Operation handles produced from C45 steel showed many fine cracks at the flame hardened noses. The cracks ran from the corners of indentations caused by the tool during alignment. Metallographic investigation showed the nose was overheated during flame hardening. It was concluded that the numerous hardening cracks were caused by abrupt quenching from over-heating temperature and by local stress concentrations due to indentations of the tool caused during alignment.

Handles welded to the top cover plate of a chemical-plant downcomer broke at the welds when the handles were used to lift the cover. The handles were fabricated of low-carbon steel rod; the cover was of type 502 stainless steel plate. The attachment welds were made with type 347 stainless steel filler metal to form a fillet between the handle and the cover. The structure was found to contain a zone of brittle martensite in the portion of the weld adjacent to the low-carbon steel handle; fracture had occurred in this zone. The brittle martensite layer in the weld was the result of using too large a welding rod and too much heat input, melting of the low-carbon steel handle, which diluted the austenitic stainless steel filler metal and formed martensitic steel in the weld zone. Because it was impractical to preheat and postheat the type 502 stainless steel cover plate, the low-carbon steel handle was welded to low-carbon steel plate, using low-carbon steel electrodes. This plate was then welded to the type 502 stainless steel plate with type 310 stainless steel electrodes. This design produced a large weld section over which the load was distributed.

Compound bow handle risers that had failed in service and during assembly along with an unassembled riser were submitted for analysis. The risers were die cast from magnesium-base alloy AM60A. Inspection of the failed risers and metallurgical investigations conducted on the stock riser revealed the presence of cold shuts at the same site in all specimens. It was recommended that all risers be thoroughly inspected and that the bow company work with their die casting shop to design a mold with acceptable filling characteristics.

The handle from a consumer product exhibited an apparent surface defect. The handle had been injection molded from a medium viscosity grade ABS resin. The anomalous appearance was objectionable to the assembler of the final product and resulted in a production lot being placed on quality-control hold. Investigation included visual inspection, 24x micrographs, and FTIR in the reflectance mode. The spectrum obtained on the included material was characteristic of polybutadiene, the rubber-modifying agent present in ABS. This supported the conclusion that the inclusion's most likely source was an undispersed gel particle formed during the production of the molding resin.

The onset of leakage adjacent to two butt welds in a 2 in. bore pipe was traced to the development of fine cracks. The pipe carried 40% sodium hydroxide solution. The actual temperature was not known, but the pipeline was steam traced at a pressure of 30 psi, equivalent to a temperature of 130 deg C (266 deg F). Magnetic crack detection revealed circumferential crack-like indications situated a short distance from the butt weld. Cracking originated on the bore surfaces of the tube and was of an intergranular nature reminiscent of caustic cracking in steam boilers. The strength of the solution of caustic soda and possibly the temperature also were in the range known to produce stress-corrosion cracking of mild steels in the presence of stresses of sufficient magnitude. In this instance the location of the cracking suggested that residual stresses from welding, which approach yield point magnitude, were responsible. As all other welds were suspect, the remedy was to remove the joints and to reweld followed by local stress relief.

After only a short time in service, oil-fired orchard heaters made of galvanized low-carbon steel pipe, 0.5 mm (0.020 in.) in thickness, became sensitive to impact, particularly during handling and storage. Most failures occurred in an area of the heater shell that normally reached the highest temperature in service. A 400x etched micrograph showed a brittle and somewhat porous metallic layer about 0.025 mm (0.001 in.) thick on both surfaces of the sheet. Next to this was an apparently single-phase region nearly 0.05 mm (0.002 in.) in thickness. The examination supported the conclusion that prolonged heating of the galvanized steel heater shells caused the zinc-rich surface to become alloyed with iron and reduce the number of layers. Also, heating caused zinc to diffuse along grain boundaries toward the center of the sheet. Zinc in the grain boundaries reacted with iron to form the brittle intergranular phase, resulting in failure by brittle fracture at low impact loads during handling and storage. Recommendation included manufacture of the pipe with aluminized instead of galvanized steel sheet for the combustion chamber.

Several type 304L stainless steel dished ends used in the fabrication of cylindrical vessels developed extensive cracking during storage. All of the dished ends had been procured from a single manufacturer and belonged to the same batch. When examined visually, several rust marks were observed, indicating contamination by rusted carbon steel particles. Liquid penetrant testing was used to determine the extent of the cracks, and in situ metallographic analysis was performed over the cracked region. The morphology of the cracks was indicative of transgranular stress-corrosion cracking (TGSCC). Conditions promoting the occurrence of the TGSCC included significant tensile stresses on the inside of the dished ends, the presence of surface contamination by iron due to poor handling practice using carbon steel implements, and storage in a coastal environment with an average temperature of 25 to 32 deg C (77 to 90 deg F), an average humidity ranging from 70 to 80%, and an atmospheric NaCl content ranging from 8 to 45 mg/m2 /day. Recommendations preventing further occurrence of the situation were strict avoidance of the use of carbon steel handling implements, strict avoidance of cleaning practices that cause long-term exposure to chlorine-containing cleaning fluid, and solution annealing of the dished ends at 1050 deg C (1920 deg F) for 1 h followed by water quenching to relieve residual stresses.

A laminated-paper microwave food tray collapsed with hot food in it. Microscopic examination of the failed tray revealed no structural or material defects. Five additional trays of like construction were also tested to determine the conditions necessary to simulate the permanent deflection of the tray handles that had occurred in the failed tray. Full distortion of the handles was obtained experimentally only by dropping a full hot tray on its end onto the floor. The test results indicated that the tray had slipped from the hand of the user.

A type 321 stainless steel downcomer expansion joint that handled process gases was found to be leaking approximately 2 to 3 weeks after installation. The expansion joint was the second such coupling placed in the plant after failure of the original bellows. The failed joint was disassembled and examined to determine the cause of failure. Energy-dispersive x-ray analysis revealed significant peaks for chlorine and phosphorus, indicating failure by chloride stress-corrosion cracking (SCC). Cracks in the liner and bellows exhibited a branched pattern also typical of SCC. Cracks through the inner liner initiated on the outer surface of the liner and propagated inward, whereas cracks in the bellows originated on the inner surface and propagated outward. Stress-corrosion cracking of the assembly was caused by chloride contaminants trapped inside the bellows following hydrostatic testing. Checking the test fluid for chloride and removing all fluids after hydrostatic testing were recommended to prevent further failure.

A crane long-travel worm drive shaft was found to be chipped during unpacking after delivery. Chemical analysis showed that the steel (EN36A with a case depth of 1 mm, or 0.04 inch did not meet specifications. Magnetic particle inspection revealed a crack on the side of the shaft opposite the chip. Metallographic examination indicated that the case depth was approximately 2 mm (0.08 in.) and that a repair weld of an earlier chip had been made in the cracked area. The chipping was attributed to excessive case depth and rough handling. It was recommended that the shaft be returned to the manufacturer and a replacement requested.

Two investment-cast A356 aluminum alloy actuators used for handles on passenger doors of commercial aircraft fractured during torquing at less than the design load. Visual examination showed that cracking had occurred through a machined side hole. Fractography revealed that the cracks originated in hot tear locations in the castings. Microprobe analysis of fracture surfaces in the hot tear region indicated a much higher silicon-to-aluminum ratio compared with the overload fracture area. No microstructural anomalies related to the failure were found during metallographic examination. It was concluded that the strength of the castings had been compromised by the presence of the casting defects. Modification of the gating system for casting was recommended to eliminate the hot tear zone. It was also suggested that the balance of the castings from the same manufacturing lot be radiographically inspected.

A heat-treated, cadmium-plated AISI 8740 steel bolt broke through the head-to-shank fillet while being handled during assembly. Fractographic and metallographic examination of the bolt traced the cause of failure to quench cracking, which occurred when the part was water cooled following hot heading and prior to the production run. The process chart for hot heading was changed from water quenching to air cooling following the forming operation.

An API type 2 steel clamp located on the riser of a semisubmersible drilling rig between the lower ball joint and riser blowout preventer (BOP) conductor failed after 7 years of service. Failure analysis revealed the cause of failure to be the low toughness of the clamp material. Contributing factors included the presence of a hard, brittle, heat-affected zone and weld defects at the handling pad eye. It was recommended that the replacement clamp be made from a material with good toughness and that any installation of attachments by welding be done according to qualified procedures.

To permit bolting of a 90 lb/yd. flat-bottomed rail to a steel structure, rectangular slots 2 in. wide x 1 in. deep were flame-cut in the base of the rail at 2 ft intervals to suit existing bolt holes. During subsequent handling, one of the rails (which were about 25 ft long) was dropped from a height of approximately 6 ft on to a concrete floor and it fractured into 11 pieces, each break occurring at a slot. The sample piece submitted for examination showed a wholly brittle fracture at each end, the fractures having originated at the sharp corners of the slots. During flame-cutting, a narrow band of material on each side of the cut was raised above the hardening temperature. When the torch had passed the rate of abstraction of heat from this zone by conduction into the cold mass of the rail was sufficiently rapid to amount to a quench and thus cause local hardening. The steel in the regions of the slots possessed little capacity for deformation, and fracturing of the martensitic layer, under cooling or impact stresses, would be likely to occur. The slots should have been cut mechanically.

This article describes some of the common elemental composition analysis methods and explains the concept of referee and economy test methods in failure analysis. It discusses different types of microchemical analyses, including backscattered electron imaging, energy-dispersive spectrometry, and wavelength-dispersive spectrometry. The article concludes with information on specimen handling.

This article focuses on the corrosion-wear synergism in aqueous slurry and grinding environments. It describes the effects of environmental factors on corrosive wear and provides information on the impact and three-body abrasive-corrosive wear. The article also discusses the various means for combating corrosive wear, namely, materials selection, surface treatments, and handling-environment modifications.

This article describes the six fundamental factors that decide a tool's performance. These are mechanical design, grade of tool steel, machining procedure, heat treatment, grinding, and handling. A deficiency in any one of the factors can lead to a tool and die failure. The article presents a seven-step procedure to be followed when looking for the reason for a failure. A review of the results of the seven-point investigation may lead directly to the source of failure or narrow the field of investigation to permit the use of special tests.

After 10 to 20 months of service, the carbon steel hoppers on three trucks used to transport bulk ammonium nitrate prills developed extensive cracking in the upper walls. The prills were discharged from the steel hoppers using air superchargers that generated an unloading pressure of approximately 11 kPa (7 psi). Each hopper truck held from 9,100 to 11,800 kg (10 to 13 tons) of prills when fully loaded and handled approximately 90,700 kg (100 tons) per month. The walls of the hoppers were made of 2.7 mm (0.105 in.) thick flat-rolled carbon steel sheet of structural quality, conforming to ASTM A 245 (obsolete specification replaced by A 570 and A 611). Investigation (visual inspection and 100x micrographs polished and etched with nital) supported the conclusion that failure of the hoppers was the result of intergranular SCC of the sheet-steel walls because of contact with a highly concentrated ammonium nitrate solution. Recommendations included the cost-effective solution of applying a three-coat epoxy-type coating with a total dry thickness of 0.3 mm (0.013 in.) to the interior surfaces of the hoppers.

The fatigue failure of a wire rope used on a skip hoist in an underground mine has been studied as part of the ongoing research by the Bureau of Mines into haulage and materials handling hazards in mines. Macroscopic correlation of individual wire failures with wear patterns, fractography, and microhardness testing were used to gain an understanding of the failure mechanism. Wire failures occurred predominantly at characteristic wear sites between strands. These wear sites are identifiable by a large reduction in diameter; however, reduction in area was not responsible for the location of failure. Fractography revealed multiple crack initiation sites to be located at other less noticeable wear sites or opposite the characteristic wear site. Microhardness testing revealed hardening, and some softening, at wear sites.