Some corrosion processes in the presence of chlorides, for steel embedded in concrete, are described and illustrated with the aid of scanning electron microscope EDXA data. Observations made of failure surfaces of reinforcements removed from the concrete beams after being subjected to sinusoidal load fluctuations at 6.7 Hz in air, 3% NaCl solution, and natural sea water are described. Reinforcement types studied included: hot-rolled mild steel bar, hot-rolled alloyed high strength bar, cold-worked high strength bar, galvanized bar of all these three types, nickel-clad bar and epoxy-coated bar.

The failure during use of a seat on a heavy-duty swing set at an elementary school was investigated. The seat contained a perforated reinforcing sheet metal (galvanized type 430 stainless steel) insert covered by an elastomeric material. Specimens of the reinforcing sheet from the failed seat were examined using SEM fractography, tensile and ductility tests, and spectrographic chemical analysis. The test results showed that the steel used did not meet the manufacturer's specifications for ductility (elongation). In addition, the small-diameter punched holes caused a stress concentration factor that aggravated the brittleness of the steel.

Single 6.4 mm (0.25 in.) post-tensioning wires failed in a parking garage in the southern portion of the United States. Several failed wires were removed and the lengths were examined for signs of corrosion using SEM metallography. The scans showed localized shallow pitting, and chloride was detected in some of the pits. The test also revealed an initial crack that was probably caused by hydrogen embrittlement. Since no chloride was detected on the fracture surface, and none was detected in the overlying concrete, the corrosion appears to have begun prior to the wires' placement in the concrete.

During the construction of a prestressed concrete viaduct, several 12.2 mm diam wires ruptured after tensioning but before the channels were grouted. They were made of heat treated prestressed concrete steel St 145/160. While the wire bundles, each containing over 100 wires, were being drawn into the channels they were repeatedly pulled over the sharp edges of square section guide blocks. The fractures were initiated at these chafe zones. It was concluded that the chafing of the wires on the edges of the guide blocks, particularly the resulting martensite formation, caused the wires to rupture.

A type 321 stainless steel (AMS 5570) pressure-tube assembly that contained a brazed reinforcing liner leaked during a pressure test. Fluorescent liquid-penetrant inspection revealed a circumferential crack extended approximately 180 deg around the tube parallel to the fillet of the brazed joint. The presence of multiple origin cracks was indicated on the inside surface of a fractured portion of the crack surface. The cracks had originated adjacent to the braze joining the tube and the reinforcing liner and propagated through the wall to the outer surface. The residues on the inner surface of the tube were identified as fluorides from the brazing flux by chemical analysis. The nature of the crack, potential for corrosion due to residual fluorides and residual swaging stress in the tube prior to brazing, confirmed that failure of the tube end was due to stress-corrosion cracking. Stress relief treatment of tube before brazing and immediate cleaning of brazing residual fluorides was recommended to avoid failure.

A tool used to stretch reinforcement wires in prestressed concrete failed. All eight individual jaws were broken. Visual examination of the fracture surfaces indicated that about half of the broken parts had a partially dendritic appearance. Further, fracture surfaces near the exteriors of the parts were clean and smooth, and there was evidence of a case. Examination of the flat surfaces of the parts revealed surface cracking where actual failure had not occurred. Chemical analysis showed the material to be a low-alloy carburizing steel. The microstructure was compatible with a steel which is cast, carburized, quenched, and tempered. The structure was generally satisfactory, except for the presence of severe shrinkage porosity. It was concluded that the presence of shrinkage porosity in critical areas was the primary cause of fracture. Extremely high hardness indicating a lack of adequate tempering was the secondary cause.

On 22 Feb 1997, one of the arms on an amusement park ride became detached from the central pylon, allowing the passenger carriage at the end of the arm to fall to the ground. Detachment of the arm was found to have occurred as a result of fracture of the cast steel bearing cap and the retaining bolt, which then allowed the axle to move out of its housing. The cap material was a cast 0.25% carbon steel. The retaining bolt failed in the threaded region, with no evidence of fatigue. One of the reinforcing straps welded to the outer surface of the cap had also fractured as the result of fatigue. Evidence of a weld repair could be seen at the location of the fracture. The bearing cap, cap 2L, failed by fatigue initiated from the corners of the two threaded holes. One of the two reinforcing straps then failed by overload, while the second one became detached by fracturing through the welds. The bolt then failed by overload. The cracking in cap 2L was not an isolated occurrence. Cracking was detected at the same location in almost all the other caps on the same device. The cracking had been in progress for considerable time. To prevent the reoccurrence of such a failure, recommendations are given for a more-rigorous inspection protocol.

A 100,000 barrel crude oil storage tank rupture caused extensive property damage in Dec 1980, in Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan. Failure was attributed to a brittle fracture that originated at a weld between a reinforcing pad and a manway nozzle. Factors that contributed to the brittle fracture included incomplete penetration in a single-bevel groove weld, poor impact properties of the hot rolled ASTM A283 low-carbon steel base material, and air temperature down to 27 C on the day of failure. Details of the analysis and results of impact testing are discussed.

Leakage was detected at the welds between stiffening plates and the pipe in a transfer line carrying butane and related petrochemical compounds. The line and reinforcing rings were of AISI 316 stainless steel, the pipe being of 508 mm diam and 6.25 mm wall thickness. The design temperature and pressure were 621 deg C and 2.75 kPa, respectively, while the operating conditions were 579 deg C and 1.03 kPa. The line was insulated. Failure occurred after approximately 90,000 h of operation, shutdowns being approximately two per annum. The cracking occurred at the toe of welds between the plates and the pipe. The creep damage failure was attributed to repeated relaxation cycles of very high thermal stresses of resulting from the periodic shutdowns, temperature fluctuations during service, or both. This failure emphasized the information available from an evaluation of the operative creep mechanism, namely grain boundary sliding, relating to the periodic nature of the loading, with high residual stresses being present.

The Rocky Point Viaduct, located near Port Orford, OR, was replaced after only 40 years of service. A beam from the original viaduct was studied in detail to determine the mechanisms contributing to severe corrosion damage to the structure. Results are presented from the delamination survey, potential and corrosion mapping, concrete chemistry, and concrete physical properties. The major cause of corrosion damage appears to have been the presence of both pre-existing and environmentally-delivered chlorides in the concrete.

A fireball engulfed half of a drill rig while in the process of drilling a shot hole. Subsequent investigation revealed the cause of the fire was the failure of the oil return hose to the separator/receiver in the air compressor. The failed hose was a 50.8 mm 100R1 type hose, as specified in AS 3791-1991 Hydraulic Hoses. This type of hose consisted of an inner tube of oil-resistant synthetic rubber, a single medium-carbon steel wire braid reinforcement, and an oil-and-weather resistant synthetic rubber cover. The wire braiding was found to be severely corroded in the area of the failure zone. The physical cause of the hose failure was by severe localized corrosion of the layer of reinforcing braid wire at the transition between the coupling and the hose at the end of the ferrule. This caused a reduction of the wire cross-sectional area to the extent that the wires broke. Once the majority of the braid wires were broken there was not enough intrinsic strength in the rubber inner hose to resist the normal operating pressures.

A hoist lift hose on a loader failed catastrophically. The hoses were a 100R13 type (as classified in AS3791-1991) with 50.8 mm nominal internal diameter. They consisted of six alternating spirals of heavy wire around a synthetic rubber inner tube with a synthetic rubber outer sheath. Failure of the lift hose was approximately 50 to 100 mm away from the "upper" end of the hose, with the straight coupling that attaches to the hydraulic system. The return hose was in much better condition, with no apparent deformation and only small areas of mechanical damage to the outer sheath. There were two modes of failure of the wire: tensile and corrosion related. The predominant corrosion mechanism appeared to be crevice corrosion related, with the corrosion being driven by the retention of water by the cover material around the wire strands. In this case study (and in most wire-reinforced hydraulic hoses), the wire reinforcing strands were a medium-carbon steel in the cold drawn condition. Radiographic nondestructive testing (NDT) was recommended to determine when a hydraulic hose should be replaced.

Bending fatigue caused crack propagation and catastrophic failures at several locations near the welds on the low-carbon steel tubular cargo box frame of police three-wheel motorcycles. ANSYS finite element analysis revealed that bending stresses in some of the frame members were aggravated by poor detail design between vertical and horizontal tubes. Stresses observed in the ANSYS analysis were not sufficient to cause the onset of fatigue. However when compounded by stress concentration factors and in-service dynamic loading, the frame could have been regularly subjected to stresses over the fatigue limit of the material. A strain gage static loading test verified FEM results, and finite element techniques were applied in the design of reinforcing members to renovate the frames. Material properties were determined and welding procedures specified for the reinforcing members. Inspection intervals were devised to avoid future problems.

Four tanks made from type 304L stainless steel were removed from storage. Atmospheric corrosion on the outside of the tanks and pitting and crevice corrosion on the inside were visible. Metallographic examination revealed that the internal corrosion had been caused by crevices related to weld spatter and uneven weld deposit and by service water that had not been drained after hydrostatic testing. External corrosion was attributed to improper passivation. It was recommended that the surfaces be properly passivated and that, before storage, the interiors be rinsed with demineralized water and dried.

The boom lift equalizer hose on an excavator failed and the resultant release of high-pressure hydraulic fluid damaged the operator cabin. The hose was a heavy duty, high-impulse, multiple-spiral wire-reinforced, rubber covered hydraulic hose equivalent to 100R13 specifications as set in AS3791-1991. It had a maximum operating pressure of 34.5 MPa (5000 psi). The failure occurred adjacent to one of the couplings, although some of the wire strands had not broken. The two outer layers of reinforcement wire on the failed end had experienced extensive corrosion, corroding away completely in most areas. This corrosion was fairly uniform around the circumference of the hose. The loss of two spirals/layers of wire reinforcement effectively reduced the pressure carrying capacity of the hose to below that of the maximum operational pressure experienced. Either the hose (or assembly) was already corroded prior to being fitted, or, the hose experienced aggressive conditions causing rapid corrosion of the exposed wire strands.

The top tube of a horizontal superheater bank in the reheat furnace of a steam generator ruptured after seven years in service. The rupture was found to have occurred in the ferritic steel tubing (2.25Cr-1Mo steel (ASME SA-213, grade T-22)) near the joint where it was welded to austenitic stainless steel tubing (type 321 stainless steel (ASME SA-213, grade TP321H)). The surface temperature of the tube was found to be higher than operating temperature in use earlier. The ferritic steel portion of the tube was found to be longitudinally split and heavily corroded in the region of the rupture. A red and white deposit was found on the sides and bottom of the tube in the rupture area. The deposit was produced by attack of the steel by the alkali acid sulfate and had thinned the tube wall. It was concluded that rupture of the tube had occurred due to thinning of the wall by coal-ash corrosion. The thinned tubes were reinforced by pad welding. Type 304 stainless steel shields were welded to the stainless steel portions of the top reheater tubes and were held in place about the chromium-molybdenum steel portions of the tubes by steel bands.

An 1100 aluminum alloy connector of a high-tension aluminum conductor steel-reinforced (ACSR) transmission cable failed after more than 20 years in service, in a region of consider able industrial pollution. The steel core was spliced with a galvanized 1020 carbon steel sheath. Visual examination showed that the connector had undergone considerable plastic deformation and necking before fracture. The steel sheath was severely corroded, and the steel splice was pressed off-center in the axial direction inside the connector. Examination of the fracture surface and micro-structural analysis indicated that the failure was caused by mechanical overload, which occurred because of weakening of the steel support cable by corrosion inside the fitting. The corrosion was ascribed to defective assembly of the connector which allowed moisture penetration.