Two aircraft-engine tailpipes of 19-9 DL stainless steel (AISI type 651) developed cracks along longitudinal gas tungsten arc butt welds after being in service for more than 1000 h. Binocular-microscope examination of the cracks in both tailpipes revealed granular, brittle-appearing surfaces confined to the HAZs of the welds. Microscopic examination of sections transverse to the weld cracks showed severe intergranular corrosion in the HAZ. The fractures appeared to be caused by loss of corrosion resistance due to sensitization, that could have been induced by the temperatures attained during gas tungsten arc welding. Tests demonstrated the presence of sensitization in the HAZ of the gas tungsten arc weld. The aircraft engine tailpipe failures were due to intergranular corrosion in service of the sensitized structure of the HAZs produced during gas tungsten arc welding. All gas tungsten arc welded tailpipes should be postweld annealed by re-solution treatment to redissolve all particles of carbide in the HAZ. Also, it was suggested that resistance seam welding be used, because there would be no corrosion problem with the faster cooling rate characteristic of this technique.

The case and stiffener of an inner-combustion-chamber case assembly failed by completely fracturing circumferentially around the edge of a groove arc weld joining the case and stiffener to the flange. The assembly consisted of a cylindrical stiffener inserted into a cylindrical case that were both welded to a flange. The case, stiffener, flange, and weld deposit were all of nickel-base alloy 718. It was observed that a manual arc weld repair had been made along almost the entire circumference of the original weld. Investigation (visual inspection, 0.5x macrographs, and 10x etched with 2% chromic acid plus HCl views) supported the conclusions that failure was by fatigue from multiple origins caused by welding defects. Ultimate failure was by tensile overload of the sections partly separated by the fatigue cracks. Recommendations included correct fit-up of the case, stiffener, and flange and more skillful welding techniques to avoid undercutting and unfused interfaces.

A steel galvanizing vat measuring 3 x 1.2 x 1.2 m (10 x 4 x 4 ft) and made of 19 mm thick carbon steel plate (ASTM A285, grade B)) at a shipbuilding and ship-repair facility failed after only three months of service. To verify suspected failure cause, two T joints were made in 12.5 mm thick ASTM A285, grade B, steel plate. One joint was welded using the semiautomatic submerged arc process with one pass on each side. A second joint was welded manually by the shielded metal arc process using E6010 welding rod and four passes on each side. The silicon content of the shielded metal arc weld was 0.54%, whereas that of the submerged arc weld was 0.86%. After being weighed, the specimens were submerged in molten zinc for 850 h. Analysis (visual inspection, chemical analysis, 100x 2% nital-etched micrographs) supported the conclusions that the vat failed due to molten-zinc corrosion along elongated ferrite bands, possibly because silicon was dissolved in the ferrite and thus made it more susceptible to attack by the molten zinc. Recommendations included rewelding the vat using the manual shielded metal arc process with at least four passes on each side.

Several of the welds in a hoist carriage tram-rail assembly fabricated by shielded metal arc welding the leg of a large T-section 1020 steel beam to the leg of a smaller T-section 1050 steel rail failed in one portion of the assembly. Four weld cracks and several indefinite indications were found by magnetic-particle inspection. The cracks were revealed by metallographic examination to have originated in the HAZs in the rail section. Cracks in welds and in HAZs resulting from arcing the electrode adjacent to the weld and weld spatter were also revealed. The tram-rail assembly was concluded to have failed by fatigue cracking in HAZs. The fatigue cracking was initiated and propagated by vibration of the tram rail by movement of the hoist carriage on the rail. As a corrective measure, welding procedures were improved and the replacement rail assemblies were preheated and postheated.

Parts of 21Cr-6Ni-9Mn stainless steel that had been forged at about 815 deg C (1500 deg F) were gas tungsten arc welded. During postweld inspection, cracks were found in the HAZs of the welds. Welding had been done using a copper fixture that contacted the steel in the area of the HAZ on each side of the weld but did not extend under the tungsten arc. In SEM examination, the cracks appeared to be intergranular and extended to a depth of approximately 1.3 mm (0.05 in.). The crack appearance suggested that the surface temperature of the HAZ could have melted a film of copper on the fixture surface and that this could have penetrated the stainless steel in the presence of tensile thermal-contraction stresses. The cracks in the weldments were a form of liquid-metal embrittlement caused by contact with superficially melted copper from the fixture and subsequent grain-boundary attack of the stainless steel in an area under residual tensile stress. The copper for the fixtures was replaced by aluminum. No further cracking was encountered.

Pipes made of low-carbon Thomas steel had been welded longitudinally employing the carbon-arc process with bare electrode wire made for argon-shielded arc welding. Difficulties were encountered during the cutting of threads because of the presence of hard spots. Microstructural examination showed welding conditions were such that a carburizing atmosphere developed, which led to an increase in carbon content and hardening at certain locations such as terminal bells and lap joints. This explained the processing difficulties during the threading operation.

An outer fan-duct assembly of titanium alloy Ti-5Al-2.5Sn (AMS 4910) for a gas-turbine fan section cracked 75 mm (3 in.) circumferentially through a repair weld in an arc weld in the front flange-duct segment. Examination of the crack with a binocular microscope revealed no evidence of fatigue. A blue etch-anodize inspection showed the presence of an alpha case along the edges of the repair weld. The alpha case, a brittle oxide-enriched layer, forms when welds are inadequately shielded from the atmosphere during deposition. The brittleness of this layer caused transgranular cracks to form and propagate in tension under the thermal stresses created by the repair-weld heat input. The crack resulted from contamination and embrittlement of a repair weld that had received inadequate gas shielding. Thermal stresses cracked the oxide-rich layer that formed. The gas-shielding accessories of the welding torch were overhauled to ensure that leak-in or entrainment of air was eliminated. Also, the purity of the shielding-gas supplies was rechecked to make certain that these had not become contaminated.

A welded ferritic stainless steel heat exchanger cracked prior to service. The welding filler metal was identified as an austenitic stainless steel and the joining method as gas tungsten arc welding. Investigation (visual inspection, SEM images, 5.9x images, and 8.9x/119x images etched with Vilella's reagent followed by electrolytic etching in 10% oxalic acid) supported the conclusion that the heat exchanger cracked due to weld cold cracking or postwelding brittle overload that occurred via flexure during fabrication. The brittle nature of the weld was likely due to a combination of high residual stresses, a mixed microstructure, inclusions, and gross grain coarsening. These synergistic factors resulted from extreme heat input during fillet welding. Recommendations included altering the welding variables such as current, voltage, and travel speed to substantially reduce the heat input.

A roadarm for a tracked vehicle failed during preproduction vehicle testing. The arm was a weldment of two cored low-alloy steel sand castings specified to ASTM A 148, grade 120–95. A maximum carbon content of 0.32% was specified. The welding procedure called for degreasing and gas metal arc welding; neither preheating nor postheating was specified. The filler metal was E70S-6 continuous consumable wire with a copper coating to protect it from atmospheric oxidation while on the reel. Analysis of the two castings revealed that the carbon content was higher than specified, ranging from 0.40 to 0.44%. The fracture occurred in the HAZ , where quenching by the surrounding metal had produced a hardness of 55 HRC. Some roadarms of similar carbon content and welded by the same procedure had not failed because they had been tempered during a hot-straightening operation. Brittle fracture of the roadarm was caused by a combination of too high a carbon equivalent in the castings and the lack of preheating and postheating during the welding procedure. A pre-heat and tempering after welding were added to the welding procedure.

A 10-in. diam, spiral-welded AISI 1020 carbon steel pipe carrying water under pressure developed numerous leaks over a four mile section. The section was fabricated using submerged-arc welding from the outside surface. Each welded length of pipe had been subjected to a proof pressure approximately twice the specified design pressure and two-thirds the approximate yield point of the parent metal. No failures or leakage were observed during proof testing. Metallurgical examination corroborated visual checks, indicating a distinct lack of root penetration in the split areas. Splitting occurred as a result of inadequate root penetration. The most likely source of difficulty in the welding process was the linear speed. Probably, the failures would not have occurred in absence of the welding problem. Also, the pipe was inadequate for the specified design pressure, as well as the reported maximum system pressure.

A welded elbow assembly (AISI type 321 stainless steel, with components joined with ER347 stainless steel filler metal by gas tungsten arc welding) was part of a hydraulic-pump pressure line for a jet aircraft. The other end of the tube was attached to a flexible metal hose, which provided no support and offered no resistance to vibration. The line was leaking hydraulic fluid at the nut end of the elbow. Investigation supported the conclusion that failure was by fatigue cracking initiated from a notch at the root of the weld and was propagated by cyclic loading of the tubing as the result of vibration and inadequate support of the hose assembly. Recommendations included changing the joint design from a cylindrical lap joint to a square-groove butt joint. Also, an additional support was recommended for the hose assembly to minimize vibration at the elbow.

This article briefly reviews the general causes of weldment failures, which may arise from rejection after inspection or failure to pass mechanical testing as well as loss of function in service. It focuses on the general discontinuities observed in welds, and shows how some imperfections may be tolerable and how the other may be root-cause defects in service failures. The article explains the effects of joint design on weldment integrity. It outlines the origins of failure associated with the inherent discontinuity of welds and the imperfections that might be introduced from arc welding processes. The article also describes failure origins in other welding processes, such as electroslag welds, electrogas welds, flash welds, upset butt welds, flash welds, electron and laser beam weld, and high-frequency induction welds.