Some corrosion processes in the presence of chlorides, for steel embedded in concrete, are described and illustrated with the aid of scanning electron microscope EDXA data. Observations made of failure surfaces of reinforcements removed from the concrete beams after being subjected to sinusoidal load fluctuations at 6.7 Hz in air, 3% NaCl solution, and natural sea water are described. Reinforcement types studied included: hot-rolled mild steel bar, hot-rolled alloyed high strength bar, cold-worked high strength bar, galvanized bar of all these three types, nickel-clad bar and epoxy-coated bar.

Plate perforation occurred in the cylindrical section and walls of the inlet foot (2.38 mm thick Incoloy 825 plate welded using INCO welding rod 135) of an inert gas fire prevention system in an oil tanker. Cross-sectional microprobe analysis showed the corrosion product to contain sulfur, mainly from the flue gas, and calcium and chlorine, mainly from the sea water. The gray corrosion product was interspersed with rust and a black carbonaceous deposit. Corrosion pitting and poor weld penetration, with carbide precipitation and heavy etching at grain boundaries, indicated sensitization and susceptibility to aqueous intergranular corrosion. Chemical analysis showed the predominant acid radical to be sulfate (6.20% in the carbonaceous deposit and 0.60% in the corrosion product), suggesting that oxidation of SO2 in the flue gas caused the corrosion. Moisture condensation, the carbon acting as a cathode, and alloy susceptibility to intergranular corrosion contributed to the corrosion.

The defects observed along weldings of stainless steel pipelines employed in marine environments were evidenced by metallographic and electrochemical examination. A compilation of cases on the effect of defective weldings, in addition to improper choice of stainless steel for water pipelines, lead to the conclusion that intercrystalline corrosion in steels involved precipitation of a surplus phase at grain boundaries. Intercrystalline corrosion in austenitic stainless steels due to precipitation of chromium carbides during conditions generated due to welding and ways to avoid the precipitation (including reduction of carbon content, appropriate heat treatment, cold work of steel, reduction of austenitic grain size and stabilizing elements) were described. The presence of microcracks due to highly localized heat concentrations with consequent thermal expansion and considerable shrinkages during cooling was investigated. The specimens were taken from various sources including transverse and longitudinal welding seam, sensitized areas and it was concluded appropriate material selection with respect to medium could control some corrosion processes.

Visual examination, optical and scanning electron microscopy were used to determine the cause of failure in the connector groove of a marine riser coupling. The specified steel was AISI 4142 (0.40 to 0.45% C; 0.75 to 1.00% Mn; 0.20 to 0.35% Si; 0.80 to 1.10% Cr; 0.15 to 0.25% Mo) normalized from 9000C. Microscopic examination revealed the crack's initiation point and subsequent propagation. SEM examination of chemically stripped corrosion showed that corrosion fatigue and stress corrosion might have contributed to the initial slow crack growth. Impact tests revealed a fracture transition temperature in excess of 1000C. The sequence of events leading to failure was detailed. The main recommendation was to quench and temper existing couplings and to use a lower carbon quenched and tempered steel for new couplings.

Several pressurized air containers (i.e., diving tanks) made of non-heat-treatable Al-5Mg aluminum alloy failed catastrophically. Catastrophic failure occurred when a subcritical stress corrosion crack reached a critical size. Critical crack size for unstable propagation was reached prior to wall penetration, which could have led to subsequent loss of pressure, resulting in explosion of the cylinder. It was recommended that more stress corrosion resistant alloys be used for sea diving applications. Furthermore, cylinders should have a reduced wall thickness that can be determined employing the “leak-before-break” design philosophy, developed using fracture mechanics, to eliminate the possibility of catastrophic ruptures.

The failure of a 90-10 cupronickel heat exchanger tube resulted in flooding of the vessel and subsequently sinking it. The corrosion of the cupronickel alloy was facilitated by the high sulfur content of the seawater in which it operated. The failure modes were anodic dissolution and copper reprecipitation.

Banding wires of the rotor of an 1800 hp motor were renewed following replacement of the banding rings. After about six months of service, a breakdown occurred due to bursting of the banding wires in several places. The 0.064 in. diam wire was nonmagnetic and of the 18/8 Cr-Ni type of austenitic stainless steel. The fractures were short and partially crystalline, with no evidence of slowly developing cracks of the fatigue type. Microscopical examination of sections taken through the fractures showed the cracking to be of the multiple branching type. Because the material was in the heavily cold-worked condition, it was not possible to determine with certainty if the cracks were of the inter- or trans-granular type. It was concluded that failure was due to stress-corrosion cracking in a chloride environment. Failure of the wires was likely due to the use of a chloride-containing flux during the soldering operation.

A pipe in the lateral wall of a boiler powering an aircraft carrier flat-top boat failed during a test at sea. The pipe was made from ASTM 192 steel, an adequate material for the application. Microstructural analysis along with equipment operating records provided valuable insight into what caused the pipe to rupture. Although the pipe had been replaced just 50 h before the accident, the analysis revealed incrustations and corrosion pits on the inner walls and oxidation on the outer walls. Microstructural changes were also observed, indicating that the steel was exposed to high temperatures. The combined effect of pitting, incrustations, and phase transformations caused the pipe to rupture.

A brackish water pump impeller was replaced after four years of service, while its predecessor lasted over 40 years. The subsequent failure investigation determined that the nickel-aluminum bronze impeller was not properly heat treated, which made the impeller susceptible to aluminum dealloying. The dealloying corrosion was exacerbated by erosion because the pump was slightly oversized. The investigation recommended better heat treating procedures and closer evaluation to ensure that new pumps are properly sized.

On 14 April 1912, at 11:40 p.m., Greenland Time, the Royal Mail Ship Titanic on its maiden voyage was proceeding westward at 21.5 knots (40 km/h) when the lookouts on the foremast sighted a massive iceberg estimated to have weighed between 150,000 to 300,000 tons at a distance of 500 m ahead. Immediately, the ship’s engines were reversed and the ship was turned to port (left) in an attempt to avoid the iceberg. In about 40 sec, the ship struck the iceberg below the waterline on its starboard (right) side near the bow. The iceberg raked the hull of the ship for 100 m, destroying the integrity of the six forward watertight compartments. Within 2 h 40 min the RMS Titanic sank. Metallurgical examination and chemical analysis of the steel taken from the Titanic revealed important clues that allow an understanding of the severity of the damage inflicted on the hull. Although the steel was probably as good as was available at the time the ship was constructed, it was very inferior when compared with modern steel. The notch toughness showed a very low value (4 J) for the steel at the water temperature (-2 deg C) in the North Atlantic at the time of the accident.

The steam tug Hercules was an ocean-going and bay tug for 55 years before being retired. It is now being restored by the National Park Service. A broken steam valve was obtained for microstructural examination. The body was gray cast iron, and the stem and seat were brass. The examination centered on corrosion of the brass components. The seat and shaft were alpha brass, with a hardness of 64 and 79 DPH, respectively. A nut held the shaft onto the seat, and was alpha-beta brass with a hardness of 197 DPH. Welded on the end of the shaft was a ring of hard (DPH 294) alpha-beta brass, which seated against the nut. The brass seat and stem show little corrosion. However, the alpha-beta brass nut and welded tip showed extensive dezincification. This process of removal of Zn and the retention of Cu began in the high Zn beta phase, but eventually both phases were attacked. The depth of penetration was consistent with dezincification rates reported in the literature for such brasses in salt water if the valve had been in service about 55 years.

Failed ferrous components were analyzed from a crane that operated on an offshore platform. The crane failed during operation and fell into the sea. The brake spring on the boom hoist was found to have fractured in four places. The spring contained a line defect (seam) that was the source of each crack. The fracture of the oil quenched and tempered (HRC 50 ASTM A229) spring was by stress-corrosion cracking after the crane fell into the sea because fatigue cannot account for the fractures observed. The crane failure was caused by an overload created by the operator catching a free-falling load.

A storage tank had been in service at a petrochemical plant for 13 years when inspectors discovered cracks adjacent to weld joints and in the base plate near the foundation. The tank was made from AISI 304 stainless steel and held styrene monomer, a derivative of benzene. The cracks were subsequently welded over with 308 stainless steel filler wire and the base plate was replaced with new material. Soon after, the tank began leaking along the weld bead, triggering a full-scale investigation; spectroscopy, optical and scanning electron microscopy, fractography, SEM-EDS analysis, and microhardness, tensile, and impact testing. The results revealed transgranular cracks in the HAZ and base plate, likely initiated by stresses developed during welding and the presence of chloride from seawater used in the plant. It was also found that the repair weld was improperly done, nor did it include a postweld heat treatment to remove weld sensitization and minimize residual stresses.

The brine-heater shell in a seawater-conversion plant failed by bursting along a welded joint connecting the hot well (C70600 per ASTM B 466) to the heater shell (ASTM A285, grade C steel). Three cracks in the welded joints between the heater shell and the hot well were revealed by visual inspection. It was observed that crack 1 and 2 were covered with high-temperature oxidation products which revealed that the surfaces had been separated for quite some time. A very high discontinuity stress which existed at the longitudinal welds between the hot well and the heater shell was revealed by stress analysis. It was interpreted that the cracks had originated shortly after the heater was put into operation and propagated slowly initially. The rate of propagation was interpreted to have increased due to discontinuity stresses greater than yield strength of the material. It was concluded that the brine heater cracked and fractured because it was overstressed in normal operation. The heater design was modified to make the heater shell and the hot well two separate units. A relief valve was recommended in the heater or in the steam line near the heater.

An austenitic stainless steel (type 316/316L stainless steel, schedule 40, 64 mm (2.5 in.) diam and larger) piping network used in the fire-sprinkler system in a large saltwater passenger and car ferry failed by rapid leaking. Operating conditions involved stagnant seawater at ambient temperatures. The pipe was in service for four weeks when three leaks appeared. Investigation (visual inspection and photographic images) supported the conclusion that the failure was caused by attack and corrosion damage of Cl ions in conditions that were ideal for three modes of highly accelerated pitting of austenitic stainless steel: the bottom surface, weld or HAZ pits, and crevices. Recommendations included proper material selection for piping, flanges, and weld rods with greater corrosion resistance. Proper filtering to prevent entrained abrasives and timely breakdown inspections were also advised.

Investigation of alleged corrosion damage to hot-rolled steel during transit requires metallurgical, chemical, and corrosion knowledge. Familiarity with non-destructive techniques and sampling procedures is necessary. A complete record of shipment history is also required, including the purchasing specifications and observations and photographs taken during surveys enroute. A frequent conclusion of such investigations is that the alleged corrosion is of no significance or did not occur during the voyage.

Gross wastage and embrittlement were observed in plain carbon steel desuperheaters in five new Naval power plants. The gross wastage could be duplicated in laboratory bomb tests using sodium hydroxide solutions and was concluded to be caused by free caustic concentrated by high heat flux. The embrittlement was shown to be caused by the flow of corrosion generated hydrogen which converted the cementite to methane which nucleated voids in the steel. A thermodynamic estimate indicated that a small amount of chromium would stabilize the carbides against decomposition by hydrogen in this temperature range, and laboratory tests with 2-14% Cr steel verified this.