This article introduces some of the general sources of heat treating problems with particular emphasis on problems caused by the actual heat treating process and the significant thermal and transformation stresses within a heat treated part. It addresses the design and material factors that cause a part to fail during heat treatment. The article discusses the problems associated with heating and furnaces, quenching media, quenching stresses, hardenability, tempering, carburizing, carbonitriding, and nitriding as well as potential stainless steel problems and problems associated with nonferrous heat treatments. The processes involved in cold working of certain ferrous and nonferrous alloys are also covered.

Component slippage in the left-side final drive train of a tracked military vehicle was detected after the vehicle had been driven 13,700 km (8500 miles) in combined highway and rough-terrain service. The slipping was traced to the mating surfaces of the final drive gear and the adjacent splined coupling sleeve. Specifications included that the gear and coupling be made from 4140 steel bar oil quenched and tempered to a hardness of 265 to 290 HB (equivalent to 27 to 31 HRC) and that the finish-machined parts be single-stage gas nitrided to produce a total case depth of 0.5 mm (0.020 in.) and a minimum surface hardness equivalent to 58 HRC. Investigation (visual inspection, low-magnification images, 500X images of polished sections etched in 2% nital, spectrographic analysis, and hardness testing) supported the conclusion that the failure occurred by crushing, or cracking, of the case as a result of several factors. Recommendations included reducing the high local stresses at the pitch line to an acceptable level with a design modification. Also suggested was specification of a core hardness of 35 to 40 HRC to provide adequate support for the case and to permit attainment of the specified surface hardness of 58 HRC.

A tool used to stretch reinforcement wires in prestressed concrete failed. All eight individual jaws were broken. Visual examination of the fracture surfaces indicated that about half of the broken parts had a partially dendritic appearance. Further, fracture surfaces near the exteriors of the parts were clean and smooth, and there was evidence of a case. Examination of the flat surfaces of the parts revealed surface cracking where actual failure had not occurred. Chemical analysis showed the material to be a low-alloy carburizing steel. The microstructure was compatible with a steel which is cast, carburized, quenched, and tempered. The structure was generally satisfactory, except for the presence of severe shrinkage porosity. It was concluded that the presence of shrinkage porosity in critical areas was the primary cause of fracture. Extremely high hardness indicating a lack of adequate tempering was the secondary cause.

A bolt breaks along a change in cross section well below its rated capacity. An anchoring screw spins freely in place, having snapped at its first supporting thread. A motor unexpectedly disengages its load, its driveshaft having fractured near a keyway. Such failures – involving axles, leaf springs, engine rods, wing struts, bearings, gears, and more – can occur, seemingly without cause, due to vibrational fracture. Vibrational fractures begin as cracks that form under cyclic loading at nominal stresses which may be considerably lower than the yield point of the material. The fracture is proceeded by local gliding and the development of cracks along lattice planes favorably orientated with respect to the principal stress. This non-reversible process is often misleadingly called “fatigue” and presents significant challenges to engineering teams that ill-advisedly take to searching for material faults. Several examples of notch-induced vibrational fractures are presented along with guidelines for investigating their cause.

Three radiant tubes, made of three different high-temperature alloys, were removed from a carburizing furnace after approximately eight months of service when they showed evidence of failure by collapsing (telescoping) in a region 30 cm (12 in.) from the tube bottoms in the vicinity of the burners. The tubes had an original wall thickness of 3.0 mm (0.120 in.) and were made of three different alloys: the first was Hastelloy X; the second alloy was RA 333, a wrought nickel-base heat-resistant alloy; and the third was experimental alloy 634, which contained 72% Ni, 4% Cr, and 3.5% Si. The three radiant tubes had been operated at a temperature of about 1040 deg C (1900 deg F) to maintain furnace temperatures of 900 to 925 deg C (1650 to 1700 deg F). Analysis (visual inspection and micrographic examination) supported the conclusion that all three tubes failed by corrosion. Recommendations included replacing the material with an alloy, such as RA 333, with a higher chromium content and with an additional element, like silicon, resistant to carburization-oxidation.

High-chromium steel pipes 42.25 x 3.25 mm from a blast furnace gas fired recuperator for the preheating of air were heavily oxidized and perforated in places. It was found that the blast furnace gas had a high sulfur content. Both the carburization and the formation of sulfide proved that in addition, from time to time at least, combustion was incomplete and the operation was carried out in a reducing atmosphere, with the result that oxygen deficiency prevented the formation or maintenance of a protective surface layer on the external surface of the pipes. The sulfur would probably not have damaged the nickel-free steel used here at the given temperatures if it had been present as sulfur dioxide in an oxidizing atmosphere. The damage was therefore caused primarily by an incorrectly conducted combustion process.

Severely reduced wall thickness was encountered at the liquid line of a lead-bath pan that was used in a continuous strip or wire oil-tempering unit. Replacement of the pan was necessary after six months of service. The pan, 6.9 m (22.5 ft) long, 0.6 m (2 ft) wide, and 38 cm (15 in.) deep with a 2.5-cm (1-in.) wall thickness, was a type 309 stainless steel weldment. Operating temperatures of the lead bath in the pan ranged from 805 deg C (1480 deg F) at the entry end to 845 deg C (1550 deg F) at the exit end. Analysis (visual inspection. metallographic analysis, moisture testing, and etched micrographs using Murakami's reagent) supported the conclusions that thinning of the pan walls at the surface of the molten lead resulted from using coke of high moisture content and from the low fluctuating coke level. Recommendations included reducing the supply of oxygen attacking the grain boundaries and the hydrogen that readily promoted decarburization with the use of dry (2 to 3% moisture content) coke. Maintaining a thick layer of coke over the entire surface of molten lead in the pan would exclude atmospheric oxygen from the grain boundaries.

Evidence of destructive pitting on the gear teeth (AMS 6263 steel) in the area of the pitchline was exhibited by an idler gear for the generator drive of an aircraft engine following test-stand engine testing. The case hardness was investigated to be lower than specified and it was suggested that it had resulted from surface defects. A decarburized surface layer and subsurface oxidation in the vicinity of pitting were revealed by metallographic examination of the 2% nital etched gear tooth sample. It was concluded that pitting had resulted as a combination of both the defects. The causes for the defects were reported based on previous investigation of heat treatment facilities. Oxide layer was caused by inadequate purging of air before carburization while decarburization was attributed to defects in the copper plating applied to the gear for its protection during austenitizing in an exothermic atmosphere. It was recommended that steps be taken during heat treatment to ensure neither of the two occurred.

A lever (machined from a casting made of AISI type 410 stainless steel, then surface hardened by nitriding) that was a component of the main fuel-control linkage of an aircraft engine fractured in flight after a service life of less than 50 h. Investigation (radiographic inspection) supported the conclusions that the lever broke at a cold shut extending through approximately 95% of the cross section. The normally applied load constituted an overload of the remainder of the lever. Recommendations included adding magnetic-particle inspection to the inspection procedures for this cast lever.

Failure of a case hardened steel shaft incorporated fuel pump in a turbine-powered aircraft resulted in damage to the aircraft. The disassembled pump was found to be dry and free of any contamination. Damage was exhibited on the pressure side of each spline tooth in the impeller and the relatively smooth cavities and undercutting of the flank on this side indicated that the damage was caused by an erosion or abrasion mechanism. A relatively smooth worn area was formed at the center of each tooth due to an abrasive action and an undulating outline with undercutting was observed on the damaged side. Particles of sand, paint, or plastic, fibers from the cartridge, brass, and steel were viewed in the brown residue on the filter cartridge under a low power microscope and later confirmed by chemical analysis. Large amount of iron was identified by application of a magnet. It was concluded that the combined effect of vibration and abrasive wear by sand and metal particles removed from the splines damaged the shaft. Case hardened spline teeth surface was recommended to increase resistance to wear and abrasion.

This report covers case histories of failures in fixed-wing light aeroplane and helicopter components. A crankshaft of AISI 4340 Ni-Cr-Mo alloy steel, heat treated and nitrided all over, failed in bending fatigue. The nitrided layer was ground too rapidly causing excessive heat generation which induced grinding cracks and grinding burn. Tensional stresses resulting from grinding developed in a thin surface layer. On another crankshaft, chromium plating introduced undesirable residual tensile stresses. Such plating is an unsatisfactory finish for crankshafts of aircraft engines. Aircraft engine manufacturers and aeronautical standards require magnetic particle inspection to detect grinding cracks after reconditioning. Renitriding after any grinding is needed also, regardless of the amount of undersize as it introduces beneficial residual compressive stresses.

Aircraft missile launcher attachment bolts fabricated from cadmium-coated Hy-tuf steel were found broken. Subsequent analysis of the broken bolts indicated three causes of failure. First, the bolts had been carburized, which was not in conformance with the heat treating requirements. Second, macroetching showed that the bolts has been machined from stock rather than forged, and the threads cut rather than rolled. It was also determined that hydrogen-assisted stress-corrosion cracking also played a part in the failure of the high-strength bolts.

Decarburization of steel may occur as skin decarburization by gases either wet or containing oxygen, and as a deep ongoing destruction of the material by hydrogen under high pressure. Guidelines are given for recognizing decarburization and determining at what point cracks occurred. How decarburization changes workpiece properties and the case of hydrogen decarburization are addressed through examples.

The self-powered flux detectors used in some nuclear reactors are Pt or V-cored co-axial cables with MgO as an insulator and Inconel 600 as the outer sheath material. The detectors are designed to operate in a He atmosphere; to maximize the conduction of heat (generated from the interaction with gamma radiation) and to prevent corrosion. A number of failures have occurred over the years because of a loss of the He cover gas in the assembly. This has resulted in either acid attack on the Inconel 600 sheath in a wet environment or gaseous corrosion in a dry environment. In the latter case, nitriding and embrittlement occurred at temperatures as low as 300 to 400 deg C (determined from an examination of the oxidation of the Zircaloy-2 carrier rod on which the detectors were mounted). Recent results are described and discussed in terms of the oxidation and nitriding kinetics of Zircaloy-2 and Inconel 600, respectively.

A crankshaft was overloaded on a test stand and suffered an incipient crack in the crank pin. The crack run generally parallel to the longitudinal axis and branched off at the entrance into the two fillets at the transition to the crank arm. It consisted of many small cracks, all of which propagated at an angle of approximately 45 deg to the longitudinal axis, and therefore were caused by torsion stresses. Neither macroscopic nor microscopic examination determined any material or processing faults. Experience has shown that torsion vibration fractures of this kind usually appear in comparatively short journal pins at high stresses. This crankshaft fracture was an example of the damage that is caused or promoted neither by material nor heat treatment mistakes nor by defects of design or machining, but solely by overstressing.

This case study involves two continuously cast steel crankshaft failures. Three parties performed their own failure analyses: (1) the engine manufacturer responsible for component design, specification, and application; (2) the steel supplier and forging supplier responsible for making the steel, forging the shape, and preliminary heat treatment; and (3) a supplier that provided induction hardening, finish machining, and inspection. An independent engineering firm was subsequently involved, but because each party had its own agenda, there was no agreement on the metallurgical source of the failure and thus no continued analysis to pin down and eliminate the root cause.

The 8620 steel latch tip, carburized and then induction hardened to a minimum surface hardness of 62 HRC, on the main-clutch stop arm on a business machine fractured during normal operation when the latch tip was subjected to intermittent impact loading. Fractographic examination 9x showed a brittle appearance at the fractures. Micrograph examination of an etched section disclosed several small cracks. Fracture of the parts may have occurred through similar cracks. Also observed was a burned layer approximately 0.075 mm (0.003 in.) deep on the latch surface, and hardness at a depth of 0.025 mm (0.001 in.) in this layer was 52 HRC (a minimum of 55 HRC was specified). Thus, the failure was caused by brittle fracture in the hardness-transition zone as the result of excessive impact loading. The burned layer indicated that the cracks had been caused by improper grinding after hardening. Redesign was recommended to include reinforcing the backing web of the tip, increasing the radius at the relief step to 1.5 x 0.5 mm (0.06 x 0.02 in.), the use of proper grinding techniques, and a requirement that the hardened zone extend a minimum of 1.5 mm (0.06 in.) beyond the step.

Pipes made of low-carbon Thomas steel had been welded longitudinally employing the carbon-arc process with bare electrode wire made for argon-shielded arc welding. Difficulties were encountered during the cutting of threads because of the presence of hard spots. Microstructural examination showed welding conditions were such that a carburizing atmosphere developed, which led to an increase in carbon content and hardening at certain locations such as terminal bells and lap joints. This explained the processing difficulties during the threading operation.

Operation handles produced from C45 steel showed many fine cracks at the flame hardened noses. The cracks ran from the corners of indentations caused by the tool during alignment. Metallographic investigation showed the nose was overheated during flame hardening. It was concluded that the numerous hardening cracks were caused by abrupt quenching from over-heating temperature and by local stress concentrations due to indentations of the tool caused during alignment.

A case-hardened sleeve made of C 15 (Material No. 1.0401) was flattened at two opposing sides and had cracked open at these places, the crack initiating at a face plane. The wall of the sleeve was 9 mm thick, but the flat ends were machined down to 5.5 mm from the outside. The customer had specified a 2 mm case depth and a hardness of at least HRC 55 at a depth of 1.5 mm. An etched cross section of the cracked end showed that the case layer had a depth of 2.3 mm, so that the sleeve was almost through-hardened at the flat ends. While the core material with the full wall thickness had the quench structure of low-carbon steel, the structure of the flattened area consisted of coarse acicular martensite with a small amount of pearlite (quench troostite) and ferrite. Therefore the sleeve was overheated and probably quenched directly from case. To prevent damage, it would have been necessary to have a lower case depth, carburize less deeply, and prevent overheating that causes brittleness and leads also to increased case depth, or else use a fine-grained steel of lower hardenability.