This article provides an overview of the effects of various material- and process-related parameters on residual stress, distortion control, cracking, and microstructure/property relationships as they relate to various types of failure. It discusses phase transformations that occur during heat treating and describes the metallurgical sources of stress and distortion during heating and cooling. The article summarizes the effect of materials and the quench-process design on distortion and cracking and details the effect of cooling characteristics on residual stress and distortion. It also provides information on the methods of minimizing distortion and tempering. The article concludes with a discussion on the effect of heat treatment processes on microstructure/property-related failures.

A forged alloy steel arm of a lifting fork with an approximate cross section of 150 x 240 mm (5.92 x 9.45 in.) fractured after only a short service life on a lift truck. The fracture surface had the appearance of a fracture originating from a surface crack. Analysis (visual inspection, 200x micrographs, chemical analysis, and metallographic examination) supported the conclusion that the primary cause of the failure was the brittleness (lack of impact toughness) of the steel. The coarse bainitic microstructure was inadequate for the service application. The microstructure resulted from either improper heat treatment or no heat treatment after the forging operation. The surface cracks in the lifting-fork arm acted as starter notches (stress raisers), assisting in the initiation of fracture. No recommendations were made.

Operation handles produced from C45 steel showed many fine cracks at the flame hardened noses. The cracks ran from the corners of indentations caused by the tool during alignment. Metallographic investigation showed the nose was overheated during flame hardening. It was concluded that the numerous hardening cracks were caused by abrupt quenching from over-heating temperature and by local stress concentrations due to indentations of the tool caused during alignment.

A heat-treated, cadmium-plated AISI 8740 steel bolt broke through the head-to-shank fillet while being handled during assembly. Fractographic and metallographic examination of the bolt traced the cause of failure to quench cracking, which occurred when the part was water cooled following hot heading and prior to the production run. The process chart for hot heading was changed from water quenching to air cooling following the forming operation.

The bolt in a bolt and thimble assembly used to connect a wire rope to a crane hanger bracket was worn excessively. Two worn bolts, one new bolt, and a new thimble were examined. Specifications required the bolts to be made of 4140 steel heat treated to a hardness of 277 to 321 HRB. Thimbles were to be made of cast 8625 steel, but no heat treatment or hardness were specified. Analysis (visual inspection, hardness testing, and metallographic examination) supported the conclusion that the wear was due to strikingly difference hardness measurements in the bolt and thimble. Recommendations included hardening and tempering the bolts to the hardness range of 375 to 430 HRB. The thimbles should be heat treated to a similar microstructure and the same hardness range as those of the bolt. Molybdenum disulfide lubricant can be liberally applied during the initial installation of the bolts. A maintenance lubrication program was not suggested, but galling could be reduced by periodic application of a solid lubricant.

Hydraulic cylinder housings were being fabricated from 4140 grade seamless steel tubing. During production, magnetic-particle inspection indicated the presence of circumferential and longitudinal cracks in a large number of cylinders. Analysis (visual inspection, dye penetrant inspection, 50x/90x/400x SEM micrographs, and metallographic analysis) supports the conclusion that the cracking problem in these components was identified as quench cracks due to their brittle, intergranular nature and the characteristic temper oxide on the fracture surfaces. Although the steel met the compositional requirements of SAE 4140, the sulfur level was 0.022% and would account for the formation of the sulfide stringers observed. Apparently, the combination of the clustered, stringer-type inclusions and the quenching conditions were too severe for this component geometry. The result was a high incidence of quench cracks that rendered the parts useless. Recommendations included changing the specification, requiring the steel to have lower sulfur concentrations. Magnetic-particle cleanliness standards should be imposed that will exclude material with harmful clusters of sulfide stringers, for example, modified AMS 2301.

Three links of a chain showing unusually strong wear were examined. Corresponding to the stress, the wear was strongest in the bends of the links, but it was especially pronounced in the bend in which the butt weld seam was located. Investigation showed the links were manufactured from an unkilled carbon-deficient steel, and were case hardened to a depth of 0.8 to 0.9 mm. The peripheral structure at the places not showing wear consisted of coarse acicular martensite with a high percentage of retained austenite. The links therefore were strongly overheated, probably directly heated during case hardening. The butt weld seams were not tight and were covered with oxide inclusions. Given that wear occurred preferentially at the welds it may be concluded that this weld defect contributed to the substantial wear. This leaves unanswered whether these chains could have withstood the high operating stress if they had been welded satisfactorily and hardened correctly, and whether it made any sense to case harden highly stressed chains of this type.

A preflight inspection found a broken diaphragm from a side controller fabricated from 17-7 PH stainless steel in the RH 950 heat treatment condition. Failure occurred by cracking of the base of the flange-like diaphragm. The crack traveled 360 deg around the diaphragm. Scanning electron microscopy (SEM) revealed that the failure occurred by a brittle intergranular mechanism and stress-corrosion cracking (SCC), and indicated a failure mode of selective grain-boundary separation. The diaphragms were heat treated in batches of 25. An improper heat treatment could have resulted in the formation of grain boundary precipitates, including chromium carbides. It was concluded that failure of the diaphragm was due to a combination of sensitization caused by improper heat treatment and subsequent SCC. It was recommended that the remaining 24 sensor diaphragms from the affected batch be removed from service. In addition, a sample from each heat treat batch should be submitted to the Strauss test (ASTM A262, practice E) to determine susceptibility to intergranular corrosion. Also, it was recommended that a stress analysis be performed on the system to determine whether a different heat treatment (which would offer lower strength but higher toughness) could be used for this part.

A connecting rod from a failed engine ruptured in fatigue without evidence of excessive stresses, detonation, overheating, or oil starvation. The origin of the fatigue failure was completely mutilated but decarburization was observed. Significant amounts of decarburization (0.010 to 0.015 in.) were found also in other forgings, such as exhaust rocker arms, main rotor drag brace clevises, bolts of carriage diagonal struts, and spring legs of main landing gears. The failure mode was low-stress, high-cycle fatigue involving tension and bending loads. The main cause was a manufacturing deficiency. The usual way to eliminate decarburization is to machine off the soft skin or employ better quality control when making them. Many aircraft manufacturers employ forged parts with machined surfaces or with shot-peened as-forged surfaces without excessive decarburization.

Occasional failures were experienced in spool-type valves used in a hydraulic system. When a valve would fail, the close-fitting rotary valve would seize, causing loss of flow control of the hydraulic oil. The rotating spool in the valve was made of 8620 steel and was gas carburized. The cylinder in which the spool fitted was made of 1117 steel, also gas carburized. Investigation (visual inspection, low magnification images, 400x images, metallographic exam, and hardness testing) supported the conclusion that momentary sliding contact between the spool and the cylinder wall caused unstable retained austenite in the failed cylinder to transform to martensite. The increase in volume resulted in sufficient size distortion to cause interference between the cylinder and the spool, seizing, and loss of flow control. The failed parts had been carburized in a process in which the carbon potential was too high, which resulted in a microstructure having excessive retained austenite after heat treatment. Recommendations included modifying the composition of the carburizing atmosphere to yield carburized parts that did not retain significant amounts of austenite when they were heat treated.

Fasteners, made in high-production progressive dies from 0.7 mm thick cold-rolled 1060 steel, were used to secure plastic fabric or webbing to the aluminum framework of outdoor furniture. It was found that approximately 30% of the fasteners cracked and fractured as they were compressed to clamp onto the framework prior to springback. The heat treatment cycle of the fasteners consisted of austenitizing, quenching, tempering to obtain a tempered martensite microstructure, acid cleaning, zinc electroplating, coating with a clear dichromate and thereafter baking to remove the nascent hydrogen. It was revealed that fasteners treated in this manner were brittle due to hydrogen embrittlement as the baking process was found to not be able to remove all the nascent hydrogen which had induced during acid cleaning and electroplating. The heat treatment cycle was modified to produce a bainitic structure and the method of plating the fastener with zinc was changed from electroplating to a mechanical deposition process to thus avoid hydrogen embrittlement.

Evidence of destructive pitting on the gear teeth (AMS 6263 steel) in the area of the pitchline was exhibited by an idler gear for the generator drive of an aircraft engine following test-stand engine testing. The case hardness was investigated to be lower than specified and it was suggested that it had resulted from surface defects. A decarburized surface layer and subsurface oxidation in the vicinity of pitting were revealed by metallographic examination of the 2% nital etched gear tooth sample. It was concluded that pitting had resulted as a combination of both the defects. The causes for the defects were reported based on previous investigation of heat treatment facilities. Oxide layer was caused by inadequate purging of air before carburization while decarburization was attributed to defects in the copper plating applied to the gear for its protection during austenitizing in an exothermic atmosphere. It was recommended that steps be taken during heat treatment to ensure neither of the two occurred.

A portion of two large spur tooth bull gears made from 4147H Cr-Mo alloy steel that had spalling teeth was submitted for evaluation. The gears were taken from a final drive wheel reduction unit of a very large open-pit mining truck. The parts had met the material and initial heat treat hardening specifications. The mode of failure was tooth profile spalling. By definition, spalling originates at a case/core interface or at the juncture of a hardened/nonhardened area. The cause of this failure was either insufficient or no induction-hardened case along the active profile. The cause was activated by a nonfunctioning induction hardening coil that did not or was not allowed to harden the midprofile of several teeth.

A plant had manufactured and heat treated their product in house for years. As time went on, the special steel that they had been using became more expensive, and a switch was made to a more common and less highly alloyed material. However, no change in hardness specifications were made, because calculations of ideal critical diameter and analysis of available hardenability data indicated that the original hardness specification could be met. There was, however, less room for process variation. The parts ended up containing temper carbides, developed heavy decarburization, and experienced excessive distortion because they were left in the furnace for extended and varying periods with the temperature “turned down a couple hundred degrees.”

Postflight inspection of a gas-turbine aircraft engine that had experienced compressor stall revealed that the engine air-intake bullet assembly had dislodged and was seated against the engine-inlet guide vanes at the 3 o'clock position. The bullet assembly consisted of an outer aerodynamic shell and an inner stiffener shell, both of 1.3 mm (0.050 in.) thick aluminum alloy 6061-T6, and four attachment clips of 1 mm (0.040 in.) thick alclad aluminum alloy 2024-T42. Each clip was joined to the outer shell by 12 spot welds and was also joined to the stiffener. Analysis (visual inspection, dye-penetrant inspection, and 10x/150x micrographs of sections etched with Keller's reagent) supports the conclusion that the outer shell of the bullet assembly separated from the stiffener because the four attachment clips fractured through the shell-to-clip spot welds. Fracture occurred by fatigue that initiated at the notch created by the intersection of the faying surfaces of the clip and shell with the spot weld nuggets. The 6061 aluminum alloy shell and stiffener were in the annealed (O) temper rather than T6, as specified. Recommendations included heat treating the shell and stiffener to the T6 temper after forming.

During installation, a clamp-strap assembly, specified to be type 410 stainless steel-austenitized at 955 to 1010 deg C (1750 to 1850 deg F), oil quenched, and tempered at 565 deg C (1050 deg F) for 2 h to achieve a hardness of 30 to 35 HRC, and used for securing the caging mechanism on a star-tracking telescope, fractured transversely across two rivet holes closest to one edge of the pin retainer in a completely brittle manner. Comparison with a non-failed strap using microscopic examination, spectrographic analysis, and slow-bend tests showed that both fit the 410 stainless steel specs, but hardness and grain size were different. Reheat treatment of full-width specimens showed that coarse grain size (ASTM 2 to 3) was responsible for the brittle fracture, and excessively high temperature during austenitizing caused the large grain size in the failed strap. The fact that the hardness of the strap that failed was lower than the specified hardness of 30 to 35 HRC had no effect on the failure because that of the non-failed strap was even lower. Recommendation was that the strap should be heat treated as specified to maintain the required ductility and grain size.

A case-hardened sleeve made of C 15 (Material No. 1.0401) was flattened at two opposing sides and had cracked open at these places, the crack initiating at a face plane. The wall of the sleeve was 9 mm thick, but the flat ends were machined down to 5.5 mm from the outside. The customer had specified a 2 mm case depth and a hardness of at least HRC 55 at a depth of 1.5 mm. An etched cross section of the cracked end showed that the case layer had a depth of 2.3 mm, so that the sleeve was almost through-hardened at the flat ends. While the core material with the full wall thickness had the quench structure of low-carbon steel, the structure of the flattened area consisted of coarse acicular martensite with a small amount of pearlite (quench troostite) and ferrite. Therefore the sleeve was overheated and probably quenched directly from case. To prevent damage, it would have been necessary to have a lower case depth, carburize less deeply, and prevent overheating that causes brittleness and leads also to increased case depth, or else use a fine-grained steel of lower hardenability.

A gear manufacturer experienced service problems with various gears and pinions that had worn prematurely or had fractured. All gears and pinions were forged from 1.60Mn-5Cr steel and were case hardened by pack carburizing. Gear Failure: One of the gears showed severe wear on the side of the teeth that came into contact with the opposing gear during engagement. The microstructure at the periphery of a worn tooth at its unworn side consisted of coarse acicular martensite with a large percentage of retained austenite. Pinion Failure: The teeth of the pinion exhibited severe spalling; the microstructure at the surface consisted of coarse acicular martensite with retained austenite. Also, a coarse network of precipitated carbide particles showed that the carburization of the case had appreciably exceeded the most favorable carbon content. This evidence supported the following conclusions: 1) High wear rate on the gears was caused by spalling of the coarse-grain surface layer. The underlying cause of the wear was overheating during the carburization. 2) Pinion failure resulted from overheating combined with excessive case carbon content. Thus, no recommendations were made.

Aircraft missile launcher attachment bolts fabricated from cadmium-coated Hy-tuf steel were found broken. Subsequent analysis of the broken bolts indicated three causes of failure. First, the bolts had been carburized, which was not in conformance with the heat treating requirements. Second, macroetching showed that the bolts has been machined from stock rather than forged, and the threads cut rather than rolled. It was also determined that hydrogen-assisted stress-corrosion cracking also played a part in the failure of the high-strength bolts.

A valve stem made of 17-4 PH (AISI type 630) stainless steel, which was used for operating a gate valve in a steam power plant, failed after approximately four months of service, during which it had been exposed to high-purity water at approximately 175 deg C (350 deg F) and 11 MPa (1600 psi). The valve stem was reported to have been solution heat treated at 1040 +/-14 deg C (1900 +/-25 deg F) for 30 min and either air quenched or oil quenched to room temperature. The stem was then reportedly aged at 550 to 595 deg C (1025 to 1100 deg F) for four hours. Investigation (visual inspection, 0.7x/50x images, hardness testing, reheat treatment, and metallographic examination) supported the conclusion that failure was by progressive SCC that originated at a stress concentration. Also, the solution heat treatment had been either omitted or performed at too high of a temperature, and the aging treatment had been at too low of a temperature. Recommendations included the following heat treatments: after forging, solution heat treat at 1040 deg C (1900 deg F) for one hour, then oil quench; to avoid susceptibility to SCC, age at 595 deg C (1100 deg F) for four hours, then air cool.