This article presents the mechanisms of polymer wear and quantifies wear in terms of wear rate (rate of removal of the material). Interfacial and bulk wear are discussed as well as a discussion on the wear study of "elastomers," "thermosets," "glassy thermoplastics," and "semicrystalline thermoplastics." The article also discusses the effects of environment and lubricant on the wear failures of polymers. It presents a case study on considering nylon as a tribological material and failure examples, explaining wear resistance of polyurethane elastomeric coatings and failure of an acetal gear wheel.

A CrN coated restrike punch was made of WR-95 (similar to H-11), which was fluidized bed nitrided. The coated punch was used on hot Inconel at about 1040 deg C (1900 deg F). However, a water-soluble graphite coolant was used to maintain the punch temperature at 230 deg C (450 deg F). Visual and binocular inspection at 64+ revealed presence of cracks and complete washout of coating in the working area of the failed punch. Comparison of metallographic cross sections of used and unused punches revealed a significant microstructural transformation in case of the used punch. Presence of a yellow porous layer was clearly evident between the nitrided layer and the coating, in case of the used punch. Cracks were observed to propagate from the outer surface into the bulk. Oxidation was evident along the cracks. The microstructural transformation observed in the case of the used punch was a clear indication of high temperature exposure (due to insufficient cooling) during application. The most probable cause of failure was thermal fatigue.

TiN coated back surgery wires were made of Ti-6Al-4V. The reported failure was the presence of pits located in the uncoated area of the wires. The uncoated area of the wire is where the wire is fixtured in the coating chamber during coating. Examination and analysis of the pits using SEM/EDX detection unit revealed significant peaks of B, O, Zr and Fe. Moreover, the shape of the pits was similar to an arc crater. The formation of pits in the wire was caused during coating due to microarcing. A contaminated fixture used during the coating most likely caused the microarcing.

A steel galvanizing vat measuring 3 x 1.2 x 1.2 m (10 x 4 x 4 ft) and made of 19 mm thick carbon steel plate (ASTM A285, grade B)) at a shipbuilding and ship-repair facility failed after only three months of service. To verify suspected failure cause, two T joints were made in 12.5 mm thick ASTM A285, grade B, steel plate. One joint was welded using the semiautomatic submerged arc process with one pass on each side. A second joint was welded manually by the shielded metal arc process using E6010 welding rod and four passes on each side. The silicon content of the shielded metal arc weld was 0.54%, whereas that of the submerged arc weld was 0.86%. After being weighed, the specimens were submerged in molten zinc for 850 h. Analysis (visual inspection, chemical analysis, 100x 2% nital-etched micrographs) supported the conclusions that the vat failed due to molten-zinc corrosion along elongated ferrite bands, possibly because silicon was dissolved in the ferrite and thus made it more susceptible to attack by the molten zinc. Recommendations included rewelding the vat using the manual shielded metal arc process with at least four passes on each side.

Socket head cap screws used in a naval application were failing in service due to delayed fracture. The standard ASTM A 574 screws were zinc plated and dichromate coated. Investigation (visual inspection, 1187 SEM images, chemical analysis, and tension testing) of both the failed screws and two unused, exemplar fasteners from the same lot supported the conclusion that the cap screws appear to have failed due to hydrogen embrittlement, as revealed by delayed cracking and intergranular fracture morphology. Static brittle overload fracture occurred due to the tension preload, and prior hydrogen charging that occurred during manufacturing. The probable source of charging was the electroplating, although postplating baking was reportedly performed as well. Recommendations included examining the manufacturing process in detail.

Aluminide-coated and uncoated IN-713 turbine blades were returned for evaluation after service in a marine environment because of severe corrosion. Based on service time, failure of these blades by corrosive deterioration was considered to be premature. Analysis (visual inspection, 2.7x micrographic examination on sections etched with ferric chloride and hydrochloric acid in methanol) supported the conclusions that the blades failed by hot-corrosion attack. Variation in rate of attack on coated blades was attributed to variation in integrity of the aluminide coating, which had been applied in 1966, when these coatings were relatively new. It is evident that maintaining the integrity of a protective coating could significantly increase the life of a nickel-base alloy blade operating in a hot and corrosive environment.

A failed H-11 tool steel pylon attachment stud was found during a routine walk-around inspection. The stud exhibited gross localized corrosion pitting at several different areas on its surface. Light general rust was also evident. Severe pitting occurred near the fracture location. The fracture face contained evidence of intergranular SCC as well as ductile dimples. The protective coating was found to be an inorganic water-base aluminide coating having a coating thickness of 7.5 to 13 micron (0.3 to 0.5 mil). The coating was of a nonuniform mottled nature. It was concluded that the failure of the pylon attachment stud was caused by general corrosion followed by SCC. The stud was not adequately protected against corrosion by the coating. It was recommended that the coating be applied to a thickness of 38 to 75 micron (1.5 to 3 mil) to provide long-time corrosion resistance. The coating must be either burnished or cured at 540 deg C (1000 deg F) to provide cathodic protection to the steel. Other coatings, such as cadmium or aluminum, were also recommended if a thinner coating is needed.

Helicopter rotor blade components that included the horizontal hinge pin, the associated nut, and the locking washer were examined. Visual examination of the submitted parts revealed that the hinge pin, fabricated from 4340 steel, was broken and that the fracture face showed a flat beach mark pattern indicative of a preexisting crack. The threaded area of the pin had an embedded thread that did not appear to come from the pin. A chemical analysis was conducted on the embedded thread and on an associated attachment to determine the origin of the thread. Analysis showed that the thread and nut were 4140 steel. Scanning electron fractographic examination of the fracture initiation site strongly suggested that the fracture progressed by fatigue. It was concluded that the failure of the horizontal hinge pin initiated at areas of localized corrosion pits. The pits in turn initiated fatigue cracks, resulting in a failure mode of corrosion fatigue. It was recommended that all of the horizontal hinge pins be inspected. Those pins determined to be satisfactory for further use should be stripped of cadmium, shot peened, and coated with cadmium to a minimum thickness of 0.0127 mm (0.0005 in.).

During a routine shear-pin check, the end lug on the barrel of the forward canopy actuator on a naval aircraft was found to have fractured. The lug was forged from aluminum alloy 2014-T6. Investigation (visual inspection, 2x views, and 140X micrographs etched with Keller's reagent) supported the conclusion that the cause of failure was SCC resulting from exposure to a marine environment. The fracture occurred in normal operation at a point where damage from pitting and intergranular corrosion acted as a stress raiser, not because of overload. The pitting and intergranular attack on the lug were evidence that the surface protection of the part had been inadequate as manufactured or had been damaged in service and not properly repaired in routine maintenance. Recommendations included anodizing the lug and barrel in sulfuric acid and giving them a dichromate sealing treatment, followed by application of a coat of paint primer. During routine maintenance checks, a careful examination was suggested to look for damage to the protective coating, and any necessary repairs should be made by cleaning, priming, and painting. Severely corroded parts should be removed from service.

Three wing flap hinge bearings were received by the laboratory for analysis. The bearings were fabricated from chromium-plated type 440C martensitic stainless steel. The intergranular fracture pattern seen in the electron fractographs, coupled with the corrosion pits observed on the inner diam of the bearings, strongly suggested that failure initiated by pitting and progressed by SCC or hydrogen embrittlement from the plating operation. It was recommended that the extent of the flap hinge bearing cracking problem be determined by using nondestructive inspection because it is possible to crack hardened type 440C during the chromium plating process. An inspection for pitting on the bearing inner diam was also recommended. It was suggested that electroless nickel be used as a coating for the entire bearing. A review of the chromium plating and baking sequence was recommended also to ensure that a source of hydrogen is not introduced during the plating operation.

Two clevis-head self-retaining bolts used in the throttle-control linkage of a naval aircraft failed on the aircraft assembly line. Specifications required the bolts to be heat treated to a hardness of 39 to 45 HRC, followed by cleaning, cadmium electroplating, and baking to minimize hydrogen embrittlement. The bolts broke at the junction of the head and shank. The nuts were, theoretically, installed fingertight. The failure was attributed to hydrogen embrittlement that had not been satisfactorily alleviated by subsequent baking. The presence of burrs on the threads prevented assembly to finger-tightness, and the consequent wrench torquing caused the actual fractures. The very small radius of the fillet between the bolt head and the shank undoubtedly accentuated the embrittling effect of the hydrogen. To prevent reoccurrence, the cleaning and cadmium-plating procedures were stipulated to be low-hydrogen in nature, and an adequate post plating baking treatment at 205 deg C (400 deg F), in conformity with ASTM B 242, was specified. A minimum radius for the head-to-shank fillet was specified at 0.25 mm (0.010 in.). All threads were required to be free of burrs. A 10-day sustained-load test was specified for a sample quantity of bolts from each lot.

Cartridge-pneumatic starter systems are used on military aircraft. In the cartridge mode used for alert starts, the starter turbine is driven by hot gases produced through the controlled burning of a solid propellant cartridge within a closed chamber (the breech chamber/cartridge chamber assembly). Premature failures of steel breech chambers have been prevalent enough to cause serious concern. The breech chamber is fabricated from a 4340 Ni-Cr-Mo steel forging heat treated to a hardness in the range HRC 40 to 45. The failures have taken several forms, including fracture and unzipping of the chamber dome, burn-through of the dome, and shearing of bayonet locking lugs. Factors identified as significant in the failures are the pressure developed in the chamber and internal corrosion of the chamber in an environment that can produce stress-corrosion cracking. The interior configuration of the chamber and the stress distribution also have a bearing upon the failure modes. Several failures are reviewed to illustrate the problems.

New aircraft wing panels extruded from 7075-T6 aluminum exhibited an unusual pattern of circular black interrupted lines, which could not be removed by scouring or light sanding. The panels, subsequent to profiling and machining, were required to be penetrated inspected, shot peened, H2SO4 anodized, and coated with MIL-C-27725 integral fuel tank coating on the rib side. Scanning electron microscopy and microprobe analysis (both conventional energy-dispersive and Auger analyzers) showed that the anodic coating was applied over an improperly cleaned and contaminated surface. The expanding corrosion product had cracked and, in some places, had flaked away the anodized coating. The corrodent had penetrated the base aluminum in the form of subsurface intergranular attack to a depth of 0.035 mm (0.0014 in.). It was recommended that a vapor degreaser be used during cleaning prior to anodizing. A hot inhibited alkaline cleaner was also recommended during cleaning prior to anodizing. The panels should be dichromate sealed after anodizing. The use of deionized water was also recommended during the dichromate sealing operation. In addition, the use of an epoxy primer prior to shipment of the panels was endorsed. Most importantly, surveillance of the anodizing process itself was emphasized.

A forged aluminum alloy 2014-T6 catapult-hook attachment fitting (anodized by the chromic acid process to protect it from corrosion) from a naval aircraft broke in service. Spectrographic analysis, visual examination, microscopic examination, and tensile analysis showed minute cracks on the inside surface of a bearing hole, and small areas of pitting corrosion were visible on the exterior surface of the fitting. The analysis also revealed a small number of rosettes, suggestive of eutectic melting, in an otherwise normal structure. These examinations and analyses support the conclusion that the presence of chromic acid stain on the fracture surface proved that the forging had cracked before anodizing. This suggest that the crack initiated during straightening, either after machining or after heat treatment. The structure and composition of the alloy appear to have been acceptable. Ductility was acceptable so rosettes found in the microstructure are believed to have been nondamaging. Had they contributed to the failure, the ductility would have been very low. The recommendations included inspection for cracks and revising the manufacturing process to include a fluorescent liquid-penetrant inspection before anodizing, because chromic acid destroys the penetrant. This inspection would reduce the possibility of cracked parts being used in service.

Fasteners, made in high-production progressive dies from 0.7 mm thick cold-rolled 1060 steel, were used to secure plastic fabric or webbing to the aluminum framework of outdoor furniture. It was found that approximately 30% of the fasteners cracked and fractured as they were compressed to clamp onto the framework prior to springback. The heat treatment cycle of the fasteners consisted of austenitizing, quenching, tempering to obtain a tempered martensite microstructure, acid cleaning, zinc electroplating, coating with a clear dichromate and thereafter baking to remove the nascent hydrogen. It was revealed that fasteners treated in this manner were brittle due to hydrogen embrittlement as the baking process was found to not be able to remove all the nascent hydrogen which had induced during acid cleaning and electroplating. The heat treatment cycle was modified to produce a bainitic structure and the method of plating the fastener with zinc was changed from electroplating to a mechanical deposition process to thus avoid hydrogen embrittlement.

An investigation of wear and failure of babbitt bushes was completed in this study. The results showed that wear at dry sliding of babbitt obtained by plasma spraying was less than that of babbitt in the as-cast state and after a deformation heat treatment. The failure of babbitt bushes was caused by a simultaneous and interrelated exhibition of fatigue and wear processes that depend considerably on cohesion strength between the bush and the bearing base and accumulation of defects on the contact surface between the bush and the shaft.

Electroless nickel plating separation from copper alloy CDA175 retaining clips used on printed circuit boards was caused by a copper oxide layer that reduced adhesion of the nickel plating on the clips. Stresses that developed during module insertion caused flaking to occur at the oxidized copper surface. Electroless nickel plating separation from OFHC copper leads was caused by improper handling rather than a plating anomaly per se. Tin plating separation from copper underplating on a hybrid package lid occurred because of a four-week delay between the copper plating and tin plating steps. It was recommended that tin plating should follow the copper underplating within 24 h and a cleaning step of bright dipping after copper plating be performed.

Near-surface porosity in zinc die castings that were subsequently plated with copper, nickel, and bright chromium was causing blemishes in the plating. Identifying die casting turbulence and hot spots were keys to process modifications that subsequently allowed porosity to be greatly minimized.

Large quantities of aluminum-clad spent nuclear materials have been in interim storage in the fuel storage basins at The Savannah River Site while awaiting processing since 1989. This extended storage as a result of a moratorium on processing resulted in corrosion of the aluminum clad. Examinations of this fuel and other data from a corrosion surveillance program in the water basins have provided basic insight into the corrosion process and have resulted in improvements in the storage facilities and basin operations. Since these improvements were implemented, there has been no new initiation of pitting observed since 1993. This paper describes the corrosion of spent fuel and the metallographic examination of Mark 31A target slugs removed from the K-basin storage pool after 5 years of storage. It discusses the SRS Corrosion Surveillance Program and the improvements made to the storage facilities which have mitigated new corrosion in the basins.

The accident at Three Mile Island Unit No. 2 on 28 March 1979 was the worst nuclear accident in US history. By Jan 1990, it was possible to electrochemically machine coupons from the lower head using a specially designed tool. The specimens contained the ER308L stainless steel cladding and the A533 Grade B plate material to a depth of about mid-wall. The microstructures of these specimens were compared to that of specimens cut from the Midland, Michigan reactor vessel, made from the same grade and thickness but never placed in service. These specimens were subjected to known thermal treatments between 800 and 1100 deg C for periods of 1 to 100 min. Microstructural parameters in the control specimens and in those from TMI-2 were quantified. Selective etchants were used to better discriminate desired microstructural features, particularly in the cladding. This report is a progress report on the quantification of changes in both the degree of carbide precipitation and delta ferrite content and shape in the cladding as a function of temperature and time to refine the estimates of the maximum temperatures experienced.