due to molten-zinc corrosion along elongated ferrite bands, possibly because silicon was dissolved in the ferrite and thus made it more susceptible to attack by the molten zinc. Recommendations included rewelding the vat using the manual shielded metal arc process with at least four passes on each side.

A 10-in. diam, spiral-welded AISI 1020 carbon steel pipe carrying water under pressure developed numerous leaks over a four mile section. The section was fabricated using submerged-arc welding from the outside surface. Each welded length of pipe had been subjected to a proof pressure approximately twice the specified design pressure and two-thirds the approximate yield point of the parent metal. No failures or leakage were observed during proof testing. Metallurgical examination corroborated visual checks, indicating a distinct lack of root penetration in the split areas. Splitting occurred as a result of inadequate root penetration. The most likely source of difficulty in the welding process was the linear speed. Probably, the failures would not have occurred in absence of the welding problem. Also, the pipe was inadequate for the specified design pressure, as well as the reported maximum system pressure.

In TAKR 300 (Bob Hope) Class transport ships, the builder observed cracking of steel cloverleaf vehicle tie-down deck sockets following installation. Sockets were made from AH36 steel plate by flame cutting and cold coining, then submerged-arc welded to the shop deck. Cracks initiated from the tip of the cloverleaf pattern in >300 cases aboard several cargo vessels in various stages of construction. Consultants who analyzed the situation concluded that the problem may have been corrosion and hydrogen embrittlement. Three possible mechanisms of failure were considered: overload failure; fatigue fracture; and, environmentally-assisted cracking. Testing indicated overload failure was the cause. Remedial actions were taken to improve the fracture properties of the deck socket. A modified manufacturing process was developed involving milling and cutting instead of coining to round the comers of the flame-cut cloverleaf lobe. This new manufacturing process solved the problem.

A main steam pipe was found to be leaking due to a large circumferential crack in a pipe-to-fitting weld in one of two steam leads between the superheater outlet nozzles and the turbine stop valves (a line made of SA335-P22 material). The main crack surface was found to be rough, oriented about normal to the outside surface, and had a dark oxidized appearance. The cracking was found to be predominantly intergranular. Distinct shiny bands that etched slower than the remainder of the sample at the top of each individual weld bead were revealed by microscopic examination. These bands were found contain small cracks and microvoids. A mechanism of intergranular creep rupture at elevated temperature was identified as a result of a series of stress-rupture and tensile tests. It was revealed by the crack shape that cracking initiated on the pipe exterior, then propagated inward and in the circumferential direction in response to a bending moment load. It was concluded that the primary cause of failure was the occurrence of bending stresses that exceeded the stress levels predicted by design calculations and that were higher than the maximum allowable primary membrane stress.

This article describes the failure characteristics of high-pressure long-distance pipelines. It discusses the causes of pipeline failures and the procedures used to investigate them. The use of fracture mechanics in failure investigations and in developing remedial measures is also reviewed.

A nuclear steam-generator vessel constructed of 100-mm thick SA302, grade B, steel was found to have a small leak. The leak originated in the circumferential closure weld joining the transition cone to the upper shell. The welds had been fabricated from the outside by the submerged arc process with a backing strip. The backing was back gouged off, and the weld was completed from the inside with E8018-C3 electrodes by the shielded metal arc process. Striations of the type normally associated with progressive or fatigue-type failures including beach marks that allowed tracing the origin of the fracture to the pits on the inner surface of the vessel were revealed. Copper deposits with zinc were revealed by EDS examination of discolorations. Pitting was revealed to have been caused by poor oxygen control in the steam generators and release of chloride into the steam generators. It was concluded by series of controlled crack-propagation-rate stress-corrosion tests that A302, grade B, steel was susceptible to transgranular stress-corrosion attack in constant extension rate testing with as low as 1 ppm chloride present. It was recommended to maintain the coolant environment low in oxygen and chloride. Copper ions in solution should be eliminated or minimized.

A 25 mm (1 in.) diam carrier shaft failed suddenly during operation. The shaft failed near the toe of the 4.8 mm (316 in.) frame-to-shaft 60 deg and 120 deg submerged metal arc (SMA) tack welds after an unknown time in service. Material specifications called for the shaft to be made from SAE 1018 cold-rolled carbon steel. Carrier assembly components were made from type 300 stainless steel, and all nuts, spacers, and washers were to be SMA tack welded to the stainless steel frame. Chemical analyses (OES, SEM/EDS) showed the shaft to actually be made from SAE 1050 high-carbon steel and that a low-carbon steel welding procedure had been used. This resulted in incipient cracks in the stainless steel weld metal near the toes of the component-to-shaft welds. The hardnesses of the heat-affected zones were as high as 58 HRC, and they were grain coarsened. The parting of the shaft was determined to have been caused by an impact failure mechanism, with the origin at the incipient cracks in the weld metal. Additionally, the coarsened heat-affected zones were found to be hydrogen embrittled. The primary cause of the failure was the use of an unspecified material.

This article discusses the failure analysis of several steel transmission pipeline failures, describes the causes and characteristics of specific pipeline failure modes, and introduces pipeline failure prevention and integrity management practices and methodologies. In addition, it covers the use of transmission pipeline in North America, discusses the procedures in pipeline failure analysis investigation, and provides a brief background on the most commonly observed pipeline flaws and degradation mechanisms. A case study related to hydrogen cracking and a hard spot is also presented.

As the result of a leak detected in a plate-formed header at PENELEC'S Shawville Unit No. 3, an extensive failure investigation was initiated to determine the origin of cracking visible along the longitudinal weld seam. Fabricated from SA387-D material and designed for a superheater outlet temperature of 566 deg C, the 11.4 cm thick header had operated for approximately 187,000 h at the time of the failure. Discussion focuses on the results of a metallographic examination of boat samples removed from the longitudinal seam weldment in the vicinity of the failure and at other areas of the header where peak temperatures were believed to have been reached. The long-term mechanical properties of the service-exposed base metal and creep-damaged weld metal were determined by creep testing. Based on the utility's decision to replace the header within one to three years, an isostress overtemperature lead specimen approach was taken, whereby failure of a test specimen in the laboratory would precede failures in the plant. These tests revealed approximately a 2:1 difference in life for the base metal as compared to weld metal.

During the final shop welding of a large armature for a direct-current motor (4475 kW, or 6000 hp), a loud bang was heard, and the welding operation stopped. When the weld was cold, nondestructive evaluation revealed a large crack adjacent to the root weld. Investigation showed the main crack had propagated parallel to the fusion boundary along the subcritical HAZ and was associated with long stringers of type II manganese sulfide (MnS) inclusions. This supported the conclusion that the weld failed by lamellar tearing as a result of the high rotational strain induced at the root of the weld caused by the weld design, weld sequence, and thermal effects. Recommendations included removing the old weldment to a depth beyond the crack and replacing this with a softer weld metal layer before making the main weld onto the softer layer.

This article describes some of the welding discontinuities and flaws characterized by nondestructive examinations. It focuses on nondestructive inspection methods used in the welding industry. The sources of weld discontinuities and defects as they relate to service failures or rejection in new construction inspection are also discussed. The article discusses the types of base metal cracks and metallurgical weld cracking. The article discusses the processes involved in the analysis of in-service weld failures. It briefly reviews the general types of process-related discontinuities of arc welds. Mechanical and environmental failure origins related to other types of welding processes are also described. The article explains the cause and effects of process-related discontinuities including weld porosity, inclusions, incomplete fusion, and incomplete penetration. Different fitness-for-service assessment methodologies for calculating allowable or critical flaw sizes are also discussed.

This article discusses the effect of using unsuitable alloys, metallurgical discontinuities, fabrication practices, and stress raisers on the failure of a pressure vessel. It provides information on pressure vessels made of composite materials and their welding practices. The article explains the failure of pressure vessels with emphasis on stress-corrosion cracking, hydrogen embrittlement, brittle and ductile fractures, creep and stress rupture, and fatigue with examples.

This article briefly reviews the general causes of weldment failures, which may arise from rejection after inspection or failure to pass mechanical testing as well as loss of function in service. It focuses on the general discontinuities observed in welds, and shows how some imperfections may be tolerable and how the other may be root-cause defects in service failures. The article explains the effects of joint design on weldment integrity. It outlines the origins of failure associated with the inherent discontinuity of welds and the imperfections that might be introduced from arc welding processes. The article also describes failure origins in other welding processes, such as electroslag welds, electrogas welds, flash welds, upset butt welds, flash welds, electron and laser beam weld, and high-frequency induction welds.