The connecting end of two forged medium-carbon steel rods used in an application in which they were subjected to severe low-frequency loading failed in service. The fractures extended completely through the connecting end. The surface hardness of the rods was found to be lower than specifications. The fractures were revealed to be in areas of the transition regions that had been rough ground to remove flash along the parting line. The presence of beach marks, indicating fatigue failure, was revealed by examination. The fracture origin was confirmed by the location and curvature of beach marks to be the rough ground surface. An incipient crack 9.5 mm along with several other cracks on one of the fractured rods was revealed by liquid penetration examination. Metallographic examination of the fractured rods indicated a banded structure consisting of zones of ferrite and pearlite. It was established that the incipient cracks found in liquid-penetrant inspection had originated at the surface in the banded region, in areas of ferrite where this constituent had been visibly deformed by grinding. Closer control on the microstructure, hardness of the forgings and smooth finish in critical area was recommended.

Several thousands of new 16 mm diam alloy steel sling chains used for handling billets failed by chain-link fractures. No failures were found to have occurred before delivery of the new chains. It was observed that the links had broken at the weld. It was found that all failures had occurred in links having hardness values in the range of 375 to 444 HRB. It was revealed by the supplier that the previous hardness level of 302 to 375 HRB was increased to minimize wear which made the links were made notch sensitive and resulted in fractures that initiated at the butt-weld flash on the inside surfaces of the links. A further reduction in ductility was believed to have been caused by lower temperatures during winter months. Thus, the failure was concluded to have been caused in a brittle manner caused by the notch sensitivity of the high hardness material at lower temperatures. The chains were retempered to a hardness of 302 to 375 HRB as a corrective measure and subsequently ordered chains had this hardness as a requirement.

A combination of adverse factors was present in the disruption of a turbo-alternator gearbox. The major cause was the imposition of a gross overload far in excess of that for which the gearbox was designed. The contributory factors were a rim material (EN9 steel) that was inherently notch-sensitive and liable to rupture in a brittle manner. Discontinuities were present in the rims formed by the drain holes drilled in their abutting faces, and possibly enhanced by the stress-raising effect of microcracks in the smeared metal at their surfaces It is probable that the load reached a value in excess of the yield point within the delay time of the material so when the fracture was initiated, it was preceded by several microcracks giving rise to the propagation of a brittle fracture.

A reversible four-way carbon steel flap valve in a thermal power station failed after 7 years of service. The flap had been fabricated by welding two carbon steel plates to both sides of a carbon steel forging. The valve was used for reversing the flow direction of seawater in the cooling system of a condenser. Visual examination of the flap showed crystalline fracture, indicating a brittle failure. Metallographic examination, chemical analyses, and tensile and impact testing indicated that the failure was caused by the notch sensitivity of the forging material, which resulted in low toughness. It was recommended that fully killed carbon steel with a fine-grain microstructure be used. Redesign of the flap to remove the step in the forging that acted as a notch was also recommended.

A forged, cadmium-plated electroslag remelt (ESR) 4340 steel mixer pivot support of the rotor support assembly located on an Army attack helicopter was found to be broken in two pieces during an inspection. Visual inspection of the failed part revealed significant wear on surfaces that contacted the bushing and areas at the machined radius where the cadmium coating had been damaged, which allowed corrosion pitting to occur. Optical microscopy showed that the crack origin was located at the machined radius within a region that was severely pitted. Electron microscopy revealed that most of the fracture surface failed in an intergranular fashion. Energy dispersive spectroscopy determined that deposits of sand, corrosion and salts were found within the pits. The failure started by hydrogen charging as a result of corrosion, and was aggravated by the stress concentration effects of pitting at the radius and the high notch sensitivity of the material. The failure mechanism was hydrogen-assisted and was most likely a combination of stress-corrosion cracking and corrosion fatigue. Recommendations were to improve the inspection criteria of the component in service and the material used in fabrication.

The repeated failure of a welded ASTM A283 grade D pipe that was part of a 6 km (4 mi) line drawing and conducting river water to a water treatment plant was investigated. Failure analysis was conducted on sections of pipe from the third failure. Visual, macrofractographic, SEM fractographic, metallographic, chemical, and mechanical property (tension and impact toughness) analyses were conducted. On the basis of the tests and observations, it was concluded that the failure was the combined result of poor notch toughness (impact) properties of the steel, high stresses in the joint area, a possible stress raiser at the intersection of the spiral weld and girth weld, and sudden impact loading, probably due to water hammer. Use of a semi- or fully killed steel with a minimum Charpy V-notch impact value of 20 J (15 ft·lbf) at 0 deg C (32 deg F) was recommended for future water lines. Certified test results from the steel mill, procedure qualification tests of the welding, and design changes to reduce water hammer were also recommended.

Several wires in aluminum conductor cables fractured within 5 to 8 years of, service in Alaskan tundra. The cables were comprised of 19-wire strands; the wires were aluminum alloy 6201-T81. Visual and metallographic examinations of the cold-upset pressure weld joints in the wires established that the fractures were caused by fatigue loading attributable to wind/thermal factors at the joints. The grain flow at the joints was transverse to the wire axis, rendering the notches of the joints sensitive to fatigue loading. An additional contributory factor was intergranular corrosion, which assisted fatigue crack initiation/propagation. The failure was attributed to the departure of conductor quality from the requirements of ASTM B 398 and B 399, which specify that “no joints shall be made during final drawing or in the finished wire” and that the joints should not be closer than 15 m (50 ft). The failed cable did not meet either criterion. It was recommended that the replacement cable be inspected for strict compliance to ASTM requirements.