A series of poppet-valve stems fabricated from 17-4 PH (AISI type 630) stainless steel failed prematurely in service during the development of a large combustion assembly. The poppet valves were part of a scavenging system that evacuated the assembly after each combustion cycle. The function of the valve is to open and close a port; thus, the valve is subjected to both impact and tensile loading. Analysis (visual inspection, hardness testing, and stress analysis) supported the conclusions that the valve stems were impact loaded to stresses in excess of their yield strength. That they failed in the threaded portion also suggests a stress-concentration effect. Recommendations included changing the material spec to a higher-strength material with greater impact strength. In this case, it was recommended that the stems, despite any possible design changes, be manufactured from an alloy such as PH 13-8Mo, which can be processed to a yield strength of 1379 MPa (200 ksi), with impact energies of the order of 81 J (60 ft·lbf) at room temperature.

The side supporting flange of the bottom platen of an 800 ton hydraulic press fractured after 9 x 10's cycles under a maximum load of 530 tons. The platen material specified in the design was cast steel 52. Metallographic examination of the fracture surface indicated that the platen had failed in fatigue as a result of a high stress concentration in a sharp 0.6 mm (0.02 in.) radius fillet. Stress analysis and fracture mechanics predictions revealed that there was also danger of fatigue failure for platens with the design radius of 10 mm (0. 4 in.) if the press operates at 800 tons. It was recommended that the remaining life of similar presses be assessed periodically controlling the cracks, their dimensions, and their propagation rates. An increase in the radius of the fillet was also recommended.

Nineteen out of 26 bolts in a multistage water pump corroded and cracked after a short time in a severe working environment containing saline water, CO 2 , and H 2 S. The failed bolts and intact nuts were to be made from a special type of stainless steel as per ASTM A 193 B8S and A 194. However, the investigation (which included visual, macroscopic, metallographic, SEM, and chemical analysis) showed that austenitic stainless steel and a nickel-base alloy were used instead. The unspecified materials are more prone to corrosion, particularly galvanic corrosion, which proved to be the primary failure mechanism in the areas of the bolts directly exposed to the working environment. Corrosion damage on surfaces facing away from the work environment was caused primarily by chloride stress-corrosion cracking, aided by loose fitting threads. Thread gaps constitute a crevice where an aggressive chemistry is allowed to develop and attack local surfaces.

A 75 cm OD x 33 mm thick pipe in a horizontal section of a hot steam reheat line ruptured after 15 years in service. The failed section was manufactured from rolled plate of material specification SA387, grade C. The longitudinal seam weld was a double butt-weld that was V-welded from both sides and failure was found to propagate along the longitudinal seam and its HAZ. The fracture surface near the inner wall of the pipe was found to have a bluish gray appearance, while the fracture surface near the outer wall was rust colored (oxides). The transverse-to-the-weld specimen from the longitudinal seam weld was revealed to have lower elongation and a shear type failure rather than the cup-cone failures. It was concluded that the welded longitudinal seam exhibited embrittlement. A low-ductility intergranular fracture that progressed through the weld metal was revealed by scanning electron microscopy. The cracks were revealed to be in existence for some time before the final failure which was indicated by the extent and amount of corrosion products. It was concluded that low ductility was responsible for the original initiation of cracks in the pipe.

Two sections of a galvanized cable 10.5 A 160 GR +NORM M 9533 (round stranded cable of normal type, h + 6, Langslay, right-handed) were examined. One had a 100 mm long blackish-brown tarnished zone obviously caused by localized heating at one end, inside which the hemp core was missing, and the other corresponded to the original condition of the cable. The cause of the damage was unknown. About a third of the wires had fractured and the rest had been cut. All were tensile fractures with a relatively high degree of necking. The cause of the localized heating was unknown. It can only be concluded from the investigation that the temperature did not exceed the Ac3 point of the wire material, which should be about 750 deg C, and that the heating lasted a fairly long time.

This article aims to identify and illustrate the types of overload failures, which are categorized as failures due to insufficient material strength and underdesign, failures due to stress concentration and material defects, and failures due to material alteration. It describes the general aspects of fracture modes and mechanisms. The article briefly reviews some mechanistic aspects of ductile and brittle crack propagation, including discussion on mixed-mode cracking. Factors associated with overload failures are discussed, and, where appropriate, preventive steps for reducing the likelihood of overload fractures are included. The article focuses primarily on the contribution of embrittlement to overload failure. The embrittling phenomena are described and differentiated by their causes, effects, and remedial methods, so that failure characteristics can be directly compared during practical failure investigation. The article describes the effects of mechanical loading on a part in service and provides information on laboratory fracture examination.

Two 25 x 40 mm (1 x 1.5 in.) AISI 4150 hot-rolled steel bars that cracked during heat treatment were examined to determine whether the heat treating procedure had contributed to the failure. Metallographic examination of a cross section taken through the fracture revealed an oxide coating on both sides of the fracture surface. The oxide was also found on the top and bottom sides of the sample. Sawcut sides of the bar did not exhibit the oxide layer The presence of the oxide in the fracture, combined with its absence on all exterior surfaces, indicated that the fracture occurred as a result of an oxide seam in the original material rather than from oxide from heat treating. Nondestructive testing prior to machining and heat treatment was recommended.

A 150 cm ID boiler drum made form ASTM A515, grade 70, steel failed during final hydrotesting at a pressure of approximately 26 MPa. Brittle fractures were revealed in between two SA-106C nozzles and remainder was found to involve tearing. Short, flat segments of fracture area, indicative of pre-existing cracks, were revealed by examination of the fracture surface at the drain grooves arc gouged at the nozzle sites. A thin layer of material with a dendritic structure was observed at the groove surface. The dendritic layer was revealed by qualitative microprobe analysis to contain over 1% C, higher than the carbon content of the base metal. The cracks in the drain groove surface could have occurred after arc gouging, during subsequent stress-relieving, or during the hydrostatic test. Flame cutting is not recommended for the type of steel used in the boiler drum because it can lead to local embrittlement and stress raisers, potentially initiating major failures.

The phenomenon of on-load corrosion is directly associated with the production of magnetite on the water-side surface of boiler tubes. On-load corrosion may first be manifested by the sudden, violent rupture of a boiler tube, such failures being found to occur predominantly on the fire-side surface of tubes situated in zones exposed to radiant heat where high rates of heat transfer pertain. In most instances, a large number of adjacent tubes are found to have suffered, the affected zone frequently extending in a horizontal band across the boiler. In some instances, pronounced local attack has taken place at butt welds in water-wall tubes, particularly those situated in zones of high heat flux. To prevent on-load corrosion an adequate flow of water must occur within the tubes in the susceptible regions of a boiler. Corrosion products and suspended matter from the pre-boiler equipment should be prevented from entering the boiler itself. Also, it is good practice to reduce as far as possible the intrusion of weld flash and other impedances to smooth flow within the boiler tubes.

Molded plastic couplings used in an industrial application exhibited abnormally brittle properties, as compared to previously produced components. The couplings were specified to be molded from a custom-compounded glass-filled nylon 6/12 resin. An inspection of the molding resin used to produce the discrepant parts revealed that the pellets were of two general types, neither of which matched the pellets from a retained resin lot. Investigation included visual inspection, micro-FTIR in the ATR mode, and analysis using DSC. The thermograms supported the conclusion that the brittle couplings contained a significant level of contamination, polypropylene and nylon 6/6. The source of the polypropylene was likely the purging compound used to clean the compounding extruder. The origin of the nylon 6/6 resin was unknown but may represent a previously compounded resin.

Over a period of 2 or 3 years, 40 to 50 premature failures of drawn high-tensile, pearlitic high-carbon (0.8 wt% C) steel wires used as cables for towing targets behind aircraft occurred. Six service failures were examined in detail. Four types of failure characteristics were noted. A close examination of wire that had been flown several times without failure was also made, and dynamic tests were conducted to investigate the fracture characteristics of wire subjected to dynamic loading. It was concluded that dynamic shock loading transmitted by the target during unsteady flight conditions was the major cause of failure. Recommendations emphasized the need for a suitable shock absorber to be fitted at the constant-tensioning device of the winch system.

An 1100 aluminum alloy connector of a high-tension aluminum conductor steel-reinforced (ACSR) transmission cable failed after more than 20 years in service, in a region of consider able industrial pollution. The steel core was spliced with a galvanized 1020 carbon steel sheath. Visual examination showed that the connector had undergone considerable plastic deformation and necking before fracture. The steel sheath was severely corroded, and the steel splice was pressed off-center in the axial direction inside the connector. Examination of the fracture surface and micro-structural analysis indicated that the failure was caused by mechanical overload, which occurred because of weakening of the steel support cable by corrosion inside the fitting. The corrosion was ascribed to defective assembly of the connector which allowed moisture penetration.

A cracked 356 mm (14 in.) diam slip-on flange (Ni-Cr-Mo-V steel) was submitted for failure analysis. Reported results and observations indicated that the flange was not an integral forging or a casting, as specified. It had been fabricated by welding and machining a ring insert within a flange with a larger internal diameter. The flange cracked because the welds between the flange and the insert were inadequate to withstand the bolting pressures. A warning was issued to end users of the flanges, which are being inspected nondestructively for conformance to specifications.

Two 38 mm (1.5 in.) diam threaded stud bolts that were part of a steel mold die assembly from a plastics molding operation were examined to determine their serviceability. Chemical analysis showed the material to be a plain carbon steel that approximated 1045. Visual examination revealed evidence of severe hammer blows to the clevis and boss areas and a gap between the die and the underside of the boss. Magnetic particle inspection showed cracks at the thread roots that, when examined metallographically, were found to contain MnS stringers. The cracking of the threads was attributed to a poor stud bolt design, which allowed a high stress concentration to occur at the base of the threads upon application of a lateral load. It was recommended that bolts of a new design that incorporated a stress-relieving groove be used. Threading of the bolt to eliminate the gap between the lower face of the boss and the die and an improved method of inserting or removing the bolt to avoid hammering (use of a wrench on a square or hexagonal boss) were also recommended.

A white cast iron water-line plug in a fire sprinkler systems split during leak repair. Examination revealed no material flaws, fatigue, or excessive corrosion. The plug head exhibited signs of excessive loads used in attempts to force the plug farther into the pipe. The evidence obtained indicated that the failure resulted from human error.

A crane long-travel worm drive shaft was found to be chipped during unpacking after delivery. Chemical analysis showed that the steel (EN36A with a case depth of 1 mm, or 0.04 inch did not meet specifications. Magnetic particle inspection revealed a crack on the side of the shaft opposite the chip. Metallographic examination indicated that the case depth was approximately 2 mm (0.08 in.) and that a repair weld of an earlier chip had been made in the cracked area. The chipping was attributed to excessive case depth and rough handling. It was recommended that the shaft be returned to the manufacturer and a replacement requested.

Several surface-mount chip resistor assemblies failed during monthly thermal shock testing and in the field. The resistor exhibited a failure mode characterized by a rise in resistance out of tolerance for the system. Representative samples from each step in the manufacturing process were selected for analysis, along with additional samples representing the various resistor failures. Visual examination revealed two different types of termination failures: total delamination and partial delamination. Electron probe microanalysis confirmed that the fracture occurred at the end of the termination. Transverse sections from each of the groups were examined metallographically. Consistent interfacial separation was noted. Fourier transform infrared and EDS analyses were also performed. It was concluded that low wraparound termination strength of the resistors had caused unacceptable increases in the resistance values, resulting in circuit nonperformance at inappropriate times. The low termination strength was attributed to deficient chip design for the intended materials and manufacturing process and exacerbated by the presence of polymeric contamination at the termination interface.

A sand-cast LM6M aluminum alloy sprocket drive wheel in an all-terrain vehicle failed. Extensive cracking had occurred around each of the six bolt holes in the wheel. Evidence of considerable deformation in this area was also noted. Examination indicated that the part failed because of gross overload. Use of an alloy with a much higher yield strength and improvement in design were recommended.

On 21 April 1995, the contents of a large blender (6 cu m) reacted and caused an explosion that killed and injured a number of workers at a plant in Lodi, NJ. A mixture of sodium hydrosulfite and aluminum powder was being mixed at the time of the accident. This report focuses on evaluations of the blender to determine if material or mechanical failures were the cause of the accident. The results indicate that the mixing vessel was metallurgically sound and did not contribute to the initiation of the failure. However, the vessel was not designed for mixing chemicals that must be isolated from water and excessive heat. Water leaking into the vessel through a graphite seal may have initiated the reactions that caused the accident.

Failure analysis is a process that is performed in order to determine the causes or factors that have led to an undesired loss of functionality. This article is intended to demonstrate proper approaches to failure analysis work. The goal of the proper approach is to allow the most useful and relevant information to be obtained. The discussion covers the principles and approaches in failure analysis work, objectives and scopes of failure analysis, the planning stages for failure analysis, the preparation of a protocol for a failure analysis, practices used by failure analysts, and procedures of failure analysis.