During the lifting of a piece of machinery by means of an overhead travelling crane the hook fractured suddenly. The load was attached to the hook by means of fiber rope slings and rupture occurred in a plane which appeared to coincide with the sling loop nearest to the back of the hook. The rated capacity of the crane was 15 tons. At the time of the mishap it was being used to lift one end of a hydraulic cylinder with a total weight of about 27 tons. Fracture was of the cleavage type throughout. There was no evidence of any prior deformation of the material in the vicinity, nor was there any indication of a pre-existing crack or major discontinuity at the point of origin. A sulfur print suggested the hook had been forged from a billet cogged down from an ingot of semi-killed steel. Failure of this hook was attributed to strain-age embrittlement of the material at the surface of the intrados.

The repeated failure of a welded ASTM A283 grade D pipe that was part of a 6 km (4 mi) line drawing and conducting river water to a water treatment plant was investigated. Failure analysis was conducted on sections of pipe from the third failure. Visual, macrofractographic, SEM fractographic, metallographic, chemical, and mechanical property (tension and impact toughness) analyses were conducted. On the basis of the tests and observations, it was concluded that the failure was the combined result of poor notch toughness (impact) properties of the steel, high stresses in the joint area, a possible stress raiser at the intersection of the spiral weld and girth weld, and sudden impact loading, probably due to water hammer. Use of a semi- or fully killed steel with a minimum Charpy V-notch impact value of 20 J (15 ft·lbf) at 0 deg C (32 deg F) was recommended for future water lines. Certified test results from the steel mill, procedure qualification tests of the welding, and design changes to reduce water hammer were also recommended.

A railway tank car developed a fracture in the region of the sill and shell attachment during operation at -34 deg C (-30 deg F). On either side of the sill-support member, cracking initiated at the weld between a 6.4 mm thick frontal cover plate and a 1.6 mm thick side support plate. The crack then propagated in a brittle manner upward through the side plate, through the welds attaching the side plate to a 25 mm (1 in.) thick shell plate (ASTM A212, grade B steel), and continued for several millimeters in the shell plate before terminating. Other plates involved were not positively identified but were generally classified as semi-killed carbon steels. Investigation (visual inspection, hardness testing, chemical analysis, Charpy V-notch testing, and drop-weight testing) supported the conclusions that the fracture was initiated by weld imperfections and propagated in a brittle manner as a result of service stresses acting on the plate having low toughness at the low service temperatures encountered. Recommendations included that the specifications for the steel plates be modified to include a toughness requirement and that improved welding and inspection practices be performed to reduce the incidence of weld imperfections.

Welded steel storage vessels used to hold mildly alkaline solution were produced in exactly the same manner from deep-drawn aluminum-killed SAE 1006 low-carbon steel sheet. After the cylindrical shell was drawn, a top low-carbon steel closure was welded to the inside diameter. The containers were then filled with the slightly alkaline solution, pressurized, and allowed to stand under ambient conditions. A small number, less than 1%, were returned because they began to leak in service. Inspection revealed general corrosion and pitting on the inner surfaces. However, other tanks that experienced the same service conditions developed no corrosion. Corrosion was linked to forming defects that provided sites for localized corrosion, and to lack of steam drying after cleaning, which increased susceptibility to general corrosion.

During a refit of a twenty-year-old Naval destroyer, two cracks were found on the inside of the killed carbon-manganese steel hull plate at the forward end of the boiler room. The cracks coincided with the location of the top and bottom plates of the bilge keel. Metallurgical examination of sections cut from the cracked area identified lamellar tearing as the principle cause of the cracking. This was surprising in 6 mm thick hull plates. Corrosion fatigue and general corrosion also contributed to hull plate perforation. Although it is probable that more lamellar tears exist near the bilge keel in other ships and may be a nuisance in the future, the hull integrity of the ships is not threatened and major repairs are not needed.

A new crane failed during the overload test following erection. A test load of 5 tons at the end of the jib (rated capacity 4 tons) was in the process of being slewed at the time of this failure. Inspection revealed that the collapse had resulted from the opening out of one eye of the rimming steel tie-bar of the main jib at the lower splice. This permitted the pin to pass through and allowed the jib to fall. Examination subsequently revealed that brittle fracture of two of the corner angles of the tower head assembly had also occurred. Had the tie-bar material been of satisfactory quality and/or, if the end that failed had been flamecut instead of sheared, then the damage resulting from the excessive overload would have been limited to yielding of the material in the region of the pin-joint. Such yielding on an overload test further indicated that the scantlings of the pin-joints were inadequate. Two other crane failures showed that failure resulted from the use of rimming steel, and embrittlement of the material was evident.

This article provides assistance to a failure analyst in broadening the initial scope of the investigation of a physical engineering failure in order to identify the root cause of a problem. The engineering design process, including task clarification, conceptual design, embodiment design, and detail design, is reviewed. The article discusses the design process at the personal and project levels but takes into consideration the effects of some higher level influences and interfaces often found to contribute to engineering failures.