Search Results for Pressure welding

A Ti-6Al-4V alloy pressure vessel failed during a proof-pressure test, fracturing along the center girth weld. The girth joints were welded with the automatic gas tungsten arc process utilizing an auxiliary trailing shield attached to the welding torch to provide inert-gas shielding for the exterior surface of the weld. A segmented backup ring with a gas channel was used inside the vessel to shield the weld root. The pressure vessel failed due to contamination of the fusion zone by oxygen, which resulted when the gas shielding the root face of the weld was diluted by air that leaked into the gas channel. Thermal stresses cracked the embrittled weld, exposing the crack surfaces to oxidation before cooling. One of these cracks caused a stress concentration so severe that failure of the vessel wall during the proof test was inevitable. A sealing system at the split-line region of the segmented backup ring was provided, and a fine-mesh stainless steel screen diffuser was incorporated in the channel section of the backup ring to prevent air from leaking in. A titanium alloy color chart was furnished to permit correlation of weld-zone discoloration with the degree of atmospheric contamination.

Several wires in aluminum conductor cables fractured within 5 to 8 years of, service in Alaskan tundra. The cables were comprised of 19-wire strands; the wires were aluminum alloy 6201-T81. Visual and metallographic examinations of the cold-upset pressure weld joints in the wires established that the fractures were caused by fatigue loading attributable to wind/thermal factors at the joints. The grain flow at the joints was transverse to the wire axis, rendering the notches of the joints sensitive to fatigue loading. An additional contributory factor was intergranular corrosion, which assisted fatigue crack initiation/propagation. The failure was attributed to the departure of conductor quality from the requirements of ASTM B 398 and B 399, which specify that “no joints shall be made during final drawing or in the finished wire” and that the joints should not be closer than 15 m (50 ft). The failed cable did not meet either criterion. It was recommended that the replacement cable be inspected for strict compliance to ASTM requirements.

A large pressure vessel designed for use in an ammonia plant failed during hydrostatic testing. It was fabricated from ten Mn-Cr-Ni-Mo-V steel plates which were rolled and welded to form ten cylindrical shell sections and three forgings of similar composition. The fracture surfaces were metallographically examined to be typical for brittle steel fracture and associated with the circumferential weld that joined the flange forging to the first shell section. Featureless facets in the HAZ were observed and were revealed to be the fracture-initiation sites. Pronounced banding in the structure of the flange forging was revealed by examination. A greater susceptibility to cracking was interpreted from the higher hardenability found within the bands. Stress relief was concluded to have not been performed at the specified temperature level (by hardness and impact tests) which caused the formation of hard spots. The mode of crack propagation was established by microstructural examination to be transgranular cleavage. It was concluded that failure of the pressure vessel stemmed from the formation of transverse fabrication cracks in the HAZ fostered by the presence of hard spots. It was recommended that normalizing and tempering temperatures be modified and a revised forging practice explored.

A spherical carbon steel fixed-catalyst bed reactor, fabricated from French steel A42C-3S, approximately equivalent to ASTM A201 grade B, failed after 20 years of service while in a standby condition. The unit was found to contain primarily hydrogen at the time of failure. The vessel had a type 304 stainless steel shroud around the catalyst bed as protection against the overheating that was possible if the gas bypassed the bed through the refractory material. The failure was observed to have begun at the toe of the shroud-support ring weld. The ring was found to have a number of small cracks at the root of the weld. The cleavage mode of fracture was confirmed by SEM. The presence of extensive secondary cracking and twinning (Neumann bands) where the fracture followed the line of the shroud-support ring was revealed by metallography. It was revealed by refinery maintenance records that the ring had been removed for hydrotest and welded without any postweld heat treatment. The final cause of failure was concluded to be cracking that developed during the installation of the new shroud ring. Stress-relief heat treatments were recommended to be performed to reduce residual-stress levels after welding.

Silver solid-state bonded components containing uranium failed under zero or low applied load several years after manufacture. The final operation in their manufacture was a proof loading that applied a sustained tensile stress to the bond, which all components passed. The components comprised circular cylinders fabricated by plating a thin layer of silver on each of the contact surfaces (uranium and stainless steel) and pressing the parts together at elevated temperature to solid-state bond the two silver surfaces. The manufacturing process produced a high level of residual stress at the bond. The failures appeared to be predominantly located between the silver layer and the uranium substrate. Normal fracture location of specimens taken from similar components was at the silver/silver bond interface. Laboratory testing revealed that the uranium/silver joint was susceptible to premature failure by stress-corrosion cracking under sustained loading if the atmosphere was saturated with water vapor.

A 10-in. diam, spiral-welded AISI 1020 carbon steel pipe carrying water under pressure developed numerous leaks over a four mile section. The section was fabricated using submerged-arc welding from the outside surface. Each welded length of pipe had been subjected to a proof pressure approximately twice the specified design pressure and two-thirds the approximate yield point of the parent metal. No failures or leakage were observed during proof testing. Metallurgical examination corroborated visual checks, indicating a distinct lack of root penetration in the split areas. Splitting occurred as a result of inadequate root penetration. The most likely source of difficulty in the welding process was the linear speed. Probably, the failures would not have occurred in absence of the welding problem. Also, the pipe was inadequate for the specified design pressure, as well as the reported maximum system pressure.

A 127 cu m (4,480 cu ft) pressurized railroad tank car burst catastrophically. The railroad tank was approximately 18 m (59 ft) long (from 2:1 elliptical heads), 3 m (10 ft) in OD, and 16 mm (0.63 in.) thick. The chemical and material properties of the tank were to comply with AAR M-128 Grade B. As a result of the explosive failure of the tank car, fragments were ejected from the central region of the car between the support trucks from ground zero to a maximum of approximately 195 m (640 ft). The mode of failure was a brittle fracture originating at a preexisting lamination and crack in the tank wall adjacent to the tank nozzle. The mechanism of failure was overpressurization of the railroad tank car caused by a chemical reaction of the butadiene contents. The interrelationship of the mode, mechanism, and consequences of failure is reviewed to reconstruct the sequence of events that led up to the breach of the railroad tank car. Means to prevent similar reoccurrences are discussed.

A backwell tube situated in the combustion chamber of a 100 atm boiler, which had been in service for many years, failed. The temperature of the saturated steam was about 300 deg C. Two pipe sections with attacked areas in the circumferential welding joint were examined for cause of failure. First section showed strong pit or trench-like attack in the welding seam on the inner surface. A bluish-black corrosion product adhered to the pits. The second section showed small blisters at the welding seam. The metallographic examination of the first section showed welding seam was strongly reduced in bulk from the inside and covered with a thick crumbling layer of magnetic iron oxide (Fe3-O4). This was a corrosion product resulting from the operation of the boiler. In addition, it was decarburized from the inside, and interspersed with grain boundary cracks. This form of attack is typical for the decarburization of steel by high-pressure hydrogen. Hence, the defects in the pipe sections were the result of scaling during the operation of the steam boiler. It was recommended to avoid unnecessary overheating during the welding of materials for high-pressure steam boiler operations.

A heat exchanger failed five years after going into service in an ammonia synthesis plant. Its container, made of Cr-Mo alloy steel (Material No. 1.7362), operated in an environment that did not exceed 400 deg C or 600 atm of hydrogen partial pressure. X-ray examination revealed a fissure in one of the welded seams, which according to microscopic examination, originated in the base material of the container. Higher magnification revealed a narrow zone adjacent to the weld seam permeated with intergranular cracks, the result of hydrogen attack. It also showed the structure to be completely martensitic. Thus, the failure was due to hardening of the base material during welding, and recommendation was made to temper or anneal the welded regions to reduce the effects of hydrogen under pressure.

One of five underground drain lines intended to carry a highly acidic effluent from a chemical-processing plant to distant holding tanks failed in just a few months. Each line was made of 304L stainless steel pipe 73 mm (2 in.) in diam with a 5 mm (0.203 in.) wall thickness. Lengths of pipe were joined by shielded metal arc welding. Soundness of the welded joints was determined by water back-pressure testing after several lengths of pipe had been installed and joined. Before completion of the pipeline, a pressure drop was observed during back-pressure testing. An extreme depression in the backfill revealed the site of failure. Analysis (visual inspection, electrical conductivity, and soil analysis) supported the conclusions that the failure had resulted from galvanic corrosion at a point where the corrosivity of the soil was substantially greater than the average, resulting in a voltage decrease near the point of failure of about 1.3 to 1.7 V. Recommendations included that the pipelines be asphalt coated and enclosed in a concrete trough with a concrete cover. Also, magnesium anodes, connected electrically to each line, should be installed at periodic intervals along their entire length to provide cathodic protection.

A newly installed pipeline leaked during cleaning prior to hydrotest at a pressure of approximately 400 psig. The intended hydrotest pressure was 750 psig. The pipeline was constructed from spiral-welded API 5L-X65 HSLA steel and was intended for seawater injection. Analysis included nondestructive testing, metallography, and scanning electron microscopy. Based on the results, the failure was attributed to transit fatigue, caused during highway transportation. Cracks along the toes of the weld from both the outside and inside surfaces, the transgranular nature of cracking, and the presence of fatigue striations all supported transit fatigue as the damage mechanism.

Welds in two CMo steel catalytic gas-oil desulfurizer reactors cracked under hydrogen pressure-temperature conditions that would not have been predicted by the June 1977 revision of the Nelson Curve for that material. Evidence of severe cracking was found in five weld-joint areas during examination of a naphtha desulfurizer by ultrasonic shear wave techniques. Defect indications were found in longitudinal and circumferential seam welds of the ASTM A204, grade A, steel sheet. The vessel was found to have a type 405 stainless steel liner for corrosion protection that was spot welded to the base metal and all vessel welds were found to be overlaid with type 309 stainless steel. Long longitudinal cracks in the weld metal, as well as transverse cracks were exposed after the weld overlay was ground off. A decarburized region on either side of the crack was revealed by metallurgical examination of a cross section of a longitudinal crack. It was concluded that the damage was caused by a form of hydrogen attack. Installation of a used Cr-Mo steel vessel with a type 347 stainless steel weld overlay was suggested as a corrective action.

Repeated failures of high-pressure ball valves were reported in a chemical plant. The ball valves were made of AFNOR Z30C13 martensitic stainless steel. Initial examination of the valves showed that failure occurred in a weld at the ball/stem junction end of austenitic stainless steel sleeves that had been welded to the valve stem at both ends. Metallographic examination showed that a crack had been introduced into the weld by improper weld heat treatment. Stress concentration at the weld location resulting from an abrupt change in cross section facilitated easy propagation of the crack during operation. Proper weld heat treatment was recommended, along with avoidance of abrupt change in cross section near the weld. Due penetrant testing at the ball stem junction before and after heat treatment was also suggested.

A thick-walled tube that was weld fabricated for use as a pressure vessel exhibited cracks. Similar cracking was apparent at the weld toes after postweld stress relief or quench-and-temper heat treatment. The cracks were not detectable by nondestructive examination after welding, immediately prior to heat treatment. Multiple-pass arc welds secured the carbon-steel flanges to the Ni-Cr-Mo-V alloy steel tubes. Investigation (visual inspection, metallographic analysis, and evaluation of the fabrication history and the analysis data) supported the conclusion that the tube failed as a result of stress-relief cracking. Very high residual stresses often result from welding thick sections of hardenable steels, even when preheating is employed. Quenched-and-tempered steels containing vanadium, as well as HSLA steels with a vanadium addition, have been shown to be susceptible to this embrittlement. Manufacturers of susceptible steels recommend use of these materials in the as-welded condition.

A 208 cm (82 in.) ID steel aqueduct (ASTM A572, grade 42, type 2 steel) fractured circumferentially at two points 152 m (500 ft) apart in a section above ground. A year later, another fracture occurred in a buried section 6.4 km (4 mi) away. Both pipes fractured during Jan at similar temperatures and pressures. The pipe had a 24 mm wall thickness, and the hydrostatic head was 331 m (1085 ft). The air temperature was approximately -13 deg C (9 deg F), the water temperature approximately 0.6 deg C (33 deg F), and the steel temperature approximately -4 deg C (25 deg F). The pipe had been shop-fabricated in 12 m (40 ft) lengths, then shop welded into 24 m (80 ft) lengths. Field assembly was with bell-and-spigot joints. Investigation (visual inspection and Charpy V-notch testing) supported the conclusion that brittle fracture of the aqueduct pipe was attributed to a combination of stress concentrations at the toes of the fillet welds due to poor welding technique, including shop welds made without preheat, and a brittle condition of the steel at winter temperatures. Recommendations included revised welding techniques, installation of expansion joints, and the use of steel plate rolled from fully killed ingots.

Two leaks were discovered at a sulfur recovery unit in a refinery. The leaks were at pipe-to-elbow welds in a 152 mm (6 in.) (NPS 6) diam line, operating in lean amine service at 50 deg C (120 deg F) and 2.9 MPa (425 psig). Thickness measurements indicated negligible loss of metal, and the leaks were clamped. A year later, 15 additional leaks were discovered, again at pipe-to-elbow welds in lean amine lines. Further nondestructive testing located other cracks, giving a total of 35. These lines had been in service for approximately eight years. Investigation (visual inspection, hardness testing, and micrographic cross-sections) supported the conclusion that the failure was caused by lean amine SCC. It was considered unlikely that these pipe welds had received such a postweld heat treatment, although it is industry practice to postweld stress relieve piping and pressure vessels in lean amine service if the temperature is expected to be above 95 deg C (200 deg F). Recommendations included inspecting all welds using shear wave ultrasonic testing and postweld heat treating all welds in lean amine service.

A large pressure vessel that had been in service as a hydrogen sulfide (H2S) absorber developed cracks and began leaking at a nozzle. The vessel contained a 20% aqueous solution of potassium hydroxide (KOH), potassium carbonate (K2CO3), and arsenic. The vessel wall was manufactured of ASTM A516, grade 70, low-carbon steel plate. A steel angle had been formed into a ring was continuously welded to the inside wall of the vessel. The groove formed by the junction of the lower tray-support weld and the top part of the weld around the nozzle was found to have a crack. Pits and scale near the crack origin were revealed by microscopic examination and cracking was found to be transgranular. Periods of corrosion alternated with sudden instances of cleavage, under a tensile load, along preferred slip planes were interpreted during examination with a microscope. It was concluded that the combination of the residual plus operating stresses and the amount of KOH present would have caused stress corrosion as a result of caustic embrittlement. It was recommended that the tray support should be installed higher on the vessel wall to prevent coincidence of the lower tray-support weld with the nozzle weld.