A 3.8-cm diam 6 x 37 rope of improved plow steel wire failed in service during dumping of a ladle of hot slag. A heavy blue oxide extending 0.6 to 0.9 m back from each side of the break was revealed on examination of the rope. Tensile fractures were shown by the broken ends of the rope. Recrystallization of the steel was revealed during microscopic examination of the wires adjacent to the break which indicated that the wires had been heated in excess of 700 deg C (1292 deg F). The tensile strength of the wires in the rope that broke was 896 MPa whereas the specification required it to be 1724 MPa. Thus, a 50% loss in tensile strength of the wires was caused by overheating which lead to failure of the rope. It was recommended that prolonged exposure of wire ropes to extreme conditions should be avoided.

The 16 mm diam 6 x 37 fiber-core improved plow steel wire rope on a scrapyard crane failed after two weeks of service under normal loading conditions. This type of rope was made of 0.71 to 0.75% carbon steel wires and a tensile strength of 1696 to 1917 MPa. The rope broke when it was attached to a chain for pulling jammed scrap from the baler. The rope was heavily abraded and several of the individual wires were broken. a uniform cold-drawn microstructure, with patches of untempered martensite in regions of severe abrasion and crown wear was revealed by metallographic examination. As a result of abrasion, a hard layer of martensite was formed on the wire. The wire was made susceptible to fatigue cracking, while bending around the sheave, by this brittle surface layer. The carbon content and tensile strength of the wire was found lower than specifications. As a corrective measure, this wire rope was substituted by the more abrasion resistant 6 x 19 rope.

Two oil-pump gears broke after four months of service in a gas compressor that operated at 1000 rpm and provided a discharge pressure of 7240 kPa (1050 psi). The compressor ran intermittently with sudden starts and stops. The large gear was sand cast from class 40 gray iron with a tensile strength of 290 MPa (42 ksi) at 207 HRB. The smaller gear was sand cast from ASTM A536, grade 100-70-03, ductile iron with a tensile strength of 696 MPa (101 ksi) at 241 HRB. Analysis (metallographic examination) supported the conclusion that excessive beam loading and a lack of ductility in the gray iron gear teeth were the primary causes of fracture. During subsequent rotation, fragments of gray iron damaged the mating ductile iron gear. Recommendations included replacing the large gear material with ASTM A536, grade 100-70-03, ductile iron normalized at 925 deg C (1700 deg F), air cooled, reheated to 870 deg C (1600 deg F), and oil quenched. The larger gear should be tempered to 200 to 240 HRB, and the smaller gear to 240 to 280 HRB.

A drive-line assembly failed during vehicle testing. The vehicle had traveled 9022 km (5606 mi) before the failure occurred. Both the intact and fractured parts of the assembly were analyzed to determine the cause and sequence of failure. Visual examination of the assembly showed three of four bearing caps, two cap screws, and one universal-joint spider had fractured. Examination of the three fractured bearing caps and the spider showed no evidence of fatigue but showed that fracture occurred in a brittle manner. The bearing cap that was not destroyed still contained portions of the two fractured cap screws. It was found that the two cap screws failed in fatigue under service stresses. The three bearing caps and the universal-joint spider broke in a brittle manner. The properties of the material in the cap screws did not fulfill the specifications. The modified 1035 steel was of insufficient alloy content. Also, the tensile strength and endurance limit were lower than specified and were inadequate for the application. The material for the cap screw was changed from modified 1035 steel to 5140 steel.

A sand-cast steel eye connector used to link together two 54,430 kg capacity floating-bridge pontoons failed prematurely in service. The pontoons were coupled by upper and lower eye and clevis connectors that were pinned together. The eye connector was found to be cast from low-alloy steel conforming to ASTM A 148, grade 150-125. The crack was found to have originated along the lower surface initially penetrating a region of shrinkage porosity. It was observed that cracking then propagated in tension through sound metal and terminated in a shear lip at the top of the eye. The fracture of the eye connector was concluded to have occurred by tensile overload because of shrinkage porosity. Sound metal was ensured by radiographic examination of subsequent castings.

Arms bolted to powerline towers were falling off two weeks after installation. Metallurgical and chemical analysis performed on the base metal, weld zone, and heat-affected zone showed acceptable quality material. Residual stress appeared to be responsible for the high failure rate. The sources of residual stress included welding, environment, and assembly operation.

The fracture cause had to be determined in a three-cylinder crankshaft made of chrome steel 34Cr4 (Material No. 1.7033) according to DIN 17200. The fracture occurred after only 150 h of operation. The fracture was of the bend fatigue type which originated in the fillet of the main bearing and ran across the jaw almost to the opposite fillet of the adjoining connecting rod bearing. The fillet was well rounded and smoothly machined. Thus, no reason for the fracture of the crankshaft could be found externally. No material defects were discernible in the origin or anywhere else. No cause for the crank fracture could be established from material testing. Probably the load was too high for the strength of the crank. Tensile strength could have been increased for the same material by tempering at lower temperature. Additionally, the resistance against high bend fatigue stresses or torsion fatigue stresses could have been increased substantially by including the fillet in the case hardening process.

A missile detached from a Navy fighter jet during a routine landing on an aircraft carrier deck because of a faulty missile launcher detent spring. Visual inspection of Inconel 718 detent spring assembly revealed that four of the nine spring leafs comprising the assembly were plastically deformed while two of the deformed leafs did not meet minimal hardness or tensile requirements. Liquid penetrant testing revealed no cracks or other surface discontinuities on the leaf springs. Material sectioned from the soft spring leafs was heat-treated according to specifications in the laboratory. The resultant increase in mechanical properties of the re-heat-treated material indicated that the original heat treatment was not performed correctly. The failure was attributed to improper heat treatment. Recommendations focused on more stringent quality control of the heat-treat operations.