During the inspection of a boiler containing cracks at the superheater header connection, cracking also was detected within the main steam drum. This was fabricated from a Mn-Mo-V low-alloy steel. It operated with water and saturated steam at approximately 335 deg C. Cracking was detected at the nozzles connecting the tubes for the entry of steam and hot water to the drum, at the downcomers, and at the connection to the safety valve. All cracks had a similar morphology, running in a longitudinal direction along the drum from the cutouts in the shell. All the cracks had developed under the influence of the hoop stress and were associated with the locally increased stress levels relating to the cutouts at nozzle and pipe connections. At their ends the cracks were filled with corrosion products, and their surfaces were seen to be very irregular. The process of crack growth was not due to fatigue only but can most probably be attributed to corrosion fatigue. The boiler steam drum design should be reviewed to reduce the local level of stress at the shell-nozzle connections.

The maximum life of base-loaded headers and piping is not possible to be predicted until they develop microcracking. The typical elements of a periodic inspection program after the occurrence of the crack was described extensively. Cracks caused by creep swelling in the stub-to-header welds in the secondary superheater outlet headers (constructed of SA335-P11 material) of a major boiler were described as an example. The OD of the header was measured to detect the amount of swelling and found to have increased 1.6% since its installation. Ligament cracks extending from tube seat to tube seat were revealed by surface inspection. Cracks were found to originate from inside the header, extend axially in the tube penetrations and radially from those holes into the ligaments. Cracks in 94 locations, ranging from small radial cracks to full 360Ý cracks were revealed by dye-penetrant inspection. The unit was operated under reduced-temperature conditions and with less load cycling than previously until a redesigned SA335-P22 header was installed.

The top tube of a horizontal superheater bank in the reheat furnace of a steam generator ruptured after seven years in service. The rupture was found to have occurred in the ferritic steel tubing (2.25Cr-1Mo steel (ASME SA-213, grade T-22)) near the joint where it was welded to austenitic stainless steel tubing (type 321 stainless steel (ASME SA-213, grade TP321H)). The surface temperature of the tube was found to be higher than operating temperature in use earlier. The ferritic steel portion of the tube was found to be longitudinally split and heavily corroded in the region of the rupture. A red and white deposit was found on the sides and bottom of the tube in the rupture area. The deposit was produced by attack of the steel by the alkali acid sulfate and had thinned the tube wall. It was concluded that rupture of the tube had occurred due to thinning of the wall by coal-ash corrosion. The thinned tubes were reinforced by pad welding. Type 304 stainless steel shields were welded to the stainless steel portions of the top reheater tubes and were held in place about the chromium-molybdenum steel portions of the tubes by steel bands.

A superheater in a generator produced 80 t/h of steam at 400 deg C and 41 kPa. Failure took place at the connection from the collector to the vent line used during start up. The material of construction was carbon steel, and the unit had 240,000 h of operation at the time of failure, with 99 shutdowns. Widespread cracking on the inside was apparent, the most severe cracking being some distance from the nozzle connection in a downstream direction. Widespread cracking and pitting were observed also at the connections to the safety valve and soot blower. Pitting was most apparent on the downstream sides of the openings in the shell. In all the damaged areas the mechanism of failure involved surface pitting and subsequent SCC. This failure showed the problems that can develop where there are long lines in which condensation may occur and return periodically to a superheater or other hot component. In this particular case, control of dissolved solids in the boiler feedwater may have been inadequate.

After some 87,000 h of operation, failure took place in the bend of a steam pipe connecting a coil of the third superheater of a steam generator to the outlet steam collector. The unit operated at 538 deg C and 135 kPa, producing 400 t/h of steam. The 2.25Cr-1Mo steel pipe in which failure took place was 50.8 mm in diam with a nominal wall thickness of 8 mm. It connected to the AISI 321 superheater tube by means of a butt weld and was one of 46 such parallel connecting tubes. The Cr-Mo tubing was situated outside the heat transfer zone of the superheater. The overall sequence of failure involved overheating of the Cr-Mo outlet tubes, heavy oxidation, oxide cracking on thermal cycling, thermal fatigue cracking plus oxidation, creep-controlled crack growth, and rapid plastic deformation and rupture. This failure was indicative of excess temperature of the steam coming from the heat transfer zone of the coil. It showed that many damage mechanisms may combine in the transition from fracture initiation to final failure. The presence of grain boundary sliding as an indication of creep damage was useful in the characterization of the stress level as high and showed that the process of creep was not operative throughout the life of the equipment.

Rupture occurred at a bend in a superheated steam transfer line between a header and a desuperheater of a boiler producing 230 t/h of steam at 540 deg C and 118 kPa. The boiler had operated for 77,000 h. Rupture occurred along the outer bend radius of the 168 mm diam tube, this being of 1 Cr, 0.5 Mo steel with a wall thickness of 14 mm. The design temperature of this tube was 490 deg C, but there is evidence that it was operating at a temperature much above 500 deg C. Metallographic analysis disclosed an advanced stage of creep damage accumulation in the form of local cracks, microcracks, and aligned damage centers which showed up as voids upon repeated polish-etch cycles. Because of the local nature of creep damage that can occur, any inspection that involves in situ metallography must be conducted at exactly the right or critical position or the presence of damage may not be detected.

Examination of the header of the third superheater of a boiler producing 150 t/h of steam at 525 deg C and 118 kPa, disclosed extensive internal cracking at the connection to the tube joining this to a safety valve. Cracking was observed within the tube and in the thickness of the shell wall itself. The boiler had been in operation for approximately 160,000 h and was shut down for inspection when the cracking was detected. The material involved was 2.25 Cr, 1 Mo steel, and the unit had been subjected to 115 shutdowns. Initiation of the cracks was attributed to thermal shock, caused by the periodic return of condensate along the long connecting line (some 9 m long). Propagation of the cracks was due to thermal cycling, together with periodic pressure cycles, producing growth by low cycle fatigue. This was aided by corrosion within the cracks and by the wedging action caused by corrosion deposits at their tips. The failure suggests control of dissolved solids in the boiler feedwater may have been inadequate.

Failure occurred in a steel superheater tube in a power plant. The tube was specified as ASTM A 213 grade T 22, and the reported operating conditions were 13 MPa (1900 psi) at 482 deg C (900 deg F). The tube carried superheated steam and was coal fired. Investigation (visual inspection, 2% nital etched 297x images, chemical analysis, and SEM fractographs) supported the conclusion that the superheater tube failed as a result of long-term overheating. Substantial creep damage reduced the strength of the tube to the point that overload failure occurred. No recommendations were made.

This paper reviews several fatigue failures from the waterwall, superheater, and economizer portions of the boiler, their causes and how they were mitigated and monitored. Some cases required simple field modifications by cutting or welding, repair of existing controls, and/or changes in maintenance. Nondestructive inspections by visual, magnetic particle, ultrasonic, and radiographic methods for detecting and monitoring damage are discussed. These failures are presented to provide hindsight that will help others in increasing the success rate for anticipating and analyzing the remaining life of other units.

An unusual type of defect was discovered during hydraulic testing of a water-tube boiler after repairs to the superheater tubes following erosion from soot-blowers. When the pressure reached 700 psi, slight leakage was found to be taking place from one of the superheater tubes in a region where there appeared to be a split, approximately 8 in. long. What was thought to be a split was actually a pronounced fold. Microscopic examination showed that a corrosion-fatigue fissure had developed from one of the inside corners of the fold, presumably as a result of the fluctuating bending stresses to which this portion of the tube would be subjected because of the discontinuity in the tube wall. It was from this fissure that the leakage occurred. It was evident that the defect developed during the manufacture of the tube, probably in the course of a drawing or rolling operation without an internal plug. The diam of this portion of the tube was reduced by local collapse and folding of the section rather than by longitudinal extension of the tube itself.

As the result of a leak detected in a plate-formed header at PENELEC'S Shawville Unit No. 3, an extensive failure investigation was initiated to determine the origin of cracking visible along the longitudinal weld seam. Fabricated from SA387-D material and designed for a superheater outlet temperature of 566 deg C, the 11.4 cm thick header had operated for approximately 187,000 h at the time of the failure. Discussion focuses on the results of a metallographic examination of boat samples removed from the longitudinal seam weldment in the vicinity of the failure and at other areas of the header where peak temperatures were believed to have been reached. The long-term mechanical properties of the service-exposed base metal and creep-damaged weld metal were determined by creep testing. Based on the utility's decision to replace the header within one to three years, an isostress overtemperature lead specimen approach was taken, whereby failure of a test specimen in the laboratory would precede failures in the plant. These tests revealed approximately a 2:1 difference in life for the base metal as compared to weld metal.

A spindle made of hardenable 13% chromium steel X40 Cr13 (Material No. 1.4034) that was fastened to a superheated steam push rod made of high temperature structural steel 13Cr-Mo44 (Material No. 1.7335) by means of a convex fillet weld, fractured at the first operation of the rod directly next to the weld bead. Investigation showed that the fracture of the superheated steam push rod spindle was caused by hardening and hardening crack formation in the weld seams and adjoining areas. It would have been preferable to avoid welding near the cross sectional transitions altogether in consideration of the crack sensitivity of high hardenability steels. If for some reason this was not possible, then all precautions should have been taken that are applicable to the particular steel, such as preheating, slow cooling and stress relief tempering after welding. The selection of an austenitic additive material should have been considered because it could have equalized stresses due to its high elongation. Most probably, however, a material of lower hardenability should have been selected for the spindle if high operating properties were of paramount importance.

Failures of 10Cr-Mo9-10 and X 20Cr-Mo-V12-1 superheated pipes during service in steam power generation plants are described. Through micrographic and fractographic analysis, creep and overheating were identified as the cause of failure. The Larson-Miller parameter is computed, as a function of oxidation thickness, temperature and time, confirming the creep failure diagnostic.

In Nov. 1998, the west superheater outlet header at an electricity generating plant began to leak steam. Subsequent investigation revealed the presence of a crack that extended for 360 deg around the full circumference of the header and through the full cross-sectional thickness. The subsequent inspection of this header and the east superheater header revealed the presence of extremely severe ligament cracking. They operated at 2400 psi (16.5 MPa) and a temperature of 540deg C (1005 deg F). Both were fabricated from seamless pipe produced in accordance with ASME Specification SA-335, and the steel was Grade P22, a 2.25Cr-1Mo alloy steel. Visual and metallurgical evaluations showed the cracking in the west superheater outlet header was caused by thermal fatigue. Tube holes had served as a preferential site for thermal fatigue cracking.

Some examples of equipment failures involving high temperature operation are presented. They include some steam generator superheater components and a pump shaft that should not have been at high temperature. Metallographic analysis is used to determine the causes of failure in each case.

The tubes of a stationary industrial boiler, 64 mm in diam and made of 1.25Cr-0.5Mo steel (ASME SA-213, grade T-11) failed by two different types of rupture. Noticeable swelling of the tubes in the area of rupture was revealed by visual examination. The tubes with slight longitudinal splits were interpreted to have failed by stress rupture resulting from prolonged overheating at 540 to 650 deg C as the microstructure exhibited extensive spheroidization and coalescence of carbides. The larger ruptures were tensile failures that resulted from rapid overheating to 815 to 870 deg C as a completely martensitic structure was revealed at the edges of the ruptures in these tubes because of rapid quenching by escaping fluid. The prolonged-overheating failures were concluded to have been the primary ruptures and that local loss of circulation had caused rapid overheating in adjacent tubes. Poor boiler circulation and high furnace temperatures were believed to have caused the prolonged overheating.

A resistance-welded carbon steel superheater tube made to ASME SA-276 specifications failed by pitting corrosion and subsequent perforation, which caused the tube to leak. The perforation was found to have occurred at a low point in a bend near the superheater outlet header. It was found that the low points of the superheater tubes could not be completely drained during idle periods. Water-level marks were noticed on the inside surface above the area of pitting. It was revealed by microscopic examination that localized pitting had resulted from oxidation. It was concluded that water contained in the tube during shutdowns had accumulated and cumulative damage due to oxygen pitting resulted in perforation of one of the tubes. Filling the system with condensate or with treated boiler water was suggested as a corrective action. Alkalinity was suggested to be maintained at a pH of 9.0 and 200 ppm of sodium sulfite should be added to the water.

An aircraft engine in which an in-flight fire had occurred was dismantled and examined. A bracket assembly fabricated from 2024 aluminum, one of several failed components, was of prime interest because of apparent heat damage. Scanning electron microscopy was used to compare laboratory-induced fractures made at room and elevated temperatures with the bracket failure. The service failure exhibited grain separation and loss of delineation of the grain boundaries due to melting. SEM revealed deep voids between grains and tendrils that connected grains, which resulted from surface tension during melting. Microscopic examination of polished, etched section through the fractured surface verified intergranular separation and breakdown of grain facets. The absence of any reduction of thickness on the bracket assembly at the point of fracture, along with evidence of intense heat at this point, indicated that little stress had been applied to the part. Comparisons of the service failure and laboratory-induced failures in conjunction with macroscopic and metallographic observations showed that the bracket assembly failed because an intense, localized flame had melted the material.

A system of carbon steel headers, handling superheated water of 188 deg C (370 deg F) at 2 MPa (300 psi) for automobile-tire curing presses, developed a number of leaks within about four months after two to three years of leak-free service. All the leaks were in shielded metal arc butt welds joining 200 mm (8 in.) diam 90 deg elbows and pipe to 200 mm (8 in.) diam welding-neck flanges. A flange-elbow-flange assembly and a flange-pipe assembly that had leaked were removed for examination. Investigation (visual inspection, hardness testing, chemical analysis, magnetic-particle testing, radiographic inspection, and 2% nital etched 1.7x views) showed varying IDs on the assemblies and supported the conclusions that the failures of the butt welds were the result of fatigue cracks caused by cyclic thermal stresses that initiated at stress-concentrating notches at the toes of the interior fillet welds on the surfaces of the flanges. Recommendations included using ultrasonic testing to identify the appropriate joints and then replacing them. Special attention to accuracy of fit-up in the replacement joints was also recommended to achieve smooth, notch-free contours on the interior surfaces.

A tube in a radiant superheater, the boiler of which is coal fired, failed by creep after 17 years of service. The failed tube was specified to be made of ASME SA-213, grade T-22. Measurable swelling of the tube diameter by about 2.4 mm and tube wastage caused by corrosion or erosion were observed. Log stress versus Larson-Miller Parameter (LMP) plots were produced to assess the remaining life of the superheater. It was revealed that the estimated operating temperature of 1060 deg F was higher than the estimated design temperature of 1000 deg F and that the tube wastage had increased the actual operating stress. Tube wastage and high operating temperatures hastened the failure. A better understanding of the material condition of this superheater was recommended to verify all the suspect hot tubes.