Two outer valve springs made from air-melted 6150 pretempered steel wire broke during production engine testing. The springs were 50 mm in OD and 64 mm in free length, had five coils and squared-and-ground ends, and were made of 5.5 mm diam wire. It was revealed that fracture was nucleated by an apparent longitudinal subsurface defect. The defect was revealed by microscopic examination to be a large pocket of nonmetallic inclusions (alumina and silicate particles) at the origin of the fracture. Partial decarburization of the steel was observed at the periphery of the pocket of inclusions. Torsional fracture was indicated by the presence of beach marks at a 45 deg angle to the wire axis. It was established that the spring fractured by fatigue nucleated at the subsurface defect.

This article describes the general root causes of failure associated with wrought metals and metalworking. This includes a brief review of the discontinuities or imperfections that may be the common sources of failure-inducing defects in bulk working of wrought products. The article discusses the types of imperfections that can be traced to the original ingot product. These include chemical segregation; ingot pipe, porosity, and centerline shrinkage; high hydrogen content; nonmetallic inclusions; unmelted electrodes and shelf; and cracks, laminations, seams, pits, blisters, and scabs. The article provides a discussion on the imperfections found in steel forgings. The problems encountered in sheet metal forming are also discussed. The article concludes with information on the causes of failure in cold formed parts.

During natural gas drilling in the EMS region in 1956, considerable numbers of longitudinal cracks and transverse fractures occurred in the connecting pieces of the bore rods. The connectors were screwed onto the rods by means of a fine thread and tightly joined with it by shrinkage at 530 deg C. The connectors were made of SAE 4140 Cr-Mo steel. The material for the rod pipes was Fe-0.4C-1Mn steel. Structural stresses played a role in the cracking. Iron sulfide formed on the fracture planes and flake-like stress cracks occurred in the steel. The hydrogen sulfide content of the gas was the cause of damage. Hydrogen liberated by reaction with the iron caused the formation of iron sulfide after penetration of the steel, which had an explosive effect during molecular separation under high pressure. This in turn caused the crack formation in conjunction with the external and residual stresses.

This paper describes the analysis of the failure of a Zr-2.5Nb pressure tube in a CANDU reactor. The failure sequence was established as: (1) the existence of an undetected manufacturing flaw in the form of a lamination, (2) in-service development of the flaw by oxidation of the lamination, (3) delayed hydride cracking, which extended the flaw through the wall of the tube, resulting in leakage, and (4) rupture of the tube by cold pressurization while the reactor was shut down. The comprehensive failure analysis led to a remedial action plan that permitted the reactor to be returned to full-power operation and ensured a low probability of a similar occurrence for all CANDU reactors.

Near-surface porosity in zinc die castings that were subsequently plated with copper, nickel, and bright chromium was causing blemishes in the plating. Identifying die casting turbulence and hot spots were keys to process modifications that subsequently allowed porosity to be greatly minimized.

The primary purpose of this article is to describe general root causes of failure that are associated with wrought metals and metalworking. This includes a brief review of the discontinuities or imperfections that may be common sources of failure-inducing defects in the bulk working of wrought products. The article addresses the types of flaws or defects that can be introduced during the steel forging process itself, including defects originating in the ingot-casting process. Defects found in nonferrous forgings—titanium, aluminum, and copper and copper alloys—also are covered.

Type 316L stainless steel pipes carrying brine at 120 deg C (250 deg F) and at a pH of about 7, failed by perforation at or near circumferential butt-weld seams. The failure was examined optically and radiographically in the field. Specimens were removed and examined metallographically and with a SEM in the laboratory. The examinations revealed a combination of failure mechanisms. The pitting failure of the welds was attributed to localized attack of an activated surface, in which anodic pits corroded rapidly. Additionally, SCC driven by residual welding stresses occurred in the base metal adjacent to the welds. Use of highly stressed austenitic stainless steels in high-chloride environments having a temperature above 65 deg C (150 deg F) should be discouraged. Solution annealing or shot peening to reduce residual stresses may be advisable. If heat treatment is not feasible after welding, the substitution of a more corrosion-resistant alloy, such as Incoloy 800 or 825, may be necessary.

An explosion occurred in a portion of a horizontal, U-shaped expansion loop in a steam main approximately 10-in. diam which had been operating at 400 psi for six years. Steam conditions varied from 538 deg C (450 deg F) saturated to 343 deg C (650 deg F) superheated. Fracture occurred longitudinally through the upper wall over a length of approximately 68 in. The sample received for examination was ultrasonically tested, which indicated a band of internal defects extending 1 in. in from the edge. Subsequently, the portion of the pipe embodying the other side of the rupture was obtained for examination. Transverse sections through this and the mating portion already received, followed by magnetic crack detection, revealed the presence of defective zones. Subsequent ultrasonic examination of other sections of the steam main indicated suspect areas in a number of lengths of pipe. These defects were basically laminations of a similar form to those which resulted in the failure of the portion of pipe.

A cross crowned by a gilded cock on a church steeple hung in a slanted position from its support after a stormy night. Fracture had occurred on the shaft of the cross which was formed by a seamless steel tubing of 60 mm OD and 2.7 mm wall thickness. The fracture had not occurred at the point of highest stress, but approximately 200 mm above it. A bell-shaped sheet metal cap was welded onto the shaft at this point. The tubing had fractured about 10 mm under this weld seam. The steel of the shaft tubing contained only 0.033P and 0.004N, and thus was not considered prone to brittle fracture or unsuitable for welded structures. Investigation showed the design of the cross was an unfortunate mistake. If the bell-shaped cap was really essential it should have been fastened by means other than welding. Furthermore, the welding was done poorly after an initial aborted attempt. This was the primary cause of fracture.

A carbon steel piping cross-tee assembly which conveyed hydrogen sulfide (H7S) process gas at 150 to 275 deg C (300 to 585 deg F) with a maximum allowable operating pressure of 3 MPa (450 psig) ruptured at the toe of one of the welds at the cross after several years of service. The failure was initially thought to be the result of thermal fatigue, and the internal surfaces exhibited the “elephant hide” pattern characteristic of thermal fatigue. However metallographic failure analysis found that this pattern was the result of corrosion rather than thermal fatigue. Corrosion caused failure at this location because the weld was abnormally thin as fabricated. Thus, failure resulted from inadequate deposition of weld metal and subsequent wall thinning from internal corrosion. It was recommended that the cross-tee be replaced with a like component, with more careful attention to weld quality.

Three sprinkler system dry pipe valve castings (class 30 gray iron), two that had failed in service and one that had been rejected during machining because of porosity, were submitted for examination. The two failures consisted of cracks in a seating face. All three were from the same heat. Visual examination showed that the casting had cracked through a thin area in the casting sidewall. Evidence of a sharply machined corner at the fracture site was also discovered. Tensile testing and metallographic analysis revealed no metallurgical cause for the failure. It was recommended that the manufacturer work with the foundry to evaluate the criticality of core placement and to eliminate the undesired thin section.

An investigation of the impeller and deposit samples from a centrifugal compressor revealed that an aluminum IR-12 refrigerant reaction had occurred, causing extensive damage to the second-stage impeller and contaminating the internal compressor components. The spherical surface morphology of the impeller fragments suggested that the aluminum had melted and resolidified. The deposits were similar in composition and were identified by XRD as consisting primarily of aluminum trifluoride. In addition, EDS analysis detected major amounts of chlorine and iron. Results of a combustion test indicated that the compressor deposit was comprised of a 9. 8 wt% carbon and that the condenser deposit contained 8.7 wt% carbon. It was concluded that the primary cause of failure was the rubbing of the impeller against the casting and that a self-sustaining Freon fire had occurred in the failed compressor

Nuclear power plants typically experience two or three high-cycle fatigue failures of stainless steel socket-welded connections in small bore piping during each plant-year of operation. This paper discusses fatigue-induced failure in socket-welded joints and the strategy Texas Utilities Electric Company (TU Electric) has implemented in response to these failures. High-cycle fatigue is invisible to proven commercial nondestructive evaluation (NDE) methods during crack initiation and the initial phases of crack growth. Under a constant applied stress, cracks grow at accelerating rates, which means cracks extend from a detectable size to a through-wall crack in a relatively short time. When fatigue cracks grow large enough to be visible to NDE, it is likely that the component is near the end of its useful life. TU Electric has determined that an inspection program designed to detect a crack prior to the component leaking would involve frequent inspections at a given location and that the cost of the inspection program would far exceed the benefits of avoiding a leak. Instead, TU Electric locates these cracks by visually monitoring for leaks. Field experience with fatigue-induced cracks in socket-welded joints has confirmed that visual monitoring does detect cracks in a timely manner, that these cracks do not result in catastrophic failures, and that the plant can be safely shut down in spite of a leaking socket-welded joint in a small bore pipe. Historical data from TU Electric and Southwest Research Institute are presented regarding the frequency of failures, failure locations, and the potential causes. The topics addressed include 1) metallurgical and fractographic features of fatigue cracks at the weld toe and weld root; 2) factors that are associated with fatigue, such as mechanical vibration, internal pulsation, joint design, and welding workmanship; and 3) implications of a leaking crack on plant safety. TU Electric has implemented the use of modified welding techniques for the fabrication of socket-welded joints that are expected to improve their ability to tolerate fatigue.

Visual examination, using the unaided eye or a low-power optical magnifier, is typically one of the first steps in a failure investigation. This article presents the guidelines for selecting samples for scanning electron microscope examination and optical metallography and for cleaning fracture surfaces. It discusses damage characterization of metals, covering various factors that influence the damage, namely stress, aggressive environment, temperature, and discontinuities.

The lifetime assessment of polymeric products is complicated, and if the methodology utilized leads to inaccurate predictions, the mistakes could lead to financial loss as well as potential loss of life, depending on the service application of the product. This article provides information on the common aging mechanisms of polymeric materials and the common accelerated testing methods used to obtain relevant data that are used with the prediction models that enable service life assessment. Beginning with a discussion of what constitutes a product failure, this article then reviews four of the eight major aging mechanisms, namely environmental stress cracking, chemical degradation, creep, and fatigue, as well as the methods used in product service lifetime assessment for them. Later, several methods of service lifetime prediction that have gained industry-wide acceptance, namely the hydrostatic design basis approach, Miner's rule, the Arrhenius model, and the Paris Law for fatigue crack propagation, are discussed.

This article briefly reviews the general causes of weldment failures, which may arise from rejection after inspection or failure to pass mechanical testing as well as loss of function in service. It focuses on the general discontinuities observed in welds, and shows how some imperfections may be tolerable and how the other may be root-cause defects in service failures. The article explains the effects of joint design on weldment integrity. It outlines the origins of failure associated with the inherent discontinuity of welds and the imperfections that might be introduced from arc welding processes. The article also describes failure origins in other welding processes, such as electroslag welds, electrogas welds, flash welds, upset butt welds, flash welds, electron and laser beam weld, and high-frequency induction welds.