A failure analysis investigation was conducted on a fractured aluminum tailwheel fork which failed moments after the landing of a privately owned, 1955 twin-engine airplane. Nondestructive evaluation via dye-penetrant inspection revealed no discernible surface cracks. The chemical composition of the sand-cast component was identified via optical emission spectroscopy and is comparable to an aluminum sand-cast alloy, AA 712.0. Metallographic evaluation via optical microscopy and scanning electron microscopy revealed a high degree of porosity in the microstructure as well as the presence of deleterious intermetallic compounds within interdendritic regions. Macrohardness testing produced hardness values which are noticeably higher than standard hardness values for 712.0. The primary fracture surfaces indicate evidence of mixed-mode fracture, via intergranular cracking, cleaved intermetallic particles, and dimpled cellular regions in the matrix. The secondary fracture surface demonstrates similar features of intergranular fracture.

Brittle intergranular fracture, typical of a hydrogen-induced delayed failure, caused the failure of an AISI 4340 Cr-Mo-Ni landing gear beam. Corrosion resulting from protective coating damage released nascent hydrogen, which diffused into the steel under the influence of sustained tensile stresses. A second factor was a cluster of non-metallic inclusions which had ‘tributary’ cracks starting from them. Also, eyebolts broke when used to lift a light aircraft (about 7000 lb.). The bolt failure was a brittle intergranular fracture, very likely due to a hydrogen-induced delayed failure mechanism. As for the factors involved, cadmium plating, acid pickling, and steelmaking processes introduce hydrogen on part surfaces. As a second contributing factor, both bolts were 10 Rc points higher in hardness than specified (25 Rc), lessening ductility and notch toughness. A third factor was inadequate procedure, which resulted in bending moments being applied to the bolt threads.

The truck beam of the left main landing gear (MGL) of a Boeing 707 airplane collapsed on the ground just after the aircraft was unloaded and refueled. The investigation revealed that failure was caused by the propagation of an intergranular crack originating from the bottom of the pit. The crack reached the critical size and caused failure by stress-corrosion cracking (SCC) under static loading conditions in service. The failed beam was protected by a well adhering paint system. However, the presence of adequate amounts of corrosion preventive compound films (CPC) on the surfaces of the failed beam could not be conclusively established because of the long term service exposure and presence of lubricants.

The failures of two aircraft components, one from a landing gear and the other from an ejector rack mechanism, were investigated. Both were made from PH 13-8 Mo (UNS S13800) precipitation-hardening stainless steel which had been heat treated to the H1000 and H950 tempers respectively and then chromium plated. The parts were characterized metallographically and mechanically and were found to be compliant. Detailed fractographic examination revealed that the first stage of both failures was similar: subsurface initiation of numerous cracks with a wide range of orientations and cleavage like features. The cracking was followed by fatigue in one case and catastrophic failure in the other. Hydrogen embrittlement was identified as the most likely mechanism of failure.

A flat spring for the main landing gear of a light aircraft failed after safe execution of a hard landing. The spring material was identified by chemical analysis to be 6150 steel. The fracture was found to have occurred near the end of the spring that was inserted through a support member about 25 mm thick and attached to the fuselage by a single bolt. Brinelling (plastic flow and indentation due to excessive localized contact pressure) was observed on the upper surface of the spring where the forward and rear edges of the spring contacted the support member. It was indicated by chevron marks that brittle fracture had started beneath the brinelled area at the forward edge of the upper surface of the spring. The origin of the brittle fracture was found to be a small fatigue crack that had been present for a considerable period of time before final fracture occurred. Fracture of the landing-gear spring was concluded to have been caused by a fatigue crack that resulted from excessive brinelling at the support point. Regular visual examinations to detect evidence of brinelling and wear at the support in aircraft with this configuration of landing-gear spring were recommended.

Examination of a cracked nose landing gear cylinder made of AISI 4340 Cr-Mo-Ni alloy steel proved that the part started to fail on the inside diam. When the nucleus of the stress-corrosion crack was studied in detail, iron oxide was found on the fracture surface. A 6500x micrograph revealed this area also displayed an intergranular texture. One of a group of small grinding cracks on the ID of the cylinder nucleated the failure. Other evidence indicated the cracks developed when the cylinder was ground during overhaul.

The US Army Research Laboratory performed a failure investigation on a broken main landing gear mount from an AH-64 Apache attack helicopter. A component had failed in flight, and initially prevented the helicopter from safely landing. In order to avoid a catastrophe, the pilot had to perform a low hover maneuver to the maintenance facility, where ground crews assembled concrete blocks at the appropriate height to allow the aircraft to safely touch down. The failed part was fabricated from maraging 300 grade steel (2,068 MPa [300 ksi] ultimate tensile strength), and was subjected to visual inspection/light optical microscopy, metallography, electron microscopy, energy dispersive spectroscopy, chemical analysis, and mechanical testing. It was observed that the vacuum cadmium coating adjacent to the fracture plane had worn off and corroded in service, thus allowing pitting corrosion to occur. The failure was hydrogen-assisted and was attributed to stress corrosion cracking (SCC) and/or corrosion fatigue (CF). Contributing to the failure was the fact that the material grain size was approximately double the required size, most likely caused from higher than nominal temperatures during thermal treatment. These large grains offered less resistance to fatigue and SCC. In addition, evidence of titanium-carbo-nitrides was detected at the grain boundaries of this material that was prohibited according to the governing specification. This phase is formed at higher thermal treatment temperatures (consistent with the large grains) and tends to embrittle the alloy. It is possible that this phase may have contributed to the intergranular attack. Recommendations were offered with respect to the use of a dry film lubricant over the cadmium coated region, and the possibility of choosing an alternative material with a lower notch sensitivity. In addition, the temperature at which this alloy is treated must be monitored to prevent coarse grain growth. As a result of this investigation and in an effort to eliminate future failures, ARL assisted in developing a cadmium brush plating procedure, and qualified two Army maintenance facilities for field repair of these components.

Ground maintenance personnel discovered hydraulic fluid leaking from two small cracks in a main landing gear cylinder made from AISI 4340 Cr-Mo-Ni alloy steel. Failure of the part had initiated on the ID of the cylinder. Numerous cracks were found under the chromium plate. A 6500x electron fractograph showed cracking was predominantly intergranular with hairline indications. Leaking had occurred only 43 h after overhaul of the part. Total service time on the part was 9488 h. It was concluded that cracking on the ID was caused by hydrogen embrittlement which occurred during or after overhaul. The specific source of hydrogen which produced failure was not ascertainable.

The jackscrew drive pins on a landing-gear bogie failed when the other bogie on the same side of the airplane was kneeled for tire change. The pins, made of 300M steel, were shot peened and chromium plated on the outside surface and were cadmium plated and painted with polyurethane on the inside surface. The top of the jackscrew was 6150 steel. Both ends of the pins were revealed to be dented where the jackscrew had pressed into them and were observed to have been resulted due to overdriving the jackscrew at the end of an unkneeling cycle. These dented areas were found to be heavily corroded with chromium plating missing. A heavily corroded intergranular fracture mode was revealed by chromium-carbon replicas of the areas of fracture origin. Deep corrosion pits adjacent to the fracture origins and directly beneath cracks in the chromium plate were revealed by metallographic examination. It was concluded that stress-corrosion cracks grew out from the rust pits. The pin material was changed from 300M steel to PH 13-8 Mo stainless steel, which is highly resistant to rusting and SCC and the jacking control system was modified to prevent overdriving.

A nose landing gear cylinder made from AISI 4340 Ni-Cr-Mo alloy steel was found cracked and leaking, causing partial depressurization. Investigation revealed the crack to be a stress-corrosion type, judging by the 6500x electron fractograph. It had started in a region of concentrated, large non-metallic inclusions near the chromium-plated ID of the cylinder. Also, there were breaks in the chromium plate and pits in the underlying base metal. The cylinder had been in service for 18,017 h, and 5948 h had passed since the first and only overhaul. Substandard plating of the ID at this time ultimately resulted in pitting of the metal. The combination of surface pitting and stress concentration at the nearby inclusions resulted in stress-corrosion cracking.

A commercial aircraft wheel half, machined from an aluminum alloy 2014 forging that had been heat treated to the T6 temper, was removed from service because a crack was discovered in the area of the grease-dam radius during a routine inspection. Neither the total number of landings nor the roll mileage was reported, but about 300 days had elapsed between the date of manufacture and the date the wheel was removed from service. The analysis (visual inspection, macrographs, micrographs, electron microprobe) supported the conclusions that the wheel half failed by fatigue. The fatigue crack originated at a material imperfection and progressed in more than one plane because changes in the direction of wheel rotation altered the direction of the applied stresses. Recommendations included rewriting the inspection specifications to require sound forgings.

The torque-arm assembly (aluminum alloy 7075-T73) for an aircraft nose landing gear failed after 22,779 simulated flights. The part, made from an aluminum alloy 7075-T73 forging, had an expected life of 100,000 simulated flights. Initial study of the fracture surfaces indicated that the primary fracture initiated from multiple origins on both sides of a lubrication hole that extended from the outer surface to the bore of a lug in two cadmium-plated flanged bushings made of copper alloy C63000 (aluminum bronze) that were press-fitted into each bored hole in the lug. Sectioning and 2x metallographic analysis showed small fatigue-type cracks in the hole adjacent to the origin of primary fracture. Hardness and electrical conductivity were typical for aluminum alloy 7075. This evidence supported the conclusion that the arm failed in fatigue cracking that initiated on each side of the lubrication hole since no material defects were found at the failure origin. Recommendations included redesign of the lubrication hole, shot peeing of the faces of the lug for added resistance to fatigue failure, and changing of the forging material to aluminum alloy 7175-T736 for its higher mechanical properties.

Two outboard main-wheel halves (aluminum alloy 2014-T6 forged) from a commercial aircraft were removed from service because of failure. One wheel half was in service for 54 days and had made 130 landings (about 1046 roll km, or 650 roll mi) when crack indications were discovered during eddy-current testing. The flange on the second wheel half failed after only 31 landings, when about 46 cm (18 in.) of the flange broke off as the aircraft was taxiing. Stains on the fracture surfaces were used to determine when cracking was initiated. The analysis (visual inspection, liquid penetrant inspection, and micrographs with deep etching in aqueous 20% sodium hydroxide) supported the conclusion that failure on both wheel halves was by fatigue caused by a forging defect resulting from abnormal transverse grain flow. The crack in the first wheel half occurred during service, and the surfaces became oxidized. Because the fracture surface of the second wheel half had chromic acid stains, it was obvious that the forging defect was open to the surface during anodizing. No recommendations were made except to notify the manufacturer.

Examination of a 7075-T6 aluminum alloy pylon strut revealed cracks in two locations on the ears of the strut. Because the part was still intact, the cracks had to be forced open so that the fractures could be examined. Scanning electron microscopy (SEM) of the opened cracks showed that the crack surfaces were covered with a mud crack pattern suggestive of stress-corrosion cracking (SCC). The T6 temper is susceptible to SCC. It was concluded that cracking of the strut could have been aggravated by the hard landing experienced by the aircraft. The strut, however, contained stress-corrosion cracks which were present before the landing. It was recommended that an inspection for SCC be made of all pylon struts with a similar service life.

The flange on an outboard main-wheel half (aluminum alloy 2014-T6 forging) on a commercial aircraft fractured during takeoff. The failure was discovered later during a routine enroute check. The flange section that broke away was recovered at the airfield from which the plane took off and was thus available for examination. Failure occurred after 37 landings (about 298 roll km, or 185 roll miles). Examination of the fracture surfaces revealed that a forging defect was present in the wall of the wheel half. The anodized coating showed distinct twin-parallel and end-grain patterns between which the fracture occurred. The periphery of the defect was the site of several small fatigue cracks that eventually progressed through the remaining wall. Rapid fatigue then progressed circumferentially. Metallographic examination using Keller's reagent showed that the microstructure was normal for aluminum alloy 2014-T6 and the hardness surpassed the minimum hardness required for aluminum alloy 2014-T6. An abrupt change in the direction of grain flow across the fracture plane indicated that the wall had buckled during forging. This evidence supported the conclusion that the wheel half failed in the flange by fatigue as the result of a rather large subsurface forging defect. No recommendations were made.

Initial investigation showed that a landing gear failure was the result of a hard landing with no evidence of contributory factors. The objective of reexamination was to determine whether there was any evidence of metallurgical failure. The landing gear was primarily an AISI type 6150 Cr-V steel flat spring attached at the top end to the fuselage and at the bottom end to the axle. Failure occurred at the clamping point near the top end of this spring. The failure showed evidence of severe brinelling at one corner in the clamping area. The fracture surfaces were clean, fresh, and indicative of a shock type of failure pattern. Closer examination, however, showed a fatigue crack at one corner. At this point, there was definite evidence of progression and oxidation. It was concluded that the corner in question was subjected to repeated brinelling resulting from normal landing loads, probably accentuated by looseness in the clamping device. The resulting residual tensile stress lowered the effective fatigue strength at that point against drag and side loads.

Service failures have occurred in a number of aircraft parts made of quenched and tempered steel heat treated to ultimate tensile strengths of 260,000 to 280,000 psi. Some of these failures have been attributed to “delayed cracking” as a result of hydrogen embrittlement or to stress-corrosion. Because of the serious nature of the failures and because the mechanism of the fracture initiation is not well understood, unusually complete laboratory investigations have been conducted. Three of these investigations are reviewed to illustrate the methods used in studying failures in aircraft parts. The results of the laboratory studies indicate that unusual care is necessary in the processing and fabrication of ultra-high-strength steel and in the design and maintenance of the structures in which it is used.

Four nose wheels fabricated from 2014-T6 aluminum alloy and cold worked at the flange were examined. Visual examination showed that the failure started in the tube well area on the wheel with serial number 31. The failure initiated in the flange fillet on wheels with serial numbers 67, 217, and 250. Scanning electron microscopy (SEM) examination of the fractures showed that failure initiated by SCC or a corrosion pit on all failures examined. The failures then progressed by fatigue. Dye penetrant testing revealed no additional flaws on the wheels that had failed in the flange area. There was, however, one flaw area in the flange of the wheel that failed in the tube well. This flaw resembled a corrosion pit. It was concluded that failure of nose wheels 67, 217, and 250 was caused by cracking due to SCC or pitting. The failures progressed by fatigue. Because failure occurred in the same general area on all three wheels, these locations are suspect as being underdesigned. It was recommended that the nose wheel be redesigned and additional service data be accumulated to understand the contributing factors that resulted in wheel failure.

One main undercarriage axle made of high strength alloy steel was subjected to simulated fatigue test for 6000 h of service. After only 300 h it broke in two along the sharp radius. The fracture revealed a coarse, irregular, and brittle surface before final fracture by thick angular shear lip zone. The presence of micropores in the cleavage facets as well as at the grain boundaries and hairline type crack indications under SEM examination were all suggestive of hydrogen embrittlement. On the basis of investigation results and observations, it was concluded that the transverse breakage of the axle had occurred intergranularly in a brittle manner, possibly, initiated by a shallow zone of fatigue along the sharp radius acting as stress riser.

Despite extensive aircraft landing gear design analyses and tests performed by designers and manufacturers, and the large number of trouble-free landings, aircraft users have experienced problems with and failures of landing gear components. Different data banks and over 200 failure analysis reports were surveyed to provide an overview of structural landing gear component failures as experienced by the Canadian Forces over the last 20 years on more than 20 aircraft types, and to assess trends in failure mechanisms and causes. Case histories were selected to illustrate typical problems, troublesome failure mechanisms, the role of high strength aluminum alloys and steels, and situations where fracture mechanics analyses provided insight into the failures. The two main failure mechanisms were: fatigue occurring mainly in steel components, and corrosion related problems with aluminum alloys. Very few overload failures were noted. A number of causes were identified: design deficiencies and manufacturing defects leading mainly to fatigue failures, and poor materials selection and improper maintenance as the principal causes of corrosion-related failures. The survey showed that a proper understanding of the failure mechanisms and causes, by thorough failure analysis, provides valuable feedback information to designers, operators and maintenance personnel for appropriate corrective actions to be taken.