The self-powered flux detectors used in some nuclear reactors are Pt or V-cored co-axial cables with MgO as an insulator and Inconel 600 as the outer sheath material. The detectors are designed to operate in a He atmosphere; to maximize the conduction of heat (generated from the interaction with gamma radiation) and to prevent corrosion. A number of failures have occurred over the years because of a loss of the He cover gas in the assembly. This has resulted in either acid attack on the Inconel 600 sheath in a wet environment or gaseous corrosion in a dry environment. In the latter case, nitriding and embrittlement occurred at temperatures as low as 300 to 400 deg C (determined from an examination of the oxidation of the Zircaloy-2 carrier rod on which the detectors were mounted). Recent results are described and discussed in terms of the oxidation and nitriding kinetics of Zircaloy-2 and Inconel 600, respectively.

A drum pinion shaft (1030 steel) which was part of the hoisting gear of a crane (capacity 18,140-kg) operating in a blooming mill failed while lifting a 9070 kg load. Chatter marks, rough-machining marks, and sharp corner radii were revealed in the keyway which extended into a shoulder at a change in diam. A circular recess below the keyway surface was revealed at each end of the keyway. A sharp corner at the end of the keyway was revealed by examination to be the origin of fracture. Beach marks were found radiating from the origin over a large portion of the fracture surface which confirmed failure of the shaft by fatigue fracture. As a corrective measure the shaft was replaced with one made of 4140 steel, quenched and tempered to a hardness of 286 to 319 HRB. The keyway was moved away from the change in section and was machined with a 1.6-mm radius in the bottom corners and a larger-radius fillet was machined at the change in section.

A hydroextractor installed new for the drying of sugar massecuite consisted of a metal basket fixed to a vertical spindle. Disruption occurred just after the machine had been run up to speed and was not preceded by any abnormal behavior. The basket assembly consisted of a Ni-Cr-Mo steel shell and two end plates. It was designed to spin at 2200 rpm, using centrifugal force to expel liquids through nearly 3000 drilled holes in the shell wall. Investigators found that the shell separated completely from the bottom plate. The top plate, though it cracked radially, remained attached over most of its circumference. The basket also contained a 22-gauge Monel metal liner that had been perforated by stabbing, raising pronounced burrs that faced each hole. Apart from the local spots of corrosion due to the lining, the inner surface of the basket showed little evidence of general corrosion. What caused the basket to fail was the presence of corrosion-fatigue cracks or fissures radiating from the holes. A secondary cause was that the scantlings of the basket were too light.

Argonne National Laboratory has conducted analyses of failed components from nuclear power-generating stations since 1974. The considerations involved in working with and analyzing radioactive components are reviewed here, and the decontamination of these components is discussed. Analyses of four failed components from nuclear plants are then described to illustrate the kinds of failures seen in service. The failures discussed are (1) intergranular stress-corrosion cracking of core spray injection piping in a boiling water reactor, (2) failure of canopy seal welds in adapter tube assemblies in the control rod drive head of a pressurized water reactor, (3) thermal fatigue of a recirculation pump shaft in a boiling water reactor, and (4) failure of pump seal wear rings by nickel leaching in a boiling water reactor.

Nondestructive testing (NDT), also known as nondestructive evaluation (NDE), includes various techniques to characterize materials without damage. This article focuses on the typical NDE techniques that may be considered when conducting a failure investigation. The article begins with discussion about the concept of the probability of detection (POD), on which the statistical reliability of crack detection is based. The coverage includes the various methods of surface inspection, including visual-examination tools, scanning technology in dimensional metrology, and the common methods of detecting surface discontinuities by magnetic-particle inspection, liquid penetrant inspection, and eddy-current testing. The major NDE methods for internal (volumetric) inspection in failure analysis also are described.

After only a short time in service, oil-fired orchard heaters made of galvanized low-carbon steel pipe, 0.5 mm (0.020 in.) in thickness, became sensitive to impact, particularly during handling and storage. Most failures occurred in an area of the heater shell that normally reached the highest temperature in service. A 400x etched micrograph showed a brittle and somewhat porous metallic layer about 0.025 mm (0.001 in.) thick on both surfaces of the sheet. Next to this was an apparently single-phase region nearly 0.05 mm (0.002 in.) in thickness. The examination supported the conclusion that prolonged heating of the galvanized steel heater shells caused the zinc-rich surface to become alloyed with iron and reduce the number of layers. Also, heating caused zinc to diffuse along grain boundaries toward the center of the sheet. Zinc in the grain boundaries reacted with iron to form the brittle intergranular phase, resulting in failure by brittle fracture at low impact loads during handling and storage. Recommendation included manufacture of the pipe with aluminized instead of galvanized steel sheet for the combustion chamber.

A failed crosshead of an industrial compressor was examined using optical and scanning electron microscope. The crosshead was an ASTM A148 grade 105-85 steel casting. On the basis of the observations reported and available background information, it was concluded that the failure began with the initiation of cracks at slag inclusions and sharp fillets in weld-repair areas in the casting. The weld-repair procedures were unsatisfactory. The cracks propagated in a fatigue mode. he casting quality was judged unacceptable because of the presence of excessive shrinkage porosity. It was recommended that crosshead castings be properly inspected before machining. Revision of foundry practice to reduce or eliminate porosity was also recommended.

The failure during use of a seat on a heavy-duty swing set at an elementary school was investigated. The seat contained a perforated reinforcing sheet metal (galvanized type 430 stainless steel) insert covered by an elastomeric material. Specimens of the reinforcing sheet from the failed seat were examined using SEM fractography, tensile and ductility tests, and spectrographic chemical analysis. The test results showed that the steel used did not meet the manufacturer's specifications for ductility (elongation). In addition, the small-diameter punched holes caused a stress concentration factor that aggravated the brittleness of the steel.

Examination of the header of the third superheater of a boiler producing 150 t/h of steam at 525 deg C and 118 kPa, disclosed extensive internal cracking at the connection to the tube joining this to a safety valve. Cracking was observed within the tube and in the thickness of the shell wall itself. The boiler had been in operation for approximately 160,000 h and was shut down for inspection when the cracking was detected. The material involved was 2.25 Cr, 1 Mo steel, and the unit had been subjected to 115 shutdowns. Initiation of the cracks was attributed to thermal shock, caused by the periodic return of condensate along the long connecting line (some 9 m long). Propagation of the cracks was due to thermal cycling, together with periodic pressure cycles, producing growth by low cycle fatigue. This was aided by corrosion within the cracks and by the wedging action caused by corrosion deposits at their tips. The failure suggests control of dissolved solids in the boiler feedwater may have been inadequate.

A failed crosshead of an industrial compressor was examined using optical and SEM. The crosshead was an ASTM A148 grade 105-85 steel casting. On the basis of the observations reported and available background information, it was concluded that the failure began with the initiation of cracks at slag inclusions and sharp fillets in weld-repair areas in the casting. The weld-repair procedures were unsatisfactory. The cracks propagated in a fatigue mode. he casting quality was judged unacceptable because of the presence of excessive shrinkage porosity. It was recommended that crosshead castings be properly inspected before machining. Revision of foundry practice to reduce or eliminate porosity was also recommended.

The failure of a reformer tube furnace manifold has been examined using metallography. It has been shown that the cause of failure was thermal fatigue; the damage was characterized by the presence of voids produced by creep mechanisms operating during the high temperature cycle under high local stress. The study indicates that standard metallographic procedures can be used to identify failure modes in high temperature petrochemical plants.

Three ASME SA106 grade B carbon steel feed water piping reducers from a pressurized water reactor showed indications of flaws near welds during ultrasonic testing. Further examination and testing indicated that the cracks resulted from a low-cycle corrosion fatigue phenomenon.

A valve stem made of 17-4 PH (AISI type 630) stainless steel, which was used for operating a gate valve in a steam power plant, failed after approximately four months of service, during which it had been exposed to high-purity water at approximately 175 deg C (350 deg F) and 11 MPa (1600 psi). The valve stem was reported to have been solution heat treated at 1040 +/-14 deg C (1900 +/-25 deg F) for 30 min and either air quenched or oil quenched to room temperature. The stem was then reportedly aged at 550 to 595 deg C (1025 to 1100 deg F) for four hours. Investigation (visual inspection, 0.7x/50x images, hardness testing, reheat treatment, and metallographic examination) supported the conclusion that failure was by progressive SCC that originated at a stress concentration. Also, the solution heat treatment had been either omitted or performed at too high of a temperature, and the aging treatment had been at too low of a temperature. Recommendations included the following heat treatments: after forging, solution heat treat at 1040 deg C (1900 deg F) for one hour, then oil quench; to avoid susceptibility to SCC, age at 595 deg C (1100 deg F) for four hours, then air cool.

A pair of steam generators operating at a pressurized water reactor site were found to be leaking near a closure weld. The generators were the vertical U-tube type, constructed from ASTM A302 grade B steel. The shell material exhibited high hardness values prior to confirmatory heat treatment, indicating high residual stresses in the area of the weld. All cracks were transgranular and were associated with pits on the inside surfaces of the vessels. It was concluded that the cracking was caused by a low-cycle corrosion fatigue phenomenon, with cracks initiating at areas of localized corrosion and propagating by fatigue. The cause of the pitting/cracking was related to the unit's copper species in solution.

During 5.7 years of service, dye penetrant inspection of Inconel 800H pigtail connections regularly showed cracks at weld toes. Weld repairs were not able to prevent reoccurrence but often aggravated the condition. Samples containing small, but detectable, reducer-to-pigtail cracks showed intergranular cracks originating at weld toes and filled with oxidation product, which precluded determination of the cracking mechanism. All weldments exhibited high degrees of secondary precipitates, with original fabrication welds exhibiting higher apparent levels than repair welds. SEM/EDS analysis showed base metal grain boundary precipitates to be primarily chromium carbides, but some titanium carbides were also observed. Failure was believed to result from the synergism of thermally driven tube distortion, which resulted in over-stress, and from the intergranular oxidation products and intergranular carbides which contributed to cracking. It was recommended that stresses be reduced and /or that materials and components be changed. Refinements in welding procedures and implementation of preweld/postweld heat treatments were recommended also.

Copper tubes from the cooler assemblies of a large air-conditioning unit exhibited leakage upon installation of the unit. Sections from two leaking tubes and one nonleaking tube were subjected to pressure testing and microscopic examination. The cause of leaking was determined to be pitting corrosion. Extensive pitting was found on the insides of all sections examined, with deep and numerous pits in leaking areas. Circumstantial evidence indicated that antifreeze solution left in the tubes from the manufacturing operation was the most likely cause of the pitting.

Large quantities of aluminum-clad spent nuclear materials have been in interim storage in the fuel storage basins at The Savannah River Site while awaiting processing since 1989. This extended storage as a result of a moratorium on processing resulted in corrosion of the aluminum clad. Examinations of this fuel and other data from a corrosion surveillance program in the water basins have provided basic insight into the corrosion process and have resulted in improvements in the storage facilities and basin operations. Since these improvements were implemented, there has been no new initiation of pitting observed since 1993. This paper describes the corrosion of spent fuel and the metallographic examination of Mark 31A target slugs removed from the K-basin storage pool after 5 years of storage. It discusses the SRS Corrosion Surveillance Program and the improvements made to the storage facilities which have mitigated new corrosion in the basins.

An investigation was conducted to better understand the time-dependent degradation of thermal barrier coated superalloy components in gas turbines. First-stage vanes are normally subjected to the highest gas velocities and temperatures during operation, and were thus the focus of the study. The samples that were analyzed had been operating at 1350 °C in a gas turbine at a combined-cycle generating plant. They were regenerated once, then used for different lengths of time. The investigation included chemical analysis, scanning electron microscopy, SEM/energy dispersive spectroscopy, and x-ray diffraction. It was shown that degradation is driven by chemical and mechanical differences, oxide growth, depletion, and recrystallization, the combined effect of which results in exfoliation, spallation, and mechanical thinning.

An API type 2 steel clamp located on the riser of a semisubmersible drilling rig between the lower ball joint and riser blowout preventer (BOP) conductor failed after 7 years of service. Failure analysis revealed the cause of failure to be the low toughness of the clamp material. Contributing factors included the presence of a hard, brittle, heat-affected zone and weld defects at the handling pad eye. It was recommended that the replacement clamp be made from a material with good toughness and that any installation of attachments by welding be done according to qualified procedures.

Nuclear power plants typically experience two or three high-cycle fatigue failures of stainless steel socket-welded connections in small bore piping during each plant-year of operation. This paper discusses fatigue-induced failure in socket-welded joints and the strategy Texas Utilities Electric Company (TU Electric) has implemented in response to these failures. High-cycle fatigue is invisible to proven commercial nondestructive evaluation (NDE) methods during crack initiation and the initial phases of crack growth. Under a constant applied stress, cracks grow at accelerating rates, which means cracks extend from a detectable size to a through-wall crack in a relatively short time. When fatigue cracks grow large enough to be visible to NDE, it is likely that the component is near the end of its useful life. TU Electric has determined that an inspection program designed to detect a crack prior to the component leaking would involve frequent inspections at a given location and that the cost of the inspection program would far exceed the benefits of avoiding a leak. Instead, TU Electric locates these cracks by visually monitoring for leaks. Field experience with fatigue-induced cracks in socket-welded joints has confirmed that visual monitoring does detect cracks in a timely manner, that these cracks do not result in catastrophic failures, and that the plant can be safely shut down in spite of a leaking socket-welded joint in a small bore pipe. Historical data from TU Electric and Southwest Research Institute are presented regarding the frequency of failures, failure locations, and the potential causes. The topics addressed include 1) metallurgical and fractographic features of fatigue cracks at the weld toe and weld root; 2) factors that are associated with fatigue, such as mechanical vibration, internal pulsation, joint design, and welding workmanship; and 3) implications of a leaking crack on plant safety. TU Electric has implemented the use of modified welding techniques for the fabrication of socket-welded joints that are expected to improve their ability to tolerate fatigue.