A 25 mm (1 in.) copper coupling had been uniformly degraded around most of the circumference of the bell and partially on the spigot end. One penetration finally occurred through the thinned area on the spigot end of the pipe. Investigation supported the conclusion that although the pipe was buried in noncorrosive sandy soil, it was found to incur stray currents at 2 Vdc in relation to a Cu/CuSO4 half cell. Recommendations included eliminating, moving, or shielding the source of stray current.

Cracking was found in the heads on large Yankee dryers, large, cylindrical, rotating, pressurized, high-temperature, cast iron pressure vessels (ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section VIII, Rules for Construction of Pressure Vessels), used to remove moisture from sheets of tissue paper during manufacturing. The typical components consist of a cast iron shell, two cast iron concave heads, and a large cast iron internal center stay attached to journals. The heads are attached to the shell and center stay with high-strength bolts. FEA and metallurgical investigation supported the conclusion that the cracking was caused by an unexpected type of load placed on the machine, namely corrosion product buildup at the head/shell interface causing the joint to displace open. It was also found that compressive bolting loads could slightly open the head/shell interface at the periphery. Recommendations included design changes in the head/shell joint, and detailed preventive maintenance inspection procedures were also suggested.

Cracks were found on the wing leading edge of a test aircraft made from AZ31B magnesium alloy. Crack lengths were approximately 230 mm (9 in.) long on the left side and approximately 130 mm (5 in.) long on the right side. The cracks ran parallel to the leading edge. The 230-mm (9-in.) crack was received for examination. Visual examination of the submitted panel revealed two cracks. One crack ran through six adjacent fastener holes. Sections of the beveled edges of the holes were missing and corrosion was evident. Visual examination of the fastener holes after separation of the crack showed that the fracture faces were corroded. Optical examination of either side of the middle group of fastener holes showed that the area of suspected crack initiation had suffered excessive corrosion. Examination of the holes on the end of the crack showed fracture characteristics typical of fatigue and/or corrosion fatigue. It was concluded that crack propagation of the fracture in the wing panel occurred by a combination of corrosion and high-cycle fatigue in the end fastener holes. It was recommended that future panels be manufactured of 2024 aluminum.

A cadmium-plated 4340 Ni-Cr-Mo steel ballast elbow assembly was submitted for failure analysis to determine the element or radical present in an oxidation product found inside the elbow assembly. Energy-dispersive x-ray analysis in the SEM showed that iron was the predominant species, presumably in an oxide form. The inside surface had the appearance of typical corrosion products. Hardness measurements indicated that the 4340 steel was heat treated to a strength of approximately 862 MPa (125 ksi). It was concluded that the oxide detected on the ballast elbow was iron oxide. The possibility that the corrosion products would eventually create a blockage of the affected hole was great considering the small hole diameter (4.2 mm, or 0.165 in.). It was recommended that a quick fix to stop the corrosion would be to apply a corrosion inhibitor inside the hole. This, however, would cause the possibility of inhibitor buildup and the eventual clogging of the hole. A change in the manufacturing process to include a cadmium plating on the hole inside surface was recommended. This was to be accomplished in accordance with MIL specification QQ-P-416, Type II, Class 1. A material change to 300-series stainless steel was also recommended.

An eddy current survey of the copper evaporator (chiller) tubes in an absorption air-conditioning unit revealed two tubes in the evaporator bundle with indications typical of longitudinal cracks. Significant necking down and grain distortion at the fracture surfaces was revealed by metallographic examination. The fracture features were found to be characteristic of an overload failure in a ductile material. The ruptured tubes were concluded as a result of examination to have failed as a result of excessive internal pressure. The source of the excessive internal pressure was assumed to be a freeze-up of the tube side water that occurred during interruption of the tube side flow or misoperation of the unit.

A white cast iron water-line plug in a fire sprinkler systems split during leak repair. Examination revealed no material flaws, fatigue, or excessive corrosion. The plug head exhibited signs of excessive loads used in attempts to force the plug farther into the pipe. The evidence obtained indicated that the failure resulted from human error.

A recuperator for blast heating of a cupola furnace became unserviceable because of the brittle fracture of several finned tubes made of heat resistant cast steel containing 1.4C, 2.3Si and 28Cr. The service temperature was reported as 850 deg C. This led to the suspicion that the fracturing had something to do with the precipitation of sigma phase. Metallographic examination showed that the multiaxial stresses caused by sigma phase formation and the related embrittlement was the cause for the fracture of the recuperator. A steel of lower chromium content with no or little tendency for sigma phase formation would have had adequate corrosion resistance at the relatively low service temperature.

A forged aluminum alloy 2014-T6 catapult-hook attachment fitting (anodized by the chromic acid process to protect it from corrosion) from a naval aircraft broke in service. Spectrographic analysis, visual examination, microscopic examination, and tensile analysis showed minute cracks on the inside surface of a bearing hole, and small areas of pitting corrosion were visible on the exterior surface of the fitting. The analysis also revealed a small number of rosettes, suggestive of eutectic melting, in an otherwise normal structure. These examinations and analyses support the conclusion that the presence of chromic acid stain on the fracture surface proved that the forging had cracked before anodizing. This suggest that the crack initiated during straightening, either after machining or after heat treatment. The structure and composition of the alloy appear to have been acceptable. Ductility was acceptable so rosettes found in the microstructure are believed to have been nondamaging. Had they contributed to the failure, the ductility would have been very low. The recommendations included inspection for cracks and revising the manufacturing process to include a fluorescent liquid-penetrant inspection before anodizing, because chromic acid destroys the penetrant. This inspection would reduce the possibility of cracked parts being used in service.

Pressure testing of a batch of AISI type 316L stainless steel thermowells intended for use in a nuclear power-plant resulted in the identification of leakage at the tips in 20% of the parts. Radiography at the tip region of representative thermowells showed linear indications along the axes. SEM examination revealed the presence of longitudinally oriented nonmetallic inclusions that were partly retained and partly dislodged. Electron-dispersive x-ray analysis indicated that the inclusions were composed of CaO. Based on the overall chemistry of the inclusion sites, the source of the CaO was determined to be slag entrapment during the steel making process. It was recommended that the thermowell blanks be ultrasonically tested prior to machining and that the design be modified to make internal pressurization possible.

Problems with materials compatibility were encountered in pyrotechnically driven devices used in a number of ordnance applications requiring rapid mechanical actuation. A fine bridgewire is located in contact with the chemical pyrotechnic, and the charge is ignited by electrical heating of the bridgewire. Evidence of severe corrosion was revealed on examination of the nickel-chromium-iron alloy bridgewire and the nickel-iron alloy pins. Metallic elements in the pin or bridgewire and substantial amounts of chlorine were detected from the x-ray spectra. Morphological changes indicative of decomposition and dissolution were revealed to have occurred in regions of the pyrotechnic that had been in contact with the bridgewire and pin surfaces by examination of the titanium-potassium perchlorate (Ti-K-Cl-O4) pyrotechnic. Substantial amounts of water were revealed to be associated with the surfaces of the titanium particles in the pyrotechnic by nuclear magnetic resonance. It was proposed that the chlorine-containing residue combined with the water from the pyrotechnic to form a thin aqueous film corroding the bridgewire and pins. A new cleaning procedure was implemented for the glass headers to eliminate the chloride contamination and a vacuum drying procedure was instituted for the pyrotechnic.

An external tank pressure/vent valve regulates the external tank fuel feed system, which transfers fuel under pressure to the internal tanks of the aircraft. A dual-position valve was found to be sticking at the intermediate positions. Also, service air check valves located on the incoming lines contained poppets that were being stuck in a closed or partially closed position because of suspected corrosion product. Residue taken from the check valve poppet and from the dual-position valve was chemically analyzed. Chloride was present in both samples. It was suspected that moisture entering the service air lines left a chloride-containing compound upon evaporation within the air check valves and pressure/vent assembly. This compound subsequently reacted with the anodized, dichromate sealed check valve housing to lock the check valve poppets in a closed or partially closed position, decreasing the actual pressure being supplied to the pressure/vent valve. It was recommended that an inspection be conducted to ensure that the service air check valves are operating properly prior to removal and servicing of the pressure/vent valve assembly. It was also recommended that dry-film lubricant be checked to ensure that it meets specifications for the pressure/vent valve assembly.

An 1100 aluminum alloy connector of a high-tension aluminum conductor steel-reinforced (ACSR) transmission cable failed after more than 20 years in service, in a region of consider able industrial pollution. The steel core was spliced with a galvanized 1020 carbon steel sheath. Visual examination showed that the connector had undergone considerable plastic deformation and necking before fracture. The steel sheath was severely corroded, and the steel splice was pressed off-center in the axial direction inside the connector. Examination of the fracture surface and micro-structural analysis indicated that the failure was caused by mechanical overload, which occurred because of weakening of the steel support cable by corrosion inside the fitting. The corrosion was ascribed to defective assembly of the connector which allowed moisture penetration.

A series of poppet-valve stems fabricated from 17-4 PH (AISI type 630) stainless steel failed prematurely in service during the development of a large combustion assembly. The poppet valves were part of a scavenging system that evacuated the assembly after each combustion cycle. The function of the valve is to open and close a port; thus, the valve is subjected to both impact and tensile loading. Analysis (visual inspection, hardness testing, and stress analysis) supported the conclusions that the valve stems were impact loaded to stresses in excess of their yield strength. That they failed in the threaded portion also suggests a stress-concentration effect. Recommendations included changing the material spec to a higher-strength material with greater impact strength. In this case, it was recommended that the stems, despite any possible design changes, be manufactured from an alloy such as PH 13-8Mo, which can be processed to a yield strength of 1379 MPa (200 ksi), with impact energies of the order of 81 J (60 ft·lbf) at room temperature.

An experimental high-temperature rotary valve was found stuck due to growth and distortion after approximately 100 h. Gas temperatures were suspected to have been high due to overfueled conditions. Both the rotor and housing in which it was stuck were annealed ferritic ductile iron similar to ASTM A395. Visual examination of the rotor revealed unusually heavy oxidation and thermal fatigue cracking along the edge of the gas passage. Material properties, including microstructure, composition, and hardness, of both the rotor and housing were evaluated to determine the cause of failure. The microstructure of the rotor was examined in three regions. The shaft material, the heavy section next to the gas passage and the thin edge of the rotor adjacent to the gas passage. The excessive gas temperatures were responsible for the expansion and distortion that prevented rotation of the rotor. Actual operating temperatures exceeded those intended for this application. The presence of transformation products in the brake-rotor edge indicated that the lower critical temperature had been exceeded during operation.

Routine inspections of a carbon steel wood pulp digester revealed a sharply increasing number of cracks in the overlay metal on the internal surface of the digester after 1 and 2 years of service. The weld overlay was composed of type 309 stainless steel on the top fourth of the digester and of a proprietary high-nickel material on the bottom three-fourths. Examination revealed three distinct modes of deterioration. General corrosion was linked to the use of unspecified overlay metal. Cracking resulted during installation from the use of a material susceptible to hot cracking. Deep corrosion fissures then developed at hot crack sites as a result of crevice corrosion. Use of the appropriate overlay material was recommended.

A 75 cm OD x 33 mm thick pipe in a horizontal section of a hot steam reheat line ruptured after 15 years in service. The failed section was manufactured from rolled plate of material specification SA387, grade C. The longitudinal seam weld was a double butt-weld that was V-welded from both sides and failure was found to propagate along the longitudinal seam and its HAZ. The fracture surface near the inner wall of the pipe was found to have a bluish gray appearance, while the fracture surface near the outer wall was rust colored (oxides). The transverse-to-the-weld specimen from the longitudinal seam weld was revealed to have lower elongation and a shear type failure rather than the cup-cone failures. It was concluded that the welded longitudinal seam exhibited embrittlement. A low-ductility intergranular fracture that progressed through the weld metal was revealed by scanning electron microscopy. The cracks were revealed to be in existence for some time before the final failure which was indicated by the extent and amount of corrosion products. It was concluded that low ductility was responsible for the original initiation of cracks in the pipe.

An oxygen line that was part of a mobile, truck -mounted oxygen-acetylene welding unit exploded in service. Analysis revealed that the failure occurred at the flexible hose-to-valve connection. It was further determined that a steel adapter had been installed at the point of failure to make the connection. Use of the adapter which joined with a brass nipple, created an unacceptable dissimilar metal joint. The steel also provided a source for the generation of sparks. Loctite, a hydrocarbon sealant that is highly flammable and explosive in contact with pure oxygen, had been used to seal the threaded joint. It was recommended that only brass fittings be used to assemble removable joints and that use of washers, sealants, and hydrocarbon lubricants be strictly avoided.

The silver layer on a thrust bearing face experienced electrostatic discharge attack (the bombardment of an in-line series of individual sparks onto the soft bearing face), which destroyed the integrity of the bearing surface. The electrical attack appeared as scratches to the naked eye. Macrophotography showed that the attack was more severe at one edge of each pad, resulting in deeper grooving and a buildup of deposits, mostly silver sulfides. Microstructural analysis of a cross section indicated that the interface between the silver overlay and the substrate (beryllium copper) was sound and free of voids and foreign material. Corrosion products contained a large quantity of sulfur. The probable cause of the attack was the presence of electrical current within the system, with sulfides a possible contributing factor. Elimination of residual magnetism and grounding of the rotating system at appropriate locations were recommended.

This paper summarizes several cases of metallurgical failure analysis of surgical implants conducted at the Laboratory of Failure Analysis of IPT, in Brazil. Investigation revealed that most of the samples were not in accordance with ISO standards and presented evidence of corrosion assisted fracture. Additionally, some components were found to contain fabrication/processing defects that contributed to premature failure. The implant of nonbiocompatible materials results in immeasurable damage to patients as well as losses for the public investment. It is proposed that local sanitary regulation agencies create mechanisms to avoid commercialization of surgical implants that are not in accordance with standards and adopt the practice of retrieval analysis of failed implants. This would protect the public health by identifying and preventing the main causes of failure in surgical implants.

A nickel alloy cylinder plated with chromium along its inner liner, installed in a commercial ice cream freezer, showed gray discoloration along its OD surface. The discolored parts exhibited significantly reduced cooling efficiency as compared with new cylinders. During operation, the OD of the cylinder was exposed to liquid ammonia refrigerant containing lubricant from the compressor. The lubricant (mineral oil) was intended to separate from the ammonia and be recirculated through the compressor. Nondestructive portable optical microscopy, XRF, EDS, and XPS analyses showed that the discoloration on the cylinder was associated with metal oxidation products coated with a thin oil film. One of the recommendations was to plate the OD of the cylinder with hard chromium to increase its resistance to erosion. Another recommendation was to reduce the amounts of water contamination in the refrigerant.