Search Results for Quality control

Two silica phenolic nozzle liners cracked during proof testing. The test consisted of pressuring the nozzles to 14.1 MPa (2050 psia) for 5 to 20 s. It was concluded that the failure was due to longitudinal cracking in the convergent exhaust-nozzle insulators, stemming from the use of silica phenolic tape produced from flawed materials that went undetected by the quality control tests, which at the time, assessed tape strength properties in the warp rather than the bias direction. Once the nozzle manufacturer and its suppliers identified the problem, they changed their quality control procedures and resumed production of nozzle liners with more tightly controlled fiber/fabric materials.

AM350 stainless steel bellows used in the control rod drive mechanism of a fast breeder reactor failed after 1000 h of service in sodium at 550 deg C (1020 deg F). Helium leak testing indicated that leaks had occurred at various regions of the welded joints between the convolutes in the bellows. The weld failure was attributed to poor quality assurance during fabrication, which resulted in cracklike openings at the fusion zone. The openings extended during tensile loading. Use of proper welding procedures and quality control measures were recommended to prevent future failures.

This article provides an overview of metal additive manufacturing (AM) processes and describes sources of failures in metal AM parts. It focuses on metal AM product failures and potential solutions related to design considerations, metallurgical characteristics, production considerations, and quality assurance. The emphasis is on the design and metallurgical aspects for the two main types of metal AM processes: powder-bed fusion (PBF) and directed-energy deposition (DED). The article also describes the processes involved in binder jet sintering, provides information on the design and fabrication sources of failure, addresses the key factors in production and quality control, and explains failure analysis of AM parts.

An I-beam of IS-226 specification—I-section dimensions of 450 x l50 x 10 mm (17.7 x 5.9 x 0.4 in.) and a length of 12.41 m (40.7ft)—was flame cut into two section in an open yard near these a coast under normal weather conditions. After approximately 112h, the shorter section of he I-beam split catastrophically along the entire length through the web. Detailed investigation revealed segregation of high levels of carbon, sulfur and phosphorus in the middle of the web and high residual stresses attributed to rolling during fabrication. Flame cutting caused a change in the distribution of the residual stresses, which, aided by low fracture toughness due to the poor quality of the beam, resulted in failure. It was recommended that segregation be avoided in cast ingots used for I-beam manufacture by implementing a better quality-control procedure.

The upper frame from a large cone crusher failed in severe service after an unspecified service duration. The ductile iron casting was identified as grade 80-55-06, signifying minimum properties of 552 MPa (80 ksi) tensile strength, 379 MPa (55 ksi) yield strength, and 6% elongation. Investigation (visual inspection, chemical analysis, unetched 30x images, and 2% nital etched 30x images) was difficult because the fracture surface of the frame section was obliterated by postfracture corrosion. Repeated attempts at cleaning using progressively stronger chemicals revealed that no telltale fracture morphology remained. However, the investigation supported the conclusion that the crusher frame failed via brittle overload fracture, likely due to excessive service stresses and substandard mechanical properties. Recommendations included additional quality-control measures to provide better spheroidal graphite morphology at the frame surface.

A connecting rod from a failed engine ruptured in fatigue without evidence of excessive stresses, detonation, overheating, or oil starvation. The origin of the fatigue failure was completely mutilated but decarburization was observed. Significant amounts of decarburization (0.010 to 0.015 in.) were found also in other forgings, such as exhaust rocker arms, main rotor drag brace clevises, bolts of carriage diagonal struts, and spring legs of main landing gears. The failure mode was low-stress, high-cycle fatigue involving tension and bending loads. The main cause was a manufacturing deficiency. The usual way to eliminate decarburization is to machine off the soft skin or employ better quality control when making them. Many aircraft manufacturers employ forged parts with machined surfaces or with shot-peened as-forged surfaces without excessive decarburization.

The handle from a consumer product exhibited an apparent surface defect. The handle had been injection molded from a medium viscosity grade ABS resin. The anomalous appearance was objectionable to the assembler of the final product and resulted in a production lot being placed on quality-control hold. Investigation included visual inspection, 24x micrographs, and FTIR in the reflectance mode. The spectrum obtained on the included material was characteristic of polybutadiene, the rubber-modifying agent present in ABS. This supported the conclusion that the inclusion's most likely source was an undispersed gel particle formed during the production of the molding resin.

During routine quality control testing, small circuit breakers exhibited high contact resistance and, in some cases, insulation of the contacts by a surface film. The contacts were made of silver-refractory (tungsten or molybdenum) alloys. Infrared analysis revealed the film to be a corrosion layer that resulted from exposure to ammonia in a humid atmosphere. Simulation tests confirmed that ammonia was the corrodent. The ammonia originated from the phenolic molding area of the plant. It was recommended that fumes from molding areas be vented outside the plant and that assembly, storage, and calibration areas be isolated from molding areas.

A missile detached from a Navy fighter jet during a routine landing on an aircraft carrier deck because of a faulty missile launcher detent spring. Visual inspection of Inconel 718 detent spring assembly revealed that four of the nine spring leafs comprising the assembly were plastically deformed while two of the deformed leafs did not meet minimal hardness or tensile requirements. Liquid penetrant testing revealed no cracks or other surface discontinuities on the leaf springs. Material sectioned from the soft spring leafs was heat-treated according to specifications in the laboratory. The resultant increase in mechanical properties of the re-heat-treated material indicated that the original heat treatment was not performed correctly. The failure was attributed to improper heat treatment. Recommendations focused on more stringent quality control of the heat-treat operations.

An HK-40 alloy tubing weld in a reformer furnace of a petrochemical plant failed by leaking after a shorter time than that predicted by design specifications. Leaking occurred because of cracks that passed through the thickness of the weldment. Analysis of the cracked tubing indicated that the sulfur and phosphorus contents of the weld metal were higher than specified, the thickness was narrower at the weld, and the mechanical resistance of the weld metal was lower than specified. Cracking initiated at the weld root by coalescence of creep cavities. Propagation and expansion was aided by internal carburization. Quality control of welding procedures and filler metal was recommended.

A production lot of mechanical hinges used in an automotive application had failed during incoming quality-control routine actuation testing. A change in part supplier had taken place between the approval of the prototype parts that performed acceptably and the receipt of the first lot of production parts. The mechanical hinges were specified to be injection molded from an impact-modified, 13% glass-fiber-reinforced nylon 6/6 resin. Investigation of samples representing the failed components and the original prototype parts included visual inspection, 118x SEM images, micro-FTIR, DSC analysis, and TGA. It supported the conclusion that the hinge assemblies failed through brittle fracture associated with stress overload during the actuation of the parts. The failed part material was found to be degraded, most likely occurring during the compounding of the resin or during the actual molding of the parts. While resins for both failed and non-failed parts produced results characteristic of a 13% glass-fiber-reinforced, impact-modified nylon 6/6, the failed part material, contained a significantly lower level of rubber, which rendered the parts less impact resistant and subsequently lowered the ductility of the molded hinge assemblies. No recommendations were made.

The various methods of furnace, torch, induction, resistance, dip, and laser brazing are used to produce a wide range of highly reliable brazed assemblies. However, imperfections that can lead to braze failure may result if proper attention is not paid to the physical properties of the material, joint design, prebraze cleaning, brazing procedures, postbraze cleaning, and quality control. Factors that must be considered include brazeability of the base metals; joint design and fit-up; filler-metal selection; prebraze cleaning; brazing temperature, time, atmosphere, or flux; conditions of the faying surfaces; postbraze cleaning; and service conditions. This article focuses on the advantages, limitations, sources of failure, and anomalies resulting from the brazing process. It discusses the processes involved in the testing and inspection required of the braze joint or assembly.

Extensive cracking was found in a batch of die-cast ZAMAK 3 solenoid valve seats during commissioning of the system in which they were installed. Scanning electron microscopic and chemical analyses conducted on one of the failed valve seats showed that the composition of the alloy was different from that specified. The presence of excess aluminum and lead impurities that had segregated to the grain boundaries, coupled with an inadequate amount of magnesium, resulted in intergranular corrosion and subsequent intergranular failure. Corrosion was accelerated by storage in a humid environment in a coastal area. It was recommended that proper chemical analysis of the zinc-aluminum alloy be carried out as a quality control procedure.

Failure analysis of a fishhook that broke during retrieval is described. Although the broken hook was discarded, several companion hooks were analyzed (chemistry, microhardness, metallographic cross section, and tensile properties) as were comparable products made by other hook manufacturers. Tensile test data indicated that the companion hooks were significantly different from hooks made by other manufacturers. The hooks broke into several pieces and failed with little or no plastic deformation, while hooks made by other manufacturers plastically deformed and did not break during testing.

A femoral knee implant was returned to the casting vendor for analysis after exhibiting poor bond strength between the cast substrate and a sintered porous coating. Both the coating and the substrate were manufactured from a cobalt-chromium-molybdenum alloy. Metallographic analysis indicated that a decarburized layer existed on all surfaces of the casting, which prevented bonding during the sintering thermal cycle. Bead-to-bead bonding within the coating appeared sufficient, and no decarburized layer was present on the bead surfaces. It was concluded that the decarburization did not occur during the sintering thermal cycle. It was recommended that the prosthetic manufacturer investigate atmosphere controls for all thermal cycles prior to coating.

The sudden collapse of a tower crane on a building site resulted in severe injuries to the driver. Failure took place at the upper portion of the foundation or lowermost section. The mast sections were constructed from four main corner angles welded to end frames also made from angle sections which were gusseted and fitted with additional doubling plates in the corners where the jointing bolts were fitted. It was evident that the collapse was due to failure of the welds attaching the corner angles to an end frame. Many of the welds at the locations where failure occurred were of poor quality. The corner angles appeared to have been cut slightly shorter than the required dimensions. This was compensated in one case by the use of a weld build-up and in the other three by make-up pieces attached by welds of insignificant dimensions.

During the preproduction stages of forging, an initial batch of 50 mm (2 in.) diam Al-4Cu alloy (L77) extruded bar stock material was found to be cracking randomly. Failure analysis was conducted to determine the metallurgical factors underlying the phenomenon. Microexamination of sections across the defects revealed intergranular cracks tracing a path of round, segregated particles and oxide film discontinuities. The segregated particles were rich in copper It was concluded that the cracking was the result of segregations occurring in poor-quality raw material. The source of segregation was suspected to be the use of improperly made master alloys. Use of improved melting techniques and proper master alloys was recommended.

This article provides information on life assessment strategies and conceptually illustrates the interplay of nondestructive evaluation (NDE) and fracture mechanics in the damage tolerant approach. It presents information on probability of detection (POD) and probability of false alarm (PFA). The article describes the damage tolerance approach to life management of cyclic-limited engine components and lists the commonly used nondestructive evaluation methods. It concludes with an illustration on the role of NDE, as quantified by POD, in fully probabilistic life management.

This article briefly introduces the concepts of failure analysis and root cause analysis (RCA), and the role of failure analysis as a general engineering tool for enhancing product quality and failure prevention. It reviews four fundamental categories of physical root causes, namely, design deficiencies, material defects, manufacturing/installation defects, and service life anomalies, with examples. The article describes several common charting methods that may be useful in performing an RCA. It also discusses other failure analysis tools, including review of all sources of input and information, people interviews, laboratory investigations, stress analysis, and fracture mechanics analysis. The article concludes with information on the categories of failure and failure prevention.

In 1975, a manufacturer was awarded a contract to produce modular air-traffic control towers for the U.S. Navy. The specifications called for painted steel siding, but the manufacturer convinced the Navy to substitute aluminum-bonded-to-plywood panels that were provided by a supplier. In less than one year, the panels began to delaminate and the aluminum began to crack. It was found that the failure was the result of chloride-induced intergranular corrosion caused by chemicals in the adhesive and excessive moisture in the wood introduced during manufacturing.