The failure of HP turbine blades in a low bypass turbofan engine was analyzed to determine the root cause. Forensic and metallurgical investigations were conducted on all failed blades as well as failed downstream components. It was found that one of the blades fractured in the dovetail region, causing extensive damage throughout the turbine. Remedial measures were suggested to prevent such failures in the future.

A bent Ni-Cu Monel 400 alloy tube, which operated as part of a pipeline in a petrochemical distillery, failed by through-thickness cracking. The pipeline was used to carry a stream of gaseous hydrocarbons containing hydrochloric acid (HCl) into a reaction tower. The tower provided a caustic solution (NaOH) to remove HCl from the stream, before the latter was directed to a burner. Metallographic examination showed that the cracks were intergranular and were frequently branched. Although nominal chemical composition of the component was found within the specified range, energy dispersive x-ray analysis (EDXA) indicated significant segregation of sulfur and chlorine along the grain boundaries. Failure was attributed to hypochlorous-acid (HClO)-induced stress-corrosion cracking (SCC). The HClO was formed by the reaction of HCl with atmospheric O 2 that entered the tube during shutdowns and startups. Residual stresses, originating from in situ bend forming of the tube during assembly of the line, provided a driving force for crack growth, and the segregation of sulfur on grain boundaries made the material more susceptible to cracking.

A 2–3 mm thick electroformed nickel mold showed early cracking under thermal load cycles. To determine the root cause, investigators obtained monotonic and cyclic properties of electroformed nickel at various temperatures and identified possible fatigue mechanisms. With the help of finite element modeling, they analyzed the material as well as the design and in-service application of the mold. They discovered that overconstraining the mold, while it was in service, caused excessive thermal stresses which accelerated crack initiation and propagation. Investigators also proposed remedies to prevent additional failures.

A sleeve-shaped fire shield that operates inside one of two burner trains in an oil and gas processing unit ruptured after 15 y of service. A detailed analysis was conducted to determine how and why the sleeve failed. The investigation included visual inspection, chemical and gas analysis, mechanical property testing, stereomicroscopy, and metallographic examination. The fire sleeves are fabricated from 3-mm thick plate made of Incoloy 800 rolled into 540-mm diam sections welded along the seam. Three such sections are joined together by circumferential welds to form a single 2.8 m sleeve. The findings from the investigation indicated that internal oxidation corrosion, driven by high temperatures, was the primary cause of failure. Prolonged exposure to temperatures up to 760 °C resulted in sensitization of the material, making it vulnerable to grain boundary attack. This led to significant deterioration of the grain boundaries, causing extensive grain loss (grain dropping) and the subsequent thinning of sleeve walls. Prior to failure, some portions of the sleeve were only 1.6 mm thick, nearly half their original thickness.

An investigation was conducted to better understand the time-dependent degradation of thermal barrier coated superalloy components in gas turbines. First-stage vanes are normally subjected to the highest gas velocities and temperatures during operation, and were thus the focus of the study. The samples that were analyzed had been operating at 1350 °C in a gas turbine at a combined-cycle generating plant. They were regenerated once, then used for different lengths of time. The investigation included chemical analysis, scanning electron microscopy, SEM/energy dispersive spectroscopy, and x-ray diffraction. It was shown that degradation is driven by chemical and mechanical differences, oxide growth, depletion, and recrystallization, the combined effect of which results in exfoliation, spallation, and mechanical thinning.

A portion of the wall of a reactor vessel used in burning impurities from carbon particles failed by localized melting. The vessel was made of Hastelloy X (Ni-22Cr-9Mo-18Fe). Considering the service environment, melting could have been caused either by excessive carburization (which would have lowered the melting point of the alloy markedly) or by overheating. A small specimen containing melted and unmelted metal was removed from the vessel wall and examined metallographically. It was observed that the interface between the melted zone and the unaffected base metal was composed of large grains and enlarged grain boundaries. An area a short distance away from the melted zone was fine grained and relatively free of massive carbides. This evidence supported the conclusion that the vessel failed by melting that resulted from heating to about 1230 to 1260 deg C (2250 to 2300 deg F), which exceeded normal operating temperatures, and carburization was not the principal cause of failure. No recommendations were made.

Ball joints made from carburized En 353 (BS970:815A16) steel failed after several hours of being fitted into vehicles. The parts were forged, machined, and thread rolled. The threads were copper plated to prevent carburization. The heat treatment consisted of carburizing in a cyanide bath for 12 hours at 930 deg C. After tempering for 2 h at 170 to 175 deg C, the copper plate was removed by immersing in an acid bath for 45 min. The investigations found the microstructure, hardness, and chemistry all met the specification. The case depth was approximately 0.75 mm to 1.0 mm. The SEM studies showed that it was a brittle fracture and completely intergranular to a depth of about 2.5 mm. It was concluded that the failure was due to hydrogen embrittlement for the following reasons: (i) failure did not occur immediately after loading, (ii) the fracture was intergranular to a depth of two to three times the case depth, (iii) secondary cracks were observed at the surface. The hydrogen was introduced during copper plate removal by acid dipping. If the tempering operation was performed after the acid dip operation, the hydrogen would have been driven out.

Within the first few months of operation of an 8 km (5 mile) long 455 mm (18 in.) diam high-pressure steam line between a coal-fired electricity-generating plant and a paper mill, several of the Inconel 600 bellows failed. The steam line operated at 6030 kPa (875 psi) and 420 deg C (790 deg F). Metallographic sections, energy-dispersive x-ray spectra, chemical analyses, tensile tests, and Auger microscope analyses showed the failed bellows met the specifications for the material. However, investigation also showed entire oxide thickness was contaminated with relatively large amounts of sodium, calcium, potassium, aluminum, and sulfur, alkali, alkali earth, and other contaminants that completely permeated even the thin oxides on the fracture surfaces. Additional investigation of the purity of the steam itself as reported by the power plant showed that corrosion and cracks were ultimately caused by the steam. While under normal operation, the steam's purity posed no problem to the material, during boiler cleaning operations, the generating plant had allowed contamination to get into the steam line.

An Inconel-clad SA-212 Grade B carbon steel inlet cone with an anticipated 25-year service life failed in a localized area after only seven years of service. The failure was caused by an erosion/corrosion leak at the midsection. Erosion/corrosion was confined to a localized area directly facing the steam inlet nozzle. The Inconel cladding was intact elsewhere in the inlet cone with insignificant corrosion-related degradation. In the absence of the conditions that led to erosion/corrosion, the Inconel clad carbon steel was considered adequate for the intended service. As a corrective measure, a solid Inconel liner was recommended in the areas of direct steam impingement.

Several large chromium-plated 4340 steel cylinders were removed from service because of deep longitudinal score marks in the plating. One of the damaged cylinders and a mating cast aluminum alloy B850-T5 bearing adapter that also exhibited deep longitudinal score marks were submitted for examination. Analysis (visual inspection, manual testing of the hardness and adherence of the chromium plating, 100x microscopic examination, and hardness testing) supported the conclusions that high localized loads on the cylinder had resulted in chipping of the chromium plating, particles of which became embedded in the aluminum alloy adapter. The sliding action of the adapter with embedded hard particles resulted in scoring of both the cylinder and the adapter. If the cylinder alone had been available for examination, it might have been concluded that the scoring had been caused by entrapped sand or debris from an external source. No recommendations were made.

An alloy IN-690 (N06690) incinerator liner approximately 0.8 mm (0.031 in.) thick failed after only 250 h of service burning solid waste. Investigation supported the conclusion that the root cause of the failure was overfiring during startup and sulfidation of the nickel-base alloy. No recommendations were made.

Failure of a pilot scale test melter resulted from severe overheating of an Inconel 690 (690) jacketed molybdenum electrode. Extreme temperatures were required to melt the glass during this campaign because the feed material contained a very high waste loading. Metallurgical evaluation revealed the presence of an alloy containing nickel and molybdenum in several ingots found on the bottom of the melter and on a drip which had solidified on the electrode sheath. This indicates that a major portion of the electrode assembly was exposed to a temperature of at least 1317 deg C, the nickel/molybdenum eutectic temperature. Small regions on the end of the 690 sheath showed evidence of melting, indicating that this localized region exceeded 1345 deg C, the melting point of 690. In addition to nickel, antimony was found on the grain boundaries of the molybdenum electrode. This also contributed to the failure of the electrode. The source of the antimony was not identified but is believed to have originated from the feed material. Metallurgical evaluation also revealed that nickel had attacked the grain boundaries of the molybdenum/tungsten drain valve. This component did not fail in service; however, intergranular attack led to degradation of the mechanical properties, resulting in the fracture of the drain valve tip during disassembly. Antimony was not observed on this component.

Problems with materials compatibility were encountered in pyrotechnically driven devices used in a number of ordnance applications requiring rapid mechanical actuation. A fine bridgewire is located in contact with the chemical pyrotechnic, and the charge is ignited by electrical heating of the bridgewire. Evidence of severe corrosion was revealed on examination of the nickel-chromium-iron alloy bridgewire and the nickel-iron alloy pins. Metallic elements in the pin or bridgewire and substantial amounts of chlorine were detected from the x-ray spectra. Morphological changes indicative of decomposition and dissolution were revealed to have occurred in regions of the pyrotechnic that had been in contact with the bridgewire and pin surfaces by examination of the titanium-potassium perchlorate (Ti-K-Cl-O4) pyrotechnic. Substantial amounts of water were revealed to be associated with the surfaces of the titanium particles in the pyrotechnic by nuclear magnetic resonance. It was proposed that the chlorine-containing residue combined with the water from the pyrotechnic to form a thin aqueous film corroding the bridgewire and pins. A new cleaning procedure was implemented for the glass headers to eliminate the chloride contamination and a vacuum drying procedure was instituted for the pyrotechnic.

This case study demonstrates that Alloy 601 (UNS N06601) is susceptible to strain-age cracking. The observation illustrates the potential importance of post weld heat treatment to the successful utilization of this alloy in certain applications.

An Incoloy 800H (UNS N08810) transfer line on the outlet of an ethane-cracking furnace failed during decoking of the furnace tubes after nine years in service. A metallographic examination using optical and scanning electron microscopy as well as energy-dispersive x-ray spectroscopy revealed that the failure was due to sulfidation. The source of the sulfur in the furnace effluent was either dimethyl disulfide, injected into the furnace feed to prevent coke formation and carburization of the furnace tubes, or contamination of the feed with sulfur bearing oil.

Plate perforation occurred in the cylindrical section and walls of the inlet foot (2.38 mm thick Incoloy 825 plate welded using INCO welding rod 135) of an inert gas fire prevention system in an oil tanker. Cross-sectional microprobe analysis showed the corrosion product to contain sulfur, mainly from the flue gas, and calcium and chlorine, mainly from the sea water. The gray corrosion product was interspersed with rust and a black carbonaceous deposit. Corrosion pitting and poor weld penetration, with carbide precipitation and heavy etching at grain boundaries, indicated sensitization and susceptibility to aqueous intergranular corrosion. Chemical analysis showed the predominant acid radical to be sulfate (6.20% in the carbonaceous deposit and 0.60% in the corrosion product), suggesting that oxidation of SO2 in the flue gas caused the corrosion. Moisture condensation, the carbon acting as a cathode, and alloy susceptibility to intergranular corrosion contributed to the corrosion.

The circumstances surrounding the in-service failure of a cast Ni-base superalloy (Alloy 713LC) second stage turbine blade and a cast and coated Co-base superalloy (MAR-M302) first stage air-cooled vane in two turbine engines used for marine application are described. An overview of a systematic approach, analyzing the nature of degeneration and failure of the failed components, utilizing conventional metallurgical techniques, is presented. The topographical features of the turbine blade fracture surface revealed a fatigue-induced crack growth pattern, where crack initiation had taken place in the blade trailing edge. An estimate of the crack-growth rate for the stage II fatigue fracture region coupled with the metallographic results helped to identify the final mode of the turbine blade failure. A detailed metallographic and fractographic examination of the air-cooled vane revealed that coating erosion in conjunction with severe hot-corrosion was responsible for crack initiation in the leading edge area.

A brazing-furnace muffle 34 cm (13 in.) wide, 26 cm (10 in.) high, and 198 cm (78 in.) long, was fabricated from nickel-base high-temperature alloy sheet and installed in a gas-fired furnace used for copper brazing of various assemblies. The operating temperature of the muffle was reported to have been closely controlled at the normal temperature of 1175 deg C (2150 deg F); a hydrogen atmosphere was used during brazing. After about five months of continuous operation, four or five holes developed on the floor of the muffle, and the muffle was removed from service. Analysis (visual inspection, x-ray spectrometry, and metallographic examination) supported the conclusion that the muffle failed by localized overheating in some areas to temperatures exceeding 1260 deg C (2300 deg F). The copper found near the holes had dripped to the floor from assemblies during brazing. The copper diffused into the nickel-base alloy and formed a grain-boundary phase that was molten at the operating temperature. The presence of this phase caused localized liquefaction and weakened the alloy sufficiently to allow formation of the holes. No recommendations were made.

A coil made of a nickel-chromium alloy (Material No. 2.4869) with approx. 80Ni and 20Cr had burned through after a brief period of operation as a heating element in a brazing furnace. The protective atmosphere consisted of an incompletely combusted coal gas. Furnace temperature reached 1150 deg C. This type of selective oxidation at which the easily oxidized chromium burns, while the nickel is not attacked, is caused by mildly oxidizing gases and is sometimes designated as green rot. Under these conditions, chromium-containing steels and alloys whose oxidation resistance is based upon formation of tight oxide layers are not stable.

Three radiant tubes, made of three different high-temperature alloys, were removed from a carburizing furnace after approximately eight months of service when they showed evidence of failure by collapsing (telescoping) in a region 30 cm (12 in.) from the tube bottoms in the vicinity of the burners. The tubes had an original wall thickness of 3.0 mm (0.120 in.) and were made of three different alloys: the first was Hastelloy X; the second alloy was RA 333, a wrought nickel-base heat-resistant alloy; and the third was experimental alloy 634, which contained 72% Ni, 4% Cr, and 3.5% Si. The three radiant tubes had been operated at a temperature of about 1040 deg C (1900 deg F) to maintain furnace temperatures of 900 to 925 deg C (1650 to 1700 deg F). Analysis (visual inspection and micrographic examination) supported the conclusion that all three tubes failed by corrosion. Recommendations included replacing the material with an alloy, such as RA 333, with a higher chromium content and with an additional element, like silicon, resistant to carburization-oxidation.