Two clamps that support overhead power lines in an electrified rail system fractured within six months of being installed. The clamps are made of CuNiSi alloy, a type of precipitation-strengthening nickel-silicon bronze. To identify the root cause of failure, the rail operator led an investigation that included fractographic and microstructural analysis, hardness testing, inductively coupled plasma spectroscopy, and finite-element analysis. The fracture was shown to be brittle in nature and covered with oxide flakes, but no other flaws relevant to the failure were observed. The investigation results suggest that the root cause of failure was a forging lap that occurred during manufacturing. Precracks induced by the forging defect and the influence of preload stress (due to bolt torque) caused the premature failure.

A helicopter rapidly lost altitude and struck a tree, causing a fire and severe damage. The hose clamp which was the subject of this investigation was one of two used on a short length of hose between the turbocharger and the carburetion system. The purpose of this examination was to determine whether the hose failed during or before the accident. Fracture in the failed clamp was accompanied by obvious permanent deformation and evidence of local shearing at the ends of the perforation where fracture occurred, and in the adjacent perforation. The first test involved tightening the clamps to failure with a torque wrench. In no case did the band material fracture. In a second attempt to duplicate the failure, a tensile testing machine was used to pull the two fittings apart while the hose was clamped in place. When the testing machine was operated at maximum head travel (approximately 20 in. per min.), one of the hose clamps broke in the same manner as the clamp in question. The manner of failure during the tension test indicated this clamp failed at the time of the crash because of a sudden separation between the turbocharger and the remainder of the aircraft.

During installation, a clamp-strap assembly, specified to be type 410 stainless steel-austenitized at 955 to 1010 deg C (1750 to 1850 deg F), oil quenched, and tempered at 565 deg C (1050 deg F) for 2 h to achieve a hardness of 30 to 35 HRC, and used for securing the caging mechanism on a star-tracking telescope, fractured transversely across two rivet holes closest to one edge of the pin retainer in a completely brittle manner. Comparison with a non-failed strap using microscopic examination, spectrographic analysis, and slow-bend tests showed that both fit the 410 stainless steel specs, but hardness and grain size were different. Reheat treatment of full-width specimens showed that coarse grain size (ASTM 2 to 3) was responsible for the brittle fracture, and excessively high temperature during austenitizing caused the large grain size in the failed strap. The fact that the hardness of the strap that failed was lower than the specified hardness of 30 to 35 HRC had no effect on the failure because that of the non-failed strap was even lower. Recommendation was that the strap should be heat treated as specified to maintain the required ductility and grain size.

An API type 2 steel clamp located on the riser of a semisubmersible drilling rig between the lower ball joint and riser blowout preventer (BOP) conductor failed after 7 years of service. Failure analysis revealed the cause of failure to be the low toughness of the clamp material. Contributing factors included the presence of a hard, brittle, heat-affected zone and weld defects at the handling pad eye. It was recommended that the replacement clamp be made from a material with good toughness and that any installation of attachments by welding be done according to qualified procedures.

The small cable (drop wire) providing service for individual subscribers from the aerial plant is held in place by a clamp made of a tin-coated brass body (attached to the cable) and a copper tail wire loop (attached to a galvanized steel hook or to a porcelain insulator). The tail wire is 2.6 mm (0.102 in.) diam annealed copper, and the clamp assembly must withstand a 2470 N (555 lb) load without breaking or slipping. A number of these clamps, located a few hundred feet from the ocean, have failed. The sharply broken wire indicated to weakening by abrasion. The copper tail wire failures had characteristics generally associated with corrosion fatigue. The broken wires showed multiple transgranular cracks near the failure, originating at the bases of pits. It was diagnosed that the copper tail wire failures were due to corrosion fatigue. The solution to this problem was to change the tail wire material for direct seashore exposure from annealed copper to annealed Monel.

A ring clamp (8740 (AMS 6322), steel forged and cadmium plated) used for attaching ducts to an aircraft engine became loose after three hours of service. When the clamp was removed from the engine, the hinge tabs on one clamp half were found to be broken. Analysis (visual inspection and microscopic and metallographic examination) supported the conclusion that both hinge tabs on the clamp half fractured in a brittle manner as the result of gross overheating, or burning, during forging. The mechanical properties of the metal, especially toughness and ductility, were greatly reduced by burning. Evidence that burning was confined to the hinge end of the clamp indicated that the metal was overheated before or during the upset forging operation. Recommendations included notifying the supplier of the burned condition on the end of the clamp. The clamps should be macroetched before cadmium plating to detect overheating. The clamps in stock should be inspected to ensure that the metal had not been weakened by overheating during the upset forging operation.

Several type 301 half-hard stainless steel clamps used to hold cylindrical galvanized steel covers to galvanized cast iron bases failed in flooded manholes after one to six months of service. Before service, they were treated with antiseize compound containing MoS2. Based on the conditions (the clamp is the cathode of a galvanic cell with zinc) and the brittle nature of the cracks, the failures were diagnosed as hydrogen-stress cracking. Laboratory experiments were conducted to substantiate the above diagnosis and to evaluate the effect of annealing and the hydrogen-stress cracking behavior of type 316 stainless steel. The problem was solved by changing the clamp material from type 301 to type 316 stainless steel and by eliminating the MoS2 antiseize compound.

A high-density polyethylene (HDPE) natural gas distribution pipe (Grade PE 3306) failed by slow, stable crack growth while in residential service. The leak occurred at a location where a squeeze clamp had been used to close the pipe during maintenance. Failure analysis showed that the origin of the failure was a small surface crack in the inner pipe wall produced by the clamping. Fracture mechanics calculations confirmed that the suspected failure process would result in a failure time close to the actual time to failure. It was recommended that: materials be screened for susceptibility to the formation of the inner wall cracks since it was not found to occur in pipe typical of that currently being placed in service; pipes be re-rounded after clamp removal to minimize residual stresses which caused failure; and a metal reinforcing collar be placed around the squeeze location after clamp removal.

This article discusses the failure of cylinder clamping rods in single cylinder diesel engines. The AISI 4140 hardened and tempered steel clamping rods were failing after 200 to 250 h of operation. The fatigue failures initiated at the root of the last thread on the clamping rod that was engaged in a blind hole in the cylinder block. The failures were caused by loose tolerances on the threads that resulted in a non-uniform distribution of load. The load was concentrated on the last threads to engage, thus causing fatigue crack nucleation at the thread root and propagation until the rod broke by overload. Changing the tolerance on the threads virtually eliminated the fatigue problem.

A clamp used for securing the hot-air ducting system on fighter aircraft fractured in an area adjacent to a slot near the end of the strap after two or three years of service. The strap was 0.8 mm (0.032 in.) thick, and the V-section was 1.3 mm (0.050 in.) thick; both were made of 19-9 DL heat-resisting alloy. The operating temperature of the duct surrounded by the clamp was 425 to 540 deg C (800 to 1000 deg F). The life of the clamp was expected to equal that of the aircraft. Investigation (visual inspection, chemical analysis, hardness testing, and 540x/2700x images etched with oxalic acid) supported the conclusion that the clamp fractured by SCC because the work metal was sensitized. Sensitization occurred during long-term exposure to the service temperature; the effects of sensitization were intensified as a result of cold forming. Recommendations included using a work metal that is less susceptible to intergranular carbide precipitation.

Two A6 tool steel (free machining grade) shafts, parts of a clamping device used for bending 5.7 cm OD tubing on an 8.6 cm radius, failed simultaneously under a maximum clamping force of 54,430 kg. The shaft was imposed with cyclic tensile stresses due to the clamping force and unidirectional bending stresses resulting from the nature of operation. Nonmetallic oxide-sulfide segregation was indicated by microscopic examination of the edge of the fracture surface. Both smooth and granular areas were revealed on visual examination of the fracture. The shaft was subjected to a low overstress as the smooth-textured fatigue zone was relatively large compared with the crystalline textured coarse final-fracture zone. The fatigue crack was nucleated by the nonmetallic inclusion that intersected the surface and initiated in the 0.25 mm radius fillet at a change in section due to stress concentration. To minimize this stress concentration, a larger radius fillet shaft at the critical change in section was suggested as corrective measure.

Initial investigation showed that a landing gear failure was the result of a hard landing with no evidence of contributory factors. The objective of reexamination was to determine whether there was any evidence of metallurgical failure. The landing gear was primarily an AISI type 6150 Cr-V steel flat spring attached at the top end to the fuselage and at the bottom end to the axle. Failure occurred at the clamping point near the top end of this spring. The failure showed evidence of severe brinelling at one corner in the clamping area. The fracture surfaces were clean, fresh, and indicative of a shock type of failure pattern. Closer examination, however, showed a fatigue crack at one corner. At this point, there was definite evidence of progression and oxidation. It was concluded that the corner in question was subjected to repeated brinelling resulting from normal landing loads, probably accentuated by looseness in the clamping device. The resulting residual tensile stress lowered the effective fatigue strength at that point against drag and side loads.

Two vertical coal-pulverizer shafts at a coal-fired generation station failed after four to five years in service. One shaft was completely broken, and the other was unbroken but cracked at both ends. shaft material was AISI type 4340 Ni-Cr- Mo alloy steel, with a uniform hardness of approximately HRC 27. Metallographic examination of transverse sections through the surface-damaged areas adjacent to the cracks also showed additional small cracks growing at an angle of approximately 60 deg to the surface. The crack propagation mode appeared to be wholly transgranular. SEM examination revealed finely spaced striations on the crack surfaces, supporting a diagnosis of fatigue cracking. Crack initiation in the pulverizer shafts started as a result of fretting fatigue. Greater attention to lubrication was suggested, combined with asking the manufacturer to consider nitriding the splined shaft. It was suggested that the surfaces be securely clamped together and that an in-service maintenance program be initiated to ensure that the tightness of the clamping bolts was verified regularly.