Resistance spot welds joining aluminum alloy 2024-T8511 stiffeners to the aluminum alloy 6061-T62 skin of an aircraft drop tank failed during slosh and vibration testing. Visual examination of the fracture surfaces showed that the failure was by tensile or bending overload. Measurements of the fractured spot welds established that all welds were below specification size. Review of the assembly procedures revealed that there had been poor fit-up between the stiffeners and the tank skin, which resulted in weak, undersize weld nuggets. The spot welds failed because of undersize nuggets that were the result of shunting caused by poor fit-up. The forming procedures were revised to achieve a precise fit between the stiffener and the tank wall. Also, an increase in welding current was suggested.

Several fractures occurred in flange studs used for remote handling of radioactive equipment. The studs, of quenched-and-tempered type 414 stainless steel, fractured in the HAZs produced in the studs during the circumferential welding that joined the studs to the flanges. The weld deposits were of type 347 stainless steel, and the flanges were type 304 stainless steel. Metallographic examination of the failed studs revealed that the HAZs contained regions of martensite and that intergranular cracks, which initiated at the stud surfaces during welding, propagated to complete separation under subsequent loading. The studs fractured under service loads as a result of intergranular crack propagation in the HAZ. Rapid heating and cooling during attachment welding produced a martensitic structure in the HAZ of the stud, which cracked circumferentially from the combination of thermal-gradient and phase-change stresses. Joining the studs to the flanges by welding should be discontinued. They should be attached by screw threads, using a key and keyway to prevent turning in service.

A series of resistance spot welds joining Z-shape and C-shape members of an aircraft drop-tank structure failed during ejection testing. The members were fabricated of alclad aluminum alloy 2024-T62. The back surface of the C-shape members showed severe electrode-indentation marks off to one side of the spot weld, suggesting improper electrode contact. Visual examination of the weld fractures showed that the weld nuggets varied considerably in size, some being very small and three exhibiting an HAZ but no weld. Of 28 welds, only nine had acceptable nugget diameters and fusion-zone widths. The weld deficiencies were traced to problems in forming and fit-up of the C-shape members and to difficulties in alignment and positioning of the weld tooling. The failure of the resistance spot welds was attributed to poor weld quality caused by unfavorable fit-up and lack of proper weld-tool positioning. The problem could be solved by better forming procedures to provide an accurate fit-up that would not interfere with electrode alignment.

A welded ferritic stainless steel heat exchanger cracked prior to service. The welding filler metal was identified as an austenitic stainless steel and the joining method as gas tungsten arc welding. Investigation (visual inspection, SEM images, 5.9x images, and 8.9x/119x images etched with Vilella's reagent followed by electrolytic etching in 10% oxalic acid) supported the conclusion that the heat exchanger cracked due to weld cold cracking or postwelding brittle overload that occurred via flexure during fabrication. The brittle nature of the weld was likely due to a combination of high residual stresses, a mixed microstructure, inclusions, and gross grain coarsening. These synergistic factors resulted from extreme heat input during fillet welding. Recommendations included altering the welding variables such as current, voltage, and travel speed to substantially reduce the heat input.

A type 321 stainless steel (AMS 5570) pressure-tube assembly that contained a brazed reinforcing liner leaked during a pressure test. Fluorescent liquid-penetrant inspection revealed a circumferential crack extended approximately 180 deg around the tube parallel to the fillet of the brazed joint. The presence of multiple origin cracks was indicated on the inside surface of a fractured portion of the crack surface. The cracks had originated adjacent to the braze joining the tube and the reinforcing liner and propagated through the wall to the outer surface. The residues on the inner surface of the tube were identified as fluorides from the brazing flux by chemical analysis. The nature of the crack, potential for corrosion due to residual fluorides and residual swaging stress in the tube prior to brazing, confirmed that failure of the tube end was due to stress-corrosion cracking. Stress relief treatment of tube before brazing and immediate cleaning of brazing residual fluorides was recommended to avoid failure.

The T-section cross member of the lifting sling failed in service while lifting a 966 kg (2130 lb) load. The L-section sling body and the cross member were made of aluminum alloy 5083 or 5086 and were joined by welding using aluminum alloy 4043 filler metal. The fracture was found by visual examination to have occurred at the weld joining the sling body and the cross member. Inadequate joint penetration and porosity was revealed by macrographic examination of the weld. Lower silicon content and a higher magnesium and manganese content than the normal for alloy 4043 filler metal were found during chemical analysis. It was revealed by examination of the ends of the failed cross member that a rotational force that had been applied on the cross member caused it to fracture near the sling body. It was concluded that brittle fracture at the weld was caused by overloading which was attributed to the misalignment of the sling during loading. Aluminum alloy 5183 or 5356 filler metal was recommended to be used to avoid brittle welds.

Postflight inspection of a gas-turbine aircraft engine that had experienced compressor stall revealed that the engine air-intake bullet assembly had dislodged and was seated against the engine-inlet guide vanes at the 3 o'clock position. The bullet assembly consisted of an outer aerodynamic shell and an inner stiffener shell, both of 1.3 mm (0.050 in.) thick aluminum alloy 6061-T6, and four attachment clips of 1 mm (0.040 in.) thick alclad aluminum alloy 2024-T42. Each clip was joined to the outer shell by 12 spot welds and was also joined to the stiffener. Analysis (visual inspection, dye-penetrant inspection, and 10x/150x micrographs of sections etched with Keller's reagent) supports the conclusion that the outer shell of the bullet assembly separated from the stiffener because the four attachment clips fractured through the shell-to-clip spot welds. Fracture occurred by fatigue that initiated at the notch created by the intersection of the faying surfaces of the clip and shell with the spot weld nuggets. The 6061 aluminum alloy shell and stiffener were in the annealed (O) temper rather than T6, as specified. Recommendations included heat treating the shell and stiffener to the T6 temper after forming.

An aircraft fuel-nozzle-support assembly exhibited cracks along the periphery of a fusion weld that attached a support arm to a fairing in a joint that approximated a T-shape in cross section. The base metal was type 321 stainless steel. Examination showed a good-quality weld penetrating to the support arm beneath, but revealed notch configurations at the inner mating surfaces at each edge of the fairing, the result of welding a poor fit-up of the support arm to the fairing. Fractures that originated at the cracks were examined by stereomicroscope and were found to contain fatigue marks that indicated crack propagation from multiple origins at the inner surface of the weld edge. Fatigue cracking was initiated at stress concentrations created by the notches at the inner surfaces between the support arm and the fairing, enhanced by poor fit-up in preparation for welding.

The case and stiffener of an inner-combustion-chamber case assembly failed by completely fracturing circumferentially around the edge of a groove arc weld joining the case and stiffener to the flange. The assembly consisted of a cylindrical stiffener inserted into a cylindrical case that were both welded to a flange. The case, stiffener, flange, and weld deposit were all of nickel-base alloy 718. It was observed that a manual arc weld repair had been made along almost the entire circumference of the original weld. Investigation (visual inspection, 0.5x macrographs, and 10x etched with 2% chromic acid plus HCl views) supported the conclusions that failure was by fatigue from multiple origins caused by welding defects. Ultimate failure was by tensile overload of the sections partly separated by the fatigue cracks. Recommendations included correct fit-up of the case, stiffener, and flange and more skillful welding techniques to avoid undercutting and unfused interfaces.

A welded elbow assembly (AISI type 321 stainless steel, with components joined with ER347 stainless steel filler metal by gas tungsten arc welding) was part of a hydraulic-pump pressure line for a jet aircraft. The other end of the tube was attached to a flexible metal hose, which provided no support and offered no resistance to vibration. The line was leaking hydraulic fluid at the nut end of the elbow. Investigation supported the conclusion that failure was by fatigue cracking initiated from a notch at the root of the weld and was propagated by cyclic loading of the tubing as the result of vibration and inadequate support of the hose assembly. Recommendations included changing the joint design from a cylindrical lap joint to a square-groove butt joint. Also, an additional support was recommended for the hose assembly to minimize vibration at the elbow.

A drawbar connecting two tank-type trailers of a highway gasoline rig broke while the rig was on an exit ramp of an interstate highway. The drawbar was a weldment of steel plates, tubes, and castings. Light fractography showed no discernable causes for the failure, but a TEM fractograph at 20,000x revealed fatigue striations and corrosion products on the fracture surface, indicating that this area was probably the site of fracture origin and that it had cracked before the accident happened. The casting on the right side of the drawbar contained large voids and a significant amount of porosity. Electron fractography established that the cast connection on the left side failed by brittle fracture. Metallographic examination showed poor weld quality in the casting-to-tube joint. Evidence found supports the conclusions that the drawbar fractured in fatigue, which originated in the weld joining the cast connector to the right side of the drawbar assembly. The crack initiated in a region of poor weld quality. A contributing factor to fracture of both connectors was the presence of voids and porosity in the castings. Recommendations included revising the welding procedures and instituting receiving inspection of the connection castings.

A pressure probe assembly comprised of type 347 stainless steel housing, brazed with AMS 4772D filler metal to the pressure probe, failed due to detachment of a rectangular segment from the housing. The presence of a large brazing metal devoid region in the pressure probe-housing joint was revealed by visual examination. Fatigue marks, emanating from multiple crack origins on the inside surface of the housing at the brazed joint were revealed by further study of the fracture. A poor metallurgical bond was confirmed by the presence of large irregular voids, flux trapped braze metal and separation between braze and housing.

Welded to the top of a dust bin for rigid support, a furnace water-wall tube in a new stationary boiler broke at the welded joint shortly after start-up. The tubes measured 64 mm (2.5 in.) OD by 3.2 mm (0.125 in.) wall thickness and were made of carbon steel to ASME SA-226 specifications. Investigation supported the conclusion that a crevice-like undercut was likely the primary cause of the fracture and that the source of the necessary fluctuating stress was tube vibration inherent in boiler operation. Recommendations included magnetic-particle inspection of the remaining water-wall tubes in the row, replacing the broken tube, and repairing cracks in other tubes by welding.

A medium-carbon helical spring was installed in a machine assembly that was welded into its final location. Weld spatter was not prevented from landing on the wire surface by any shield. An elongated drop and two tiny droplets of metal were observed a short distance from the fracture. No droplets were revealed at the origin of the fracture, but it was assumed that a drop of molten metal landed at the origin. Adherence of the spatter drop was expected to have been affected by the opening and closing of the fatigue crack. Weld spatter bead was concluded to have caused the fatigue fracture.

A fluorescent liquid-penetrant inspection of an experimental stator vane of a first-stage axial compressor revealed the presence of a longitudinal crack over 50 mm (2 in.) long at the edge of a resistance seam weld. The vane was made of titanium alloy Ti-6Al-4V (AMS 4911). The crack was opened by fracturing the vane. The crack surface displayed fatigue beach marks emanating from the seam-weld interface. Both the leading-edge and trailing-edge seam welds exhibited weld-metal expulsions up to 3.6 mm (0.14 in.) in length. Metallographic examination confirmed that metal expulsion from the resistance welds was generally present. The stator vane failed by a fatigue crack that initiated at internal surface discontinuities caused by metal expulsion from the resistance seam weld used in fabricating the vane. Expulsion of metal from seam welds should be eliminated by a slight reduction in welding current to reduce the temperature, by an increase in the electrode force, or both.

An elbow made from welded steel tube had become leaky along a well-defined line in the axial direction. The entire wall of the tube was corroded, and the longitudinally-welded seam stood out clearly as a result of particularly intensive corrosive attack. The appearance of the corroded surface indicates the action of water with a high oxygen content. The oxygen in the return water must have originated from the ventilation of the open expansion vessel. Because of the corrosion-favoring effect of a crevice, water with a high oxygen-content that was perhaps still warm or even hot found particularly favorable conditions for corrosion in the defective welded seam (crevice corrosion). The tube material itself is perfectly satisfactory and in no way responsible for the failure.

The welds joining the liner and shell of a fluid catalytic cracking unit failed. The shell was made of ASTM A515 carbon steel welded with E7018 filler metal. The liner was made of type 405 stainless steel and was plug welded to the shell using ER309 and ER310 stainless steel filler metal. Fine cracks starting inside the weld zone and spreading outward through the weld and toward the surface were observed during examination. Decarburization and graphitization of the carbon steel at the interface was noted. The high carbon level was found to allow martensite to form eventually. The structure was found to be austenitic in the area where the grain-boundary precipitates appeared heaviest. The composition of the precipitates was analyzed using an electron microprobe to reveal presence of sulfur. Microstructural changes in the weld alloy at the interface were interpreted to be caused by dilution of the alloy and the presence of sulfur caused hot shortness. The necessary internal stress to produce extensive cracking was produced by the differential thermal expansion of the carbon and stainless steels. Periodic careful gouging of the affected areas followed by repair welding was recommended.

An air bottle, machined from a solid block of aluminum alloy 2219-T852, displayed liquid-penetrant crack indications after assembly welding. The air bottle was machined to rough shape, a 3.8 mm (0.15 in.) wall thickness cylindrical cup with a 19 mm (3/4 in.) wall thickness integral boss on one side. After annealing, hot spinning, annealing a second time, and tack welding a port fitting, the assembly was torch preheated to 120 to 150 deg C (250 to 300 deg F). The port fitting was then welded in place. Final full heat treatment to the T62 temper was followed by machining, testing, and inspection. The crack indications were found only on one side of the boss and on the lower portion of the hot-spun dome region. The metallographic specimens revealed triangular voids and severe intergranular cracks. The cracks displayed the glossy surfaces typical of melted and resolidified material. The localized cracks in the air bottle were from grain-boundary eutectic melting caused by local torch overheating used in preparation for assembly welding of a port fitting. A change in design was scheduled to semiautomatic welding without the use of preheating for the joining of the port fitting for the dome opening.

Airfoil-shape impingement cooling tubes were fabricated of 0.25 mm (0.010 in.) thick Hastelloy X sheet stock, then pulse-laser-beam butt welded to cast Hastelloy X base plugs. Each weldment was then inserted through the base of a hollow cast turbine blade for a jet engine. The weldments were finally secured to the bases of the turbine blades by a brazing operation. One of the laser beam attachment welds broke after a 28-h engine test run. Exposure of the fracture surface for study under the electron microscope revealed the joint had broken in stress rupture. Failure was caused by tensile overload from stress concentration at the root of the laser beam weld, which was caused by the sharp notch created by the lack of full weld penetration. Radiographic inspection of all cooling-tube weldments was made mandatory, with rejection stipulated for joints containing subsurface weld-root notches. In addition, all turbine blades containing cooling-tube weldments were reprocessed by back-brazing. Back brazed turbine blades were reinstalled in the engine and withstood the full 150-h model test run without incident.

A pushrod made by inertia welding two rough bored pieces of bar stock installed in a mud pump fractured after two weeks in service. The flange portion was made of 94B17 steel, and the shaft was made of 8620 steel. It was disclosed by visual examination that the fracture occurred in the shaft portion at the intersection of a 1.3 cm thick wall and a tapered surface at the bottom of the hole. The fatigue crack was influenced by one-way bending stresses initiated at the inner surface and progressed around the entire inner circumference. A heavily decarburized layer was detected on the inner surface of the flange portion and sharp corner was found at the intersection of the sidewall and bottom of the hole. It was concluded that the stress raiser due to the abrupt section change was accentuated by decarburized layer. As a corrective measure, the design of the pushrod was changed to a one-piece forging and circulation of atmosphere during heat treatment was permitted through a hole drilled in the flange end of the rod to avoid decarburization.