Search Results for Liners

Stainless steel liners (AISI type 321) used in bellows-type expansion joints in a duct assembly installed in a low-pressure nitrogen gas system failed in service. The duct assembly consisted of two expansion joints connected by a 32 cm (12 in.) OD pipe of ASTM A106 grade B steel. Elbows made of ASTM A234 grade B steel were attached to each end of the assembly, 180 deg apart. A 1.3 mm (0.050 in.) thick liner with an OD of 29 cm (11 in.) was welded inside each joint. The upstream ends were stable, but the downstream ends of the liners remained free, allowing the components to move with the expansion and contraction of the bellows. Investigation (visual inspection, hardness testing, and 30x fractographs) supported the conclusion that the liners failed in fatigue initiated at the intersection of the longitudinal weld forming the liner and the circumferential weld by which it attached to the bellows assembly. Recommendations included increasing the thickness of the liners from 1.3 to 1.9 mm (0.050 to 0.075 in.) in order to damp some of the stress-producing vibrations.

Cavitation damage of diesel engine cylinder liners is due to vibration of the cylinder wall, initiated by slap of the piston under the combined forces of inertia and firing pressure as it passes top dead center. The occurrence on the anti-thrust side may possibly result from bouncing of the piston. The exact mechanism of cavitation damage is not entirely clear. Two schools of thought have developed, one supporting an essentially erosive, and the other an essentially corrosive, mechanism. Measures to prevent, or reduce, cavitation damage should be considered firstly from the aspect of design, attention being given to methods of reducing the amplitude of the liner vibration. Attempts have been made to reduce the severity of attack by attention to the environment. Inhibitors, such as chromates, benzoate/nitrite mixtures, and emulsified oils, have been tried with varying success. Attempts have been made to reduce or prevent cavitation damage by the application of cathodic protection, and this has been found to be effective in certain instances of trouble on propellers.

Two broken ball-mill liners from a copper-mine ore operation were submitted for failure analysis. These liners failed prematurely, having reached less than 20% of their expected life. The chemical composition of the liners was within specifications for high-chromium white cast iron. The two broken liners were sand blasted for visual inspection and subsequent metallography and hardness testing. Many cracks were found externally and on the undersides. There were also signs of mechanical damage that occurred inside the mill before detection of the failures. The underside cracking is significant because the user advised that the liners were not backed in the installation. Cracking was present in the microstructures of both liners. These cracks tend to fracture the brittle carbide phase first; once nucleated, the sharp cracks can propagate and grow to critical dimensions, which eventually induces complete failure to the load-bearing section. The premature failure of these liners was caused by severe localized overstress conditions due to localized impact in service. Proper backing of shell liners should be ensured to reduce the effect of impact forces in the ball mill.

Two silica phenolic nozzle liners cracked during proof testing. The test consisted of pressuring the nozzles to 14.1 MPa (2050 psia) for 5 to 20 s. It was concluded that the failure was due to longitudinal cracking in the convergent exhaust-nozzle insulators, stemming from the use of silica phenolic tape produced from flawed materials that went undetected by the quality control tests, which at the time, assessed tape strength properties in the warp rather than the bias direction. Once the nozzle manufacturer and its suppliers identified the problem, they changed their quality control procedures and resumed production of nozzle liners with more tightly controlled fiber/fabric materials.

The repeated failure of rubber-covered rotors and volute liners in a flue gas desulfurization system after conversion from lime slurry reagent to limestone slurry reagent was investigated. The pump was a horizontal 50 x 65 mm (2 x 2.5 in.) Galiger pump with a split cast iron case and open rotor (impeller). Both the case and the ductile iron rotor core were covered by natural rubber. Analyses conducted included surface examination of wear patterns, chemical analysis of materials, measurement of mechanical properties, and in-place flow tests. It was determined that the proximate cause of failure was cavitation and vortexing between the rotor and the lining. The root cause of the failure was the conversion from lime to limestone slurry without appropriate modification of the pump. Conversion to the limestone slurry resulted in fluid dynamics outside the operational limits of the pump. The recommended remedial action was replacement with a pump appropriately sized for the desired pressures and flow rates for limestone slurry.

A CF-8M (cast type 316) neck liner or manway was removed from the top of a digester vessel. Repeated attempts to repair the part in the field during its life cycle of many years had failed to keep the unit from leaking. The casting was a CF-8M modified with the molybdenum level at the top end of the range. The plate was standard 317L material. The filler metal was type 316, although marginal in molybdenum content. Investigation (visual inspection, chemical analysis, micrographs, and metallographic examination) supported the conclusion that the damage to the neck liner was due to Cl-SCC in an area of debris buildup. It appeared the original casting suffered SCC in a low-oxygen area high in chlorides from repeated wet/dry cycles where there was a buildup of debris. Recommendations included redesigning the neck liner to eliminate the abrupt change where there was debris buildup. If redesign was impossible, an alloy more resistant to Cl-SCC, such as a duplex stainless steel or a high-molybdenum (4 to 6%) austenitic stainless steel, should be used.

An alloy IN-690 (N06690) incinerator liner approximately 0.8 mm (0.031 in.) thick failed after only 250 h of service burning solid waste. Investigation supported the conclusion that the root cause of the failure was overfiring during startup and sulfidation of the nickel-base alloy. No recommendations were made.

A high-chromium white cast iron shell liner installed in an ore crusher sustained impact damage in the course of operation. Visual-optical examination revealed horizontal cracks on the surface of the liner along with particles that had fractured off. Metallographic examination indicated a heavily deformed surface layer with chip formation at the wear surface. The chemical composition of the liner was found to be Fe-2.74C-0.75Mn-0.55Si-0.51Ni-19.4Cr-1.15M. This alloy is highly resistant to abrasive wear, yet at the same time, prone to chipping because little plastic displacement will occur at the surface. The liner failed as a result of severe abrasion caused by the impact of taconite rock. This was a material-selection problem in that the wrong alloy was used for a condition not anticipated in the original choice.

Pinhole defects were found in a main combustion chamber made from NARloy-Z after an unexpectedly short time in service. Analysis indicated that the throat section of the liner had been exposed to very severe environmental conditions of high temperature and high oxygen content, which caused ductility loss and grain-boundary separation. The excessive oxygen content in the liner was attributed to diffusion from an oxygen-rich environment that had resulted from nonuniform mixing of propellants. The internal oxygen embrittled the alloy and reduced its thermal conductivity, which resulted in a higher hot-gas wall temperature and associated degradation of mechanical properties.

The welds joining the liner and shell of a fluid catalytic cracking unit failed. The shell was made of ASTM A515 carbon steel welded with E7018 filler metal. The liner was made of type 405 stainless steel and was plug welded to the shell using ER309 and ER310 stainless steel filler metal. Fine cracks starting inside the weld zone and spreading outward through the weld and toward the surface were observed during examination. Decarburization and graphitization of the carbon steel at the interface was noted. The high carbon level was found to allow martensite to form eventually. The structure was found to be austenitic in the area where the grain-boundary precipitates appeared heaviest. The composition of the precipitates was analyzed using an electron microprobe to reveal presence of sulfur. Microstructural changes in the weld alloy at the interface were interpreted to be caused by dilution of the alloy and the presence of sulfur caused hot shortness. The necessary internal stress to produce extensive cracking was produced by the differential thermal expansion of the carbon and stainless steels. Periodic careful gouging of the affected areas followed by repair welding was recommended.