Failures occurred in admiralty brass condenser tubes in a nuclear plant cooled by freshwater. About 2500 tubes had to be replaced over a span of six years. Investigation (visual inspection, chemical analysis, water chemistry (for both intake and outfall), and corrosion products in the operating system and on test coupons exposed to the operating environment) supported the conclusion that the failure was caused by microbe-initiated SCC. No recommendations were made.

Leaks developed in 22 admiralty brass condenser tubes. The tubes were part of a condenser that was being used to condense steam from a nuclear power plant and had been in operation for less than 2 years. Analysis identified three types of failure modes: stress-corrosion cracking, corrosion under deposit (pitting and crevice), and dezincification. Fractures were transgranular and typical of stress-corrosion cracking. The primary cause of the corrosion deposit was low-flow conditions in those parts of the condenser where failure occurred. Maintenance of proper flow conditions was recommended.

Inhibited admiralty brass (UNS C44300) condenser tubes used in a natural-gas-fired cogeneration plant failed during testing. Two samples, one from a leaking tube and the other from an on leaking tube, were examined. Chemical analyses were conducted on the tubes and corrosion deposits. Stress-corrosion cracking was shown to have caused the failure. The most probable corrosive was ammonia or an ammonium compound in the presence of oxygen and water. All of the tubes were replaced.

Dezincification is a particular form of corrosive attack which may occur in a variety of environments and to which some brasses are susceptible. It is favored by waters having a high oxygen, carbon dioxide, or chloride content, and is accelerated by elevated temperatures and low water velocities. In the present study, steam turbine condenser tubes had to be renewed after 25 years of service. The tubes were nominally of 70:30 brass. The appearance of a typically corroded one showed uniform dezincification attack on the bore, extending from one-half to two-thirds through the tube wall thickness.

Leaks developed at random locations in aluminum brass condenser tubes within the first year of operation of a steam condenser in a nuclear power plant. One failed tube underwent scanning electron microscopy surface examination and optical microscope metallography. It was determined that the tube failed from crevice corrosion under seawater deposits that had formed on the inner surface. Mechanical cleaning of the condenser tubes every 6 months and installation of intake screens of smaller mesh size were recommended.

A detailed failure analysis was conducted on an ammonia refrigerant condenser tube component that failed catastrophically during its initial hours of operation. Evidence collected clearly demonstrated that the weld between a pipe and a dished end contained a sharp unfused region at its root (lack of penetration). Component failure had started from this weld defect. The hydrogen absorbed during welding facilitated crack initiation from this weld defect during storage of the component after welding. Poor weld toughness at the low operating temperature facilitated crack growth during startup, culminating in catastrophic failure as soon as the crack exceeded critical length.

An aluminum brass seawater surface condenser failed due to pitting after less than one year of service. Large pits filled with a green deposit were evidenced under the nonuniform black scale present over the entire inside surface of the tube. The black deposit was identified as primarily copper sulfide, with zinc and aluminum sulfides while the green deposit was revealed to be copper chloride. The combination of sulfide and chloride attack on the tubes was concluded to have resulted in the failure. Injection of ferrous sulfate upstream of the condenser which could aid the formation of protective oxide films was recommended.

A failure occurred in buried brass (92% Cu, 8% Zn) piping used to carry drinking water in wet clay soil after less than two years in service. Investigation (visual inspection, chemical analysis of both the pipe surface and water, and a comparison of the corrosion failure of power station condenser tubing cooled by seawater for two copper alloys, an aluminum brass alloyed with arsenic (UNS C68700, ASTM B111, or Cu-Zn-20Al DIN17660), and a cupronickel 70-30 alloy with iron added (C71500, ASTM B111, or Cu-Ni-30Fe DIN17665)) supported the conclusion that the failure was caused by microbial induced corrosion by sulfate-reducing bacteria. No recommendations were made.

A steam-condensate line (type 316 stainless steel tubing) began leaking after five to six years in service. The line carried steam condensate at 120 deg C (250 deg F) with a two hour heat-up/cool-down cycle. No chemical treatment had been given to either the condensate or the boiler water. To check for chlorides, the inside of the tubing was rinsed with distilled water, and the rinse water was collected in a clean beaker. A few drops of silver nitrate solution were added to the rinse water, which clouded slightly because of the formation of insoluble silver chloride. This and additional investigation (visual inspection, and 250x micrograph etched with aqua regia) supported the conclusion that the tubing failed by chloride SCC. Chlorides in the steam condensate also caused corrosion of the inner surface of the tubing. Stress was produced when the tubing was bent during installation. Recommendations included providing water treatment to remove chlorides from the system. Continuous flow should be maintained throughout the entire tubing system to prevent concentration of chlorides. No chloride-containing water should be permitted to remain in the system during shutdown periods, and bending of tubing during installation should be avoided to reduce residual stress.

An E-Brite /Ferralium explosively bonded tube sheet in a nitric acid condenser was removed from service because of corrosion. Visual and metallographic examination of tube sheet samples revealed severe cracking in the heat-affected zone between the outer tubes and the weld joining the tube sheet to the floating skirt. Cracks penetrated deep into the tube sheet, and occasionally into the tube walls. The microstructures of both alloys and of the weld appeared normal. Intergranular corrosion characteristic of end-grain attack was apparent. A low dead spot at the skirt / tube sheet joint allowed the Nox to condense and subsequently reboil. This, coupled with repeated repair welding in the area, reduced resistance to acid attack. Intergranular corrosion continued until failure. Recommendations included changing operating parameter inlet to prevent HNO3 condensation outside the inlet and replacement of the floating skirt with virgin material (i.e., material unaffected by weld repairs).

A copper condenser dashpot in a refrigeration plant failed prematurely. The dashpot was a long tubular component with a cup brazed at each end. Stereomicroscopic examination of the fracture surface at low magnification revealed a typical ductile mode of failure. The failure was attributed to insufficient component thickness, which made the dashpot unable to withstand internal operating pressure, and to extensive annealing in the heat-affected zones of the brazed joints. It was recommended that the condenser dashpot design take into account the annealing effects of brazing. Hydrostatic testing at a pressure times greater than the maximum operating pressure prior to placing the component in service was also suggested.

Several tubes in a 35 m 2 (115 ft 2 ) type 316 stainless steel shell-and-tube condenser leaked unexpectedly in an organic chemical plant that produces vinyl acetate monomer. Leaks were discovered after 5 years of operation and relocation of the condenser to another unit in the same plant. Examination of tubes and tube sheets revealed pitting damage on the OD surface. Some of the pits had penetrated fully, resulting in holes. Inside diameter surfaces were free of corrosion. Macro- and microexaminations indicated that the tubes had been properly manufactured. Pitting was attributed to stagnant water on the shell side. It was recommended that the surfaces not be kept in contacts with closed stagnant water for appreciable lengths of time.