Search Results for 304

A heavily worked 304 stainless steel wire basket recrystallized and distorted while in service at 650 deg C (1200 deg F). This case study demonstrates that heavily cold worked austenitic stainless steel components can experience large losses in creep strength, and potentially structural collapse, under elevated temperature service, even at temperatures more than 300 deg C (540 deg F) below the normal solution annealing temperature. The creep strength of the recrystallized 304/304L steel was more than 1000 times less than that achievable with solution annealed 304H. These observations are consistent with limitations (2000 Addendum to ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code) on the use of cold worked austenitic stainless steels for elevated temperature service.

A stainless steel pipe transferring hot white liquor solution of sodium hydroxide and sodium sulfite, developed leaks adjacent to the welds within four years of service. The stainless steel pipe was AISI type 304 and welded with E308 weld electrodes. The service temperature was 190 deg C (375 deg F) and the solution contained approximately 700 ppm chlorides. Liquid penetrant inspection of the pipeline showed the leaks were numerous and confined adjacent to the welds. A metallographic specimen from the circumferential weld showed the cracks initiated at the inside surface. In addition to the base metal, SCC also had initiated at a notch at the weld root due to improper welding procedures. Failure was attributed to chloride-induced SCC with secondary contributory factors, including improper welding procedures. It was recommended that the pipeline be replaced with a material more resistant to SCC. The candidate materials are commercial grade unalloyed titanium or Inconel 600, which have superior resistance to SCC compared to austenitic stainless steels.

Cerclage wire, which was used with two screws and washers for a tension band in a corrective internal fixation, was found broken at several points and corroded after nine months in service. The material was examined using energy-dispersive x-ray analysis and determined not to be in compliance with standards (type 304 stainless steel without molybdenum). The screws and washers were found to be made of remelted implant-quality type 316L stainless steel and were intact. Signs of sensitization, characterized by chromium carbide precipitates at the grain boundaries, were revealed by the microstructure. Intercrystalline corrosion with pitted grains was indicated by SEM fractography. Improper heat treatment of the steel was interpreted to have led to intercrystalline corrosion and implant separation.

Heavy pitting corrosion on type 304 stainless steel bone screw was studied. A screw head that exhibited heavy pitting corrosion attack was observed. Deep tunnels that penetrated the screw head and followed the inclusion lines were revealed. The screw was inserted in a plate made of type 316LR stainless steel and some mechanical fretting and very few corrosion pits were revealed. Type 304 stainless steel was deemed not to be satisfactory as an implant material.

Several failures occurred in 64-mm schedule 80 type 304 stainless steel (ASME SA-312, grade TP304) piping in a steam-plant heat-exchanger system near tee fittings at which cool water returning from the heat exchanger was combined with hot water from a bypass. Various portions of the piping were subjected to temperatures ranging from 29 to 288 deg C. Each of the failures were revealed to consist of transgranular cracking in and/or close to the circumferential butt weld joining the tee fitting to the downstream pipe leg, where the hot bypass water mixed with the cool return water. The transgranular cracks suggested that thermal fatigue was a more likely cause of failure than SCC. It was concluded by temperature measurements that circumferential temperature gradients, in combination with inadequate flexibility in the piping system as a whole, had caused the failures. The tee fitting was redesigned to alleviate the thermal stress pattern.

A fused-salt electrolytic-cell pot containing a molten eutectic mixture of sodium, potassium, and lithium chlorides and operating at melt temperatures from 500 to 650 deg C (930 to 1200 deg F) exhibited excessive corrosion after two months of service. The pot was a welded cylinder with 3-mm thick type 304 stainless steel walls and was about 305 mm (12 in.) in height and diam. Analysis (visual inspection and 500x micrographs etched with CuCl2) supported the conclusions that the pot failed by intergranular corrosion because an unstabilized austenitic stainless steel containing more than 0.03% carbon had been sensitized and placed in contact in service with a corrosive medium at temperatures in the sensitizing range. Recommendations included changing material for the pot from type 304 stainless steel to Hastelloy N (70Ni-17Mo-7Cr-5Fe). Maximum corrosion resistance and ductility are developed in Hastelloy N when the alloy is solution heat treated at 1120 deg C (2050 deg F) and is either quenched in water or rapidly cooled in air. An alternative, but less suitable, material for the pot was type 347 (stabilized grade) stainless steel. After welding, the 347 should be stress relieved at 900 deg C (1650 deg F) for 2 h and rapidly cooled to minimize residual stresses.

Three separate corrosion mechanisms were involved in the failure of an AISI type 304 stainless steel pipe elbow. The major cracks, including the one that penetrated the wall, tend to be wide-mouthed, tapering to a blunt tip, with corrosion products filling much of the crack space. This was characteristic of corrosion fatigue. The second type of cracking originated at some of the major cracks. These cracks were branched and transgranular, which is characteristic of stress-corrosion caused by chlorides. The third crack mode, an intergranular network, was most probably the result of hydrogen sulphide attack. The 13-year service life of the elbow made it difficult, if not impossible, to determine the order of the corrosion mechanisms or the length of time it took to reach the present state of degradation after the initiation of corrosion. Based on the long service life the present material has given, it was recommended that it be used again.

This investigation involved two AISI 304L acid storage tanks and one AISI 304L spent solvent tank from a sewage treatment facility. After installation, these tanks were hydrostatically tested using sewage effluent. No leaks were found and after a year or two, the tanks were drained and filled with nitric acid in preparation for service. Three weeks later the two acid tanks were found to be leaking from the bottom. Samples from the spent solvent tank revealed that pitting was located in a depressed area near a suction hole, beneath a black residue. It was concluded that the acid tanks failed by chloride-induced pitting initiated by microbial activity. Further, the spent solvent tank failed by a similar, but anaerobic mechanism. The use of the effluent for the hydrostatic test and the failure to remove it and clean and dry the tanks was the primary cause of failure. Localized carbide segregation in the original plate served as preferential corrosion sites. Had the tanks been hydrostatically tested in a proper manner, the pitting may not have occurred.

Majority of the water feeders in a new chicken house had stopped working. The water feeders were found to be operated on the principle that when the chickens pecked a plastic bowl, a compressed spring released a squirt of water. The small compression springs were made from type 302 stainless steel, and the operating stresses were safely within the design limits given by the Goodman diagram. The springs were revealed by scanning electron microscopy to contain numerous cracks on their inside surface, and these cracks were all at 45 deg to the wire axis. The solution was recommended as to select a grade of spring steel that would be more corrosion resistant than 302 stainless.

Several hundred leaks were reported in the type 304 stainless steel pipelines, vessels, and tanks of a chemical plant at a tropical location within a few weeks after startup. Investigation of the failure involved a site visit, metallographic examination and analysis of the material, analysis of hydrotest waters, and microbiological examination of slime that had formed in certain pipework sections. It was determined that the failure resulted from microbially induced corrosion promoted by the use of poor-quality hydrotest water and uncontrolled hydrotesting practice. Use of appropriate hydrotesting procedures was recommended to prevent similar failures.

One inch diam Type 304 stainless steel piping was designed to carry containment atmosphere samples to an analyzer to monitor hydrogen and oxygen levels during operational and the design basis accident conditions that are postulated to occur in a boiling water reactor. Only one of six lines in the system had thru-wall cracks. Shallow incipient cracks were detected at the lowest elevations of one other line. The balance of the system had no signs of SCC attack. Chlorides and corrosion deposits in varying amounts were found throughout the system. The failure mechanism was transgranular, chloride, stress-corrosion cracking. Replacement decisions were based on the presence of SCC attack or heavy corrosion deposits indicative of extended exposure time to chloride-contaminated water. The existing uncracked pipe, about 75 percent of the piping in the system, was retained despite the presence of low level surface chlorides. Controls were implemented to insure that temperatures are kept below 150 deg F, or, walls of the pipe are moisture-free or the cumulative wetted period will never exceed 30 h.

A 150 mm (6 in.) schedule 80S type 304 stainless steel pipe (11 mm, or 0.432 in., wall thickness), which had served as an equalizer line in the primary loop of a pressurized-water reactor, was found to contain several circumferential cracks 50 to 100 mm (2 to 4 in.) long. Two of these cracks, which had penetrated the pipe wall, were responsible for leaks detected in a hydrostatic test performed during a general inspection after seven years of service. Investigation (visual inspection, visual and ultrasonic weld examination, water analysis, and chemical analysis) supported the conclusion that the failure was caused by SCC due to stress, sensitization, and environment. Recommendations included replacing all pipe sections and installing them using low-heat-input, multiple-pass welding procedures.

A storage tank had been in service at a petrochemical plant for 13 years when inspectors discovered cracks adjacent to weld joints and in the base plate near the foundation. The tank was made from AISI 304 stainless steel and held styrene monomer, a derivative of benzene. The cracks were subsequently welded over with 308 stainless steel filler wire and the base plate was replaced with new material. Soon after, the tank began leaking along the weld bead, triggering a full-scale investigation; spectroscopy, optical and scanning electron microscopy, fractography, SEM-EDS analysis, and microhardness, tensile, and impact testing. The results revealed transgranular cracks in the HAZ and base plate, likely initiated by stresses developed during welding and the presence of chloride from seawater used in the plant. It was also found that the repair weld was improperly done, nor did it include a postweld heat treatment to remove weld sensitization and minimize residual stresses.