Welds in two CMo steel catalytic gas-oil desulfurizer reactors cracked under hydrogen pressure-temperature conditions that would not have been predicted by the June 1977 revision of the Nelson Curve for that material. Evidence of severe cracking was found in five weld-joint areas during examination of a naphtha desulfurizer by ultrasonic shear wave techniques. Defect indications were found in longitudinal and circumferential seam welds of the ASTM A204, grade A, steel sheet. The vessel was found to have a type 405 stainless steel liner for corrosion protection that was spot welded to the base metal and all vessel welds were found to be overlaid with type 309 stainless steel. Long longitudinal cracks in the weld metal, as well as transverse cracks were exposed after the weld overlay was ground off. A decarburized region on either side of the crack was revealed by metallurgical examination of a cross section of a longitudinal crack. It was concluded that the damage was caused by a form of hydrogen attack. Installation of a used Cr-Mo steel vessel with a type 347 stainless steel weld overlay was suggested as a corrective action.

The welds joining the liner and shell of a fluid catalytic cracking unit failed. The shell was made of ASTM A515 carbon steel welded with E7018 filler metal. The liner was made of type 405 stainless steel and was plug welded to the shell using ER309 and ER310 stainless steel filler metal. Fine cracks starting inside the weld zone and spreading outward through the weld and toward the surface were observed during examination. Decarburization and graphitization of the carbon steel at the interface was noted. The high carbon level was found to allow martensite to form eventually. The structure was found to be austenitic in the area where the grain-boundary precipitates appeared heaviest. The composition of the precipitates was analyzed using an electron microprobe to reveal presence of sulfur. Microstructural changes in the weld alloy at the interface were interpreted to be caused by dilution of the alloy and the presence of sulfur caused hot shortness. The necessary internal stress to produce extensive cracking was produced by the differential thermal expansion of the carbon and stainless steels. Periodic careful gouging of the affected areas followed by repair welding was recommended.

An exhaust diffuser assembly failed prematurely in service. The failure occurred near the intake end of the assembly and involved fracture in the diffuser cone (Corten), diffuser in take flange (type 310 stainless steel), diffuser exit flange (type 405 stainless steel), expansion bellows (Inconel 600), and bellows intake flange (Corten). Individual segments of the failed subassemblies were examined using various methods. The analysis indicated that the weld joint in the diffuser intake flange (type 310 stainless steel to Corten steel) contained diffusion-zone solidification cracks. The joints had been produced using the mechanized gas-metal arc welding process. Cracking was attributed to improper control of welding parameters, and failure was attributed to weld defects.

Several of the springs, made of 1.1 mm diam Inconel X-750 wire and used for tightening the interstage packing ring in a high-pressure turbine, were found broken after approximately seven years of operation. Intergranular cracks about 1.3 mm in depth and oriented at an angle of 45 deg to the axis of the wire were revealed by metallographic examination. A light-gray phase, which had the appearance of liquid-metal corrosion, was observed to have penetrated the grains on the fracture surfaces. The spring wires were found to fracture in a brittle manner characteristic of fracture from torsional loading (along a plane 45 deg to the wire axis). Liquid-metal embrittlement was expected to have been caused by metals (Sn, Zn, Pb) which melt much below maximum service temperature of the turbine. The springs were concluded to have fractured by intergranular stress-corrosion cracking promoted by the action of liquid zinc and tin in combination with static and torsional stresses on the spring wire. As a corrective measure, Na, Sn, and Zn which were present in pigmented oil used as a lubricant during spring winding was cleaned thoroughly by the spring manufacturer before shipment to remove all contaminants.

Radial cracking occurred adjacent to 11 vanes in a 19-vane impeller operating in a chemical plant environment. The impeller vanes were fillet welded to both the disk and the cover Cracks were next to the fillet welds and near the cover outer diameter They generally did not extend to the outer diameter. The entire impeller surface was tested by the dry magnetic particle method. Visual and microstructural examinations revealed intergranular cracking. Energy-dispersive spectroscopy of corrosion products contained in the cracks disclosed the presence of chlorine and sulfur The failure was attributed to stress-corrosion cracking caused by a corrosive atmosphere.

A section of pipe in a hydrocarbon pipeline was found to be leaking. The pipeline was installed several decades earlier and was protected by an external coating of extruded polyethylene and a cathodic protection system. The failed pipe section was made from API 5L X46 line pipe steel, approximately 22 cm (8.7 in.) OD x 0.5 cm (0.2 in.) wall thickness, which was electric resistance welded along the longitudinal seam. The pressure at the time and location of the failure was 2760 kPa, which corresponds to 20% of the specified minimum yield strength. The cause of failure (based on visual inspection, magnetic particle inspection, stereoscopic analysis, scanning electron microscopy, tensile and hardness testing, and chemical analysis) was attributed to damage resulting from a lightning strike.

Alloy 430 stainless steel tube-to-header welds failed in a heat recovery steam generator (HRSG) within one year of commissioning. The HRSG was in a combined cycle, gas-fired, combustion turbine electric power plant. Alloy 430, a 17% Cr ferritic stainless steel, was selected because of its resistance to chloride and sulfuric acid dewpoint corrosion under conditions potentially present in the HRSG low-pressure feedwater economizer. Intergranular corrosion and cracking were found in the weld metal and heat-affected zones. The hardness in these regions was up to 35 HRC, and the weld had received a postweld heat treatment (PWHT). Metallographic examination revealed that the corroded areas contained undertempered martensite. Fully tempered weld areas with a hardness of 93 HRB were not attacked. No evidence of corrosion fatigue was found. Uneven temperature control during PWHT was the most likely cause of failure.

In an industrial application, 24 speed-increaser gearboxes were used to transmit 258 kW (346 hp) and increase speed from 55 to 375 rev/min. The gears were parallel shaft, single helical, carburized, and ground. The splash lubrication system used a mineral oil without antiscuff additives with ISO 100 viscosity. After about 250 h of operation, two gearboxes failed by bending fatigue. Investigation showed the primary failure mode was scuffing, and the earlier bending fatigue failures were caused by dynamic loads generated by the worn gear teeth. Testing of a prototype gearbox showed that the failure resulted from several interrelated factors: the lubricant viscosity was too low causing high temperatures; no antiscuff additives were used; a gearbox designed as a speed reducer was used as a speed increaser (the designer selected a long-addendum tooth for the pinion); the gear teeth were not provided with a coating or plating to ease running-in; and the gears were not run-in properly under reduced loads. The case suggests that such gear failures can be avoided if designers and operators recognize that the lubricant is an important component of a gearbox and appreciate that gear design requires the consideration and control of many interrelated factors.

Two Z-shape impeller vanes failed. The vane material was 14-hard type 301 stainless steel. The vanes were of two-piece construction, with a longitudinal weld. Analyses indicated that the vanes had not been solution annealed after welding, leaving the heat-affected zone above the welds in a highly sensitized state. The sensitized material lost corrosion resistance, became embrittled along the grain boundaries, and finally failed by intergranular cracking. Use of type 410 martensitic stainless steel was recommended.

A 75 cm OD x 33 mm thick pipe in a horizontal section of a hot steam reheat line ruptured after 15 years in service. The failed section was manufactured from rolled plate of material specification SA387, grade C. The longitudinal seam weld was a double butt-weld that was V-welded from both sides and failure was found to propagate along the longitudinal seam and its HAZ. The fracture surface near the inner wall of the pipe was found to have a bluish gray appearance, while the fracture surface near the outer wall was rust colored (oxides). The transverse-to-the-weld specimen from the longitudinal seam weld was revealed to have lower elongation and a shear type failure rather than the cup-cone failures. It was concluded that the welded longitudinal seam exhibited embrittlement. A low-ductility intergranular fracture that progressed through the weld metal was revealed by scanning electron microscopy. The cracks were revealed to be in existence for some time before the final failure which was indicated by the extent and amount of corrosion products. It was concluded that low ductility was responsible for the original initiation of cracks in the pipe.

Field fatigue failures occurred in a hand-operated gear shift lever mechanism made of 1049 medium carbon steel hardened to 269 to 285 HB. The failures occurred in the 3.18 mm (0.127 in.) radius. Redesign increased the shift lever's diameter to 25 mm (1 in.) and the radius to 4.75 mm (0.187 in.). Also, instead of the as-forged surface, it was expedient to machine the radius. The as-forged surface at 360 MPa (52 ksi) maximum working stress would not ensure satisfactory life because the recalculated maximum stress was 390 MPa (57 ksi). However, the machined surface with a maximum working stress of 475 MPa (69 ksi) gives a safe margin above the 390 MPa (57 ksi) requirement for design stress. Interpreting these values, the forged surface should have a life expectancy of 1,000,000 cycles of stress. However, because the load cycle was somewhat uncertain, the machined radius was chosen to obtain a greater margin of safety. Redesigning eliminated the failures.

A detailed investigative failure analysis was conducted on an autoclave which blew apart in a furnace for no apparent reason. Bolt failure resulted in separation of the autoclave lid and subsequent destruction of the furnace. Analysis using metallography, fractography, mechanical testing and exemplar tests were performed on the bolt material. Mechanical engineering analysis and leak-before-break criteria were extensively analyzed. Results led to only one possible conclusion: that an explosion occurred within the autoclave. Suggestions for autoclave design are presented as a result of the analysis.

The curved parts of exit pigtails made of wrought Incoloy 800H tubing used in steam reforming furnaces failed by performance after a period of service shorter than that predicted by the designers. Examination of a set of tubes consisting of both curved (perforated) and straight parts revealed that the cracks initiated at the outer surface by a combined mechanism of creep and intergranular embrittlement. A smaller grain size resulting from cold bending fabrication procedures for the curved parts was responsible for accelerating the embrittlement. It was recommended that hot bending be used for fabrication of the curved parts. A change of alloy to a low-alloy chromium-molybdenum allay to protect against heat was also suggested.

A 127 cu m (4,480 cu ft) pressurized railroad tank car burst catastrophically. The railroad tank was approximately 18 m (59 ft) long (from 2:1 elliptical heads), 3 m (10 ft) in OD, and 16 mm (0.63 in.) thick. The chemical and material properties of the tank were to comply with AAR M-128 Grade B. As a result of the explosive failure of the tank car, fragments were ejected from the central region of the car between the support trucks from ground zero to a maximum of approximately 195 m (640 ft). The mode of failure was a brittle fracture originating at a preexisting lamination and crack in the tank wall adjacent to the tank nozzle. The mechanism of failure was overpressurization of the railroad tank car caused by a chemical reaction of the butadiene contents. The interrelationship of the mode, mechanism, and consequences of failure is reviewed to reconstruct the sequence of events that led up to the breach of the railroad tank car. Means to prevent similar reoccurrences are discussed.