A helicopter was hovering approximately 10 ft above a ship when one spar section failed explosively. Visual inspection revealed a crack had progressed through one member of a dual spar plate assembly at a fold pin lug hole. The remaining spar plate carried the blade load until the aircraft was landed. The helicopter main rotor blade spar fracture was analyzed by conventional and advanced computerized fractographic techniques. Digital fractographic Imaging Analysis of theoretical and actual fracture surfaces was applied for automatic detection of fatigue striation spacing. The approach offered a means of quantification of fracture features, providing for objective fractography.

The paper describes the findings from a damaged propeller blade made from Mn-Ni-Al-bronze, commercially known as Superston 70 (ABS Type 5). The blade had broken at the 0.65 pitch radius location, and the fracture occurred in a brittle mode. The findings reported here point to two potential contributors to the propeller blade failure, viz., the presence of casting flaws at the low pressure side of the propeller blade and service stresses at this surface that reached approximately 400 MPa. This stress value exceeded the yield strength at the corresponding location of the unbroken blade by approximately 40%.

Helicopter rotor blade components that included the horizontal hinge pin, the associated nut, and the locking washer were examined. Visual examination of the submitted parts revealed that the hinge pin, fabricated from 4340 steel, was broken and that the fracture face showed a flat beach mark pattern indicative of a preexisting crack. The threaded area of the pin had an embedded thread that did not appear to come from the pin. A chemical analysis was conducted on the embedded thread and on an associated attachment to determine the origin of the thread. Analysis showed that the thread and nut were 4140 steel. Scanning electron fractographic examination of the fracture initiation site strongly suggested that the fracture progressed by fatigue. It was concluded that the failure of the horizontal hinge pin initiated at areas of localized corrosion pits. The pits in turn initiated fatigue cracks, resulting in a failure mode of corrosion fatigue. It was recommended that all of the horizontal hinge pins be inspected. Those pins determined to be satisfactory for further use should be stripped of cadmium, shot peened, and coated with cadmium to a minimum thickness of 0.0127 mm (0.0005 in.).

During an acceptance test of the Apollo spacecraft 101 service module prior to delivery, an SPS fuel pressure vessel (SN054) (titanium Ti-6Al-4V, approximately 1.2 m (4 ft) in diam and 3 m (10 ft) long) containing methanol developed cracks adjacent to the welds. The test was stopped. This acceptance test had been run 38 times on similar pressure vessels without problems. The methanol was a safe-fluid replacement for the storable hypergolic fuels (blend of 50% hydrazine and 50% unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine). Investigation (visual inspection and 65X images) showed similarities to stress-corrosion resulting from contamination during misprocessing of the vessels. However, another vessel underwent a more severe testing procedure and failed catastrophically. Further investigation supported the conclusion that the failure cause was SCC of titanium in methanol. Attack is promoted by crazing of the protective oxide film. It was learned that minor changes in the testing procedures could inhibit or accelerate the reaction. Recommendations included replacing the methanol with a suitable alternate fluid. Isopropyl alcohol was chosen after considerable testing. This incident further resulted in the imposition of a control specification (MF0004-018) for all fluids that contact titanium for existing and future space designs.

An aluminum alloy propeller blade that had been cold straightened to correct deformation incurred in service fractured soon after being returned to service. Visual examination revealed that crack initiation occurred at the top surface in an area containing numerous surface pits. Macroscopic appearance of the surface was of brittle fracture. X-ray stress analysis did not detect any residual stress in the top surface of the propeller blade adjacent to the fracture. However, a spanwise tensile stress of approximately 51 MPa (7.4 ksi) was indicated in the same surface of the unfailed mating blade at the location of the initial bend. Evidence found supports the conclusions that the residual stress probably originated with straightening, and the apparent absence of stress in the fractured blade was the result of relaxation through fracture. Because no prior crack damage could be attributed to the initial deformation or to straightening, rapid fracture may have been induced by residual stresses contributing to the normal spectrum of cyclic stresses. Recommendations included stress-relief annealing after cold straightening, refinishing of the surface, thus reducing fracturing of propeller blades that were cold straightened to correct deformation experienced in service.

The spindle of a helicopter-rotor blade fractured after 7383 h of flight service. At every overhaul (the spindle that failed was overhauled six times and reworked twice), any spindle that showed wear was reworked by grinding the shank to 0.1 mm (0.004 in.) under the finished diam. The spindle was then shot peened with S170 shot to an Almen intensity of 0.010 to 0.012 A. Following shot peening, the shank was nickel sulfamate plated to 0.05 mm (0.002 in.) over the finished diam, ground to finished size, and cadmium plated. Visual and stereomicroscopic exam showed faint grinding marks and circumferential grooves on the surface near the fillet at the junction of the shank and fork, which should have been peened over and covered with peening dimples. Evidence found supports the conclusions that the spindle failed in fatigue that originated near the junction of the shank and fork. The nonuniformity of the shot-peened effect on the shank and fillet portions of the spindle resulted from incomplete peeing. The fracture was of the low-stress high-cycle type, initiated by stresses well below the gross yield strength and propagated by thousands of load cycles. No recommendations were made.

A Lynx helicopter from the Royal Netherlands Navy lost a rotor blade during preparation for take-off. The blade loss was due to failure of a rotor hub arm by fatigue. The arm was integral to the titanium alloy rotor hub. An extensive material based failure analysis covered the hub manufacture, service damage, and estimates of service stresses. There was no evidence for failure due to poor material properties. However, fractographic and fracture mechanics analyses of the service failure, a full scale test failure, and specimen test failures indicated that the service fatigue stress history could have been more severe than anticipated. This possibility was subsequently supported by a separate investigation of the assumed and actual fatigue loads and stresses.

A large four-engine aircraft was on a cargo flight at night when a loud bang was heard, accompanied by a loss of power from both engines on the left side. After an emergency landing, it was discovered that the propellers from both left side engines were missing. The initial investigation determined that the four-bladed propeller from the left inboard engine had separated in flight, subsequently impacting the left outboard engine, causing its propeller to separate also. Three years later, the left inboard propeller hub was recovered. All four blades had separated through the shank area adjacent to the hub. Detailed SEM examination confirmed a fatigue mode of failure in this area with a primary single origin on the inside surface of the shank. The main fatigue origin site was coincident with one of the defects on the inner surface of the blade shank. The most probable source for creating the defects on the ID bore of the shank was the blade tip chrome plating process, which was carried out during the last overhaul prior to the failure.

Fretting and/or fretting corrosion fatigue have been observed on such parts as main rotor counterweight tie rods, fixed-pitch propeller blades, propeller blade clamps, pressure regulator lines, and landing gear support brackets. Microcracks started from severe corrosion pits in a failed control rotor spar tube assembly made of cadmium-plated AISI 4130 Cr-Mo alloy steel. Inadequate design was responsible for the failure. A lower tine of the main rotor blade cuff failed in fatigue. The rotor blade cuff was forged of 2014-T6 aluminum alloy. Initial stages of crack growth displayed features typical of low stress intensity fatigue of aluminum alloys. The fatigue resulted from abnormal fretting owing to inadequate torquing of the main retention bolts. Aircraft maintenance engineers and owners were advised to adhere to specifications when torquing this joint.

Proper stress analysis during component design is imperative for accurate life and performance prediction. The total stress on a part is comprised of the applied design stress and any residual stress that may exist due to forming or machining operations. Stress-corrosion cracking may be defined as the spontaneous failure of a metal resulting from the combined effects of a corrosive environment and the effective component of tensile stress acting on the structure. However, because of the orientation dependence in aluminum, it is the residual stress occurring in the most susceptible direction that must be considered of primary importance in material selection for design configuration. A Navy UH-1N helicopter main rotor blade grip manufactured from a 2014-T6 aluminum alloy forging failed because of a design flaw that left a high residual tensile stress along the short transverse plane; this in turn provided the necessary condition for stress corrosion to initiate. A complete failure investigation to ascertain the exact cause of the failure was conducted utilizing stereomicroscopic examination, scanning electron microscopy, metallographic inspection and interpretation, energy-dispersive chemical analysis, physical and mechanical evaluation. Stereomicroscopic examination of the opened crack fracture surface revealed one large fan-shaped region that had propagated radially through the thickness of the material from two distinct origin areas on the internal diam of the grip. Higher magnification inspection near the origin area revealed a flat, wood-like appearance. Scanning electron microscopy divulged the presence of substantial mud cracking and intergranular separation on the fracture surface. Metallographic examination revealed intergranular cracking and substantial leaf separation along the elongated grains parallel to the fracture surface. Chemical composition and hardness requirements were found to be as specified. The blade grip failed due to a stress corrosion crack which initiated on the inner diam and propagated in the short transverse direction through the thickness of the component. The high residual tensile stress in the part resulting from the forging and exposed after machining of the inner diam, combined with the presence of moisture, provided the necessary conditions to facilitate crack initiation and propagation.

This report covers case histories of failures in fixed-wing light airplane and helicopter components. In a 2025-T6 or 2219 aluminum alloy propeller blade that failed near the tip, cracks started on the leading edge at surface damage in the critical area-the zone between 4 and 10 in. from the tip of the blade. Incorrect dressing and inadequate pre-flight inspection were the two main causes. Two other types of propeller blade fatigue failures resulted mainly from propeller straightening operations, usually performed after previous blade bending damage. To eliminate blade tip failures, all surface-damaged material should be removed and polished smooth before further flight. The blade should be correctly dressed. Also, the tachometer should be calibrated to ensure the engine/propeller combination is not operated in the critical speed range at normal cruising speeds.

The propeller from a small private airplane came off in flight. The head ends of all six attachment bolts remained in the propeller hub when it was found. Two threaded shanks with nuts remained with the engine, while the remaining four shank ends with their nuts were missing. Parts available for examination, in addition to the hub and attachment bolts, were the two propeller blades and the engine crankshaft. The purpose of this examination was to determine the nature and probable cause of failure in the six attachment bolts. Indications of fatigue failure and wear were the major findings in visual and low power microscopic examination. Fracture surfaces indicated failure was initiated in the threads in four bolts and in the shanks in two. The group of four bolts failed primarily due to tensile loads, while the other two bolts failed primarily due to bending loads. It was concluded that failure was due to improper installation torqueing of the bolts.

A helicopter tail rotor blade spar failed in fatigue, allowing the blade to separate during flight. The 2014-T652 aluminum alloy blade had a hollow spar shank filled with lead wool ballast and a thermoset polymeric seal. A corrosion pit was present at the origin of the fatigue zone and numerous trails of corrosion pits were located on the spar cavity's inner surfaces. The corrosion pitting resulted from the failure of the thermoset seal in the spar shank cavity. The seal failure allowed moisture to enter into the cavity. The moisture then served as an electrolyte for galvanic corrosion between the lead wool ballast and the aluminum spar inner surface. The pitting initiated fatigue cracking which led to the spar failure.

A helicopter tail rotor blade spar failed in fatigue, allowing the outer section of the blade to separate in flight. The 7075-T7351 aluminum alloy blade had fiberglass pockets. The blade spar was a hollow “D” shape, and corrosion pits were present on the inner surface of the hollow spar A single corrosion pit, 0.38 mm (0.015 in.) deep, led to a fatigue failure of the spar The failure initiated on the pylon side of the blade. Dimensional analysis of the spar near the failure revealed measurements within engineering drawing tolerances. Though corrosion pitting was present, there was an absence of significant amounts of corrosion product and all of the pits were filled with corrosion-preventative primer. This indicated that the pitting occurred during spar manufacture, prior to the application of the primer The pitting resulted from multiple nickel plating and defective plating removal by acid etching. Post-plating baking operations subsequently reduced the fatigue strength of the spar.

An accidental overspeed condition during wind tunnel testing resulted in the destruction of a propeller rotor The occurrence was initially attributed to malfunction in the collective pitch control system. All fractured parts in the system were inspected. Highly suspect parts, including the pitch control thrust bearing set, head bolts, hub fork, and actuator rod end, were examined in more detail The thrust bearing set (52100 steel) was identified as the probable source of the uncommanded pitch angle change. A complete failure analysis of the bearing indicated that failure was precipitated by excessive heating, causing cage disintegration, plastic flow of the races and balls, and eventual separation of inner and outer races. It was recommended that the bearing set be resized to accommodate the large thrust as and that a thermocouple be added to monitor the condition of the bearing during testing.

A Marine Corps helicopter crash was investigated. Efforts were directed to the failure of one of the main rotor blades that had apparently separated in the air. The apparent failure of a blade integrity monitor (BIM) system was also considered. The rotor blade comprised a long, hollow 6061-T651 aluminum alloy extrusion and 26 fiberglass “pockets” that provided the trailing-edge airfoil shape. Visual examination of the fracture surface of the aluminum extrusion indicated fatigue crack growth followed by ductile overload separation. Examination of the fatigue fracture region revealed several pits that appeared to have acted as fracture origin sites. Time to failure was determined using fracture mechanics. It was concluded that failure was caused by a fatigue crack that grew to critical length without detection. The crack originated at pits that resulted from the use of an improperly designed heating element used to cure fiberglass repairs.