Two types of chromium-plated hydraulic cylinders failed by cracking on their outer surfaces. In one case, the parts had a history of cracking in the nominally unstressed, as-fabricated condition. In another, cracks were detected after the cylinders were subjected to a pressure impulse test. Both part types were made of 15-5 PH (UNS S15500) precipitation hardening stainless steel. Hydrogen embrittlement cracking was the likely cause of failure for both part types. Cracking of the as-fabricated parts was ultimately prevented by changing the manufacturing procedure to allow for a reheat treatment. For parts that cracked after pressure testing, excessive dimensional changes precluded the inclusion of a reheat treatment as a manufacturing step, and further failure was averted by carefully employing proper machining practices, avoiding abusive machining.

Hydraulic cylinder housings were being fabricated from 4140 grade seamless steel tubing. During production, magnetic-particle inspection indicated the presence of circumferential and longitudinal cracks in a large number of cylinders. Analysis (visual inspection, dye penetrant inspection, 50x/90x/400x SEM micrographs, and metallographic analysis) supports the conclusion that the cracking problem in these components was identified as quench cracks due to their brittle, intergranular nature and the characteristic temper oxide on the fracture surfaces. Although the steel met the compositional requirements of SAE 4140, the sulfur level was 0.022% and would account for the formation of the sulfide stringers observed. Apparently, the combination of the clustered, stringer-type inclusions and the quenching conditions were too severe for this component geometry. The result was a high incidence of quench cracks that rendered the parts useless. Recommendations included changing the specification, requiring the steel to have lower sulfur concentrations. Magnetic-particle cleanliness standards should be imposed that will exclude material with harmful clusters of sulfide stringers, for example, modified AMS 2301.

Immediately after installation, leakage was observed at the mounting surface of several rebuilt hydraulic actuators that had been in storage for up to three years. At each joint, there was an aluminum alloy spacer and a vellum gasket. The mounting flanges of the steel actuators had been nickel plated. During assembly of the actuators a lubricant containing molybdenum disulfide had been applied to the gaskets as a sealant. The vellum gasket was found to be electrically conductive, and analysis (visual inspection, 500x unetched micrographs, galvanic action testing, and x-ray diffraction) supported the conclusions that leakage was the result of galvanic corrosion of the aluminum alloy spacers while in storage. The molybdenum disulfide was apparently suspended in a volatile water-containing vehicle that acted as an electrolyte between the aluminum alloy spacer and the nickel-plated steel actuator housing. Initially, the vellum gasket acted as an insulator, but the water-containing lubricant gradually impregnated the vellum gasket, establishing a galvanic couple. Recommendations included discontinuing use of molybdenum disulfide lubricant as a gasket sealer, and assembling the actuators using dry vellum gaskets.

Problems with materials compatibility were encountered in pyrotechnically driven devices used in a number of ordnance applications requiring rapid mechanical actuation. A fine bridgewire is located in contact with the chemical pyrotechnic, and the charge is ignited by electrical heating of the bridgewire. Evidence of severe corrosion was revealed on examination of the nickel-chromium-iron alloy bridgewire and the nickel-iron alloy pins. Metallic elements in the pin or bridgewire and substantial amounts of chlorine were detected from the x-ray spectra. Morphological changes indicative of decomposition and dissolution were revealed to have occurred in regions of the pyrotechnic that had been in contact with the bridgewire and pin surfaces by examination of the titanium-potassium perchlorate (Ti-K-Cl-O4) pyrotechnic. Substantial amounts of water were revealed to be associated with the surfaces of the titanium particles in the pyrotechnic by nuclear magnetic resonance. It was proposed that the chlorine-containing residue combined with the water from the pyrotechnic to form a thin aqueous film corroding the bridgewire and pins. A new cleaning procedure was implemented for the glass headers to eliminate the chloride contamination and a vacuum drying procedure was instituted for the pyrotechnic.

A preflight inspection found a broken diaphragm from a side controller fabricated from 17-7 PH stainless steel in the RH 950 heat treatment condition. Failure occurred by cracking of the base of the flange-like diaphragm. The crack traveled 360 deg around the diaphragm. Scanning electron microscopy (SEM) revealed that the failure occurred by a brittle intergranular mechanism and stress-corrosion cracking (SCC), and indicated a failure mode of selective grain-boundary separation. The diaphragms were heat treated in batches of 25. An improper heat treatment could have resulted in the formation of grain boundary precipitates, including chromium carbides. It was concluded that failure of the diaphragm was due to a combination of sensitization caused by improper heat treatment and subsequent SCC. It was recommended that the remaining 24 sensor diaphragms from the affected batch be removed from service. In addition, a sample from each heat treat batch should be submitted to the Strauss test (ASTM A262, practice E) to determine susceptibility to intergranular corrosion. Also, it was recommended that a stress analysis be performed on the system to determine whether a different heat treatment (which would offer lower strength but higher toughness) could be used for this part.

Three wing flap hinge bearings were received by the laboratory for analysis. The bearings were fabricated from chromium-plated type 440C martensitic stainless steel. The intergranular fracture pattern seen in the electron fractographs, coupled with the corrosion pits observed on the inner diam of the bearings, strongly suggested that failure initiated by pitting and progressed by SCC or hydrogen embrittlement from the plating operation. It was recommended that the extent of the flap hinge bearing cracking problem be determined by using nondestructive inspection because it is possible to crack hardened type 440C during the chromium plating process. An inspection for pitting on the bearing inner diam was also recommended. It was suggested that electroless nickel be used as a coating for the entire bearing. A review of the chromium plating and baking sequence was recommended also to ensure that a source of hydrogen is not introduced during the plating operation.

Two clevis-head self-retaining bolts used in the throttle-control linkage of a naval aircraft failed on the aircraft assembly line. Specifications required the bolts to be heat treated to a hardness of 39 to 45 HRC, followed by cleaning, cadmium electroplating, and baking to minimize hydrogen embrittlement. The bolts broke at the junction of the head and shank. The nuts were, theoretically, installed fingertight. The failure was attributed to hydrogen embrittlement that had not been satisfactorily alleviated by subsequent baking. The presence of burrs on the threads prevented assembly to finger-tightness, and the consequent wrench torquing caused the actual fractures. The very small radius of the fillet between the bolt head and the shank undoubtedly accentuated the embrittling effect of the hydrogen. To prevent reoccurrence, the cleaning and cadmium-plating procedures were stipulated to be low-hydrogen in nature, and an adequate post plating baking treatment at 205 deg C (400 deg F), in conformity with ASTM B 242, was specified. A minimum radius for the head-to-shank fillet was specified at 0.25 mm (0.010 in.). All threads were required to be free of burrs. A 10-day sustained-load test was specified for a sample quantity of bolts from each lot.

In January 1965, a Reaction Control System (RCS) pressure vessel (titanium alloy Ti-6Al-4V) on an Apollo spacecraft cracked in six adjacent locations. It used N2O4 for vehicle attitude control through roll, pitch, and yaw engines, and was protected from the N2O4 by a Teflon positive expulsion bladder. Investigation (visual inspection, pressure testing of 10 similar vessels, and chemical testing of the N2O4) supported the conclusion that the failure was due to stress corrosion from the N2O4, and specifically from a specification change in the military specification MIL-P-26539. Recommendations included revising the specification to require a minimum NO content of 0.6%.

Pitostatic system connectors were being found cracked on several aircraft. Two of the cracked connectors made of 2024-T351 aluminum alloy were submitted for failure analysis. The connectors had cut pipelike threads that were sealed with Teflon-type tape when installed. Longitudinal cracks were located near the opening of the female ends of each connector. A cross section showed intergranular cracking with multiple branching in one connector. Scanning electron microscopy (SEM) showed intergranular cracking and separation of elongated grains. A cross section of connector threads showed an incomplete thread form resulting from improper tapping. It was concluded that the pitostatic system connectors failed by SCC. The stress was caused by forcing the improperly threaded female nut over its fully threaded male counterpart to effect a seal. The one connector tested for chemical composition was not made of 2024 aluminum alloy as reported but of 2017 aluminum. It was recommended that the pitostatic system connector manufacturing process be revised to produce full-depth threads rather than pseudo pipe threads. Wall thickness should be increased to increase the hoop stress bearing area if pipe threads were to be used. A determination of proper torque values for tightening the connectors was suggested also.

A throttle arm of an aircraft engine fractured and caused loss of engine control. The broken part consisted of a 6.4-mm (1/4-in.) diam medium-carbon steel rod with a thread to fit a knurled brass nut that was inserted into the throttle knob. The threaded rod had been welded to the throttle-linkage bar by an assembly-weld deposit made on the rod adjacent to the threaded portion. The fracture surface exhibited a coarse-grain brittle texture with an initiating crack at a thread root. The throttle-arm failed by brittle fracture because of the presence of cracks at the thread roots that were within the HAZ of the adjacent weld deposit. The heat of welding had generated a coarse-grain structure with a weak grain-boundary network of ferrite that had not been corrected by postweld heat treatment. The combination of the cracks and this unfavorable microstructure provided a weakened condition that resulted in catastrophic, brittle fracture under normal applied loads. The design was altered to eliminate the weld adjacent to the threaded portion of the rod.

A 17-4 PH steering actuator rod end body broke during normal take-off. Results of failure analysis revealed that the wall thickness of the race was much below the design limits, thus causing the race to rest on the body's swaged edges rather than on the load carrying centerline of the body. This assembly condition generated abnormal high loads on the swaged edges, ultimately resulting in fatigue failure. To prevent a recurrence of similar failure in the future, the dimensions of the race in the spherical bearing were changed, no further failure occurred.

Two investment-cast A356 aluminum alloy actuators used for handles on passenger doors of commercial aircraft fractured during torquing at less than the design load. Visual examination showed that cracking had occurred through a machined side hole. Fractography revealed that the cracks originated in hot tear locations in the castings. Microprobe analysis of fracture surfaces in the hot tear region indicated a much higher silicon-to-aluminum ratio compared with the overload fracture area. No microstructural anomalies related to the failure were found during metallographic examination. It was concluded that the strength of the castings had been compromised by the presence of the casting defects. Modification of the gating system for casting was recommended to eliminate the hot tear zone. It was also suggested that the balance of the castings from the same manufacturing lot be radiographically inspected.